',/■■  ■:■'-:■  ■/,  ■'.■'•'■''■'■''  :     :  : 


THE 

GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

VOLUME  I 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK   •    BOSTON   •    CHICAGO 
SAN    FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


THE 


GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


BY 

A.   LAWRENCE   LOWELL 

PRESIDENT    OK    HARVARD    UNIVERSITY 


VOLUME   I 

NEW    EDITION,    WITH    ADDITIONAL    CHAPTER 


Nrtrj  gotk 

THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

1912 

All  righti  reserved 


Copyright,  1908,  1912, 
By  A.   LAWRENCE  LOWELL. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.  Published  May,  1908.  Reprinted 
June,  1908.  Revised  and  reprinted  Nove..)ber,  1908;  February, 
1909;  January,  August,  1910;  January,  1912. 

New  Edition,  with  additional  chapter,  published  September, 
December,  1912 


Nortooot)  $rtBB 

J.  8.  Cushlng  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Muss.,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

Measured  by  the  standards  of  duration,  absence  of  vio- 
lent commotions,  maintenance  of  law  and  order,  general 
prosperity  and  contentment  of  the  people,  and  by  the  extent 
of  its  influence  on  the  institutions  and  political  thought  of 
other  lands,  the  English  government  has  been  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  the  world  has  ever  known.  An  attempt, 
therefore,  to  study  it  at  any  salient  epoch  cannot  be  value- 
less;  and  the  present  is  a  salient  epoch,  for  the  nation  has 
now  enjoyed  something  very  near  to  manhood  suffrage  in 
the  boroughs  for  forty  years,  and  throughout  the  country 
more  than  twenty  years,  a  period  long  enough  for  democ- 
racy to  produce  its  primary  if  not  its  ultimate  effects. 
Moreover,  England  has  one  of  the  most  interesting  of 
popular  governments,  because  it  has  had  a  free  develop- 
ment, little  hampered  by  rigid  constitutional  devices.  It 
is  an  organism  constantly  adapting  itself  to  its  environ- 
ment, and  hence  in  full  harmony  with  national  conditions. 
An  endeavour  has  been  made  in  these  volumes  to  portray 
the  present  form  of  that  organism  and  the  forces  which 
maintain   its  equilibrium. 

In  preparing  a  study  of  this  kind  one  feels  the  need  of 
limiting  its  scope,  by  reducing  the  denominator  as  Arthur 
Helps  remarked.  Hence  the  work  covers  only  the  English 
government  as  it  stands  to-day;  and  further,  only  those 
institutions,  national  and  local,  that  have  a  general  bear- 
ing. The  British  Constitution  is  full  of  exceptions,  of 
local  customs  and  special  acts  with  which  town  clerks 
must,  be  familiar.  They  fill  the  path  of  these  men  with 
pitfalls,  but  they  do  not  affect  seriously  the  general  princi- 
ples of  the  government,  and  no  attempt  is  made  to  describe 
them  here.      Even  the  institutions  of  Scotland  and  Ireland, 


vi  PREFACE 

interesting  as  they  are  in  themselves,  have  been  referred 
to  only  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  national  government  or 
throw  light  upon  its  working. 

Even  so  limited,  the  subject  is  not  without  difficulties. 
The  forces  to  be  studied  do  not  lie  upon  the  surface,  and 
some  of  them  are  not  described  in  any  document  or  found 
in  any  treatise.  They  can  be  learned  only  from  men  con- 
nected with  the  machinery  of  public  life.  A  student  must, 
therefore,  rely  largely  upon  conversations  which  he  can 
use  but  cannot  cite  as  authorities,  and  the  soundness  of 
his  conclusions  must  be  measured  less  by  his  references  in 
footnotes  than  by  the  judgment  of  the  small  portion  of  the 
public  that  knows  at  first-hand  the  things  whereof  he 
speaks.  The  precise  effect  of  the  various  forces  at  work 
must  be  a  matter  of  opinion  on  which  well-informed  people 
may  differ,  and  the  writer  has  drawn  the  picture  as  it 
appeared  to  him. 

To  undertake  a  study  of  this  kind  would  be  impossible 
without  manifold  assistance  from  others ;  and  the  writer 
is  glad  of  this  chance  to  express  his  sense  of  obligation  to 
the  many  persons  who  have  given  him  help  and  informa- 
tion, men  in  public  life  belonging  to  different  parties, 
permanent  officials,  national  and  local,  officers  of  political 
associations,  jurists,  publicists  and  many  oth'  rs.  It  is 
pleasant  for  him  to  recall  the  constant  courtesy  with 
which  he  was  treated,  not  infrequently,  in  the  case  of 
local  officers,  without  any  introduction  or  claim  of  any 
kind.  Among  many  men  to  whom  he  owes  much  he  de- 
sires to  acknowledge  his  debt  to  Rt.  Hon.  Joseph  Chamber- 
lain, Lord  Fitzmaurice,  Rt.  Hon.  John  Morley,  the  late  Sir 
William  Harcourt,  Lord  Reay,  Mr.  Frederic  Harrison,  Sir 
William  James  Farrer,  Sir  Alexander  Hargreaves  Brown, 
Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  Sir  C.  P.  Lucas,  Sir  Horace  Plunkett, 
Mr.  Sidney  Webb,  Mr.  Graham  Wallas,  Dr.  William  Cun- 
ningham, Mr.  Francis  W.  Hirst,  the  late  Capt.  R.  W.  E. 
Middleton,  Mr.  A.  E.  Southall  of  the  National   Union   of 


PREFACE  Vll 

Conservative  Associations  and  Mr.  Charles  Geake  of  the 
Liberal  Publication  Department. 

His  thanks  are  especially  due  to  Professor  A.  V.  Dicey, 
Sir  Courtenay  Ilbert,  Professor  H.  Morse  Stephens,  now  of 
the  University  of  California,  and  Professor  W.  B.  Munro  of 
Harvard  University,  who,  besides  giving  him  information, 
have  kindly  read  a  part  of  the  manuscript  or  proof  sheets 
and  made  many  valuable  suggestions.  Above  all  he  feels 
the  deepest  gratitude  to  Rt.  Hon.  James  Bryce,  now 
happily  British  ambassador  to  the  United  States,  the 
master  and  guide  of  all  students  of  modern  political 
systems,  whose  unwearied  assistance,  counsel  and  encour- 
agement have  been  a  constant  help  throughout  the  prepara- 
tion of  this  work,  and  who  has  read  the  whole  of  the  proof 
sheets  except  the  chapters  that  deal  with  the  Empire. 
These  friends  have  made  the  writing  of  the  book  possible, 
and  saved  the  author  from  many  blunders.  It  is  needless 
to  say  that  none  of  them  are  in  any  way  responsible  for 
any  opinions  in  these  pages ;  and  in  fact  the  writer  has 
tried  not  to  express,  and  so  far  as  possible  not  to  form, 
opinions  on  matters  of  current  party  politics. 

The  writer  is  indebted  also  to  a  number  of  his  students 
at  Harvard,  who  have  made  researches  in  several  different 
subjects.  While  some  of  the  more  important  of  these  con- 
tributions have  been  referred  to  in  the  notes,  it  has  been 
impossible  to  do  this  in  all  cases.  Finally  he  desires  to 
acknowledge  the  help  he  lias  received  in  his  investigations 
from  three  assistants :  Mr.  Emerson  David  Fite,  now  of 
Yale  University,  Mr.  Robert  Lee  Hale,  now  of  the  Harvard 
Law  School,  and  Mr.  Thomas  N.  Hoover  of  the  Harvard 
Graduate  School,  the  last  of  these  having  also  verified  the 
citations  and  prepared  the  index. 

April,  1908. 


PREFACE   TO   THE   REVISED   EDITION 

Since  this  book  was  published  the  author  has  received  a 
number  of  letters,  both  from  friends  and  from  men  with 
whom  he  was  not  previously  acquainted,  pointing  out 
mistakes  of  various  kinds.  For  these  letters  he  is  very 
grateful,  and  the  suggestions  in  them  have  enabled  him  to 
make  many  corrections  in  the  text.  In  revising  the  plates 
it  has  been  impossible  to  undertake  the  extensive  changes 
required  for  a  discussion  of  events  that  occurred  after  the 
book  was  written;  but  where  these  affect  a  definite  state- 
ment an  attempt  has  been  made,  either  to  refer  to  them  in 
footnotes,  or  to  modify  the  statement  itself. 

A  criticism  of  a  general  nature  sometimes  made  by  the 
press  has  been  that  the  writer  underestimates  the  future 
importance  of  the  Labour  Party;  and  in  fact  the  recent 
adhesion  to  its  ranks  of  other  Labour  members  is  very 
significant.  The  strength  of  the  party  at  this  moment  is 
certainly  great,  far  greater  than  at  any  earlier  period,  and 
a  considerable  growth  of  independent  power  on  its  part 
would  doubtless  involve  a  decided  readjustment  in  the 
present  methods  of  working  parliamentary  government. 
But  perhaps  it  is  safer  for  an  observer  to  observe  than  to 
prophesy. 

November,  1908. 


PREFACE   TO   EDITION   OF   1912 

Any  description  of  the  government  of  a  country  can  be 
accurate  only  for  the  time  that  it  portrays.  An  attempt  to 
revise  it,  even  after  a  short  lapse  of  time,  like  a  second  ex- 
posure on  a  photographic  plate,  merely  blurs  the  image. 
Nevertheless  the  changes  in  England  have  been  so  great 
within  the  last  few  years  that  a  new  edition  of  a  book  on  the 
government  of  the  Kingdom  cannot  be  issued  without  re- 
ferring to  them.  By  far  the  most  important  as  well  as  the 
most  obvious  of  them  has  been  the  reduction  in  the  power 
of  the  House  of  Lords,  and  an  additional  chapter  has  there- 
fore been  inserted  immediately  after  the  former  chapters 
dealing  with  that  House.  The  discussion  of  the  difficulties 
of  reforming  the  House  has  been  left  as  it  stood,  for  while 
the  conditions  have  been  changed  by  legislation,  the  prob- 
lem has  by  no  means  been  wholly  solved.  The  composi- 
tion of  the  body  has  not  yet  been  altered,  and,  even  as  re- 
gards its  powers,  the  solution  has  been  a  rough  and  ready 
one,  brought  about  by  exasperation  over  the  rejection 
of  the  Finance  Act ;  a  cutting  of  the  Gordion  knot  which 
has  left  loose  ends. 

Other  significant  changes  of  an  institutional  character 
have  been  made.  Most  important  among  them  from  a 
political  standpoint  are  probably  those  of  the  reduction  of 
the  term  of  Parliament  to  five  years,1  and  the  payment  of 
members  of  the  House  of  Commons.  The  last  was  brought 
about  not  by  a  statute  but  by  a  simple  resolution  adopted 
on  August  10,  1911  ;  "That,  in  the  opinion  of  this  House, 
provision  should  be  made  for  the  payment  of  a  salary  at 
the  rate  of  four  hundred  pounds  a  year  to  every  Member 
of  this  House,  excluding  any  Member  who  is  for  the  time 
being  in  receipt  of  a  salary  as  an  officer  of  the  House,  or 

1  1-2  Geo.  V.,  c.  13,  §  7. 
ix 


X  PREFACE  TO  EDITION  OF   1912 

as  a  Minister,  or  as  an  officer  of  his  Majesty's  Household." 
This  was  followed  on  August  14  by  the  adoption  in 
Committee  of  Supply  of  a  vote  for  the  appropriation  re- 
quired. The  Lords  passed  the  appropriation  bill  in  which 
it  was  contained  without  amendment,  and  on  August  18 
it  received  the  royal  assent.  The  Conservatives  objected 
to  the  payment  of  members  on  principle,  to  the  procedure 
employed  in  adopting  it,  and  to  the  fact  that  the  members 
were  voting   salaries  to  themselves  for    the  current  year. 

Other  changes  of  a  political  character  have  been  the  adop- 
tion of  a  federal  constitution  for  South  Africa,1  the  provision 
that  aldermen  in  boroughs  shall  not  vote  for  aldermen 
nor  out-going  aldermen  for  the  mayor,2  and  that  women 
shall  be  eligible  as  councillors  or  aldermen  in  county  and 
borough  councils.3  As  a  matter  of  interest  it  may  be  noted 
also  that  in  1909  the  Commons  dropped  their  resolution 
against  the  participation  of  peers  at  elections ;  and  that 
at  the  accession  of  George  V.  a  new  Coronation  Oath  was 
adopted  to  remove  the  offence  of  the  old  one  to  the  Catholics.4 

Two  great  pieces  of  social  legislation  have  been  enacted. 
The  first  was  the  Old  Age  Pensions  Act,5  providing  pensions 
running  from  one  shilling  to  five  shillings  a  week  for  persons 
with  an  income  of  less  than  thirty  guineas,  who  are  seventy 
years  of  age,  and  have  been  for  twenty  years  British  sub- 
jects resident  in  the  United  Kingdom ;  the  expense  to  be 
defrayed  wholly  from  the  national  treasury.  The  second 
was  the  National  Insurance  Act  of  1911,6  which  provided 
for  compulsory  insurance  of  working  people  against  sick- 
ness and  unemployment.  In  this  case  the  Government 
contributes  roughly  one  fourth  of  the  money  needed,  and 
the  rest  is  furnished  in  about  equal  parts  by  the  employer 
and  the  employed. 

A.  Lawrence  Lowell. 

Cambridge,  June,  1912. 

1  9  Edw.  VII.,  c.  9.  2  10  Edw.  VII.  and  1  Geo.  V.,  c.  19. 

1  7  Edw.  VII.,  c.  33.  *  10  Edw.  VII.  and  1  Geo.  V,  c.  29. 

8  8  Edw.  VII.,  c.  40.  8  1-2  Geo.  V,  c.  55. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


VOLUME   I 

PAGl 

Introductory  Note  on  the  Constitution 1 


PART   I.  — THE   CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT 

CHAPTER  I 
The  Crown 16 

CHAPTER  II 
The  Crown  and  the  Cabinet 27 

CHAPTER   III 
The  Cabinet  and  the  Ministers 53 

CHAPTER   IV 
The  Executive  Departments 81 

CHAPTER   V 
The  Treasury 115 

CHAPTER   VI 
Miscellaneous  Offices 131 

CHAPTER   VII 
The  Permanent  Civil  Service 145 

CHAPTER   VIII 
The  Ministers  and  the  Civil  Service 173 

CHAPTER   TX 
The  House  of  Commons  —  Constituencies  and  Voters       .         .     195 

CHAPTER   X 

The  House  of  Commons  —  Electoral  Procedure         .        .        .    219 

xi 


xii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XI 

PAGB 

The   House  of  Commons  —  Disqualifications,  Privilege,   Ses- 
sions          239 

CHAPTER   XII 
Procedure  in  the  House  of  Commons  —  The  House,  its  Rules 

and  Officers 248 

CHAPTER   XIII 

Procedure  in  the  House  of  Commons  —  Committees  and  Public 

Bills 264 

CHAPTER  XIV 
Procedure    in    the    House    of    Commons  —  Money    Bills    and 

Accounts 279 

CHAPTER   XV 
Procedure  in  the  House  of  Commons  —  Closure         .        .        .    292 

CHAPTER   XVI 

Procedure   in  the  House   of   Commons  —  Sittings  and  Order 

of  Business 302 

CHAPTER  XVII 
The  Cabinet's  Control  of  the  Commons 309 

CHAPTER   XVIII 
The  Commons'  Control  of  the  Cabinet 327 

CHAPTER   XIX 
The  Form  and  Contexts  of  Statutes 356 

CHAPTER   XX 
Private  Bill  Legislation 367 

CHAPTER   XXI 
The  House  of  Lords 394 

CHAPTER   XXII 
The  Cabinet  and  the  House  of  Lords  ......     405 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER   XXII  a 

PAGB 

The  House  of  Lords  and  the  Act  of  1911 423 

CHAPTER  XXIII 
The  Cabinet  and  the  Country 437 

PART   II.  — THE  PARTY   SYSTEM 

CHAPTER   XXIY 
Party  and  the  Parliamentary  System 449 

CHAPTER   XXY 
Party  Organisation  in  Parliament 462 

CHAPTER   XXVI 
Non-party  Organisations  outside  of  Parliament      .        .        .     472 

CHAPTER   XXVII 
Local  Party  Organisations 480 

CHAPTER   XXVIII 
Action  of  Local  Organisations 505 

CHAPTER   XXIX 
The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Caucus  —  The  Liberals  .         .         .     515 

CHAPTER    NXX 
The  Rise  and  Fall  ok  the  Caucus  —  The  Conservatives  549 


TABLE    OF  CONTENTS 

VOLUME  II 
CHAPTER   XXXI 

WAQM 

Ancillary  Party  Organisations 1 

CHAPTER  XXXII 
The  Functions  of  Party  Organisations 18 

CHAPTER   XXXIII 
The  Labour  Party 24 

CHAPTER   XXXIV 
Candidates  and  Elections 46 

CHAPTER  XXXV 
The  Strength  of  Party  Ties 71 

CHAPTER  XXXVI 
Political  Oscillations 101 

CHAPTER   XXXVII 
The  Existing  Parties 113 

PART   III.  — LOCAL   GOVERNMENT 

CHAPTER   XXXVIII 
Areas  of  Local  Government 129 

CHAPTER   XXXIX 
Boroughs  —  The  Town  Council 144 

CHAPTER   XL 

Boroughs  —  The  Permanent  Officials 171 

xiv 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  XV 

CHAPTER  XLI 

PACK 

Boroughs  —  Powers  and  Resources 181 

CHAPTER  XLII 
London 202 

CHAPTER  XLIII 
The  London  County  Council 215 

CHAPTER  XLIV 
Municipal  Trading 233 

CHAPTER   XLV 
Other  Local  Authorities 268 

CHAPTER  XLVI 
Central  Control  284 

PART   IV.— EDUCATION 

CHAPTER  XLVII 
Public  Elementary  Education 295 

CHAPTER  XLVIII 
Secondary  Education 324 

CHAPTER  XLIX 
The  Universities 343 

CHAPTER   L 
Education  in  Scotland 354 

PART  V.  — THE   CHURCH 

CHAPTER  LI 
Organisation  of  the  Church 362 

CHAPTER   LII 
Revenues  of  the  Church  . 374 


xvi  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  LIH 

PACK 

The  Free  Church  Federation 380 

PART   VI.  — THE   EMPIRE 

CHAPTER  LIV 
Component  Parts  of  the  Empire 386 

CHAPTER  LV 
The  Self-governing  Colonies 392 

CHAPTER  LVI 
The  Crown  Colonies 408 

CHAPTER   LVII 
India  and  the  Protectorates 420 

CHAPTER  LVIII 
Imperial  Federation 430 

PART  VIL— THE   COURTS   OF  LAW 

CHAPTER   LIX 
History  of  the  Courts 439 

CHAPTER   LX 
The  Existing  Courts 451 

CHAPTER   LXI 
The  English  Conception  of  Law 471 

CHAPTER   LXII 
Effects  of  the  Conception  of  Law 489 

PART   VIII.— REFLECTIONS 

CHAPTER    LXIII 
Aristocracy  and  Democracy 505 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xvii 

CHAPTER   LXIV 

PAOl 

Public,  Private  and  Local  Interests 514 

CHAPTER  LXV 
The  Growth  of  Paternalism 520 

CHAPTER   LXVI 
Party  and  Class  Legislations 531 

CHAPTER  LXVII 
Conclusion 539 

INDEX 541 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
ON  THE  CONSTITUTION 

De  Tocqueville  declared  that  the  English  Constitution  Different 
did  not  really  exist,1  and  he   said   so  because  in  his  mind  JJea™0^s  of 
the  word  "  constitution  "  meant  a  perfectly  definite  thing  to  Constitu- 
which  nothing  in  England  conformed.     An  examination  of 
modern  governments  shows,  however,  that  the  thing  is  by 
no  means  so  definite  as  he  had  supposed. 

The  term  "  constitution "  is  usually  applied  to  an  attempt  a  Docu- 
to  embody  in  a  single  authoritative  document,   or  a  small  b^dyingThe 
group  of  documents,  the  fundamental  political  institutions  Chief  Insti- 

-i-»  ....  .  tutions. 

of  a  state.  But  such  an  attempt  is  rarely,  it  ever,  completely 
successful ;  and  even  if  the  constitution  when  framed  covers 
all  the  main  principles  on  which  the  government  is  based, 
it  often  happens  that  they  become  modified  in  practice,  or 
that  other  principles  arise,  so  that  the  constitution  no  longer 
corresponds  fully  with  the  actual  government  of  the  coun- 
try. In  France,  for  example,  the  principle  that  the  cabinet 
can  stay  in  office  only  so  long  as  it  retains  the  confidence  of 
the  popular  chamber,  the  principle,  in  short,  of  a  ministry 
responsible  in  the  parliamentary  sense,  was  not  mentioned 
in  the  charters  of  1814  or  1830,  and  yet  it  was  certainly 
firmly  established  in  the  reign  of  Louis  Philippe;  and  it  is 
noteworthy  that  this  same  principle,  on  which  the  whole 
political  system  of  the  English  self-governing  colonies  is 
based,  appears  neither  in  the  British  North  American  Act 
nor  in  the  Australian  Federation  Act.  The  first  of  those 
statutes,  following  the  English  tradition,  speaks  of  the 
Privy  Council  for  Canada,2  but  never  of  the  cabinet  or  the 
ministers;  while  the  Australian  Act,  going  a  step  farther, 
refers  to  the  Queen's  Ministers  of  State,3  but  ignores  their 

1  La  Democratic  en  Anu'riauc,  I.,  Ch.  vi. 

*  30-31  Vic,  c.  3,  5    11. 

8  Gli-Gl  Vic,  c.  12,  Const.,  §§    01-65. 

D  1 


2  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

responsibility  to  the  parliament.1  Again,  in  the  United 
States,  the  provision  that  the  electoral  college  shall  choose 
the  President  has  become  so  modified  in  practice  that  the 
electors  must  vote  for  the  candidate  nominated  by  the 
party  to  which  they  owe  their  own  election.  In  choosing 
the  President  they  have  become,  by  the  force  of  custom, 
as  much  a  mere  piece  of  mechanism  as  the  Crown  in  Eng- 
land when  giving  its  assent  to  acts  passed  by  the  two  Houses 
of  Parliament.  Their  freedom  of  choice  is  as  obsolete  as  the 
royal  veto.  So  far,  therefore,  as  this  meaning  of  the  term 
is  concerned,  the  constitution  of  England  differs  from  those 
of  other  countries  rather  in  degree  than  in  kind.  It  differs 
in  the  fact  that  the  documents,  being  many  statutes,  are 
very  numerous,  and  the  part  played  by  custom  is  unusually 
large. 
Not  change-  De  Tocqueville  had  more  particularly  in  mind  another 
Ordinary  meaning  which  is  commonly  attached  to  the  term  "  constitu- 
Lcgisiation.  tion."  It  is  thatof  an  instrument  of  special  sanctity,  distinct 
in  character  from  all  other  laws;  and  alterable  only  by  a 
peculiar  process,  differing  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  from 
the  ordinary  forms  of  legislation.  The  special  sanctity  is, 
of  course,  a  matter  of  sentiment  incapable  of  exact  defini- 
tion, and  it  may  be  said  to  belong  to  the  British  Constitution 
quite  as  much  as  to  some  others.  The  peculiar  process  of 
amendment,  on  the  other  hand,  —  the  separation  of  the 
so-called  constituent  and  law-making  powers,  —  upon 
which  Mr.  Bryce  bases  his  division  of  constitutions  into 
rigid  and  flexible,2  has  had  a  long  history  and  been  much 
discussed ;  but  although  the  contrast  between  the  two 
types  is  highly  important,  the  creation  of  intermediate 
forms  has  made  it  less  exact  as  a  basis  of  classification. 
The  later  constitutions,  and  the  more  recent  practice,  have 
tended  to  obscure  the  distinction.     A  separation  between 

1  The  provisions  about  the  responsibility  of  the  ministers  are  almost 
identical  in  the  constitutions  of  Belgium  (Arts.  63,  64,  65,  88,  89,  90)  and 
Prussia  (Arts.  44,  45,  60,  61);  but  in  Belgium  the  cabinet  is  politically 
responsible  to  the  chamber,  while  in  Prussia  it  is  not. 

'"Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence,"  Essay  III. 


THE   CONSTITUTION  3 

the  constituent  and  law-making  powers  does  not,  in  fact,  Rigid  and 
always  exist  in  written  constitutions.     The  Italian  Statnto,   conTtitu- 
for  instance,  which  contains  no  provision  for  amendment,   tions. 
can   be,    and   in  fact   has   been,    altered   by   the   ordinary 
process  of  legislation;1    and   the  same  thing  was  true  of 
the  French  Charter  of  1830.2    The   last  Spanish   constitu- 
tion omits  all  provision  for   amendment,  but  one  may  as- 
sume that   if  it  lasts   long  enough  to  require  amendment 
the  changes  will  be  made  by  ordinary  legislative  process. 

From  countries  which  can  change  their  fundamental  con- 
stitution by  the  ordinary  process  of  legislation  we  pass  by 
almost  imperceptible  degrees  to  those  where  the  constitu- 
tional and  law-making  powers  are  in  substantially  different 
hands.  Thus  the  procedure  for  changing  the  constitution 
in  Prussia  differs  from  that  for  the  enactment  of  laws 
only  by  the  requirement  of  two  readings  at  an  interval  of 
twenty-one  days.  Here  there  is  a  difference  legally  per- 
ceptible between  the  methods  of  changing  the  constitution 
and  other  laws;  but  it  may  be  remarked  that  a  provision 
in  the  constitution  to  the  effect  that  all  laws  should  require 
two  readings  at  an  interval  of  twenty-one  days,  would  not 
essentially  change  the  nature  of  the  constitution,  and  yet 
in  theory  it  would  make  that  constitution  flexible  instead 
of  rigid.  As  it  is,  the  fundamental  laws  are  quite  as  much 
under  the  control  of  the  legislature  in  Prussia  as  they  are 
in  England.3  This  is  almost  equally  true  of  France ;  for 
although  the  changes  in  her  constitution  are  made  by  the 
National  Assembly,  composed  of  the  two  chambers  sitting 
together,  yet  the  Assembly  can  meet  only  after  the  two 
chambers    have   passed    a    concurrent    resolution    to    that 

1  C'f.  Brusa,  Italien,  in  Marquardsen's  Handbuch  des  Orffeitilichen  Rechts, 
12-10,  181-82. 

2  Professor  Dicey  points  out  ("Law  of  the  Constitution,"  5  Ed.,  116  and 
Note  2)  that  I)c  Tocqueville  considered  the  Charter  unalterable  by 
reason  of  this  omission,  but  that  it  was,  in  fact,  changed  like  an  ordinary 
law. 

3  Tor  the  purpose  of  the  argument  it  is  unimportant  that  Prussia  is  not  a 
sovereign  s-tate,  and  for  sixteen  years  it  did  exist  as  an  independent  sover- 
eign state  under  its  present  constitution. 


4  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

effect;  and  in  fact  the  chambers  are  in  the  habit  of  deter- 
mining beforehand  by  separate  votes  the  amendments 
which  shall  be  submitted  to  the  Assembly.  So  that  in 
France,  also,  the  constitution  is  virtually  under  the  unre- 
stricted control  of  the  legislature. 
The  Dis-  The    separation  of    constituent   and  law-making  powers 

tinction  has  has  been  rendered  of  much  less  practical  importance  in  some 

Lost  Practi-  x  x 

cai  ira-  countries  not  only  by  making  the  process  of  amending  the 
portance.  constitution  more  simple,  but  also  by  making  the  enact- 
ment of  laws  more  complex.  In  Switzerland,  for  example, 
changes  in  the  Constitution  of  1848  required  a  popular  vote, 
while  changes  in  the  laws  did  not ;  but  after  the  referendum 
on  ordinary  laws  was  introduced  in  1874,  this  distinction 
largely  disappeared,  and  at  the  present  day  the  differences 
between  the  methods  of  passing  constitutional  amendments 
and  ordinary  laws  are  comparatively  slight.  In  the  case 
of  ordinary  laws  a  popular  vote  is  taken  only  on  the  petition 
of  thirty  thousand  citizens  or  eight  cantons,  and  the  popular 
majority  is  decisive;  whereas  constitutional  amendments 
must  be  submitted  to  the  people  whether  a  petition  is  pre- 
sented or  not,  and  for  their  ratification  a  majority  vote  in 
more  than  half  the  cantons  as  well  as  a  majority  in  the 
Confederation  as  a  whole  is  required.1 

In  those  European  countries  where  the  difference  in  the 
procedure  for  changing  constitutional  and  other  laws  is  the 
most  marked,  the  special  formalities  for  the  former  consist 
in  requiring  more  than  a  majority  vote  in  the  legislature,  or 
that  a  general  election  shall  take  place  before  the  amend- 
ment is  finally  adopted,  or  both.  Now  the  last  of  those 
conditions  is  practically  not  unknown  in  England.  There 
is  a  growing  feeling  that  no  fundamental  or  far-reaching 
change  ought  to  be  made  unless,  as  a  result  of  a  general 
election  fought  on  that  issue,  Parliament  has  received  from 
the  nation  a  mandate  to  make  the  change.  Such  a  doc- 
trine does  not  affect  the  law,  but  it  does  affect  that  body 

1  Constitutional  amendments  can  also  be  proposed  by  popular  initiative, 
arid  ordinary  laws  cannot. 


THE   CONSTITUTION  5 

of  customs  which  is  a  not  less  vital  part  of  the  British 
Constitution. 

The  classical  distinction  between  constituent  and  law- 
making powers,  and  hence  between  rigid  and  flexible  con- 
stitutions, has  also  been  somewhat  effaced  by  extending 
the  requirement  of  a  special  procedure  to  the  enactment  of 
certain  classes  of  ordinary  law.  Thus  in  the  German  Em- 
pire the  only  peculiar  formality  for  amendments  to  the 
constitution  is  found  in  the  provision  that  they  are  defeated 
by  fourteen  adverse  votes  in  the  Bundesrath.1  This  gives 
Prussia  with  her  seventeen  votes  a  veto  upon  them,  but  she 
has  also  a  veto  in  the  Bundesrath  upon  any  measures  affect- 
ing the  army,  the  navy,  customs-duties  or  excises.2 

In  the  middle  of  the  last  century  written  constitutions  in  Growing 
Europe  were  framed  for  the  most  part  upon  the  same  model  wantctty  in 
and  were  much  alike,  so  that  a  written  constitution  usually  Constitu- 
implied  a  definite  type  of  limited  monarchy,  where  the  same  tlons- 
class  of  matters  were  removed  from  the  direct  control  of  the 
legislature  and  placed,  in  theory  at  least,  under  special  pro- 
tection.    But  now  written  constitutions  all  over  the  world 
have  come  to  differ  a  great  deal,  some  of  them  being  simpler, 
and  others  more  comprehensive  than  of  old.     The  consti- 
tutional laws  of  France,  for  example,  provide  only  for  the 
bare  organisation  of  the   public    authorities,    and    can  be 
amended   virtually   at   will   by  the   legislature ;   while    the 
constitutions    of    Switzerland,  Germany    and    the    United 
States  go  into  great  detail,  and  that  of  the  United  States 
can    be    amended    only    with    the    greatest    difficulty.    The 
result   is   that   the   French   constitution,    although   written 
and  technically  rigid,  bears  from  the  point  of  view  of  rigidity 
a   far   closer  resemblance   to   the    constitution   of   England 
than  to  that  of  the  United  States. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  the  distinction  between 
constitutions  which  are  flexible  and  those  which  are  rigid, 
while  valuable,  has  ceased  to  mark  a  contrast  between 
widely    separated    groups ;    and    that  it    might    be    well    to 

1  Const.,  Art.  78.  2  Ibid.,  Art.  5. 


6 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


A  Constitu- 
tion as  a 
Supreme 
Law. 


Meaning  of 
Law  where 
the  Common 
Law  Pre- 
vails. 


regard  the  distinction  as  one  of  degree  rather  than  of  kind. 
From  this  aspect  it  may  be  said  that  of  late  years  consti- 
tutions have  tended  on  the  whole  to  become  more  flexible ; 
and  at  the  same  time  there  has  been  a  tendency  toward 
greater  variations  in  flexibility,  the  constitutions  of  Eng- 
land and  of  Hungary  standing  at  one  end  of  the  scale,  and 
that  of  the  United  States  at  the  other. 

If  the  term  "  constitution  "  does  not  necessarily  imply  that 
the  so-called  constituent  and  law-making  powers  are  in 
different  hands,  still  less  does  it  imply  the  existence  of  a 
law  of  superior  obligation  which  controls  legally  the  acts 
of  the  legislature.  Before  discussing  that  question,  one 
must  understand  clearly  what  is  meant  by  a  law.  In  Eng- 
land, and  in  the  countries  that  have  inherited  the  Anglo- 
Norman  system  of  jurisprudence,  a  law  may  be  defined  as  a 
rule  that  will  be  enforced  by  the  courts.  This  results  from 
the  fact  that  officers  of  the  government,  like  private  per- 
sons, are  subject  to  judicial  process,  and  liable  to  have 
the  legality  of  their  actions  examined  and  determined  by  the 
ordinary  tribunals.  Hence  a  rule  recognised  as  law  by  the 
courts  will  be  enforced  against  both  officials  and  private 
citizens;  and  a  rule  which  they  do  not  recognise  cannot  be 
enforced  at  all,  for  they  will  entertain  suits  »and  prosecu- 
tions against  officials  who  try  to  apply  it,  and  will  afford 
protection  to  individuals  who  resist  them.1  Assuming  this 
definition  of  law,  the  famous  decision  of  Chief  Justice  Mar- 
shall 2  that  an  Act  of  Congress  inconsistent  with  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  must  be  treated  as  invalid 
was  a  logical  necessity.  The  Constitution  was  certainly 
intended  to  be  a  law,  and  as  such  it  could  be  enforced  by 
the  courts.  But  if  that  law  came  into  conflict  with  another 
law,  an  Act  of  Congress  for  example,  the  court  must  con- 
sider, as  in  any  other  case  of  conflict  of  laws,  which  law  was 


1  By  far  the  best  exposition  of  this  matter  is  to  be  found  in  Professor 
Dicry's  "Law  of  the  Constitution."     It  is  discussed  more  fully  in  Chapter 
I.,   infra. 
7  Marbury  vs.  Madison,  1  Cranch,  137. 


THE   CONSTITUTION  7 

of  superior  authority;  and  there  could  be  no  doubt  that 
the  Constitution  was  the  superior  of  the  two.  The  same 
principle  is  applied  in  the  British  colonies,  when  colonial 
acts  come  into  collision  with  the  Acts  of  Parliament  estab- 
lishing the  colonial  government ; 1  and  it  has  been  incor- 
porated into  the  constitutions  of  the  Spanish  American 
republics. 

But,  except  for  those  Latin  countries  which  have  copied  where  the 
it  from  the  United  States,  the  doctrine  is  almost  entirely  prevails?* 
confined  to  the  places  where  the  Common  Law  prevails,2 
for  elsewhere  the  same  definition  of  law  does  not  obtain. 
In  accordance  with  the  French  interpretation  of  the  theory 
of  the  separation  of  powers,  it  is  the  general  rule  on  the 
continent  of  Europe  that  the  ordinary  courts  administer 
only  private  law  between  private  citizens,  and  that  questions 
affecting  the  rights  and  duties  of  public  officials  are  with- 
drawn from  their  jurisdiction.  Such  questions  are  now 
usually,  though  not  universally,  submitted  to  special  tri- 
bunals known  as  administrative  courts.  The  rules  admin- 
istered by  these  tribunals  are  laws,  but  they  form  a  distinct 
and  separate  branch  of  the  law  from  that  applied  by  the 
ordinary  courts.  On  the  continent,  therefore,  a  constitu- 
tion may  or  may  not  be  properly  regarded  as  a  law,  but  even 
if  it  be  so  regarded  it  is  not  of  necessity  enforced  by  any 
court.     On  the  contrary,  if  an  ordinary  court  is  not  suf- 

1  The  Australian  Federation  Act  (§  74)  refers  particularly  to  the 
decision  of  such  questions,  limiting  the  right  to  bring  them  on  appeal 
before  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council. 

s  There  are  a  few  exceptions.  Provisions  giving  such  a  power  to  the 
courts  are  to  be  found  in  the  constitutions  of  the  little  Swiss  cantons  of  Uri 
(Art.  51)  and  Unterwalden  nid  dem  Wald  (Art.  43).  The  Swiss  national 
constitution,  on  the  other  hand  (Art.  113),  directs  the  Federal  Tribunal  to 
apply  every  law  enacted  by  the  national  legislature.  Some  discussion  has 
taken  place  on  the  question  in  Germany.  (See  Brinton  Coxe,  "Judicial 
Power  and  Unconstitutional  Legislation,"  Ch.  ix.,  and  the  writer's 
"Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,"  I.,  282-84.)  Curiously 
enough,  a  struggle  over  this  question  occurred  in  the  Transvaal  not  long 
before  the  South  African  War  (Bryce's  "Studies  in  History  and  Jurispru- 
dence," 378;  Kruger's  "Memoirs,"  254-57).  In  his  next  inaugural  address 
President  Kruger  quoted  Scripture  to  prove  that  the  principle  of  holding 
statutes  unconstitutional  had  been  invented  by  the  devil.    (Kruger,  35-1-55.) 


8  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF  ENGLAND 

fered  to  pass  upon  the  legality  of  the  actions  of  a  policeman, 
it  would  be  hardly  rational  that  it  should  pass  upon  the 
validity  of  an  act  of  the  national  legislature;  and  it  would 
be  even  more  irrational  to  intrust  any  such  power  to  the 
administrative  courts  which  are  under  the  influence  of  the 
executive  branch  of  the  government.1 
Legal  Re-  The  conception  of  a  constitution  as  a  law  of  superior  obli- 
Pmver'Sofn  gation,  which  imposes  legal  restraints  upon  the  action  of  the 
Legislature  legislature,  is  really  confined  to  a  very  few  countries,  chiefly 
to  America  and  the  English  self-governing  colonies.2  In 
Europe  it  has  no  proper  place,  for  whether  a  constitution 
in  continental  states  be  or  be  not  regarded  as  a  supreme 
law,  no  body  of  men  has,  as  a  rule,  been  intrusted  with  legal 
authority  to  enforce  its  provisions  as  against  the  legislature ; 
and  in  England  there  is  no  law  superior  in  obligation  to  an 
Act  of  Parliament.  There  can,  indeed,  be  no  doubt  that 
the  Acts  of  Union  with  Scotland  and  Ireland  were  intended 
to  be,  in  part  at  least,  forever  binding,  but  as  they  created 
no  authority  with  power  either  to  enforce  or  to  amend  the 
Acts,  the  united  Parliament  assumed  that,  like  its  prede- 
cessors, it  possessed  unlimited  sovereignty;  and  it  has,  in 
fact,  altered  material  provisions  in  each  of  those  statutes.3 
The  English  Constitution  —  speaking,  of  course,  of  its 
form,  not  its  content  —  differs,  therefore,  from  those  of  most 
other  European  nations  more  widely  in  method  of  expres- 
sion than  in  essential  nature  and  legal  effect.     They  have 

1  Esmein  (FAcmmts  de  droit  constitution^,  425-28)  describes  the  various 
proposals  made  at  different  times  in  France  for  annulling  unconstitutional 
laws.  One  of  these,  Sieyes's  jurie  constitutionaire,  bears  a  curious  resem- 
blance to  an  institution  for  a  somewhat  analogous  purpose  in  Athens: 
Goodwin,  "  Demosthenes  on  the  Crown,"  Essay  II.,  316-27. 

2  It  must  be  observed,  also,  that  the  English  colonies  are  not  legally  inde- 
pendent or  sovereign  states,  and  hence  their  parliaments  are  legally  subordi- 
nate legislatures.  We  may  note  in  this  connection  that  the  Swiss  Federal 
Tribunal  can  hold  unconstitutional  laws  of  the  cantons  which  violate  the 
constitution  either  of  the  confederation  or  of  the  canton. 

3  Professor  Dicey  argued  that  the  first  Home  Rule  Bill  if  enacted  might 
have  restricted  the  legal  sovereignty  of  Parliament.  "England's  Case 
against  Home  Rule,"  2'AH,  el  scq.  This  result  was  denied  by  the  other  side. 
P.ryce,  "  Studies  in  Hist,  and  Jur.,"    176,  note. 


THE   CONSTITUTION  9 

been  created  usually  as  a  result  of  a  movement  to  change 
fundamentally  the  political  institutions  of  the  country,  and 
the  new  plan  has  naturally  been  embodied  in  a  document; 
but  since  the  Restoration  England  has  never  revised  her 
frame  of  government  as  a  whole,  and  hence  has  felt  no  need 
of  codifying  it.  The  national  political  institutions  are  to  be  Sources  of 
found  in  statutes,1  in  customs  which  are  enforced  and  de-  conSitu-Sh 
veloped  by  the  courts  and  form  a  part  of  the  Common  Law,  tion. 
and  in  customs  strictly  so  called  which  have  no  legal  validity 
whatever  and  cannot  be  enforced  at  law.  These  last  are 
very  appropriately  called  by  Professor  Dicey  the  conven- 
tions of  the  constitution.  The  two  chief  peculiarities  of  the 
English  Constitution  are :  first,  that  no  laws  are  ear-marked 
as  constitutional,  —  all  laws  can  be  changed  by  Parliament, 
and  hence  it  is  futile  to  attempt  to  draw  a  sharp  line  between 
those  laws  which  do  and  those  which  do  not  form  a  part  of 
the  constitution ;  —  second,  the  large  part  played  by  cus- 
tomary rules,  which  are  carefully  followed,  but  which  are 
entirely  devoid  of  legal  sanction.  Customs  or  conventions 
of  this  kind  exist,  and  in  the  nature  of  things  must  to  some 
extent  exist,  under  all  governments.  In  the  United  States 
where  they  might,  perhaps,  be  least  expected,  they  have, 
as  already  observed,  transformed  the  presidential  electors 
into  a  mere  machine  for  registering  the  popular  vote  in  the 
several  states,  and  this  is  only  the  most  striking  of  the  in- 
stances that  might  be  cited.2  England  is  peculiar,  not 
because  it  has  such  conventions,  but  because  they  are  more 
abundant  and  all-pervasive  than  elsewhere.  The  most 
familiar  of  them  is,  of  course,  the  rule  that  the  King  must 
art  on  the  advice  of  his  ministers,  while  they  must  resign 
or  dissolve  Parliament  when  they  lose  the  confidence  of 
the  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons. 

It  is  impossible,  however,  to  make  a  precise  list  of  the 

1  Boutmy  in  his  Etudes  de  droit  rnnstitutinnel  (1  Ed.,  9)  adds  treaties  or 
quasi-treaties  (the  Acts  of  Union),  and  solemn  agreements  such  as  the  Bill 
of  Rights.      But  all  these  are  in  legal  effect  simply  statutes. 

2  Bryce,  American  Commonwealth,  Ch.  xxxiv. 


10  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

conventions  of  the  constitution,  for  they  are  constantly 
changing  by  a  natural  process  of  growth  and  decay ;  and 
while  some  of  them  are  universally  accepted,  others  are  in  a 
state  of  uncertainty.  Hence  one  hears  from  time  to  time 
a  member  of  the  Opposition  assert  that  some  action  of  the 
government  is  unconstitutional,  meaning  that  it  is  an  un- 
usual breach  of  a  principle  which  in  his  opinion  ought  to 
be  recognised  as  inviolable.  It  was  said,  for  example,  that 
the  Parliament  of  1900,  having  been  elected  on  the  issue  of 
the  South  African  war,  was  not  justified  in  enacting  meas- 
ures of  great  importance  on  other  subjects,  but  that  a  fresh 
mandate  from  the  nation  ought  to  be  obtained  by  another 
general  election.  As  claims  of  this  kind  are  in  dispute, 
those  customs  alone  can  safely  be  said  to  be  a  part  of  the 
constitution  which  are  generally  assumed  to  be  outside  the 
range  of  current  political  controversy. 
The  Reia-  The  relation  between  law  and  custom  in  the  English  gov- 
and  Cus-aw  eminent  is  characteristic.  From  the  very  fact  that  the  law 
consists  of  those  rules  which  are  enforced  by  the  courts,  it 
follows  that  the  law,  —  including,  of  course,  both  the  stat- 
utes and  the  Common  Law,  —  is  perfectly  distinct  from  the 
conventions  of  the  constitution ;  is  quite  independent  of 
them,  and  is  rigidly  enforced.  The  conventions  do  not 
abrogate  or  obliterate  legal  rights  and  privileges,  but  merely 
determine  how  they  shall  be  exercised.  The  legal  forms  are 
scrupulously  observed,  and  are  as  requisite  for  the  validity 
of  an  act  as  if  custom  had  not  affected  their  use.1  The 
power  of  the  Crown,  for  example,  to  refuse  its  consent  to 
bills  passed  by  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament  is  obsolete, 
yet  the  right  remains  legally  unimpaired.  The  royal  assent 
is  given  to  such  bills  with  as  much  solemnity  as  if  it  were 

1  The  habit  of  collecting  new  or  increased  duties  or  excises  as  soon  as 
the  resolution  to  impose  them  passes  the  House  of  Commons  is  an  apparent 
exception  to  this  principle,  for  the  taxes  are  not  legally  payable  until  laid  by 
Acl  of  Parliament.  The  object  of  the  custom  is  to  prevent  a  large  loss  of 
revenue  by  importations  made  after  it  is  known  that  the  duty  will  be  levied 
and  before  it  goes  into  effect.  The  act  when  passed  contains,  of  course,  a 
clause  authorising  and  thereby  making  legal  the  collection  from  the  date  of 
the  resolution,  and  if  it  fails  to  pass  the  tax  is  refunded. 


torn. 


THE   CONSTITUTION  11 

still  discretionary,  and  without  that  formality  a  statute 
would  have  no  validity  whatever.  Public  law  in  countries 
where  it  is  administered  not  by  the  ordinary  courts,  but 
solely  by  the  executive,  or  with  the  aid  of  special  tribu- 
nals composed  of  administrative  officials,  must  of  necessity 
contain  a  discretionary  element,  and  that  element  is  always 
affected  by  political  conventions.  Hence  there  is  a  likeli- 
hood that  the  line  between  law  and  convention  will  become 
blurred,  but  this  is  not  so  in  England.  There  the  law  and 
the  conventions  of  the  constitution  are  each  developing 
by  processes  peculiar  to  themselves,  but  the  line  between 
them  remains  permanently  clear.  The  conventions  are 
superimposed  upon  the  law,  and  modify  political  relations 
without  in  the  least  affecting  legal  ones.  In  fact  Freeman 
declared  that  the  growth  of  the  unwritten  conventions  of 
the  constitution  began  after  the  supremacy  of  the  law  had 
been  firmly  established  by  the  revolution  of  1688,  and  that 
they  could  not  have  been  evolved  if  that  condition  had  not 
existed.1 

The  question  why  the  conventions  of  the  constitution  The  Sane 
are  so  scrupulously  followed,  when  they  have  no  legal  force,  custom. 
is  not  a  simple  one.  Impeachment  as  a  means  of  compelling 
the  observance  of  traditions  has,  of  course,  long  been  obso- 
lete. Professor  Dicey  maintains  that  the  ultimate  sanction 
of  these  conventions  lies  in  the  fact  that  any  ministry  or 
official  violating  them  would  be  speedily  brought  into  con- 
flict with  the  law  of  the  land  as  enforced  by  the  courts.2  He 
takes  as  illustrations  the  omission  to  summon  Parliament 
every  year,  and  the  retention  of  office  by  a  ministry  against 
the  will  of  the  Commons  without  dissolving;  and  he  shows 
;xi  each  case  how  the  ministry  would  be  brought  into  con- 
flict with  the  law  by  the  failure  to  enact  the  annual  army 
bill  or  to  pass  the  appropriations.  He  proves  that  in  such 
cases  the  wheels  of  government  would  be  stopped  by  the 
regular  operation  of  the  law;    and  that  the  House  of  Com- 

1  "Growth  of  the  English  Constitution,"  107,  112-13,  119. 
1  "Law  of  the  Constitution,"  Ch.  xv. 


12  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

mons  can  readily  bring  about  this  result  if  it  pleases.1 
There  is,  however,  another  question,  and  that  is  why  the 
House  is  determined  to  exert  its  power  so  as  to  maintain 
the  conventions  of  the  constitution  as  they  stand  to-day.  It 
has  long  possessed  the  necessary  authority,  but  the  con- 
ventions were  evolved  slowly.  The  House  of  Representa- 
tives in  Washington  has  the  same  power  to  stop  appropria- 
tions, but  it  does  not  try  to  use  it  to  force  a  responsible 
ministry  upon  the  President;  a  result  which  has,  on  the 
other  hand,  been  brought  about  in  France  almost  as  con- 
clusively as  in  England,  and  that  without  the  sanction 
arising  from  the  risk  of  conflict  between  the  government 
and  the  courts.  Any  parliament  could  use  its  authority 
if  it  chose  to  keep  the  ministry  in  office  indefinitely,  as  well 
as  to  make  it  responsible.  It  could  pass  a  permanent  army 
act,  grant  the  tea  and  income  taxes  for  a  term  of  years, 
charge  all  ordinary  expenses  upon  the  Consolidated  Fund, 
and  so  make  the  existing  ministry  well-nigh  independent 
of  future  parliaments. 

The  question  seems  to  resolve  itself  into  two  parts :  first, 
why  a  custom  once  established  is  so  tenaciously  followed 
in  England  ;  and,  second,  why  the  conventions  have  assumed 
their  present  form.  In  regard  to  the  first  it  may  be  sug- 
gested that  while  the  consequences  mentioned  by  Professor 
Dicey  form,  no  doubt,  the  ultimate  sanction  of  the  most 
important  conventions  of  the  constitution,  they  are  not  the 
usual,  or  in  fact  the  real,  motive  for  obedience;  just  as  the 
dread  of  criminal  punishment  is  not  the  general  motive  for 
ordinary  morality.  The  risk  of  imprisonment  never  occurs, 
indeed,  to  people  of  high  character,  and  in  the  same  way 
the  ultimate  sanctions  of  the  law  are  not  usually  present  in 
the  minds  of  men  in  English  public  life.  In  the  main  the 
conventions  are  observed  because  they  are  a  code  of  honour. 
They  are,  as  it  were,  the  rules  of  the  game,  and  the  single 

1  All  this  is  true  only  of  conventions  that  give  effect  to  the  will  of  the 
majority  of  the  House  of  Commons,  not  of  those  that  secure  fair  play  to  the 
minority,  which  are  in  fact  not  less  important. 


THE  CONSTITUTION  13 

class  in  the  community  which  has  hitherto  had  the  con- 
duct of  English  public  life  almost  entirely  in  its  own  hands 
is  the  very  class  that  is  peculiarly  sensitive  to  obligation  of 
this  kind.  Moreover,  the  very  fact  that  one  class  rules,  by 
the  sufferance  of  the  whole  nation,  as  trustees  for  the  pub- 
lic, makes  that  class  exceedingly  careful  not  to  violate  the 
understandings  on  which  the  trust  is  held. 

The  key  to  the  question  why  the  conventions  have  as- 
sumed their  present  form  is  to  be  found  mainly  in  Pro- 
fessor Dicey's  remark  *  that  all  of  them  exist  for  the  sake  of 
securing  obedience  to  the  deliberately  expressed  will  of  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  ultimately  to  the  will  of  the  nation. 
Their  effect  has  been  to  bring  the  prerogatives  of  the  Crown 
more  and  more  completely  under  the  control  of  the  cabinet, 
and  the  cabinet  itself  under  the  control  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons ;  to  restrain  the  opposition  of  the  Lords  to  any  policy 
on  which  the  Commons  backed  by  the  nation  are  deter- 
mined; and,  finally,  through  the  power  of  dissolution  to 
make  the  House  of  Commons  itself  reflect  as  nearly  as  may 
be  the  views  of  the  electorate.  In  England  there  is,  in  fact, 
only  one  conclusive  means  of  expressing  the  popular  will  — 
that  of  an  election  to  the  House  of  Commons ;  and  in  ordi- 
nary cases  there  is  only  one  body  that  has  power  to  inter- 
pret that  expression,  the  cabinet  placed  in  office  by  the 
House  so  elected. 

Professor  Dicey  has  also  pointed  out  a  singular  result  of  The  Effects 
the  conventions.  If  the  growing  power  of  the  House  of  ofCu8tom- 
Commons,  instead  of  being  used  to  impose  customary  re- 
straints on  the  exercise  of  authority  by  the  Crown  and 
the  House  of  Lords,  had  been  exerted  to  limit  that  authority 
by  law,  the  Crown  and  the  House  of  Lords  would  have  been 
far  more  free  to  exercise  at  their  discretion  the  powers  still 
left  in  their  hands ;  and  hence  the  House  of  Commons  could 
not  have  obtained  its  present  omnipotence.  By  leaving  the 
prerogative  substantially  untouched  by  law,  and  requiring 
that  it  should  be  wielded  by  ministers  responsible  to  them, 
1  "Law  of  the  Constitution,"  3G0,  384. 


14  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

the  Commons  have  drawn  into  their  own  control  all  the 
powers  of  the  sovereign  that  time  has  not  rendered  entirely 
obsolete. 

The  great  part  played  by  custom  has  had  another  effect 
upon  English  public  life.  It  has  tended  to  develop  a  con- 
servative temperament.  If  laws  are  changed  the  new  ones 
may  have  the  same  authority  as  the  old;  but  if  customs 
are  changed  rapidly  they  lose  their  force  altogether.  Sta- 
bility is  necessary  for  the  very  life  of  custom.  The  con- 
ventions of  the  constitution  could  not  exist  without  respect 
for  precedent,  and  where  the  institutions  and  liberties  of  a 
country  depend  not  upon  a  written  code,  but  upon  custom, 
there  is  a  natural  tendency  to  magnify  the  importance  of 
tradition  and  precedent  in  themselves.  In  England,  there- 
fore, there  is  a  peculiar  veneration  for  custom,  and  a  dispo- 
sition to  make  as  little  change  in  it  as  is  compatible  with 
changing  times.  The  result  is  a  constant  tinkering,  rather 
than  remodelling,  of  outworn  institutions,  —  a  spirit  which 
is  strongly  marked  throughout  the  whole  of  English  public 
life. 
English  Critics  and  apologists  both  assert  that  the  English  politi- 

LoRicai  but  ca^  system  is  not  logical ;  and  the  statement  is  true  in  the 
Scientific.  sense  that  the  system  was  not  excogitated  by  an  a  priori 
method.  But  on  the  other  hand  the  very  fact  that  it  has 
grown  up  by  a  continual  series  of  adaptations  to  existing 
needs  has  made  it  on  the  whole  more  consistent  with  itself, 
has  brought  each  part  more  into  harmony  with  the  rest, 
than  is  the  case  in  any  other  government.  In  this  it  is  like 
a  living  organism.  There  are,  no  doubt,  many  small  anoma- 
lies and  survivals  that  mar  the  unity  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
scription ;  but  these,  like  survivals  of  structure  in  animals, 
like  the  splint  bones  in  the  leg  of  a  horse  for  example,  do 
not  interfere  seriously  with  the  action  of  the  whole.  It  may 
be  said  that  in  politics  the  Frenchman  has  tended  in  the 
past  to  draw  logical  conclusions  from  correct  premises,  and 
that  his  results  have  often  been  wrong,  while  the  Englishman 
draws  illogical  conclusions  from  incorrect  premises,  and  his 


THE   CONSTITUTION  15 

results  are  commonly  right.  The  fact  being  that  all  ab- 
stract propositions  in  politics  are  at  best  approximations, 
and  an  attempt  to  reason  from  them  usually  magnifies  the 
inaccuracy.  But  in  England  the  institutions  being  empiri- 
cal have  resulted  from  experience,  although  men  have  often 
tried  to  explain  them  afterwards  by  a  somewhat  artificial 
and  incongruous  process  of  reasoning.  In  this  sense  French 
political  principles  may  be  said  to  be  the  more  logical,  the 
English  government  —  not  the  theories  about  it  —  the  more 
scientific.  It  is  more  important,  therefore,  to  describe  the 
organs  of  the  English  government  and  their  relations  to 
one  another  than  to  consider  the  traditional  principles  that 
have  been  supposed  to  underlie  the  system.  But  the  very 
nature  of  the  English  government  renders  it  peculiarly  diffi- 
cult to  portray.  As  the  laws  that  regulate  its  structure 
are  overlaid  by  customs  which  moderate  very  greatly  their 
operation  without  affecting  their  meaning  or  their  validity, 
it  is  necessary  to  describe  separately  the  legal  and  cus- 
tomary aspects  of  the  constitution.  It  is  almost  unavoid- 
able to  pass  in  review  first  the  legal  organisation  of  each 
institution,  and  then  its  actual  functions.  Such  a  process 
is  sometimes  tedious,  especially  for  a  person  already  familiar 
with  the  subject,  but  an  attempt  has  been  made  in  the  fol- 
lowing pages  to  separate  as  far  as  possible  the  dry  legal  de- 
tails from  a  discussion  of  the  working  forces,  so  that  the 
former  may  be  skipped  by  the  judicious  reader. 


PART    I.  — CENTRAL    GOVERNMENT 
CHAPTER  I 

THE   CROWN 

Political  liberty  and  romance  in  English  history  are 
both  bound  up  with  the  shifting  fortunes  of  the  throne. 
The  strong  hand  of  the  Norman  and  Angevin  kings  welded 
the  whole  country  into  a  nation,  and  on  that  foundation 
were  built  the  solid  structures  of  a  national  Common  Law, 
a  national  Parliament,  and  a  long  series  of  national  stat- 
utes. When  in  the  fulness  of  time  the  Crown  had  accom- 
plished its  work  of  unification,  it  came  into  conflict  with 
Parliament,  and  after  a  series  of  convulsions,  in  which  one 
king  lost  his  head  and  another  his  throne,  political  evolu- 
tion resumed  its  normal  course.  The  House  of  Commons 
gradually  drew  the  royal  authority  under  its  control.  But 
it  did  so  without  seriously  curtailing  the  legal  powers  of 
the  Crown,  and  thus  the  King  legally  enjoys  most  of  the 
attributes  that  belonged  to  his  predecessors,  although  the 
exercise  of  his  functions  has  passed  into  other  hands.  If 
the  personal  authority  of  the  monarch  has  become  a 
shadow  of  its  former  massiveness,  the  government  is  still 
conducted  in  his  name,  and  largely  by  means  of  the  legal 
rights  attached  to  his  office.  With  a  study  of  the  Crown, 
therefore,  a  description  of  English  government  most  fit- 
tingly begins. 
TheTitieto  Ever  since  1088,  when  James  II.,  fleeing  in  fear  of  his 
life,  "withdrew  himself  out  of  the  kingdom,  and  thereby 
abdicated,"  the  title  to  the  Crown  has  been  based  entirely 
upon  parliamentary  enactment.  At  the  present  day  it 
rests  upon  the  Act  of  Settlement  of  1701/  which  provided 
that,  in  default  of  heirs  of  William  and  of  Anne,  the  Crown 
should  pass  to  the   Elect ress  Sophia,   and  the  heirs  of  her 

1  12-13  Will.  III.,  c  2. 
16 


THE  CROWN  17 

body,  being  Protestants.  Sophia  was  the  granddaughter 
of  James  I.,  through  her  mother,  wife  of  the  Elector  Pala- 
tine ;  and  while  not  his  nearest  heir,  was  the  nearest  who 
was  a  Protestant. 

The  rules  of  descent  are  in  the  main  the  same  as  those  The  Rules  of 
for  the  inheritance  of  land  at  Common  Law.1  That  is,  the  Succession- 
title  passes  to  the  eldest  son ;  or,  if  he  is  not  living,  through 
him  to  his  issue,  male  or  female,  as  if  he  had  himself  died 
upon  the  throne.  If  the  first  son  has  died  without  issue, 
then  to,  or  through,  the  eldest  son  who  is  living,  or  has  issue 
living;  and  in  default  of  any  sons  living,  or  leaving  issue, 
then  to,  or  through,  the  eldest  daughter.  The  rule  is,  how- 
ever, subject  to  the  qualification  that  any  one  who  is,  or  be- 
comes, a  Catholic  is  excluded  from,  and  forfeits,  the  right  to 
the  Crown,  which  then  passes  to  the  next  heir.  In  order 
to  insure  a  test  that  will  make  this  last  provision  effective, 
the  sovereign  is  obliged  to  take  an  oath,  abjuring  the  Catho- 
lic religion,  in  words  which  have  proved  offensive  to  mem- 
bers of  that  faith.  After  the  accession  of  Edward  VII., 
therefore,  but  before  his  coronation,  an  effort  was  made  to 
modify  the  form  of  the  oath,  and  a  bill  was  introduced  into 
the  House  of  Lords  for  that  purpose ;  but  it  was  not  then 
found  possible  to  arrange  a  phrase  satisfactory  to  all  parties, 
and  the  bill  was  dropped. 

In  other  monarchies  permanent  provision  has  been  made  incapacity 
by  law  for  the  possible  incapacity  of  the  monarch,  whether  sovereign. 
by  reason  of  infancy  or  insanity.  But  this  has  never  been 
done  in  England.  Each  case  has  been  dealt  with  as  it  arose, 
and  usually  after  it  has  arisen,  so  that,  in  default  of  any 
person  competent  to  give  the  royal  assent  to  bills,  Parlia- 
ment has  been  driven  into  the  legal  absurdity  of  first  passing 
a  regency  bill  to  confer  such  a  power  upon  a  regent,  and 
then  directing  the  Chancellor  to  affix  the  Great  Seal  to  a  com- 
mission for  giving  assent  to  that  bill.  Until  recent  times  it 
was  also  thought  necessary  to  appoint  officers,  Lords  Justices 

'  Except,  of  course,  thai  the  eldest  of  several  sisters  succeeds  instead  of 
all  having  equal  rights  as  co-parceners. 

c 


18  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

or  others,  to  exercise  the  royal  powers  when  the  sovereign 
went  out  of  the  kingdom ;  but  with  the  rapidity  of  modern 
travel  and  communication  this  has  become  unnecessary, 
and  it  has  not  been  done  since  the  accession  of  Queen 
Victoria. 
The  Powers  The  authority  of  the  English  monarch  may  be  considered 
Crown  from  different  points  of  view,  which  must  be  taken  up  in 

succession;  the  first  question  being  what  power  is  legally 
vested  in  the  Crown ;  the  second  how  much  of  that  power 
can  practically  be  exercised  at  all ;  the  third  how  far  the 
power  of  the  Crown  actually  is,  or  may  be,  used  in  accordance 
with  the  personal  wishes  of  the  King,  and  how  far  its  exercise 
is  really  directed  by  his  ministers ;  the  fourth,  how  far  their 
action  is  in  turn  controlled  by  Parliament.  The  first  two 
questions,  which  form  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  cannot 
always  be  treated  separately,  for  it  is  sometimes  impossible 
to  be  sure  whether  a  power  that  cannot  practically  be  exer- 
cised is  or  is  not  legally  vested  in  the  Crown.  An  attempt 
to  make  use  of  any  doubtful  power  would  probably  be 
resisted,  and  the  legality  of  the  act  could  be  discussed  in 
Parliament  or  determined  by  the  law  courts ;  but  it  is  very 
rare  at  the  present  day  that  any  such  attempt  is  made. 
There  are  powers  that  have  been  disputed,  or  fallen  into 
disuse,  and  that  no  government  would  ever  think  of  reviv- 
ing; and  thus  the  question  of  law  never  having  been  settled, 
the  legal  right  of  the  Crown  to  make  use  of  them  must 
remain  uncertain. 
The  The  authority  of  the  Crown  may  be  traced  to  two  different 

sources.  One  of  them  is  statutory,  and  comprises  the  vari- 
ous powers  conferred  upon  the  Crown  by  Acts  of  Parliament. 
The  other  source  gives  rise  to  what  is  more  properly  called 
the  prerogative.  This  lias  been  described  by  Professor 
Dicey  '  as  the  original  discretionary  authority  left  at  any 
moment  in  the  hands  of  the  King;  in  other  words,  what 
remains  of  the  ancient  customary  or  Common  Law  powers 
inherent  in  the  Crown.     The  distinction  is  one  not  always 

1  "  Law  of  the  Constitution,"  355. 


THE  CROWN  19 

perfectly  easy  to  draw,  for  many  parts  of  the  prerogative 
have  been  regulated  and  modified  by  statute,  and  in  such 
cases  it  is  not  always  clear  whether  the  authority  now  exer- 
cised is  derived  from  statute  or  from  the  prerogative. 
Nevertheless  the  distinction  is  often  important,  because 
where  the  powers  have  been  conferred  by  Parliament  the 
Crown  acts  by  virtue  of  a  delegated  authority  which  lies 
wholly  within  the  four  corners  of  the  statute,  and  exists 
only  so  far  as  it  is  expressly  contained  therein;  while  the 
prerogative  not  being  circumscribed  by  any  document  is 
more  indefinite,  and  capable  of  expanding  or  contracting 
with  the  progress  of  the  suns. 

All  legislative  power  is  vested  in  the  King  in  Parliament ;  Legislative 
that  is,  in  the  King  acting  in  concert  with  the  two  Houses.  ower* 
Legally,  every  act  requires  the  royal  assent,  and,  indeed,  the 
Houses  can  transact  business  only  during  the  pleasure  of  the 
Crown,  which  summons  and  prorogues  them,  and  can  at  any 
moment  dissolve  the  House  of  Commons.  But  it  is  impor- 
tant to  note  that  by  itself,  and  apart  from  Parliament, 
the  Crown  has  to-day,  within  the  United  Kingdom,1  no  inhe- 
rent legislative  power  whatever.  This  was  not  always  true, 
for  legislation  has  at  times  been  enacted  by  the  Crown  alone 
in  the  form  of  ordinances  or  proclamations;  but  the  prac- 
tice may  be  said  to  have  received  its  death-blow  from  the 
famous  opinion  of  Lord  Coke,  "that  the  King  by  his  procla- 
mation cannot  create  any  offence  which  was  not  an  offence 
before,  for  then  he  may  alter  the  law  of  the  land."2  The 
English  Crown  has,  therefore,  no  inherent  power  to  make 
ordinances  for  completing  the  laws,  such  as  is  possessed  by 
the  chief  magistrate  in  France  and  other  continental  states. 
This  does  not  mean  that  it  cannot  make  regulations  for  the 

1  The  statement  is  made  with  this  limitation  because  the  Crown  has 
always  had  inherent  authority  to  legislate  directly  for  Crown  colonies  ac- 
quired by  conquest;  but  if  the  Crown  once  grants  a  representative  legislature 
to  such  a  colony  without  reserving  its  own  legislative  authority,  it  surrenders 
that  authority  over  the  colony  forever.  See  Jenkyns,  "  British  Rule  and 
Jurisdiction   Beyond   the  Seas,"  4-6,  95;   Campbell  vs.  Hall,  Cowp.,  204. 

2  Cake's  Reports,  XII.,  76. 


20  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

conduct  of  affairs  by  its  own  servants,  by  Orders  in  Council, 
for  example,  establishing  regulations  for  the  management 
of  the  Army,  or  prescribing  examinations  for  entrance  to  the 
civil  service.  These  are  merely  rules  such  as  any  private 
employer  might  make  in  his  own  business,  and  differ  en- 
tirely in  their  nature  from  ordinances  which  have  the  force 
of  law,  and  are  binding  quite  apart  from  any  contract  of 
employment. 

Power  to  make  ordinances  which  have  the  force  of  law 
and  are  binding  on  the  whole  community  is,  however,  fre- 
quently given  to  the  Crown  !  by  statute,  notably  in  matters 
affecting  public  health,  education,  etc.,  and  the  practice  is 
constantly  becoming  more  and  more  extensive,  until  at  pres- 
ent the  rules  made  in  pursuance  of  such  powers  —  known 
as  "statutory  orders"  —  are  published  every  year  in  a 
volume  similar  in  form  to  that  containing  the  statutes., 
Some  of  these  orders  must  be  submitted  to  Parliament,  but 
go  into  effect  unless  within  a  certain  time  an  address  to  the 
contrary  is  passed  by  one  of  the  Houses,  while  others  take 
effect  at  once,  or  after  a  fixed  period,  and  are  laid  upon  the 
tables  of  the  Houses  in  order  to  give  formal  notice  of  their 
adoption.  A  fuller  description  of  these  orders  must,  how- 
ever, be  postponed  to  the  chapters  that  deal  with  Parlia- 
ment. It  is  only  necessary  here  to  point  out  that  in  making 
such  orders  the  Crown  acts  by  virtue  of  a  purely  delegated 
authority,  and  stands  in  the  same  position  as  a  town  council. 
The  orders  are  a  species  of  subordinate  legislation,  and  can 
be  enacted  only  in  strict  conformity  with  the  statutes  by 
which  the  power  is  granted ;  and  being  delegated,  not  in- 
herent in  the  Crown,  a  power  of  this  kind  does  not  fall 
within  the  prerogative  in  its  narrower  and  more  appropriate 
sense. 

Executive         The  Crown  is  at  the  head  of  the  executive  branch  of  the 
central    government,  and    carries    out  the   laws,  so   far  as 
their  execution   requires  the  intervention  of  any  national 
public  authority.     In   fact    all    national    executive    power, 
1  Or  more  strictly  to  the  Crown  in  Council. 


Power. 


THE  CROWN  21 

whether  regulated  by  statute,  or  forming  strictly  a  part  of 
the  prerogative,  is  exercised  in  the  name  of  the  Crown,  and 
by  its  authority,  except  when  directly  conferred  by  statute 
upon  some  officer  of  the  Crown,  and  in  this  case,  as  we  shall 
see,  it  is  exercised  by  that  officer  as  a  servant  of  the  Crown, 
and  under  its  direction  and  control.  Legally  some  of  the 
executive  powers  are  indeed  vested  in  the  Crown  in  Council 
—  that  is,  in  the  King  acting  with  his  Privy  Council  —  but 
as  the  Council  has  no  independent  authority,  and  consists, 
for  practical  purposes,  of  the  principal  ministers  appointed 
by  the  Crown,  even  these  powers  may  be  said  to  reside  in 
the  Crown  alone. 

All  national  public  officers,  except  some  of  the  officials  of  Appoint- 
the  Houses  of  Parliament,  and  a  few  hereditary  dignitaries  Q^nts  to 
whose  duties  are  purely  ceremonial,1  are  appointed  directly 
by  the  Crown  or  by  the  high  state  officials  whom  it  has 
itself  appointed  ;  and  the  Crown  has  also  the  right  to  remove 
them,  barring  a  small  number  whose  tenure  is  during  good 
behaviour.  Of  these  last  by  far  the  most  important  are 
the  judges,  the  members  of  the  Council  of  India,  and  the 
Controller  and  Auditor  General,  no  one  of  whom  has  any 
direct  part  in  the  executive  government  of  the  kingdom.2 
Now  the  right  to  appoint  and  remove  involves  the  power 
to  control ;  and,  therefore,  it  may  be  said  in  general  that 
the  whole  executive  machinery  of  the  central  government 
of  England  is  under  the  direction  of  the  Crown. 

The  Crown  furthermore  authorises  under  the  sign  manual  other 
the  expenditure  of  public  money  in  accordance  with  the  Poyers 

under  the 

appropriations  made  by  Parliament,  and  then  expends  the  Preroga- 
money.     It  can  grant  charters  of  incorporation,  with  powers    lve 
not  inconsistent  with  the  law  of  the  land,  so  far  as  the  right 
to  do  so  has  not  been  limited  by  statute ;  but  in  consequence 

1  Such  as  the  hereditary  Earl  Marshal  and  Grand  Falconer. 

2  On  the  power  of  removal  from  an  office  held  during  good  behaviour,  and 
on  the  effect  of  the  provision  that  the  three  classes  of  officers  mentioned 
above  may  be  removed  upon  the  address  of  both  Houses  of  Parliament,  see 
Anson,  "  Law  and  Custom  of  the  Constitution,"  II.,  213-1").  The  references 
to  Anson  are  to  the  3  Ed.  of   Vol.  I.  (1897);  the  2  Ed.  of  Vol.  II.  (189G). 


22  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

of  the  various  reform  acts,  municipal  corporation  acts,  and 
local  government  acts,  no  charter  conferring  political 
power  can  now  be  created  except  in  pursuance  of  statute, 
while  even  commercial  companies  usually  require  privi- 
leges which  can  be  given  only  by  the  same  authority.1  The 
Crown  grants  all  pardons,  creates  all  peers,  and  confers  all 
titles  and  honours.  As  head  of  the  Established  Church  of 
England  it  summons  Convocation  with  a  license  to  transact 
business  specified  in  advance.  It  virtually  appoints  the 
archbishops,  bishops  and  most  of  the  deans  and  canons, 
and  has  in  its  gift  many  rectorships  and  other  livings.2  As 
head  of  the  Army  and  Navy  it  raises  and  controls  the  armed 
forces  of  the  nation,  and  makes  regulations  for  their  govern- 
ment, subject,  of  course,  to  the  statutes  and  to  the  passage 
of  the  Annual  Army  Act.  It  represents  the  empire  in  all 
external  relations,  and  in  all  dealings  with  foreign  powers. 
It  has  power  to  declare  war,  make  peace,  and  conclude 
treaties,  save  that,  without  the  sanction  of  Parliament,  a 
treaty  cannot  impose  a  charge  upon  the  people,  or  change 
the  law  of  the  land,  and  it  is  doubtful  how  far  without  that 
sanction  private  rights  can  be  sacrificed  or  territory  ceded.3 
Executive  Just  as  Parliament  has   often    conferred   legislative    au- 

under  thority    upon    the  Crown,   so    it  has    conferred    executive 

statutes.  power  in  addition  to  that  possessed  by  virtue  of  the  pre- 
rogative. I  do  not  refer  here  to  the  cases  where  a  statute 
creates  new  public  duties  to  be  performed  directly  by  the 
Crown  and  confers  upon  it  the  authority  needed  for  the 
purpose.  Such  powers,  although  statutory,  are  exercised 
in  the  same  way  as  those  derived  from  the  prerogative. 
I  refer  to  statutes  that  regulate  the  duties  or  privileges  of 
local  and  other  bodies,  and  give  to  the  Crown,  not  a  direct 
authority  to  carry  out  the  law,  but  a  power  of  supervision 
and    control.      Statutes   of   this   kind   have    become    very 

1  Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  2  Ed.  (1887),  Ch.  xiv. 

2  See  the  later  chapter  on  The  Church. 

'  ('(.  Anson,  "  l,a\v  and  Custom,"  [I.,  297-99;  Dicey,  "Law  of  the  Con- 
stitution," :;'.):;.  Heligoland  was  ceded  to  Germany  by  treaty  in  1890, 
subject   io  the  assent  of  Parliament,  which  was  given  by  53-54  Vic,  c.  32. 


THE  CROWN  23 

common  during  the  last  half  century  in  relation  to  such 
matters  as  local  government,  public  health,  pauperism, 
housing  of  the  working-classes,  education,  tramways, 
electric  lighting  and  a  host  of  other  things.  Even  with- 
out an  express  grant  of  authority,  supervisory  powers 
have  often  been  conferred  upon  the  Crown  by  means 
of  appropriations  for  local  purposes  which  can  be  applied 
by  the  government  at  its  discretion,  and  hence  in  accord- 
ance with  such  regulations  as  it  chooses  to  prescribe.  This 
has  been  true,  for  example,  of  the  subsidies  in  aid  of  the 
local  police,  and  of  education.  By  such  methods  the  local 
authorities,  and  especially  the  smaller  ones,  have  been 
brought  under  the  tutelage  of  the  Crown  to  an  extent 
quite  unknown  in  the  past. 

All  told,  the  executive  authority  of  the  Crown  is,  in  the  eye  wide  Ex- 
of  the  law,  very  wide,  far  wider  than  that  of  the  chief  magis-  p"^.  ^ 
trate  in  many  countries,  and  well-nigh  as  extensive  as  that  the  Crown, 
now  possessed  by  the  monarch  in  any  government  not  an 
absolute  despotism ;  and  although  the  Crown  has  no  in- 
herent legislative  power  except  in  conjunction  with  Par- 
liament, it  has  been  given  by  statute  very  large  powers 
of  subordinate  legislation.  "It  would  very  much  surprise 
people,"  as  Bagehot  remarked  in  his  incisive  way,  "if  they 
were  only  told  how  many  things  the  Queen  could  do  without 
consulting  Parliament  .  .  .  Not  to  mention  other  things, 
she  could  disband  the  army  (by  law  she  cannot  engage 
more  than  a  certain  number  of  men,  but  she  is  not  obliged 
to  engage  any  men)  ;  she  could  dismiss  all  the  officers,  from 
the  General  Commanding-in-Chief  downwards ;  she  could 
dismiss  all  the  sailors  too;  she  could  sell  off  all  our  ships 
of  war  and  all  our  naval  stores;  she  could  make  a  peace  by 
the  sacrifice  of  Cornwall,  and  begin  a  war  for  the  conquest 
of  Brittany.  She  could  make  every  citizen  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  male  or  female,  a  peer;  she  could  make  every 
parish  in  the  United  Kingdom  a  'university';  she  could 
dismiss  most  of  the  civil  servants;  she  could  pardon  all 
offenders.     In    a    word,    tin;    Queen    could    by    prerogative 


have  been 
Lost 


24  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

upset  all  the  action  of  civil  government  within  the  govern- 
ment."1 We  might  add  that  the  Crown  could  appoint 
bishops,  and  in  many  places  clergymen,  whose  doctrines 
were  repulsive  to  their  flocks ;  could  cause  every  dog  to  be 
muzzled,  every  pauper  to  eat  leeks,  every  child  in  the 
public  elementary  schools  to  study  Welsh ;  and  could  make 
all  local  improvements,  such  as  tramways  and  electric 
light,  well-nigh  impossible. 
Powers  that  Great  as  the  prerogative  is  to-day,  it  was,  in  some  direc- 
tions, even  more  extensive  in  the  past,  and  men  are  in  the 
habit  of  repeating  the  phrases  derived  from  that  past  after 
they  have  lost  their  meaning.  This  is  done  by  writers  who 
are  not  under  the  slightest  misapprehension  in  regard  to 
the  actual  legal  authority  of  the  Crown.  It  is  the  habit, 
for  example,  to  speak  of  the  Crown  as  the  fountain  of  jus- 
tice, and  even  an  author  so  learned  and  accurate  as  Todd 
repeats  Blackstone's  statement  that  "By  the  fountain  of 
justice,  the  law  does  not  mean  the  author  or  original,  but 
only  the  distributor.  Justice  is  not  derived  from  the  king, 
as  from  his  free  gift,  but  he  is  the  steward  of  the  public,  to 
dispense  it  to  whom  it  is  due.  He  is  not  the  spring,  but 
the  reservoir,  from  whence  right  and  equity  are  conducted 
by  a  thousand  channels  to  every  individual."  2  Now  apart 
from  public  prosecution  by  the  state,  which  is  less  com- 
mon in  England  than  elsewhere,  and  the  use  of  the  King's 
name  in  judicial  process,  the  only  legal  connection  of  the 
Crown  with  the  distribution  of  justice  to-day  lies  in  the 
appointment  of  the  judges;  and  to  call  it  on  that  account 
the  reservoir  of  justice  is  merely  fanciful.  There  was  a 
time  when  the  Crown  was  really  the  fountain  or  reservoir 
of  justice,  when  it  might  fairly  have  been  said  to  admin- 
ister justice  by  deputy.  It  created  the  Common  Law 
courts,  and  after  the  growth  of  civilisation  had  produced 
more  refined  and  complex  ideas  of  justice  it  received 
petitions  for  the  redress  of  wrongs  not  recognised  before. 

1  "English  Constitution,"  2  Ed.  (Amor.),  Introd.,  31. 
'Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  I.,  570. 


THE  CROWN  25 

and  established  new  courts  to  deal  with  them.  Stubbs 
has  compared  the  process  to  that  of  the  sun  throwing  off  a 
series  of  nebulous  envelopes,  which  rolled  up  into  compact 
bodies,  but  left  the  old  nucleus  of  light  to  assert  its  vitality, 
unimpaired  by  successive  emanations.1  In  this  way  the 
courts  of  equity  arose  to  give  relief  in  cases  where  there 
was  no  remedy  by  the  strict  rules  of  the  Common  Law, 
while  the  Star  Chamber  performed  an  analogous  function 
in  criminal  matters.  This  last  tribunal  came  to  be  used 
as  a  political  engine  under  the  Stuarts,  and  was  abolished 
by  statute  2  early  in  the  struggle  with  Charles  I.  With  the 
fall  of  the  Stuarts  the  power  of  the  Crown  to  create  new 
courts  came  to  an  end  altogether.  In  1089  the  Bill  of 
Rights  declared  the  " Court  of  Commissioners  for  Ecclesi- 
astical Causes,  and  all  other  Commissions  and  Courts  of  a 
like  Nature,"  illegal,  and  since  that  time  an  Act  of  Parlia- 
ment has  been  necessary  to  create  any  new  court  of  justice 
in  England. 

The  Crown  has  been  deprived  in  the  same  way  of  other 
powers  once  possessed  or  claimed  under  the  prerogative. 
The  Bill  of  Rights,  for  example,  declared  illegal  the  sus- 
pending or  dispensing  with  laws,  and  the  maintenance  of  a 
standing  army  in  time  of  peace  without  the  consent  of 
Parliament.  Some  powers  have,  from  long  disuse,  become 
obsolete  and  have  been  lost ;  such  as  the  right  to  confer  on 
boroughs  the  privilege  of  electing  members  to  the  House 
of  Commons ; 3  and  the  power  to  create  life  peers  with  votes 
in  the  House  of  Lords.4  Other  powers  again,  although 
legally  unimpaired,  have  become  obsolete  in  practice,  and 
can  no  longer  be  exerted.  The  illustration  commonly  given 
of  this  is  the  right  of  the  Crown  to  withhold  its  assent 
to  a  bill  passed  by  Parliament,  —  popularly  called,  or  mis- 

1  "Const.  Hist,  of  England,"  4  Ed..  L,  647.  2  16  Car.  T.,  c.  10. 

3  It  may  be  maintained  that  the  right,  if  not  already  lost  by  disuse,  was 
by  implication,  though  not  expressly,  taken  away  by  the  Reform  Acts  of 
IH'.i'J,  IS()7  and  1885,  which  created  new  boroughs  and  disfranchised  old  ones. 

4  See  the  debate  in  the  Lords  on  the  Wensleydalc  ease.  Hans.,  3  Ser., 
CXL.,  [ifiasim. 


26  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

called,  the  veto.  The  right  has  not  been  exercised  since 
the  days  of  Queen  Anne ;  but  it  may  not  be  gone  so  com- 
pletely beyond  revival  as  is  generally  supposed.  It  could, 
of  course,  be  used  only  on  the  advice  of  the  ministry  of  the 
day,  and  under  ordinary  circumstances  a  ministry  willing 
to  withhold  the  royal  assent  to  a  bill  would  be  bound  to 
treat  the  passage  of  that  bill  by  the  House  of  Commons  as 
a  ground  for  resignation  or  dissolution.  One  can  imagine, 
however,  a  case  where  after  a  bill  has  passed  the  Commons 
the  ministry  should  resign,  and  the  House  of  Lords  should 
insist  on  passing  the  bill  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the 
new  cabinet.  It  would  be  rash  to  assert  that  in  such  a  case 
the  royal  assent  would  not  be  withheld.  Something  of  the 
kind  very  nearly  occurred  in  1858,  when  the  ministry  threat- 
ened to  advise  the  Queen  to  withhold  her  assent  to  a  private 
bill  unless  the  Lords  gave  permission  to  the  Board  of  Works 
to  appear  before  the  private  bill  committee  and  oppose 
the  plans.1 
Powers  of  Since  the  accession  of  the  House  of  Hanover  the  new 

pxoroiTod'bv  Powers  conferred  upon  the  Crown  by  statute  have  probably 
Ministers.  more  than  made  up  for  the  loss  to  the  prerogative  of  powers 
which  have  either  been  restricted  by  the  same  process  or 
become  obsolete  by  disuse.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  the 
prerogative,  as  it  existed  at  that  time,  has  remained  legally 
vested  in  the  Crown,  and  can  be  exercised  to-day ;  but  it 
is  no  longer  used  in  accordance  with  the  personal  wishes  of 
the  sovereign.  By  a  gradual  process  his  authority  has 
come  more  and  more  under  the  control  of  his  ministers, 
until  it  is  now  almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  cabinet, 
which  is  responsible  to  Parliament,  and  through  Parliament 
to  the  nation.  The  cabinet  is  to-day  the  mainspring  of 
the  whole  political  system,  and  the  clearest  method  of  ex- 
plaining the  relations  of  the  different  branches  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  each  other  is  to  describe  in  succession  their 
relations  with  the  cabinet. 

1  The   Victoria  Station  and   Pimlico   Railway  Bill,   Hans.,  3  Scr.,  CLL. 
586-89,  691-93,  797-98.     Sec  Todd,  II.,  392. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  CROWN  AND  THE  CABINET 

It  is  not  within  the  province  of  this  book  to  trace  the  pro- 
cess whereby  the  King  became  irresponsible  both  at  law  and 
before  the  nation,  while  the  responsibility  for  his  acts  became 
transferred  to  his  ministers.  The  story  has  been  told  by 
others  far  better  than  the  writer  could  tell  it,  and  the  object 
here  is  only  to  note  the  results  of  that  process  in  the  existing 
constitution. 

The  doctrine  that  "the  King  can  do  no  wrong"  had  its  The  King 
beginnings  as  far  back  as  the  infancy  of  Henry  III.,  and  by  wrong  at 
degrees  it  grew  until  it  became  a  cardinal  principle  of  the  Law; 
constitution.  Legally  it  means  that  he  cannot  be  adjudged 
guilty  of  wrong-doing,  and  hence  that  no  proceedings  can 
be  brought  against  him.  He  cannot  be  prosecuted  crimi- 
nally, or,  without  his  own  consent,  sued  civilly  in  tort  or  in 
contract  in  any  court  in  the  land.1  But  clearly  if  the  gov- 
ernment is  to  be  one  of  law,  if  public  officers  like  private 
citizens  are  to  be  subject  to  the  courts,  if  the  people  are  to 
be  protected  from  arbitrary  power,  the  servant  who  acts  on 
behalf  of  the  Crown  must  be  held  responsible  for  illegal 
conduct  from  the  consequences  of  which  the  King  himself 
is  free.  Hence  the  principle  arose  that  the  King's  command 
is  no  excuse  for  a  wrongful  act,  and  this  is  a  firmly  estab- 
lished maxim  of  the  Common  Law  in  both  civil  and  crimi- 
nal proceedings.2     To  prevent  royal  violations  of  the  law, 

1  If  a  person  lias  a  claim  against  the  Crown  for  broach  of  contract,  or 
because  his  property  i  in  its  possession,  he  may  bring  a  Petition  of  Right, 
and  the  Crown  on  the  advice  of  the  Home  Secretary  will  order  the  petition 
indorsed  "  Let  riyht  he  done,"  when   the  case  proceeds  like  an  ordinary  suit. 

2  Anson,  II.,  4,  .",,  42,  43,  27K,  ^7<>,  476-80.  Bui  a  servant  of  the 
Crown  is  not  liable  on  its  contracts,  for  he  has  made  no  contract  personally, 
and  he  cannot  be  compelled  to  carry  out  the  contracts  of  the  Crown.     Gid- 


or  in 
Politics. 


28  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

however,  it  is  not  enough  to  hold  liable  a  servant  who  exe- 
cutes unlawful  orders,  if  the  master  still  has  power  to  commit 
offences  directly.  A  further  step  must  be  taken  by  restrain- 
ing the  Crown  from  acting  without  the  mediation  of  a  ser- 
vant who  can  be  made  accountable,  and  for  this  reason 
Edward  IV.  was  informed  that  he  could  not  make  an  arrest 
in  person.1  But,  as  the  kings  and  queens  are  not  likely  to 
be  tempted  into  personal  assaults  and  trespasses,  the  prin- 
ciple that  they  can  act  only  through  agents  has  had  little 
importance  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  liability  at  law, 
although  it  is  a  matter  of  vital  consequence  in  relation  to 
their  political  responsibility. 

The  doctrine  that  the  King  can  do  no  wrong  applies 
not  only  to  legal  offences,  but  also  to  political  errors.  The 
principle  developed  slowly,  as  a  part  of  the  long  movement 
that  has  brought  the  royal  authority  under  the  control  of 
public  opinion ;  not  that  the  process  was  altogether  con- 
scious, or  the  steps  deliberately  planned,  but  taking  con- 
stitutional history  as  a  whole,  we  can  see  that  it  tended  to 
a  result,  and  in  speaking  of  this  it  is  natural  to  use  terms 
implying  an  intent  which  the  actors  did  not  really  possess. 
To  keep  the  Crown  from  actual  violations  of  law  was  not 
always  easy,  but  it  was  far  more  difficult  to  prevent  it  from 
using  its  undoubted  prerogatives  to  carry  out  an  unpopular 
policy.  Parliament  could  do  something  in  a  fitful  and  in- 
termittent way  by  refusing  supplies  or  insisting  upon  the 
redress  of  particular  grievances,   but  that  alone  was  not 

ley  vs.  Lord  Palmerston,  3  B.  &  B.,  284.  The  rule  that  the  sovereign  cannot 
be  sued  has  been  held  to  prevent  a  possessory  action  against  a  person 
wrongfully  in  the  possession  of  land  as  agent  of  the  Crown :  Doe.  d.  Legh.  vs. 
Roe.,  8  M.  &  W.,  579.  It  would  seem  that  in  such  a  case  the  courts  might 
have  held  that  as  the  King  could  do  no  wrong,  the  wrongful  act,  and  conse- 
quently the  possession,  was  not  his;  in  other  words,  that  the  agency  could 
not  be  set  up  as  a  defence  to  the  wrongful  act.  Compare  United  States  vs. 
Lee,  106  I  .S.,  196,  where  land  had  been  illegally  seized  by  the  government 
of  the  I'nitnl  Stale-. 

1  Coke.  Inst.  (  1  Ed.),  II.,  186-87.  "Hussey  Chief  Justice  reported,  that 
Sir  John  Markham  said  to  King  E.  I.  that  the  King  could  not  arrest  any 
man  for  suspition  of  Treason,  or  Felony,  as  any  of  his  Subjects  might, 
because  if  the  King  did  wrong,  the  party  could  not  have  his  Action."  E.  I. 
is  a  mistake  for  K.  1  V. 


THE  CROWN  AND  THE  CABINET  29 

enough  to  secure  harmony  between  the  Crown  and  the  other 
political  forces  of  the  day.  There  could,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  be  no  appropriate  penalty  for  royal  misgovernment. 
In  the  Middle  Ages,  indeed,  a  bad  king  or  a  weak  king  might 
lose  his  throne  or  even  his  life ;  but  in  more  settled  times 
such  things  could  not  take  place  without  a  violent  con- 
vulsion of  the  whole  realm,  —  a  truth  only  too  well  illus- 
trated by  the  events  of  the  seventeenth  century.  An 
orderly  government  cannot  be  founded  on  the  basis  of  per- 
sonal rule  tempered  by  revolution.  Either  the  royal  power 
must  be  exercised  at  the  personal  will  of  the  monarch,  or 
else  other  persons  who  can  be  made  accountable  must  take 
part  in  his  acts  of  state. 

As  early  as  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries  the  a  Minister 
King's  Council  had  begun  to  encumber  the  affixing  of  the  ^l^ach  o^ 
various  seals  with  a  series  of  formalities  which  involved  his  Acts, 
the  intervention  of  one  or  more  royal  officers.  The  process 
continued  until  custom  or  statute  required  that  almost 
every  public  act  which  the  Crown  was  in  the  habit  of  per- 
forming directly  —  except  the  appointment  and  removal 
of  the  great  officers  of  state  themselves  —  must  either  be 
done  in  the  Privy  Council,  or  by  means  of  an  instrument 
authenticated  by  seals  or  countersignatures  affixed  by  one 
or  more  officers  of  state.1  The  object  of  these  formalities 
was  to  protect  the  Crown  from  improvident  grants,  and  to 
secure  the  influence  of  the  Council  over  the  administration,2 
rather  than  to  create  any  responsibility  to  Parliament  or 
the  public ;  and  yet  it  was  easy  to  maintain,  when  the  time 
was  ripe,  that  the  officer  who  sealed  or  signed  assumed 
thereby  responsibility  for  the  act.  Then  if  a  wrong  was 
committed  some  one  could  be  held  to  account ;  for  mis- 
conduct some  one  could  be  punished  ;  for  acts  that  were 
unpopular,  or  a  policy  that  was  odious,  some  one  beneath 
the  throne  could  be  assailed  ;  and  if  a  strong  expression  of 
resentment  did  not  deter  the  offender,  Parliament  had  as  a 

1  Anson,  II.,  27,  42-54.      Dicey,  "The  Privy  Council,"  34  rt  seq. 

2  Dicey,  Ibid.,  40-42. 


Modern  Re- 
sponsibility 


30  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

last  resort  the  weapons  of  impeachment  and  bill  of  attainder. 
These  weapons  were  a  stage  in  the  process  of  evolution,  a 
stepping-stone  in  the  progress  of  parliamentary  control,  but 
they  were  far  too  rough  to  produce  a  true  accord  between 
the  Crown  and  Parliament ;  and  when  the  political  experi- 
ments of  William  and  of  Anne,  fostered  by  the  timely  acci- 
dent of  two  unkingly  foreigners  upon  the  throne,  evolved 
at  last  the  system  of  a  responsible  ministry  in  its  present 
form,  even  impeachment  became  obsolete,  or  rather  it  lin- 
gered only  as  a  means  of  retribution  for  personal  malfea- 
sance in  office. 
Nature  of  The  rules  requiring  seals  or  signatures  to  be  affixed  to 
royal  acts,  though  somewhat  simplified,  remain  in  force  to- 
day, but  they  have  ceased  to  be  the  real  source  of  respon- 
sibility. The  effort  to  fasten  upon  a  particular  person  the 
actual  responsibility  for  each  public  act  of  the  Crown  by 
compelling  some  officer  to  put  his  approval  of  it  on  record, 
has  been  superseded  by  the  general  principle  that  the  re- 
sponsibility must  always  be  imputed  to  a  minister.  Though 
ignorant  of  the  matter  at  the  time  it  occurred,  he  becomes 
answerable  if  he  retains  his  post  after  it  comes  to  his  know- 
ledge ;  and  even  though  not  in  office  when  the  act  was  done, 
yet  if  he  is  appointed  in  consequence  of  it,  he  assumes  with 
the  office  the  responsibility  for  the  act.  This  happened  to 
Sir  Robert  Peel  in  1834.  Believing,  as  every  one  at  that 
time  did  believe,  that  the  King  had  arbitrarily  dismissed 
Lord  Melbourne's  cabinet,  he  said,  "I  should  by  my  ac- 
ceptance of  the  office  of  First  Minister  become  technically , 
if  not  morally,  responsible  for  the  dissolution  of  the  pre- 
ceding government,  although  I  had  not  the  remotest  concern 
in  it."  The  rule  is  so  universal  in  its  operation  "that  there 
is  not  a  moment  in  the  King's  life,  from  his  accession  to  his 
demise,  during  which  there  is  not  some  one  responsible  to 
Parliament  for  his  public  conduct."  2  A  minister  is  now 
politically    responsible    for   everything   that    occurs    in    his 

1  Mahon  and  Cardwell,  "  Memoirs  by  Sir  Robert  Peel,"  II.,  31. 

2  Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  2  Ed.,  I.,  266. 


THE  CROWN  AND  THE  CABINET  31 

department,  whether  countersignature  or  seal  is  affixed 
by  him  or  not;  and  all  the  ministers  are  jointly  responsible 
for  every  highly  important  political  act.  A  minister  whose 
policy  is  condemned  by  Parliament  is  no  longer  punished, 
he  resigns ;  and  if  the  affair  involves  more  than  his  personal 
conduct  or  competence,  if  it  is  of  such  moment  that  it  ought 
to  have  engaged  the  attention  of  the  cabinet,  his  colleagues 
resign  with  him.  Thus  punitive  responsibility  has  been 
replaced  by  political  responsibility,  and  separate  has  been 
enlarged  to  joint  responsibility. 

The  ministers,  being  responsible  to  Parliament  for  all  the  The  King 
acts  of  the  Crown,  are  obliged  to  refrain  from  things  that  ^^^iT 
they  cannot  justify,  and  to  insist  upon  actions  which  they  of  Min- 
regard  as  necessary.     In  short,  the  cabinet  must  carry  out  w  erb' 
its  own  policy ;   and  to  that  policy  the  Crown  must  submit. 
The  King  may,  of  course,  be  able  to  persuade  his  ministers    . 
to  abandon  a  policy  of  which  he  does  not  approve,  and  of 
his  opportunities  for  doing  so  we  shall  have  more  to  say 
later ;    but  if  he  cannot  persuade  them,  and,  backed  by  a 
majority  in  Parliament,  they  insist  upon  their  views,  he 
must  yield.     It  is  commonly  said  that  he  must  give  his 
ministers  his  confidence,  but  it  would  be  more  accurate  to 
say  that  he  must  follow  their  advice.     With   the   progress 
of  the  parliamentary  system  this  custom  has  grown  more 
and  more  settled,  the  ministers  assuming  greater  control, 
and  the  Crown  yielding  more  readily,  not  necessarily  from 
any  dread  of  the  consequences,  but  from  the  force  of  habit. 

According  to  the  older  theory  of  parliamentary  govern-  or  Find 
rnent,  it  was  merely  necessary  that  the  King  should  have  w|uieASc^pt 
ministers  who  would  accept  responsibility  for  his  acts;   and,    Responsi- 
therefore,  he  might  disregard  their  advice  if  he  could  find 
others  who   were   willing  to   adopt  his  policy,    and   assume 
responsibility  for  it.     Such  an  alternative  is  a  very  remote 
possibility  in   England  to-day.      It  could  only  be  brought 
about  in  one  of  two  ways. 

In  the  first  place  it  might  be  brought  about  by  the  dis- 
missal of  the  cabinet.     William   IV.  was  long  supposed  to 


32  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

have  dismissed  arbitrarily  Lord  Melbourne's  cabinet  in 
1834,  and  for  many  years  his  action  in  so  doing  was  freely 
criticised;  but  on  the  publication  of  the  Melbourne  Papers1 
it  appeared  that  the  Prime  Minister  himself,  meeting  with 
great  difficulty  in  carrying  on  the  government,  virtually 
suggested  the  dismissal  to  the  King ;  and  thus  the  incident 
was  rather  in  the  nature  of  a  resignation  than  a  dismissal. 
The  right  to  dismiss  a  ministry,  although  unquestionably 
within  the  legal  prerogative  of  the  Crown,  seems  to  be 
regarded  as  one  of  those  powers  which  the  close  respon- 
sibility of  the  cabinet  to  the  House  of  Commons  has 
practically  made  obsolete.  As  in  the  case  of  some  other 
powers,  however,  it  is  hardly  safe  to  predict  that  it  will 
never  be  used  again,  for  circumstances  might  arise  in 
which  it  was  evident  that  the  ministry  and  the  House 
of  Commons  no  longer  represented  the  opinion  of  the 
country.  Before  Mr.  Gladstone's  last  administration  few 
people  would  have  hesitated  to  say  that  the  House  of 
Lords  would  never  again  venture  to  reject  a  bill  on  which 
a  House  of  Commons,  fresh  from  a  general  election,  was 
thoroughly  in  earnest,  when  the  subject  of  the  bill  had  been 
one  of  the  chief  issues  in  that  election.  Yet  the  Lords  re- 
jected the  last  Home  Rule  Bill  of  1893,  without  losing  popu- 
larity by  so  doing;  and  in  190G  it  destroyed  the  Education 
Bill.  It  is  conceivable  that  under  similar  conditions  the 
Crown  might,  by  dismissing  a  ministry,  force  a  dissolution, 
and  appeal  to  the  electorate.  Such  an  event,  though  highly 
improbable,  cannot  be  said  to  be  impossible. 

The  dismissal  of  a  ministry  must,  of  course,  be  carefully 
distinguished  from  the  dismissal  of  an  individual  minister. 
This  would  be  done,  as  in  the  case  of  Lord  Palmerston,  — ■ 
the  last  of  the  kind  that  has  occurred,  —  at  the  request 
of  the  Premier,  and  therefore  not  contrary  to,  but  in  accord- 
ance with,  the  advice  of  the  person  chiefly  responsible  for 
the  acts  of  the  Crown. 

The  other  way  in  which  a  change  of  ministry  could  be 

1  Pp.  220-26. 


THE  CROWN  AND  THE  CABINET  33 

brought  about  by  the  Crown  would  be  by  a  refusal  to  con- 
sent to  some  act  which  the  ministry  deemed  essential  to  their 
remaining  in  office.  Some  cases  of  the  exercise  of  such  a 
right  by  the  representative  of  the  Crown  have  taken  place 
in  the  self-governing  colonies,  but  they  are  not  such  as 
are  likely  to  occur  in  England.  A  request,  for  example, 
by  the  ministry  to  be  allowed  to  dissolve  a  colonial  legis- 
lature has  on  several  occasions  been  refused  by  the  gov- 
ernor, usually  on  the  ground  that  a  general  election  had 
recently  been  held,  or  that  there  was  no  important  issue 
pending  between  the  parties  which  the  people  could  properly 
be  called  upon  to  decide.1  In  England,  on  the  other  hand, 
such  a  request  by  a  ministry  has  never  been  refused  since 
William  Pitt  in  1784  invented  the  principle  that  a  govern- 
ment faced  by  a  hostile  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons 
may  appeal  to  the  electorate  instead  of  resigning ;  nor  is  it 
probable  that  it  will  be  refused,  because  the  rules  of  political 
fair  play  are  so  thoroughly  understood  among  English 
statesmen  that  the  power  is  not  likely  to  be  misused  for 
party  purposes. 

An  interesting  discussion  on  the  right  of  a  colonial  gov- 
ernor to  reject  the  advice  of  his  ministers  was  raised  in  the 
case  of  Governor  Darling  of  Victoria  in  1865.  The  story 
has  been  often  told.  It  grew  out  of  a  quarrel  between  the 
Assembly  and  the  Legislative  Council,  which  were  both  elec- 
tive, but  happened  to  be  on  opposite  sides  in  politics.  The 
Assembly,  wishing  to  enact  a  protective  tariff,  to  which  a 
majority  of  the  Council  was  known  to  be  opposed,  tacked 
it  to  the  annual  appropriation  bill ;  and  the  Council,  unable 
to  amend  such  a  bill,  rejected  it  altogether.  Thereupon  the 
Governor,  yielding  to  the  pressure  of  his  ministers,  sanc- 
tioned the  levy  of  the  new  duties,  the  issue  of  a  loan,  and 
the  payment  of  official  salaries,  without  the  authority  of 
any  act  regularly  passed  by  both  branches  of  the  legislature. 
For  permitting,  on  the  advice  of  his  ministers,  such  a  viola- 

1  A  description  of  these;  rases  may  be  found  in  Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in 
the  Hriti.sh  Colonies,"  52")-7.'i. 


of  a  New 

Premier 


34  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

tion  of  law,  Governor  Darling  was  rebuked,  and  finally  dis- 
missed by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies.1     It  is 
needless  to  say  that  no  such  situation  has  ever  arisen,  or  is 
likely  to  arise,  in  England. 
Selection  There  is  one  matter  in  which  the  Crown  cannot  really 

be  bound  by  the  advice  of  ministers,  and  that  is  in  the  selec- 
tion of  a  Premier.  It  would  be  obviously  improper,  not  to 
say  absurd,  that  the  King  in  the  selection  of  a  new  Prime 
Minister  should  be  obliged  to  follow  the  opinion  of  the  old 
one  who  has  just  resigned  in  consequence  of  a  change  of 
party  in  the  House  of  Commons.  That  Mr.  Balfour,  for 
example,  should  have  had  the  right  to  dictate  whether  Sir 
Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  or  Lord  Rosebery  should  be 
his  successor  would  have  been  grotesque.  There  is  usually 
one  recognised  leader  of  the  Opposition,  and  when  that  is 
the  case  the  Crown  must  intrust  the  formation  of  the  new 
ministry  to  him.  This  was  illustrated  in  1880.  Mr.  Glad- 
stone had,  some  years  before,  retired  from  the  leadership 
of  the  Liberals  in  Parliament,  and  the  Queen,  after  their 
success  at  the  general  election,  sent  for  Lord  Hartington, 
then  leading  them  in  the  House  of  Commons  ;  but  she 
found  that  Mr.  Gladstone,  who  had  really  led  the  party  in 
the  country  to  victory,  was  the  only  possible  head  of  a 
Liberal  government.2 

If  the  party  that  has  obtained  a  majority  in  Parliament 
has  no  recognised  leader,  the  Crown  may  intrust  the  forma- 
tion of  a  ministry  to  any  one  of  its  chief  men  who  is  willing 
to  undertake  the  task ;  or  if,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  the 
parties  have  become  more  or  less  disintegrated,  so  that  only 
a  coalition  ministry  can  be  formed,  the  Crown  can  send  for 
the  head  of  any  one  of  the  various  groups.  Not  to  speak 
of  earlier  days,  when  the  King  had  more  freedom  than  at 
present  in  the  formation  of  his  cabinets,  it  happened  several 
times  in  the  reign  of  Queen  Victoria  that  the  question  who 
should  be  Prime  Minister  was  determined  by  her  personal 

1  Todd,  "  Pari.  Govt,  in  the  British  Colonies,"  105  et  seq. 

2  Cf.  Morley,  "  Life  of  Gladstone,"  Book  II.,  Ch.  vii. 


THE  CROWN  AND  THE  CABINET  35 

choice.  In  1852,  for  example,  Lord  Aberdeen's  coalition 
cabinet  was  formed  by  her  desire.1  In  1859  she  selected 
Lord  Palmerston  rather  than  Lord  John  Russell ; 2  and  in 
1868  and  1894,  when  in  each  case  the  existing  cabinet  lost 
its  head,  she  selected  the  minister  who  was  to  succeed,  desig- 
nating in  the  first  case  Mr.  Disraeli,  and  in  the  last  Lord 
Rosebery.3  Such  opportunities,  however,  are  likely  to  be 
less  common  in  future,  for  it  is  altogether  probable  that  a 
party  will  prefer  to  choose  its  own  leader  rather  than  to 
leave  the  selection  to  the  Crown. 

The  choice  of  the  other  members  of  the  cabinet  is  a  very  Selection 
different  matter;  for  although  former  sovereigns  insisted  Mincers 
on  having  a  decisive  voice  in  the  composition  of  the  ministry, 
it  may  be  said  that  with  Peel's  appointment  to  office  in  1834 
the  principle  was  definitely  established  that  the  Prime 
Minister  chooses  his  colleagues,  and  is  responsible  for  their 
selection.4  The  royal  authority  in  this  matter  gave  a  last 
dying  flicker  in  the  bed-chamber  question  of  1839,  where 
Peel's  clumsiness  and  the  Queen's  impetuosity  gave  rise  to 
a  misunderstanding.  Peel  wished  to  replace  some  of  the 
ladies  attendant  on  the  Queen,  who  were  exclusively  Whigs, 
by  Conservatives;  and  the  Queen,  getting  the  impression 
that  he  intended  to  replace  them  all,  refused.5  When  Peel 
came  into  office  two  years  later  part  of  the  Whig  ladies  re- 
tired and  were  replaced ;  and  it  has  since  been  settled  that 
the  Mistress  of  the  Holies,  like  the  Gentlemen  of  the  House- 
hold, shall  change  with  the  administration,  but  that  the 
other  ladies  shall  remain.  The  Mistress  of  the  Robes,  how- 
ever, must  always  be  a  duchess,  and  during  the  last  years 
of  the  Queen's  life  it  happened  that  there  was  no  duchess 
who  was  a  Liberal. 

At  the  present  day  all  persons  whose  offices  are  considered 

1  Sidney  Lee,  "Life  of  Quern  Victoria,"  1  Ed.,  232-33. 

3  Ashley's  "Life  of  Lord  Palmerston,"  II.,  154-57.  Lee,  "  life  of  Queen 
Victoria,"  296.  3  Lee,  Ibid.,  511. 

*  Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  2  Ed.,  I.,  323  et  seq 

'Parker,  "Sir  Robert  Peel,"  II.,  391  et  seq.,  and  Lee,  "Life  of  Queen 
Victoria,"  97-10.'! 


36  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

political  are  appointed  in  accordance  with  the  advice  of  the 
Prime  Minister.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  sovereign 
may  not  urge  his  own  views,  perhaps  with  success,  and  on 
one  occasion,  at  least,  the  Queen  secured,  it  is  said,  a  place 
in  the  cabinet  for  a  former  minister  whom  the  incoming 
Premier  had  either  forgotten  or  meant  to  leave  out.  It 
does  mean,  however,  that  if  the  minister  insists  upon 
his  advice  it  must  be  accepted.  More  than  once,  for  ex- 
ample, the  Queen  tried  in  vain  to  exclude  from  the  Foreign 
Office  Lord  Palmerston,  who  was  a  constant  grief  of  mind 
to  her.  As  Mr.  Morley  puts  it  in  the  chapter,  in  his  "Life  of 
Walpole,"  which  is  understood  to  express  Mr.  Gladstone's 
views  upon  the  cabinet,  "Constitutional  respect  for  the 
Crown  would  inspire  a  natural  regard  for  the  personal  wishes 
of  the  sovereign  in  recommendations  to  office,  but  royal 
predilections  or  prejudices  will  undoubtedly  be  less  and  less 
able  to  stand  against  the  Prime  Minister's  strong  view  of 
the  requirements  of  the  public  service."  l 
For  what  The  responsibilities  of  the  ministers  may  be  classified  as 

Acts  Minis-    technical  ancj  complete.     Thus  for  acts  which  happen  before 

ters  are  Ke-  L  ~  *- 

sponsible,  they  come  into  office,  and  which  they  could  not  possibly 
have  advised,  they  assume  what  may  be  called  a  technical, 
or  perhaps  a  nominal,  responsibility.  A  premier  is  techni- 
cally responsible  for  his  own  selection ;  but  as  responsibility 
of  that  kind  means  merely  the  obligation  to  resign  on  an 
adverse  vote  of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  as  he  would  be 
obliged  to  do  this  in  any  event,  he  assumes  no  additional 
responsibility  by  reason  of  his  own  selection ;  and  the  same 
thing  may  be  said  of  all  acts  which  happen  before  the  min- 
isters come  into  power,  and  which  they  do  not  by  accept- 
ing office  effectually  sanction  or  condone.  They  become 
responsible,  for  example,  for  the  condition  of  the  public  de- 
partments of  which  they  take  charge ;  and  yet  it  may  be 
for  the  very  purpose  of  changing  that  condition  that  they 
were  put  in  office.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  difference 
between  those  things  for  which   they   are  technically   re- 

1  Morley,  "  Walpole,"  158. 


THE  CROWN  AND  THE  CABINET  37 

sponsible  but  not  to  blame,  and  those  things  which  have 
been  done  by  their  advice,  and  for  the  consequence  of  which 
they  may  be  said  to  be  morally  or  completely  responsible. 
The  distinction  is  unimportant  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  conventions  of  the  constitution,  but  its  practical  conse- 
quences are  considerable  as  regards  the  position  of  the 
cabinet  before  Parliament  and  the  public.  Now  the  min- 
isters are  completely  responsible  for  all  political  acts  done 
by  the  Crown  during  their  tenure  of  office,  even  those  which 
appear  to  be  most  directly  the  work  of  the  sovereign  him- 
self. All  communications  with  the  representatives  of  foreign 
powers,  for  example,  pass  through  their  hands.  The  crea- 
tion of  peers,  the  granting  of  honours,  are  now  unquestion- 
ably subject  to  their  advice;  and  although  when  King 
Edward's  list  of  coronation  honours  was  announced  in 
1901,  The  Times  declared  that  the  names  were  the  personal 
choice  of  the  monarch,  it  took  pains  to  add  that  the  con- 
stitutional responsibility  must,  of  course,  rest  with  the 
ministers.1 

In  short,  the  ministers  direct  the  action  of  the  Crown  in 
all  matters  relating  to  the  government.  The  King's  speech 
on  the  opening  of  Parliament  is,  of  course,  written  by  them ; 
and  they  prepare  any  answers  to  addresses  that  may  have 
a  political  character.  All  official  letters  and  reports  to  the 
King,  and  all  communications  from  him,  must  pass  through 
the  hands  of  one  of  their  number.  A  letter  addressed  to 
the  sovereign  as  such  by  a  subject,  or  other  private  person, 
passes  through  the  office  of  the  Home  Secretary;  and  even 
peers,  who  have  a  constitutional  right  to  approach  him, 
must  make  an  appointment  for  the  interview  through  the 
same  office.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  Crown  may  not 
consult  any  one  it  pleases.  That  question  came  up  in  rela- 
tion to  Prince  Albert,  whom  the  ministers  at  first  held  at 
arm's  length,  and  whose  presence  at  their  interviews  with 
the  Queen  they  refused  for  a  couple  of  years  to  permit, 
while  he,   on  the  other  hand,    called  himself  the  Queen's 

1  The  Times,  June  26,   1902. 


38  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

"confidential  adviser"  and  "permanent  minister."1  Con- 
fidential adviser  he  certainly  was,  but  minister  he  certainly 
was  not,  because  in  the  nature  of  things  he  could  not  be 
responsible  for  her  acts.  Mr.  Gladstone  in  his  "Gleanings 
of  Past  Years"  2  seems  to  have  defined  the  true  position 
of  the  Queen  and  Prince  Consort  when  he  said  that  she  has 
a  right  to  take  secret  counsel  with  any  one,  subject  only  to 
the  condition  that  it  does  not  disturb  her  relation  with  her 
ministers.  She  cannot,  as  a  rule,  consult  the  Opposition, 
because  they  are  directly  opposed  to  the  ministry ;  but  she 
can  consult  any  one  else,  provided  it  does  not  affect  the  re- 
sponsibility of  her  ministers;  that  is,  provided  that  in  the 
end  she  follows  their  advice, 
public  and  The  ministers  are  responsible  for  the  public,  not  the  pri- 
A^sTof  the  vate,  acts  of  the  Crown;  but  it  is  sometimes  hard  to  dis- 
crown, tinguish  between  the  two.  Queen  Victoria,  for  example,  had 
relatives  on  many  of  the  thrones  of  Europe  to  whom  it  was 
absurd  that  she  should  not  write  private  letters;  while 
other  crowned  heads  were  constantly  writing  letters  to  her 
on  public  business  which  they  did  not  intend  the  ministers 
to  see.  The  rule  was,  therefore,  adopted  that  all  her  cor- 
respondence with  foreign  sovereigns,  not  her  relatives, 
should  pass  through  the  ministers'  hands,  —  an  arrange- 
ment which,  though  a  necessary  result  of  English  responsible 
government,  was  galling  to  the  Queen,  who  was  often 
made  to  express  in  her  own  handwriting  opinions  quite 
different  from  those  which  she  really  held.3  In  domestic 
matters,  also,  it  is  hard  to  draw  the  line  between  what 
is  public  and  what  is  private.  The  Queen's  marriage, 
which  was  felt  at  the  time  to  have  a  greater  political  im- 
portance than  it  would  have  to-day,  was  arranged  by  her- 
self, without  consultation  with  her  ministers,  and  merely 
announced  to  them.  On  the  other  hand,  when  the  Princess 
Louise  was  betrothed  to  the  Marquis  of  Lome,  Mr.  Glad- 
stone stated  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  the  marriage 

1  Martin,  "  Life  of  the  Prince  Consort,"  4  Ed.,  L,  74.  » I.,  73. 

3  Lee,  "  Life  of  Queen  Victoria,"  1  Ed.,  211-13. 


versy. 


THE  CROWN  AND  THE    CABINET  39 

with  a  subject  had  not  been  decided  upon  without  the 
advice  of  the  ministers  of  the  Crown.1  The  risk  of  a  strong 
infusion  of  British  blood  in  the  veins  of  some  future  occu- 
pant of  the  throne  is,  it  seems,  a  political  matter,  for  which 
the  cabinet  must  hold  itself  responsible.  But  this  is  not 
true  of  purely  social  affairs.  One  of  the  chief  functions  of 
the  Crown  is  that  connected  with  its  duties  as  the  head  of  the 
social  life  of  the  capital.  These  duties  the  Queen  virtually 
abandoned  for  many  years  after  her  husband's  death ;  but 
although  there  were  loud  complaints  on  the  part  of  the  pub- 
lic, the  question  was  not  regarded  as  a  political  one  for  which 
the  ministers  could  be  called  to  account. 

Since  the  King  can  do  no  wrong,  he  can  do  neither  right  The  King's 
nor  wrong.     He  must  not  be  praised  or  blamed  for  political  g^6^0* 
acts ;  nor  must  his  ministers  make  public  the  fact  that  any  into  Public 
decision  on  a  matter  of  state  was  actually  made  by  him.2 
His  name  must  not  be  brought  into  political  controversy 
in  any  way,  or  his  personal  wishes  referred  to  in  argument, 
either  within  or  without  Parliament.3     This  principle  was 
not    fully    recognized    until   after  the   accession   of  Queen 
Victoria.     At  the  first  election  of  her  reign  the  Tories  com- 
plained, apparently  with  reason,  that  the  Whigs  used  her 

1  Todd,  "  Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  2  Ed.,  I.,  266,  note  y.  Hans.,  3 
Ser.  CCIV.,  173,  370. 

2  Disraeli's  opponents  were  right  for  criticising  him  for  letting  it  be  known 
that  it  was  the  Queen  who  had  decided  whether  to  accept  his  resignation 
or  to  dissolve  in  1868:  Hans.,  3  Ser.  CXCI,  1705,  1724,  1742,  17S8,  1794, 
1800,  1806,  1811.  There  was  no  objection  to  allowing  her  to  decide  if  he 
pleased,  —  that  is,  he  might  accept  her  opinion  as  his  own,  — but  he  ought 
to  have  assumed  in  public  the  sole  responsibility  for  the  decision. 

3  In  1876  Mr.  Lowe  in  a  public  speech  expressed  his  belief  that  the  Queen 
had  urged  previous  ministers  in  vain  to  procure  for  her  the  title  of  Empress 
of  India.  The  matter  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  he  was  forced  to  make  an  apology,  which  was  somewhat  abject, 
the  Queen  through  the  Prime  Minister  having  denied  the  truth  of  his  state- 
ment:   Hans.,  :i  Ser.  CCXXVIII.,  2023  rl  seq.;    and  CCXXIX.,  f)_'-.->;5. 

An  apparent,  though  not  a  real,  exception  may  be  found  in  the  rule  which 
requires  that  before  a  bill  affecting  the  prerogative  can  be  introduced  into 
Parliament,  notice;  of  the  King's  assent  thereto  must  be  given.  If  the  bill 
affects  only  the  private  property  of  the  Crown  it  is  not  a  political  matter. 
If  it  affects  the  public  powers  of  the  Crown,  then  the  assent  is  given  on  the 
responsibility  of  the  ministers. 


40  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

and  her  name  as  party  weapons,1  and  three  years  later  we 
find  Wellington  referring  to  the  Queen  as  the  head  of  the 
party  opposed  to  the  Conservatives.2  Almost  the  only 
public  acts  that  can  be  done  by  the  Crown  before  the  public 
eye  are  ceremonies,  public  functions,  speeches  which  have 
no  political  character  and  deeds  of  kindness  that  are  above 
criticism.  When  the  Queen,  for  example,  made  her  last 
visit  to  Ireland,  the  public  were  allowed  to  understand  that 
it  was  her  own  suggestion,  and  the  same  thing  was  true  of 
her  order  allowing  Irish  soldiers  to  wear  the  shamrock,  it 
being  assumed  that  such  acts  could  not  have  a  political 
bearing,  and  would  excite  no  hostile  comment. 
Actual  in-  According  to  the  earlier  theory  of  the  constitution  the 
the  SOTO-  ministers  were  the  counsellors  of  the  King.  It  was  for  them 
ew-  to  advise  and  for  him  to  decide.     Now  the  parts  are  almost 

reversed.  The  King  is  consulted,  but  the  ministers  decide. 
It  is  commonly  said  that,  with  the  sovereign,  influence  has 
been  substituted  for  power ;  or  as  Bagehot  puts  it  in  his  own 
emphatic  way,  the  Crown  has  "three  rights  —  the  right  to 
be  consulted,  the  right  to  encourage,  the  right  to  warn. 
And  a  king  of  great  sense  and  sagacity  would  want  no 
others."  But  after  the  advice  and  warning  have  been 
given  the  final  decision  must  remain  with  the  ministers. 
It  is  for  them  to  determine  whether  their  opinion  is  of  such 
importance  that  they  feel  obliged  to  insist  upon  it  in  spite 
of  the  objections  of  the  King,  and  if  they  do  he  must  yield. 
Bagehot  goes  on  to  describe  how  effective  the  right  to 
advise  may  become  in  the  hands  of  a  sage  and  experienced 
monarch,  but  he  admits  how  small  the  chance  must  be  that 
the  occupant  of  the  throne  will  possess  the  qualities  needed 
for  making  a  good  use  of  the  right,  and  adds  that  the  attempt 
of  the  ordinary  monarch  to  exercise  it  would  probably  do 
more  harm  than  good. 

Historians  have  often  observed  that  the  absence  of  the 

1  Lee,  "  Life  of  Queen  Victoria,"  74-75. 
5  Parker,  "  Sir  Robert  Peel,"  II.,  415  et  seq. 
*  English  Const.,  1  Ed.,  103. 


THE   CROWN   AND  THE   CABINET  41 

sovereign  from  cabinet  meetings,  since  the  accession  of  the  He  is  Con- 
House  of  Hanover,  has  been  a  great  factor  in  the  growth  of  ^DecLtoiT 
cabinet  government.  His  absence  had,  indeed,  three  dis-  is  Reached 
tinct  effects.  It  helped  to  free  the  individual  members  of 
the  cabinet  from  royal  pressure ;  it  made  it  easier  for  them 
to  act  as  a  unit  in  their  relations  with  the  monarch ;  and  it 
tended  to  remove  him  from  the  discussion  of  public  policy 
until  it  had  been  formulated.  This  last  point  is  highly  im- 
portant, and  has  a  bearing  upon  the  influence  of  the  King 
to-day,  because  it  is  before  the  ministers  have  formed  an 
opinion  that  his  advice  and  warning  are  most  effective.  It 
is  while  some  of  them  are  reluctant  and  others  are  hesitating 
that  the  weight  of  his  views  has  the  best  chance  of  turning 
the  scale.  After  the  matter  has  been  threshed  out  and 
an  agreement  reached  the  decision  is  far  less  likely  to  be 
reversed,  or  even  seriously  modified,  by  his  personal  prefer- 
ences. 

Now  the  sovereign  is  not  usually  consulted  about  matters 
of  domestic  legislation  and  policy  until  the  opinion  of  the 
cabinet  has  taken  shape.  For  although  he  is  informed  in 
general  terms  of  what  is  done  at  cabinet  meetings,  and 
sometimes  discusses  with  a  minister  the  proposed  measures 
relating  to  his  department,  yet  a  matter  is  commonly  talked 
over  and  agreed  upon  by  the  ministers  before  it  is  submitted 
to  him  for  approval.  In  this  way  "the  sovereign  is  brought 
into  contact  only  with  the  net  results  of  previous  inquiry 
and  deliberation,"  1  and  the  views  of  the  cabinet  are  "laid 
before"  him  "and  before  Parliament,  as  if  they  were  the 
views  of  one  man."  2  Queen  Victoria  tried,  indeed,  to 
insist  upon  the  right  of  "commenting  on  all  proposals 
before  they  are  matured;"  3  but  apparently  without  much 
success.  This  was  not  equally  true,  however,  of  all  depart- 
ments of  the  government.  On  the  contrary,  after  a  long 
struggle  with  Lord  Palmerston,  in  which  she  suffered  many 

'Gladstone,  "Gleanings  of  Past  Years,"  I.,  85. 

2  Morlcy.  "  Life  of  Walpole,"   15',. 

3  This  was  in  1880.     Lee,  "  Life  of  Queen  Vietoria,"  451. 


42  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

exasperating  rebuffs,  the  autocratic  foreign  minister  by  his 
impulsiveness  and  lack  of  perfect  candour  gave  her  at 
last  an  advantage.  She  succeeded  in  establishing,  by  the 
memorandum  of  August,  1850,  the  rule  that  she  must  be 
kept  informed  of  foreign  correspondence  and  despatches 
before  they  were  sent,  so  that  foreign  matters  should  be 
intact  and  not  already  compromised  when  they  were  brought 
to  her  attention.  Mr.  Gladstone  has  criticised  the  princi- 
ples laid  down  at  that  time  because  they  meant  that  the 
comments  of  the  Premier  on  despatches  were  to  be  made, 
not  privately  to  the  foreign  minister,  but  after  the  draft 
had  been  submitted  to  the  Queen.1  In  other  words,  he 
complained  that  the  Queen  was  consulted  before  the  tenor 
of  the  despatch  had  been  finally  settled  between  the  Premier 
and  the  foreign  minister.  His  criticism  seems,  therefore, 
to  be  levelled  at  the  practice  of  consulting  the  Crown  before 
the  policy  has  been  agreed  upon  by  those  who  are  responsi- 
ble for  it,2  in  this  case  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign 
Secretary,  for  despatches  are  not  ordinarily  brought  before 
the  full  cabinet  for  consideration. 

The  opportunity  for  an  exertion  of  royal  influence  is 
much  less  in  those  matters  which  are  settled  in  cabinet  meet- 
ing than  in  others.  In  the  former  case  the  sovereign  is  not 
usually  consulted  until  the  question  has  been  thoroughly 
discussed,  and  the  cabinet  has  reached  a  decision  which  is 
the  more  difficult  to  change  because  it  is  often  the  result  of 
a  compromise,  and  has,  therefore,  something  of  the  binding 
force  of  an  agreement ;   whereas,  in  questions  which  are  not 


1  "  Gleanings  of  Past  Years,"  I.,  86,  87. 

5  For  the  same  reason  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Control  objected  in 
1842,  when  Ford  Ellenborough,  the  Governor  General  of  India,  took  upon 
himself  to  write  directly  to  the  Queen.  Parker,  "  Life  of  Sir  Robert  Peel," 
II.,  591. 

In  1885  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  tendered  his  resignation  as  Secretary 
of  State  for  India,  because  the  Prime  Minister,  without  consulting  him,  had 
transmitted  to  the  Viceroy  a  suggestion  by  the  Queen  that  one  of  her  sons 
should  be  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  forces  in  Bombay.  The  ap- 
pointment was  not  made,  and  Ford  Randolph  withdrew  his  resignation. 
Winston  Churchill,  "  Life  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill,"  L,  503-13. 


THE   CROWN   AND  THE   CABINET  43 

brought  directly  before  the  cabinet,  the  Crown  when  con- 
sulted has  to  overcome  only  the  opinion,  and  perhaps  the 
hasty  opinion,  of  one  or  two  ministers.  This  is  true  in  such 
matters  as  the  less  important  foreign  relations,  ecclesiasti- 
cal and  other  patronage,  and  the  ordinary  executive  work 
of  the  various  departments.  But  herein  another  difference 
must  be  observed.  The  executive  action  of  the  govern- 
ment in  domestic  affairs  is  usually  brought  under  very  close 
scrutiny  by  Parliament,  and  is  subjected  to  a  galling  fire 
there.  Hence  the  minister,  with  the  volley  of  questions 
levelled  at  the  Treasury  Bench  ever  before  his  mind,  finds 
it  more  difficult  in  these  affairs  to  yield  his  opinion  to  that 
of  the  monarch  than  he  does  in  the  case  of  foreign  negotia- 
tions, and  of  ecclesiastical,  judicial  and  military  patronage, 
which  are  not  habitually  discussed  in  Parliament.1  It 
would  seem,  therefore,  that  under  ordinary  circumstances 
the  personal  influence  of  the  King  in  political  matters  is 
not  likely  to  be  very  effectively  asserted  outside  of  foreign 
affairs,  church  patronage,  and  some  other  appointments 
to  office. 

Although  one  can  perceive  the  general  limitations  upon  Personal 
the  personal  influence  of  the  monarch  imposed  by  the  con- 
ditions under  which  it  is  exercised,  one  can  never  know  how  Victoria, 
vigorously  it  is  being  used  at  the  moment ;  and,  indeed,  it 
is  difficult  to  estimate  its  actual  effect  during  any  compara- 
tively recent  period.  There  is  no  use  in  going  back  beyond 
the  reign  of  Queen  Victoria,  to  times  when  the  parliamentary 
system  was  so  imperfectly  developed  that  ministers  some- 
times gave  individual  and  contrary  advice  to  the  King;2 
and  since  the  Queen  came  to  the  throne  very  little  has 
been  published  which  throws  light  upon  the  subject.  From 
the  various  memoirs  and  letters  of  her  ministers  almost 
everything  has  been  eliminated  that  bears  upon  the  actual 
influence  she  exerted.  Nevertheless  certain  facts  appear. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  personal  opinions  of  the 

1  Cf.   Dicey,  "Law  of  the  Constitution,"  . 5  FOd.,  392. 

2  Cf  Parker,  "  Life  of  Sir  Robert  Peel,"  I.,  334. 


Influence  of 
Queen 


44  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

monarch  were  deemed  of  greater  importance  at  the  time 
of  the  Queen's  accession  than  they  are  to-day.  Of  late 
years,  indeed,  many  popular  writers  have  tended  to  neglect 
the  royal  influence  altogether.  With  the  love  of  broad 
generalisation,  which  is  at  once  valuable  and  perilous  in 
political  philosophy,  publicists  have  been  in  the  habit  of 
speaking  of  the  Queen  as  a  figurehead;  but  statesmen 
who  have  seen  the  inner  life  of  the  cabinet  know  that  the 
metaphor  is  inexact.  Mr.  Gladstone  is  reported  to  have  said 
that  every  treatise  on  the  English  government  which  he  had 
read  failed  to  estimate  her  actual  influence  at  its  true  value ; 
and  in  his  "Gleanings  of  Past  Years"  *  he  remarks,  "there 
is  not  a  doubt  that  the  aggregate  of  direct  influence  nor- 
mally exercised  by  the  sovereign  upon  the  counsels  and 
proceedings  of  her  ministers  is  considerable  in  amount, 
tends  to  permanence  and  solidity  of  action,  and  confers 
much  benefit  on  the  country."  Perhaps  at  a  later  period 
he  might  have  stated  this  less  strongly ;  and  although  no 
final  judgment  can  yet  be  formed,  one  may  venture  an 
estimate  of  the  Queen's  influence  in  the  different  branches 
of  the  government. 
in  Domestic  The  effect  of  the  Queen's  personal  preferences  in  the 
Pohcy.  selection   of  the    Prime    Minister    and    his    colleagues    has 

already  been  discussed,  and  it  may  be  added  that  on  two 
or  three  occasions  a  cabinet,  instead  of  resigning  on  a  defeat 
in  the  Commons,  dissolved  Parliament  in  deference  to  her 
wishes; 2  but  except  for  this  it  is  hard  to  find  definite  traces 
of  her  influence  upon  the  general  domestic  policy  of  the 
country.  Yet  in  some  departments,  at  least,  of  the  public 
service  she  took  a  very  lively  interest.  At  times  she  was 
prodigal  of  suggestions  and  advice,  which  bore,  as  far  as 
one  can  see,  no  positive  fruit.  She  held  her  opinions 
strongly,  expressed  them  boldly,  and  was  frank  in  her 
criticism  of    measures,  but   did  not    succeed  apparently  in 

1  I.,  42. 

2  Lee,  "  Life  of    Queen  Victoria,"  133,  295,  387,  and  .see  page  39,  note 
2,  supra. 


THE  CROWN  AND  THE  CABINET  45 

persuading  her  ministers  to  abandon  or  even  to  modify 
them.  On  more  than  one  occasion  she  used  her  personal 
influence  over  the  peers  to  prevent  a  disagreement  between 
the  Houses,  but  this  was  never  done  to  give  effect  to  her 
own  personal  views,  and  in  the  case  of  the  Irish  Church 
Disestablishment  Bill  it  was  done  to  secure  the  passage  of 
a  government  measure  with  which  she  was  not  herself  in 
sympathy.1  In  short  her  personal  influence  in  domestic 
affairs,  either  in  the  form  of  initiating  policy,  or  of  effect- 
ing changes  in  that  of  her  ministers,  seems  to  have  been 
very  slight.  To  this  statement,  however,  a  couple  of  ex- 
ceptions must  be  made,  which  relate  to  the  Army  and  the 
Church.  The  Queen,  who  regarded  the  Army  as  peculiarly 
dependent  upon  the  sovereign,  procured  the  appointment 
of  a  royal  duke  as  Commander-in-Chief,  and  for  a  time 
she  resisted  successfully  all  attempts  to  change  the  vague 
relation  of  that  office  to  the  Crown,2  although  in  the  end 
it  was  made  completely  subordinate  to  the  minister  re- 
sponsible to  Parliament.3  In  the  matter  of  ecclesiastical 
appointments  her  opinions  were  expressed  with  still  greater 
effect,  bishops  and  deans  having  in  several  cases  been 
selected  by  her,  sometimes  in  preference  to  candidates 
proposed  by  the  Prime  Minister. 

But  it  was  in  foreign  affairs  that  the  Queen's  efforts  were  in  Foreign 
most  untiring,  and  on  the  whole  most  successful,  in  spite 
of  many  disappointments.  For  years  she  was  opposed  to 
Lord  Palmerston's  aggressive  attitude,  and  while  she  never 
effected  a  radical  change  of  policy,  she  appears  at  times  to 
have  softened  it  to  some  extent.1  Throughout  her  reign 
she  insisted  upon  the  right  to  criticise  despatches,  and  not 
infrequently  she  caused  changes  to  be  made  in  them ;  some- 
times, as  in  the  European  crisis  of  1859-1861,  by  appealing 
from  the  Foreign  Secretary  and  the  Prime  Minister  to  the 

1  Morley,  "life  of  Cladstone,"  II.,  267  el  seq.     Davidson  and  Rcnham, 
"  Life  of  Archbishop  Tail,"  2  Kd..  II  ,  20-21,  3.3-36,  40-42. 

2  Lee,  "  Life  of  Queen  Victoria,"  206,  302. 

1  33-34  Vie.,  c.  17.     Order  in  Council,  June  4,  1870. 
*  Cf.  Lee,  "  Life  of  Queen  Victoria,"  299,  336,  349. 


46 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Changes 
during  the 
Queen's 
Reign. 


cabinet  as  a  whole.1  The  most  famous  case  is  that  of  the 
Trent  Affair  in  1861,  where  the  changes  made  in  a  despatch, 
in  accordance  with  the  suggestions  of  the  Prince  Consort  a 
few  days  before  his  death,  avoided  a  danger  of  serious 
trouble  with  the  United  States.  In  foreign  affairs,  therefore, 
it  is  safe  to  conclude  that  while  the  Queen  never  initiated  a 
policy,  her  influence  had  on  several  important  occasions  a 
perceptible  effect  in  modifying  the  policy  of  her  ministers. 
In  the  closing  chapter  of  his  biography  of  the  Queen,  Mr. 
Lee  says  that  her  "  personal  influence  was  far  greater  at  the 
end  of  her  life  than  at  her  accession  to  the  throne.  Never- 
theless it  was  a  vague  intangible  element  in  the  political 
sphere,  and  was  far  removed  from  the  solid  remnants  of  per- 
sonal power  which  had  adhered  to  the  sceptre  of  her  prede- 
cessors." 2  No  doubt  her  long  experience,  and  the  venera- 
tion due  to  her  age  and  unblemished  character,  caused  her 
opinions  to  be  treated  with  growing  respect ;  but  there  can 
be  no  doubt,  also,  that  the  political  influence  of  the  sover- 
eign faded  slowly  to  a  narrower  and  fainter  ray  during 
her  reign.  One  sees  this  in  Peel's  remark  at  her  accession, 
that  the  personal  character  of  a  constitutional  monarch 
counteracts  the  levity  of  ministers  and  the  blasts  of  demo- 
cratic passions.3  One  sees  it  in  the  great  importance  at- 
tached at  that  time  to  the  persons  surrounding  the  Queen, 
to  the  Ladies  of  the  Bedchamber,  to  the  question  of  her 
private  secretary,  and  to  the  position  of  the  Prince  Consort. 
The  Queen  herself  seems  to  have  held  views  about  her  own 
position  that  were  drawn  from  the  past  rather  than  the 
present.4     At  least  this  is  the  impression  one  forms,  and  it  is 

1  Morley,  "Life  of  Walpole,"  159.  But  see  Morley,  "Life  of  Gladstone," 
L,  415.  2  Pp.  544-45. 

3  "  Croker  Papers,"  II.,  317.  A  couple  of  years  earlier  Peel  had  dreaded 
the  advent  of  a  ministry  that  might  appear  to  be  dictated  to  the  King  by  the 
House  of  Commons,  and  continue  in  office  independently  of  his  will  and  con- 
trol. Parker,  "Sir  Robert  Peel,"  II.,  302.  No  statesman  would  repeat 
either  of  these  remarks  to-day. 

4  In  Prince  Albert's  letter  to  his  daughter,  the  Crown  Princess  of  Prussia, 
on  the  advantages  of  a  responsible  ministry,  he  speaks  of  the  power  of  the 
monarch  to  settle  the  principles  on  which  political  action  is  to  be  based,  in 
terms  not  applicable  in  England.  Martin,  "Life  of  the  Prince  Consort." 
IV.,  218. 


THE  CROWN  AND  THE  CABINET  47 

fortified  both  by  her  defence  of  her  seclusion  in  1864,  on 
the  ground  that  she  had  higher  duties  to  discharge  which 
she  could  not  neglect  without  injury  to  the  public  service; 
and  by  her  complaint  that  some  of  her  ministers  did  not 
allow  her  time  enough  to  consider  and  decide  public  ques- 
tions, when  in  reality  the  decision  was  not  made  by  her  at 
all.  The  Crown  has  been  compared  to  a  wheel  turning 
inside  the  engine  of  state  with  great  rapidity,  but  producing 
little  effect  because  unconnected  with  the  rest  of  the  ma- 
chinery. This  is,  no  doubt,  an  exaggeration;  but  the 
actual  influence  of  Queen  Victoria  upon  the  course  of  politi- 
cal events  was  small  as  compared  with  the  great  industry 
and  activity  she  displayed.  What  the  influence  of  the 
sovereign  will  be  in  the  future  cannot  be  foretold  with  pre- 
cision. It  must  depend  largely  upon  the  insight,  the  tact, 
the  skill,  the  industry  and  the  popularity  of  the  monarch 
himself;  and  as  regards  any  one  department,  upon  his 
interest  in  that  department.  The  monarch  is  not  likely  to 
be  inured  to  a  life  of  strenuous  work,  and  yet  in  addition 
to  the  political  routine,  which  is  by  no  means  small,  his 
duties,  social  and  ceremonial,  are  great.  Moreover,  with 
the  highest  qualifications  for  the  throne,  his  opportunities 
must  be  very  limited,  for  there  is  certainly  no  reason  to 
expect  any  growth  in  irresponsible  political  authority. 

Bagehot's  views  upon  the  utility  of  the  monarchy  have  utility  of 
become    classic.     Recognising   the    small    chance   that    an  archv^as  a 
hereditary  sovereign  would  possess  the  qualities  necessary  Political 

Force 

to  exert  any  great  influence  for  good  upon  political  ques- 
tions, he  did  not  deem  the  Crown  of  great  value  as  a  part 
of  the  machinery  of  the  state ;  and  he  explained  at  some 
length  how  a  parliamentary  system  of  government  could  be 
made  to  work  perfectly  well  in  a  republic,  although  up  to 
that  time  such  an  experiment  had  never  been  tried.  But 
he  thought  the  Crown  of  the  highest  importance  in  England 
as  the  dignified  part  of  the  government.  Writing  shortly 
before  the  Reform  Bill  of  1X07,  he  dreaded  the  extension 
of  democracy  in  Creat  Britain,  for  he  had  a  low  opinion  of 


48  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

the  political  capacity  of  the  English  masses.  He  felt  that 
the  good  government  of  the  country  depended  upon  their 
remaining  in  a  deferential  attitude  towards  the  classes 
fitted  by  nature  to  rule  the  state,  and  he  regarded  the  Crown 
as  one  of  the  strongest  elements  in  keeping  up  that  deferen- 
tial attitude.  According  to  his  conception  of  English  polity 
the  lower  classes  believed  that  the  government  was  con- 
ducted by  the  Queen,  whom  they  revered,  while  the  cabi- 
net, unseen  and  unknown  by  the  ignorant  multitude,  was 
thereby  enabled  to  carry  on  a  system  which  would  be  in 
danger  of  collapsing  if  the  public  thoroughly  understood  its 
real  nature.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  case  when 
Bagehot  wrote,  this  state  of  things  is  certainly  not  true 
to-day.  The  English  masses  have  more  political  intelli- 
gence than  he  supposed,  or  more  political  education  than 
when  he  wrote.  A  traveller  in  England  does  not  meet 
to-day  people  who  think  that  the  country  is  governed  by 
the  King,  nor  does  he  find  any  ignorance  about  the  cabinet, 
or  any  illusions  about  the  part  played  by  the  chief  leaders 
in  Parliament.  The  English  workingman  is  now  bombarded 
from  the  platform,  in  the  newspapers  and  in  political  leaflets, 
with  electioneering  appeals  which  do  not  refer  to  the  King, 
but  discuss  unceasingly  the  party  leaders  and  their  doings. 
The  political  action  of  the  Crown  is,  in  fact,  less  present  to 
men's  minds  than  it  was  half  a  century  ago.  Mr.  Lee  tells 
us  that  he  was  impressed  by  the  outspoken  criticism  of  the 
Queen's  actions  in  the  early  and  middle  years  of  her  reign.1 
To-day  the  social  and  ceremonial  functions  of  the  Crown 
attract  quite  as  much  interest  as  ever;  but  as  a  political 
organ  it  has  receded  into  the  background,  and  occupies  less 
public  attention  than  it  did  formerly.  The  stranger  can 
hardly  fail  to  note  how  rarely  he  hears  the  name  of  the 
sovereign  mentioned  in  connection  with  political  matters; 
and  when  he  docs  hear  it  the  reference  is  only  too  apt  to  be 
made  by  way  of  complaint.  If  the  foreign  policy  is  un- 
popular, if  there  is  delay  in  the  formation  of  a  cabinet,  one 

1  "Life  of  Victoria,"  Prof.,  vii-viii. 


THE   CROWN  AND   THE   CABINET  49 

may  hear  utterly  unfounded  rumours  attributing  the  blame 
to  the  King.  Even  if  a  committee  of  inquiry  is  thought 
not  to  have  probed  some  matter  to  the  bottom,  it  is  perhaps 
whispered  that  persons  in  favour  at  court  are  involved. 
Fortunately  such  reports  are  uncommon.  In  general  the 
growth  of  the  doctrine  of  royal  irresponsibility  has  removed 
the  Crown  farther  and  farther  out  of  the  public  sight,  while 
the  spread  of  democracy  has  made  the  masses  more  and 
more  familiar  with  the  actual  forces  in  public  life.  One 
may  dismiss,  therefore,  the  idea  that  the  Crown  has  any 
perceptible  effect  to-day  in  securing  the  loyalty  of  the 
English  people,  or  their  obedience  to  the  government. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  government  of  England  is  incon- 
ceivable without  the  parliamentary  system,  and  no  one 
has  yet  devised  a  method  of  working  that  system  without 
a  central  figure,  powerless,  no  doubt,  but  beyond  the  reach 
of  party  strife.  European  countries  that  had  no  kings  have 
felt  constrained  to  adopt  monarchs  who  might  hold  a  sceptre 
which  they  could  not  wield ;  and  one  nation,  disliking 
kings,  has  been  forced  to  set  up  a  president  with  most  of 
the  attributes  of  royalty  except  the  title.  If  the  English 
Crown  is  no  longer  the  motive  power  of  the  ship  of  state,  it 
is  the  spar  on  which  the  sail  is  bent,  and  as  such  it  is  not 
only  a  useful  but  an  essential  part  of  the  vessel. 

The  social  and  ceremonial  duties  of  the  Crown  are  now  As  a  Social 
its  most  conspicuous,  if  not  its  most  important,  functions.  ??  *  ora 
There  can  be  no  question  that  the  influence  of  the  Queen 
and  her  court  was  a  powerful  element  in  the  movement  that 
raised  the  moral  tone  of  society  during  the  first  half  of  the 
last  century.  But  such  an  influence  must  vary  with  the 
personal  character  of  the  monarch.  It  may  be  exerted  for 
good  or  for  evil;  and  it  may  not  be  so  strong  in  the  future 
as  it  has  been  in  the  past. 

In  its  relation  to  the  masses  royalty  may  lie  considered  Asa 
in  another  aspect.     Within  a  generation  there  has  been  a     a8ean  ■ 
great    growth    of    interest    in    ceremony    and    dress.     Anti- 
quated   customs    and    costumes    have    been    revived,    and 


50  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

matters  of  this  kind  are  regarded  by  many  people  as  of 
prime  importance.  A  kindred  result  of  the  same  social 
force  has  been  a  marked  increase  in  what  Bagehot  called 
the  spirit  of  deference,  and  what  those  who  dislike  it  call 
snobbishness  —  a  tendency  by  no  means  confined  to  the 
British  Isles.  All  this  has  exalted  the  regard  for  titles 
and  offices,  and  enhanced  the  attractiveness  of  those  who 
bear  them.  In  prestige  the  titled  classes  have  profited 
thereby,  and  although  their  position  is  less  and  less  depend- 
ent upon  court  favour,  the  royal  family  has  also  profited 
directly.  The  presence  of  some  one  of  its  members  is 
sought  at  ceremonies  of  all  kinds,  whether  it  be  the  opening 
of  a  new  building,  the  inauguration  of  a  charity,  or  an  an- 
niversary celebration  at  a  university.  The  attendance  of 
the  King  on  such  occasions  insures  an  extended  report  in 
all  the  newspapers  of  the  country,  and  is,  therefore,  a  most 
effective  form  of  advertisement. 
As  a  A  century  or  more  ago  people  who  had  learned  nothing 

Symbol.  fr0m  the  history  of  Greece  or  Rome,  and  above  all  of  Venice, 
were  wont  to  assert  that  the  sentiment  of  loyalty  requires  a 
person  for  its  object.  No  one  would  make  such  a  statement 
now.  No  one  pretends  that  the  English  would  be  less 
patriotic  under  a  republic ;  and  yet  with  the  strengthening 
conception  of  the  British  Empire,  the  importance  of  the 
Crown  as  the  symbol  of  imperial  unity  has  been  more  keenly 
felt.  To  most  countries  the  visible  symbol  of  the  state  is 
the  flag;  but  curiously  enough  there  is  no  British  national 
flag.  Different  banners  are  used  for  different  purposes; 
the  King  himself  uses  the  Royal  Standard ;  ships  of  war 
carry  at  the  peak  the  White  Ensign ;  naval  reserve  vessels 
fly  the  Blue  Ensign,  and  merchantmen  the  Red  Ensign ; 
while  the  troops  march,  and  Parliament  meets,  under  the 
Union  Jack ;  and  all  of  these  are  freely  displayed  on  occa- 
sions of  public  rejoicing.  There  is  a  tendency  at  the  moment 
to  speak  of  the  Union  Jack  as  the  national  flag,  but  a  recent 
occurrence  will  illustrate  how  far  this  is  from  being  justified. 
A  British  subject  residing  at  Panama  had  been  in  the  habit 


THE   CROWN  AND   THE   CABINET  51 

of  flying  the  Red  Ensign,  until  one  day  he  hoisted  in  its  place 
the  Union  Jack.  Now,  according  to  the  regulations  the 
Jack  is  displayed  from  the  consulates,  and  the  British  con- 
sul requested  his  patriotic  fellow-citizen  not  to  use  it  on  his 
private  house.  The  question  was  finally  referred  to  the 
British  Foreign  Office,  which  in  deference  to  a  law  of  Panama 
forbidding  all  private  display  of  alien  flags,  supported  the 
position  of  the  consul,  but  refrained  from  expressing  any 
opinion  on  the  right  of  an  English  citizen  to  hoist  the  Union 
Jack  in  foreign  parts.1  Each  of  the  self-governing  colonies 
has,  moreover,  its  own  flag,  which  consists  of  the  Union 
Jack  with  some  distinctive  emblem  upon  it.  One  of  the 
first  acts  of  the  new  Commonwealth  of  Australia  was  to 
adopt  a  separate  flag  of  this  kind.  The  government  held  a 
competition  in  designs,  and  some  thirty  thousand  were 
presented.  From  these  one  was  selected  which  showed  at 
the  same  time  the  connection  with  the  empire  and  the  self- 
dependence  of  the  commonwealth.  It  is  the  Union  Jack 
with  a  southern  cross  and  a  six-pointed  star  at  one  end,  — 
a  design  that  seems  to  have  been  more  shocking  to  heraldic 
than  to  imperialist  sensibilities. 

The  Crown  is  thus  the  only  visible  symbol  of  the  union 
of  the  empire,  and  this  has  undoubtedly  had  no  incon- 
siderable effect  upon  the  reverence  felt  for  the  throne. 

Whatever  the  utility  of  the  Crown  may  be  at  the  present  Popularity 
time,  there  is  no  doubt  of  its  universal  popularity.  A  Monarch 
generation  ago,  when  the  Queen,  by  her  seclusion  after  the 
death  of  Prince  Albert,  neglected  the  social  functions  of 
the  court,  a  number  of  people  began  to  have  serious  doubts 
on  the  subject.  This  was  while  republican  ideals  of  the 
earlier  type  still  prevailed,  and  before  men  had  learned  that 
a  republic  is  essentially  a  form  of  government,  and  not 
necessarily  either  better  or  worse  than  other  forms.  The 
small  republican  group  in  England  thought  the  monarchy 
useless  and  expensive ;  but  people  have  now  learned  that 
republics   are    not    economical,    and    that  the  real  cost  of 

1  The  Times,  Sept.  17,  1903. 


52  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

maintaining  the  throne  is  relatively  small.1  So  that  while 
the  benefits  derived  from  the  Crown  may  not  be  estimated 
more  highly,  or  admitted  more  universally  than  they  were 
at  that  time,  the  objections  to  the  monarchy  have  almost 
entirely  disappeared,  and  there  is  no  republican  sentiment 
left  to-day  either  in  Parliament  or  the  country. 

1  Hans.,  4  Ser.  XCIV.,  1500.  The  Civil  List  of  Edward  VII.  was  fixed 
at  his  accession  at  £543,000,  to  which  must  be  added  about  £60,000 
of  revenues  from  the  Duchy  of  Lancaster,  and  also  the  revenues  from  the 
Duchy  of  Cornwall  which  go  to  the  heir  apparent  as  Duke  of  Cornwall. 
Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  List,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  V.,  607. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   CABINET   AND   THE   MINISTERS 


A  German  professor  in  a  lecture  on  anatomy  is  reported  Absence  of 

Fixed  T 
ditioiis. 


to  have  said  to  his  class,  "Gentlemen,  we  now  come  to  the  I 


spleen.  About  the  functions  of  the  spleen,  gentlemen,  we 
know  nothing.  So  much  for  the  spleen."  It  is  with  such 
feelings  that  one  enters  upon  the  task  of  writing  a  chapter 
upon  the  cabinet ;  although  that  body  has  become  more 
and  more,  decade  by  decade,  the  motive  power  of  all  politi- 
cal action.  The  fact  is  that  the  cabinet  from  its  very 
nature  can  hardly  have  fixed  traditions.  In  the  first  place, 
it  has  no  legal  status  as  an  organ  of  government,  but  is  an 
informal  body,  unknown  to  the  law,  whose  business  is  to 
bring  about  a  cooperation  among  the  different  forces  of  the 
state  without  interfering  with  their  legal  independence. 
Its  action  must,  therefore,  be  of  an  informal  character. 
Then  it  meets  in  secret,  and  no  records  of  its  proceedings 
are  kept,  which  would  in  itself  make  very  difficult  the  es- 
tablishment and  preservation  of  a  tradition.  This  could, 
indeed,  happen  only  in  case  of  a  certain  permanence  among 
the  members  who  could  learn  and  transmit  its  practice. 
But  a  new  cabinet  contains  under  ordinary  circumstances 
none  of  the  members  of  its  predecessor.  A  Conservative 
minister  knows  nothing  of  the  procedure  under  Liberal 
administrations;  and  we  find  even  a  man  of  the  experience 
of  Sir  Robert  Peel  asking  Sir  James  Graham  about  the 
practice  of  a  Liberal  cabinet,  of  which  that  statesman  — ■ 
who  at  this  time  changed  his  party  every  decade  —  had 
formerly  been  a  member.1  No  doubt  the  mode  of  trans- 
acting  business   varies   a   good    deal    from    one    cabinet   to 

1  Parker,  "Sir  Robert  Peel,"  III.,  496. 
5.1 


54  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

another,  depending  to  a  great  extent  upon  the  personal 
qualities  of  the  members.  Still,  the  real  nature  of  the  work 
to  be  done,  and  hence  the  method  of  doing  it,  have  changed 
during  the  last  half  century  less  in  the  case  of  the  cabinet 
than  of  any  of  the  other  political  organs  of  the  state,  and  one 
can  observe  certain  general  characteristics  that  may  be  noted. 
Nature  of  The  conventions  of  the  constitution  have  limited  and 
the  Cabinet.  regUiated  the  exercise  of  all  legal  powers  by  the  regular 
organs  of  the  state  in  such  a  way  as  to  vest  the  main  au- 
thority of  the  central  government  — -  the  driving  and  the 
steering  force  —  in  the  hands  of  a  body  entirely  unknown 
to  the  law.  The  members  of  the  cabinet  are  now  always 
the  holders  of  public  offices  created  by  law;  but  their  pos- 
session of  those  offices  by  no  means  determines  their  activity 
as  members  of  the  cabinet.  They  have,  indeed,  two  func- 
tions. Individually,  as  officials,  they  do  the  executive 
work  of  the  state  and  administer  its  departments;  col- 
lectively they  direct  the  general  policy  of  the  government, 
and  this  they  do  irrespective  of  their  individual  authority 
as  officials.  Their  several  administrative  duties,  and  their 
collective  functions  are  quite  distinct ;  and  may,  in  the 
case  of  a  particular  person,  have  little  or  no  connection. 
The  Lord  Privy  Seal,  for  example,  has  no  administrative 
duties  whatever;  and  it  is  conceivable  that  the  work  of 
other  members  might  not  come  before  the  cabinet  during 
the  whole  life  of  the  ministry. 
Functions  The  essential  function  of  the  cabinet  is  to  coordinate 
and  guide  the  political  action  of  the  different  branches  of 
the  government,  and  thus  create  a  consistent  policy.  Bage- 
hot  called  it  a  hyphen  that  joins,  a  buckle  that  fastens,  the 
executive  and  legislative  together;  and  in  another  place 
he  speaks  of  it  as  a  committee  of  Parliament  chosen  to  rule 
the  nation.  More  strictly,  it  is  a  committee  of  the  party 
that  has  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The  mi- 
nority arc  not  represented  upon  it ;  and  in  this  it  differs  from 
every  other  parliamentary  committee.  The  distinction  is 
so  obvious  to  us  to-day,  we  are  so  accustomed  to  govern- 


Cabinet. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   MINISTERS  55 

ment  by  party  wherever  popular  institutions  prevail,  that 
we  are  apt  to  forget  the  importance  of  the  fact.  Party  gov- 
ernment as  a  system  has  developed  comparatively  recently ; 
but  it  has  now  become  almost  universal.  The  only  excep- 
tion among  democratic  countries  (that  is,  the  only  case 
where  the  executive  body  habitually  contains  members  of 
opposing  parties)  is  in  Switzerland.  Still  the  system  is 
carried  to  a  greater  extent  in  some  countries  than  in  others ; 
and  the  amount  of  power  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a 
single  party  leader,  or  a  body  of  party  leaders,  varies  very 
much.  The  President  of  the  United  States,  for  example,  is 
the  representative  of  a  party ;  but  he  rules  the  nation  only 
in  part.  The  legislature  is  neither  in  theory  nor  in  practice 
under  his  control ;  and  this  is  so  far  true  that  even  when 
Congress  is  of  the  same  party  as  himself,  neither  he  nor  any 
committee  of  the  party  so  controls  both  executive  and 
legislative  that  any  one  body  can  be  said  to  rule  the  nation. 
But  where  the  parliamentary  system  prevails,  the  cabinet, 
virtually  combining  in  its  own  hands,  as  it  does,  the  legis- 
lative and  executive  authorities,  may  fairly  be  said  to  rule 
the  nation ;  although  the  degree  in  which  this  is  true  must 
depend  upon  the  extent  of  its  real  control  over  the  legis- 
lature. Xow,  although  the  legal  power  of  the  executive 
government  is  in  some  respects  less  in  England  than  in  most 
continental  countries,  the  actual  control  of  the  cabinet  over 
the  legislature  is  greater  than  anywhere  else. 

The  cabinet  is  selected  by  the  party,  not  directly,  but 
indirectly,  yet  for  that  very  reason  represents  it  the  better. 
Direct  election  is  apt  to  mean  strife  within  the  party,  re- 
sulting in  a  choice  that  represents  the  views  of  one  section 
as  opposed  to  those  of  another,  or  else  in  a  compromise  on 
colourless  persons;  while  the  existing  indirect  selection 
results  practically  in  taking  the  men  and  all  the  men,  who 
have  forced  themselves  into  the  front  rank  of  the  party 
and  acquired  influence  in  Parliament.  The  minority  of  the 
House  of  Commons  is  not  represented  in  the  cabinet;  but 
the  whole  of  the  majority  is  now  habitually  represented,  all 


56  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

the  more  prominent  leaders  from  every  section  of  the  party 
being  admitted.  In  its  essence,  therefore,  the  cabinet  is 
an  informal  but  permanent  caucus  of  the  parliamentary 
chiefs  of  the  party  in  power  —  and  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  chiefs  of  the  party  are  all  in  Parliament.  Its  ob- 
ject is  to  secure  the  cohesion  without  which  the  party  can- 
not retain  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons  and  remain 
in  power.  The  machinery  is  one  of  wheels  within  wheels; 
the  outside  ring  consisting  of  the  party  that  has  a  majority 
in  the  House  of  Commons;  the  next  ring  being  the  min- 
istry, which  contains  the  men  who  are  most  active  within 
that  party ;  and  the  smallest  of  all  being  the  cabinet,  con- 
taining the  real  leaders  or  chiefs.  By  this  means  is  secured 
that  unity  of  party  action  which  depends  upon  placing  the 
directing  power  in  the  hands  of  a  body  small  enough  to 
agree,  and  influential  enough  to  control.  There  have,  of 
course,  been  times  when  the  majority  was  not  sufficiently 
homogeneous  to  unite  in  a  cabinet ;  when  a  ministry  of  one 
party  has  depended  for  its  majority  upon  the  support  of  a 
detached  group  holding  the  balance  of  power.  The  Peel- 
ites  in  1850,  the  Liberal  Unionists  in  1886,  and  the  Irish 
Nationalists  in  1892  formed  groups  of  this  kind ;  but  such 
a  condition  of  things  is  in  its  nature  temporary  and  transi- 
tional, and  usually  gives  place  to  a  coalition  ministry, 
followed  by  party  amalgamation. 
Formation  The  statesman  sent  for  by  the  Crown  and  intrusted  with 
the  formation  of  a  ministry  becomes  himself  the  Prime  Min- 
ister, and  selects  his  colleagues.  It  may  be  added,  also, 
that  he  has  virtually  power  to  dismiss  a  minister ;  that  is, 
subject  to  his  responsibility  to  the  cabinet  as  a  whole  and 
to  Parliament,  he  can  request  the  Crown  to  dismiss  a  col- 
league —  a  request  which  the  Crown  cannot  practically 
refuse.1     In  the  selection  of  the  cabinet  his  choice  is,  how- 

1  This  is  the  opinion  of  two  of  the  most  prominent  Prime  Ministers  of  the 
century.  Ashley,  "Life  of  Palmerston,"  II.,  :«();  Morley,  "Life  of  Wal- 
pole,"  1.59;  the  latter  representing,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  the 
views  of  Mr.  Gladstone. 


of  the 
Cabinet 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   MINISTERS  57 

ever,  decidedly  limited  both  as  to  persons  and  offices.  In 
the  first  place,  all  the  men  still  in  active  public  life  who 
served  in  the  last  cabinet  of  the  party  have  a  claim,  a  very 
strong  claim,  to  sit  in  the  new  cabinet,  and  hence  it  is  un- 
usual to  discard  a  man  who  is  willing  to  return  to  office.1 
This  in  itself  fills  a  goodly  number  of  the  cabinet  positions. 
Then  all  the  prominent  leaders  in  Parliament,  and  especially 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  must  be  included.  In  fact,  as 
Mr.  Bagehot  puts  it,  the  Prime  Minister's  independent 
choice  extends  rather  to  the  division  of  the  cabinet  offices 
than  to  the  choice  of  cabinet  ministers.  Still,  he  has  some 
latitude  in  regard  to  the  men  whom  he  will  admit ;  especially 
the  younger  men,  who  are  appointed  to  offices  in  the  min- 
istry but  not  in  the  cabinet,  and  this  may  be  a  matter  of 
great  moment.  One  cannot  tell,  for  example,  how  different 
the  history  of  Parliament  in  the  middle  of  the  century 
might  have  been  had  Peel  decided  to  invite  Disraeli  to  join 
his  ministry  in  1841.2  Although  the  Prime  Minister  has 
by  no  means  a  free  hand  in  the  selection  of  his  colleagues, 
the  task  is  often  extremely  difficult  and  vexatious.  It  is 
like  that  of  constructing  a  figure  out  of  blocks  which  are  too 
numerous  for  the  purpose,  and  which  are  not  of  shapes  to 
fit  perfectly  together ;  for  with  the  selection  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  cabinet  the  difficulties  are  by  no  means  over. 
The  distribution  of  the  offices  among  them  may  raise  addi- 
tional problems.  One  man  will  take  only  a  particular  office, 
while  others  may  object  to  serving  if  he  occupies  that  post. 
Where  parties  are  a  good  deal  broken  up,  or  are  evenly  di- 
vided, obstacles  like  these  have  sometimes  prevented  the 
formation  of  a  cabinet  altogether ;  and  there  is  always  some 
disappointment  and  consequent  discontent  on  the  part  of 

1  For  an  example  of  the  difficulties  that  arise  on  this  score,  <•/.  Morley, 
"  Life  of  Gladstone,"  II.,  628-29.  Lord  Roscbcry,  who,  after  being  Prime 
Minister  in  1895,  was  left  out  of  the  next  Liberal  cabinet  in  1905,  had 
taken  himself  out  of  the  field  by  saying  that  he  could  not  serve  in  a 
ministry  whose  chief  held  the  views  on  Home  Rule  that  Sir  Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman  had  expressed. 

'  Cf.  Parker,  "  Sir  Robert  Peel,"  II.,  486-89;    III.,  347-48. 


58  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

men  who  thought  themselves  sufficiently  prominent  to  be 
admitted  to  the  ministry,  and  whose  chagrin  may  drive 
them  into  an  independent  attitude. 

There  are,  indeed,  two  ways  in  which  an  ambitious  young 
member  of  the  House  of  Commons  can  render  his  services 
indispensable  to  the  Prime  Minister.  He  must,  of  course, 
first  get  the  ear  of  the  House,  and  make  himself  a  power  there. 
Then  he  may  vote  regularly  with  the  party  whips,  support 
the  leaders  of  his  party  on  all  occasions,  and  speak  in  their 
favour  whenever  he  can  be  of  use  to  them.  In  that  case  he 
is  likely  to  be  regarded  as  a  promising  young  man  of  sound 
principles  who  can  be  relied  upon  by  his  chiefs.  Or,  he  may 
follow  the  opposite  course  of  the  candid  friend,  criticising 
and  even  attacking  the  leader  of  his  party,  showing  the 
wreak  points  in  his  arguments,  and  the  errors  in  his  policy. 
In  that  case,  if  the  young  man  has  achieved  so  important  a 
position  that  he  cannot  be  disregarded,  he  stands  a  good 
chance  of  being  given  an  office  as  a  dangerous  critic  who 
must  be  conciliated  and  attached  firmly  to  the  government. 
The  first  of  these  methods  is  slower  but  safer.  The  second 
has  sometimes  been  tried  with  startling  success,  notably  in 
the  case  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill ;  but  it  has  also  been 
tried  too  obviously,  and  without  the  necessary  social  or  par- 
liamentary influence ;  and  when  it  does  not  succeed  it  is 
likely  to  leave  its  victim  hopelessly  stranded  below  the 
gangway, 
increase  The  number  of  members  in  the  cabinet  has  varied  very 

much  at  different  times,1  and  of  late  years  it  has  shown  a 
marked  tendency  to  increase.  William  Pitt  had  only  six 
colleagues.  A  generation  ago  the  cabinets  contained  from 
a  dozen  to  sixteen  members;  but  they  have  now  run  up 
to  eighteen  or  twenty.  There  are  several  reasons  for  the 
change.  In  the  first  place,  as  the  sphere  of  the  state  activity 
extends  and  the  government  grows  more  paternal,  the  range 
of  affairs  that  come  within  the  action  of  the  cabinet  is 
greater;    and   hence   from   time  to   time   there   is   need   of 

'Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  2  Ed.,  II.,  189-90. 


in  Size. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   MINISTERS  59 

admitting  a  representative  of  some  fresh  department  to  its 
consultations.  Then,  on  the  political  side,  the  development 
of  the  parliamentary  system  has  made  it  necessary  for  the 
cabinet  to  have  an  ever  stronger  and  stronger  hold  upon 
the  House  of  Commons ;  and,  therefore,  the  different  shades 
of  feeling  in  the  party  that  has  a  majority  in  that  House 
must  be  more  and  more  fully  represented  in  the  cabinet. 
This  alone  would  tend  to  increase  the  number  of  its  mem- 
bers ;  but  far  more  important  still  is  the  fact  that  a  seat  in 
the  cabinet  has  become  the  ambition  of  all  the  prominent 
men  in  Parliament.  Consequently  the  desire  to  be  included 
is  very  great,  and  the  disappointment  correspondingly  acute. 
For  these  various  reasons  there  is  a  constant  pressure  to 
increase  the  size  of  the  cabinet.  The  result  is  not  without 
its  evils.  A  score  of  men  cannot  discuss  and  agree  on  a 
policy  with  the  same  readiness  as  a  dozen.  There  is  more 
danger  of  delay  when  action  must  be  taken.  There  is  a 
greater  probability  of  long  discussions  that  are  inconclusive 
or  result  in  a  weak  compromise.  There  is,  in  short,  all  the 
lack  of  administrative  efficiency  which  a  larger  body  always 
presents ;  unless,  indeed,  that  body  is  virtually  guided  and 
controlled  by  a  small  number  of  its  own  members.  That 
some  recent  cabinets  have  been  actually  so  controlled  there 
can  be  little  doubt ;  and  this  must  become  more  and  more 
the  case  as  the  cabinet  grows  larger,  if  it  is  to  retain  its  great 
suppleness  and  strength.  One  sometimes  hears  of  an  inte- 
rior junto,  or  cabinet  within  the  cabinet,  that  really  deter- 
mines the  policy.  This  is  undoubtedly  an  exaggeration; 
a  giving  of  formal  shape  to  informal  conferences  among 
leaders  on  special  questions,  which  have  always  taken  place ; 
but  it  appears  not  improbable  that  if  the  growth  in  the  size 
of  the  cabinet  continues,  some  such  interior  nucleus  may 
develop  which  will  bear  to  the  cabinet  something  of  the 
relation  that  the  cabinet  now  bears  to  the  ministry. 

Certain  offices  always  bring  their  holders  into  the  cabinet.   Offices  in 
These  are  the  positions  of  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury  (a  post  *  u'(u,mt' 
almost  invariably  held  either  by  the  Prime  Minister  himself, 


60  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

or  by  the  leader  of  the  House  of  Commons  if  the  Prime  Min- 
ister is  a  peer  and  takes  some  other  office) ;  Lord  Chan- 
cellor (a  great  political  as  well  as  judicial  office) ;  the  great 
English  executive  offices,  those  of  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer,  the  five  Secretaries  of  State,  and  the  First  Lord 
of  the  Admiralty ;  and  a  couple  of  dignified  positions  with- 
out active  administrative  duties,  those  of  President  of 
the  Council  and  the  Lord  Privy  Seal.  Certain  other  officers 
have  been  of  late  years  always  in  the  cabinet ;  such  are  the 
Presidents  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  the  Local  Government 
Board,  and  the  Board  of  Education,  and  the  Chief  Sec- 
retary for  Ireland,  —  except  when  his  nominal  superior,  the 
Lord  Lieutenant  for  Ireland,  is  himself  a  member.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Secretary  for  Scotland  and  the  Chancellor 
of  the  Duchy  of  Lancaster  are  usually  in  the  cabinet ; 
while  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Agriculture  and 
the  Postmaster-General  are  often  there;  the  First  Com- 
missioner of  Works  and  the  Lord  Chancellor  for  Ireland 
occasionally  so.  The  tendency  at  the  present  day  is 
certainly  in  the  direction  of  including  the  head  of  every 
considerable  branch  of  the  administration. 

The  counsel  of  a  statesman  who  was  incapacitated  for 
the  performance  of  steady  administrative  work,  or  un- 
willing to  undertake  it,  was  occasionally  secured  in  former 
times  by  giving  him  a  seat  in  the  cabinet  without  any 
office  under  the  Crown.  He  then  became  what  is  known 
on  the  continent  as  a  minister  without  portfolio.  The  last 
case  of  this  kind  in  England  was  that  of  Lord  John  Russell 
in  1854-1850;  but  the  same  object  is  practically  attained 
to-day  by  means  of  the  office  of  Lord  Privy  Seal,1  which 
involves  no  real  administrative  duties,  and  those  of  Presi- 
dent of  the  Council,2  and  Chancellor  of  the  Duchy  of 
Lancaster,  where  the  duties  are  very  light. 

1  If  the  post  of  Lord  Privy  Seal  is  not  needed  for  this  purpose,  it  is  given, 
without  salary,  to  the  holder  of  some  other  office. 

2  The  President  of  the  Council  had  in  the  past  a  somewhat  undefined 
authority  in  connection  with  the  Committee  of  the  Council  on  Education, 
but  this  committee  has  now  been  replaced  by  a  Board. 


THE   CABINET  AND   THE   MINISTERS  61 

As  the  continental  practice  whereby  ministers  are  allowed  The  Minis- 
to  address  the  legislature,  whether  they  have  seats  in  it  or  hive  "seats 
not,  is  unknown  in  England,  every  member  of  the  cabinet,  in  Pariia- 
and  indeed  of  the  ministry,  must  have  a  seat  in  one  or  other 
House  of  Parliament ; x  the  last  exception  being  that  of  Mr. 
Gladstone,  who  held  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State  for  the 
Colonies  during  the  last  few  months  of  Sir  Robert  Peel's 
administration  in  1846,  although  he  had  failed  of  reelection 
to  the  House  of  Commons.2  The  reason  commonly  given 
for  such  a  limitation  in  the  selection  of  ministers  is  that 
otherwise  they  could  not  be  made  responsible  to  Parlia- 
ment, where  they  must  be  present  in  order  to  answer  ques- 
tions, and  give  information  relating  to  their  departments. 
From  the  standpoint  of  Parliament  this  is  perfectly  true, 
but  the  converse  is  also  true.  The  head  of  a  department 
sits  in  the  House  of  Commons  quite  as  much  in  order  to 
control  the  House,  as  in  order  that  the  House  may  control 
him.  In  his  chapter  on  " Changes  of  Ministry,"  Bagehot 
has  shown  how  defenceless  against  attack  any  department 
is  sure  to  be  without  a  spokesman  in  Parliament,  and  he 
cites  as  a  forcible  illustration  the  fate  of  the  first  Poor  Law 
Commission.3  All  this  applies,  of  course,  only  to  the  House 
of  Commons,  for  although  the  presence  of  ministers  in  the 
House  of  Lords  is  a  convenience  in  debate,  and  an  appro- 
priate recognition  of  the  legal  equality  of  the  two  chambers, 
there  is  no  responsibility  to  be  secured  thereby,  and  it  is  not 
the  essential  means  of  controlling  the  action  of  the  peers. 

The  men  who  win  places  in  the  ministry  have  usually,  The  Cabinet 
although  by  no  means  invariably,  made  their  mark  in  de-  A^i™s?n 
bate.     It  is  a  strange  assumption  that  a  good  talker  must  trative  Ef- 
be  a  good  administrator,  and  that  a  strong  government  can 
be  formed  by  parcelling  out  the  offices  among  the  leading 


1  The  Law  Officers  present  occasional  exceptions. 

2  As  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Birrell  in  the  present  ministry,  a  man  who  is  not 
in  Parliament  may,  of  course,  be  included  in  a  new  cabinet  in  the  expecta- 
tion that  he  will  win  a  seat  at  the  impending  dissolution. 

3  Eng.  Const.,  1  Ed.,  228-30. 


62  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

debaters  in  the  legislative  body.  At  first  sight  it  appears 
as  irrational  as  the  other  corollary  of  the  parliamentary 
system,  that  the  public  service  is  promoted  by  dismissing 
an  excellent  foreign  minister,  because  the  House  of  Com- 
mons does  not  like  an  unpopular  clause  in  an  education  bill. 
Any  one  with  a  sense  of  humour  can  point  out  the  incon- 
gruities in  any  human  organisation,  whether  it  works  in 
practice  well  or  ill.  But  there  is,  in  fact,  reason  to  expect 
that  a  leading  debater  will  make  a  good  head  of  a  depart- 
ment. Influence  is  rarely  acquired  over  a  body  so  perma- 
nent as  the  House  of  Commons  by  mere  showy  eloquence. 
Real  weight  there  must  be  based  upon  a  knowledge  of  men, 
and  a  power  to  master  facts  and  grasp  the  essential  points 
in  a  situation.  It  must  be  based,  in  other  words,  upon  the 
qualities  most  essential  to  a  good  head  of  a  department  in 
a  government  where,  as  in  England,  the  technical  knowledge, 
the  traditions,  and  the  orderly  conduct  of  affairs,  are  se- 
cured by  a  corps  of  highly  efficient  permanent  officials.  No 
doubt  all  leading  debaters  do  not  make  good  administrators. 
Sometimes  a  minister  is  negligent  or  ineffective,  and  occa- 
sionally he  is  rash.  There  are  men,  also,  who  have  out- 
lived their  usefulness,  or  who  were  once  thought  very 
promising,  and  have  not  fulfilled  their  promise,  but  who 
cannot  be  discarded  and  must  be  given  a  post  of  more  or 
less  importance.  The  system  works,  however,  on  the  whole 
very  well,  and  supplies  to  the  government  offices  a  few 
extraordinary,  and  many  fairly  efficient,  chiefs,  although  it 
puts  some  departments  under  the  control  of  poor  admin- 
istrators. 

The  power  of  creating  peers  would  make  it  possible  to 
select  for  the  head  of  a  department  a  tried  administrator 
altogether  outside  of  the  parliamentary  field.  Something 
like  this  was  attempted  in  the  recent  case  of  Lord  Milner, 
who  was  offered,  on  Mr.  Chamberlain's  resignation,  the  post 
of  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies.  Lord  Milner  was, 
indeed,  a  peer  at  the  time  the  place  was  tendered  to  him, 
but  he  had  attended  in  the  House  of  Lords  only  to  take  his 


THE   CABINET   AND  THE   MINISTERS  63 

seat.  He  had  never  spoken  or  voted  there,  and  in  fact  had 
had  no  parliamentary  career,  his  nearest  approach  to  St. 
Stephens  having  consisted  in  standing  on  one  occasion  as  a 
candidate  for  the  House  of  Commons  without  success. 

Formerly  a  statesman  regularly  began  his  official  life  as  a 
parliamentary  under-secretary ;  and  he  did  not  become  the 
head  of  a  department,  or  win  a  seat  in  the  cabinet,  until  he 
had  in  this  way  served  his  apprenticeship  in  public  admin- 
istration —  a  practice  which  furnished  both  a  guarantee 
of  experience  and  a  test  of  executive  capacity.  Of  late 
years  there  have  been  a  number  of  exceptions  to  this  rule. 
Mr.  Chamberlain,  Lord  Randolph  Churchill,  Mr.  Morley 
and  Mr.  Birrell,  for  example,  were  admitted  to  the  cabinet, 
and  put  at  the  head  of  great  departments  without  any 
previous  training  in  the  service  of  the  government.  As  a 
rule,  however,  the  old  system  is  likely  to  prevail,  because  it 
is  difficult  for  a  man  to  make  his  mark  in  Parliament  unless 
he  begins  his  work  there  very  young;  and  the  exceptions 
occur  only  in  cases  of  men  of  great  ability. 

In  the  earlier  part  of  the  last  century,  before  the  party  sys-  The  Need  of 
tern  had  developed  as  fully  as  it  has  to-day,  complete  unity  n!uty  l? the 
in  the  cabinet  was  much  less  necessary  than  it  is  now.  At 
that  time  it  was  not  uncommon  to  have  matters,  sometimes 
very  important  ones,  treated  as  open  questions  in  the  cabi- 
net, and  a  good  deal  of  discussion  has  taken  place  upon  the 
advantages  and  the  evils  of  such  a  practice.1  Members  of 
the  cabinet  occasionally  spoke  and  voted  against  govern- 
ment measures,  although  a  difference  carried  to  that  length 
was  always  rare.  One  even  finds  colleagues  in  the  minis- 
try standing  as  opposing  candidate's  at  an  election.2  Such 
occurrences  would  be  impossible  to-day,  because,  as  will 
appear  more  fully  when  we  come  to  treat  of  the  political 
parties     parliamentary   government    in    its    present    highly 

1  Cf.  Todd.  "Pari,  f'.ovf.  in  England."  II.,  40").  note  w. 

2  This  happened,  for  example,  in  ISii/i,  when  Pa'merston,  Cioulburn  and 
Copley  Call  three  in  the  ministry)  were  three  out  of  the  six  candidates  for 
the  two  seats  for  Cambridge  I'niversity.  Bulwer,  "Life  of  l'alinerston." 
I.,   153  tt  seq. 


64  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

developed  form  requires  a  very  strong  cohesion  among  the 
members  of  the  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and, 
therefore,  absolute  harmony,  or  the  appearance  of  harmony, 
among  their  leaders.  It  is  necessary  to  present  a  united 
front  to  the  Opposition,  but  if  the  trumpet  give  an  uncer- 
tain sound,  who  shall  prepare  himself  for  the  battle  ?  Any 
one  watching  the  course  of  events  during  the  early  summer 
of  1903  must  have  observed  how  rapidly  the  process  of  dis- 
integration went  on  in  the  Conservative  party  while  it  was 
known  that  the  ministers  were  at  odds  over  the  tariff. 
Party  cohesion,  both  in  the  House  and  in  the  cabinet,  is, 
indeed,  an  essential  feature  of  the  parliamentary  system; 
but  since  men,  however  united  on  general  principles,  do  not 
by  nature  think  alike  in  all  things,  differences  of  opinion 
must  constantly  arise  within  the  cabinet  itself.1  Some- 
times they  are  pushed  so  far  that  they  can  be  settled  only 
by  a  division  or  vote,  but  this  is  exceptional,  for  the  ob- 
ject of  the  members  is,  if  possible,  to  agree,  not  to  obtain 
a  majority  of  voices  and  override  the  rest.2  The  work  of 
every  cabinet  must,  therefore,  involve  a  series  of  compro- 
mises and  concessions,  the  more  so  because  the  members 
represent  the  varying  shades  of  opinion  comprised  in  the 
party  in  power.  A  minister  who  belongs  to  one  wing  of 
the  party  may,  in  fact,  be  more  nearly  in  accord  with  a 
member  of  the  front  Opposition  Bench  than  with  some  col- 
league who  stands  at  the  other  political  pole  of  opinion, 
and  yet  he  will  stay  in  the  cabinet  unless  the  measures  pro- 
posed are  such  that  he  feels  conscientiously  obliged  to  re- 
sign. So  long  as  he  remains  in  the  government  he  will 
attempt  to  agree  with  his  colleagues,  but  when  he  has  finally 
left  them  his  personal  opinions  will  take  full  course,  and 

1  One  cannot  road  Mr.  Morley's  "Life  of  Gladstone"  without  being  struck 
by  the  frequency  of  such  differences.  One  feels  that  in  his  twenty-five 
years  of  life  in  the  cabinet  Gladstone  must  have  expended  almost  as  much 
effort  in  making  his  views  prevail  with  his  colleagues  as  in  forcing  them 
through  Parliament. 

2  In  Gladstone's  cabinet  of  1880-1885  the  practice  of  counting  votes  was 
complained  of,  as  an  innovation.     Morley,  "  Life  of  Gladstone,"  III.,  5. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   MINISTERS  65 

he  may  go  off  at  a  tangent.  In  this  way  the  behaviour  of 
an  ex-minister  towards  his  former  colleagues,  which  is  some- 
times attributed  to  rancour,  may  very  well  be  due  to  a 
natural  expansion  of  opinions  which  were  held  in  check 
while  he  clung  to  the  cabinet. 

Men  engaged  in  a  common  cause  who  come  together  for  Need  of 
the  purpose  of  reaching  an  agreement  usually  succeed,  pro-  y" 

vided  their  differences  of  opinion  are  not  made  public. 
But  without  secrecy  harmony  of  views  is  well-nigh  unat- 
tainable ;  for  if  the  contradictory  opinions  held  by  mem- 
bers of  the  cabinet  were  once  made  public  it  would  be  im- 
possible afterwards  to  make  the  concessions  necessary  to  a 
compromise,  without  the  loss  of  public  reputation  for  con- 
sistency and  force  of  character.  Moreover  a  knowledge  of 
the  initial  divergence  of  views  among  the  ministers  would 
vastly  increase  the  difficulty  of  rallying  the  whole  party  in 
support  of  the  policy  finally  adopted,  and  would  offer  vul- 
nerable points  to  the  attacks  of  the  Opposition.  Secrecy 
is,  therefore,  an  essential  part  of  the  parliamentary  system, 
and  hence  it  is  the  habit,  while  making  public  the  fact  that 
a  meeting  of  the  cabinet  has  taken  place,  and  the  names  of 
the  members  present,  to  give  no  statement  of  the  business 
transacted.  Not  only  is  no  official  notice  of  the  proceedings 
published,  but  it  is  no  less  important  that  they  should  not 
be  in  any  way  divulged.  In  fact,  by  a  well-recognised 
custom,  it  is  highly  improper  to  refer  in  Parliament,  or 
elsewhere,  to  what  has  been  said  or  done  at  meetings  of  the 
cabinet,  although  reticence  must  at  times  place  certain 
members  in  a  very  uncomfortable  position.1     Occasionally 

1  This  obligation  has  been  said  to  rest  upon  the  cabinet  minister's  oath 
of  secrecy  as  a  privy  councillor  (Todd,  2  Ed.,  II.,  83-84,  240).  Hut  this 
would  seem  to  be  another  case  of  confusion  between  the  law  and  the  con- 
ventions of  the  constitution.  Although  the  permission  of  the  sovereign 
must  be  obtained  before  proceedings  in  the  cabinet  can  be  made  public 
(rf.  Hans.,  3  Ser.  CCCIV.,  1182,  1186,  1189),  yet  in  fact  the  duty  of  secrecy 
is  not  merely  a  legal  obligation  towards  the  sovereign  which  he  can  waive 
under  the  advice,  for  example,  of  a  ministry  of  the  other  party.  It  is  a 
moral  duty  towards  one's  colleagues,  which  ceases  when  by  lapse  of  time, 
or  otherwise,  the  reason  for  it  has  been  removed;  and  the  secrets  must  be 
r 


66  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

it  becomes  well-nigh  intolerable.  This  is  true  where  a  cabi- 
net breaks  up  owing  to  dissensions  over  an  issue  that  ex- 
cites keen  public  interest,  and  in  such  cases  the  story  of  what 
happened  may  be  told  in  a  way  that  would  be  thought 
inexcusable  under  other  circumstances.1 

When  we  consider  the  great  public  interest  that  attaches 
to  the  decisions  of  the  cabinet,  and  the  great  value  that 
premature  information  would  have  for  journalists  and 
speculators,  it  is  astonishing  how  little  cabinet  secrets  have 
leaked  out.  In  curious  contrast  with  this  are  the  reports 
of  select  committees  of  Parliament,  the  contents  of  which 
are  often  known  before  the  report  is  made,2  probably  in 
most  cases  not  from  any  deliberate  disclosure,  but  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  piecing  together  of  small  bits  of  information,  no 
one  of  which  alone  would  seem  to  be  a  betrayal  of  confidence. 
The  reason  this  does  not  happen  in  the  case  of  cabinets  is 
no  doubt  to  be  sought  in  the  complete  reliance  of  the  mem- 
bers upon  one  another,  and  their  disbelief  in  the  statements 
of  any  one  who  pretends  to  have  obtained  information  from 
a  colleague.  The  best  proof  of  the  real  silence  of  ministers 
is  found  in  the  fact  that  although  on  two  or  three  occasions 
the  press  has  been  remarkably  shrewd  in  guessing  at  prob- 
able decisions,  members  of  the  cabinet  have  seldom  been 
guilty  of  talking  indiscreetly.  The  one  or  two  instances 
where  it  is  alleged  to  have  occurred  have,  indeed,  acquired 
the  sort  of  notoriety  of  exceptions  that  prove  the  rule.3 

At  one  time,  it  seems,  before  the  reign  of  Queen  Victoria, 
minutes  of  cabinet  meetings  were  kept,  showing  the  opin- 


kept  from  other  privy  councillors,  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition  for  example, 
as  well  as  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  Sometimes  sharp  discussions  have 
occurred  on  the  limits  of  the  permission  given  to  reveal  what  has  taken 
place  at  cabinet  meetings.  This  occurred  after  Mr.  Chamberlain's  resig- 
nation in  1886.       Churchill,  "Life  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill,"  II.,  85-86. 

1  E.g.  Hans.  (1886),  3  Ser.  CCCIV.,  1181  el  seq.,  1811  et  seq.,  and  (1904), 
4  Ser.  CXXIX.,  878,  880;  CXXX.,  349  et  seq.;  CXXXL,  403  et  seq.,  709 
et  seq. 

2  E.g.  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  List,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  V.,  607. 

3  There  is  some  interesting  gossip  about  instances  of  this  kind  in  Mac- 
Donagh,  "Book  of  Parliament,"  337-49. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   MINISTERS  67 

ions  held,  with  the  reasons  given  therefor,  and  these  were 
transmitted  to  the  King.1  Even  as  late  as  1855  regular 
cabinet  dinners  took  place,  marked  by  the  possible  con- 
venience that  no  reports  of  the  topics  of  discussion  were 
sent  to  the  sovereign,  as  in  the  ca^e  of  more  formal  meetings.2 
At  the  present  day  he  receives  only  a  general  statement  of 
the  matters  discussed,  with  formal  minutes  of  decisions 
that  require  his  approval ;  and  it  would  be  considered  im- 
proper to  inform  him  of  the  conflicting  opinions  held  by  the 
different  ministers.3  In  fact  no  records  of  the  cabinet  are 
kept.  This  results  in  occasional  differences  of  recollection 
on  the  question  whether  a  definite  conclusion  was  reached 
on  certain  matters  or  not;  but  possible  difficulties  of  that 
kind  are  probably  of  far  less  consequence  than  the  facility 
in  compromising  differences  of  opinion  and  reaching  a  har- 
monious conclusion  that  comes  from  the  entire  informality 
of  the  proceedings.  So  little  formal,  indeed,  are  the  meet- 
ings that  a  person  not  a  member  of  the  cabinet  is  occasion- 
ally brought  in  for  consultation.  This  occurred  in  1848, 
for  example,  when  the  Duke  of  Wellington  attended  a  Lib- 
eral cabinet  to  give  advice  upon  measures  to  be  taken  in  view 
of  the  danger  of  the  Chartist  riots. 

It  is  an  old  practice,  and  obviously  a  necessary  one,  to  Times  of 
hold  one  or  more  meetings  of  the  cabinet  in  the  autumn  to  Meetlne- 
consider  the  measures  to  be  presented  to  Parliament  during 
the  coming  session ;  to  arrange,  as  it  were,  the  government's 
parliamentary  programme.  Other  meetings  are  held  from 
time  to  time  whenever  necessary ;  sometimes  as  often  as 
once  a  week  during  the  session ;  occasionally  even  more 
frequently  when  urgent  and  difficult  matters  are  to  be  de- 

1  Parker,  "Sir  Robert  Peel,"  III.,  496-90. 

2  M  or  ley,  "Life  of  Walpole,"  151.  Cabinet  dinners  have  oecasionally 
taken  place  of  late  year.s,  but  it  is  safe  to  say  that  they  have  not  been  held 
with  that  object. 

3  .Mr.  Gladstone  "was  emphatic  and  decided  in  his  opinion  that  if  the 
Premier  mentioned  to  the  Queen  any  of  his  colleagues  who  had  opposed  him 
in  the  cabinet,  he  was  guilty  of  great  baseness  and  perfidy."  Morley,  "  Life 
of  Clad.-tone,"  II.,  575.  Hut  this  seems  to  have  applied  only  to  giving  their 
names.    Ibid.,  III.,  132. 


68  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

cided.  After  the  session  of  Parliament  comes  to  an  end  in 
August,  the  ministers  usually  take  their  vacation  in  travel, 
sport,  or  public  speaking;  and  cabinet  meetings  are  sus- 
pended unless  political  questions  of  a  pressing  nature  arise. 

In  the  rare  cases  where  the  cabinet  is  obliged  to  settle  its 
policy  by  the  crude  method  of  a  division  or  vote,  the  voices 
of  its  members  count  alike;  but  questions  are  usually 
decided  by  preponderance  of  opinion,  not  by  votes;  and 
the  weight  of  the  opinions  of  the  ministers  is  naturally 
very  unequal.  Such  a  difference  must  be  particularly 
marked  in  the  large  cabinets  of  the  present  day;  and 
some  of  the  members  must  be  perfectly  well  aware  that 
they  are  expected  to  follow  rather  than  to  lead.  The  rela- 
tive influence  of  the  different  ministers  over  their  colleagues, 
both  at  the  cabinet  meetings  and  elsewhere,  depends,  of 
course,  primarily  upon  their  personal  qualities;  although 
the  post  occupied  is,  in  some  cases,  not  without  importance. 
This  is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  the  Prime  Minister. 
The  Prime  Until  1906  the  Prime  Minister,  like  the  cabinet  itself,  was 
unknown  to  the  law,1  but  the  position  has  long  been  one  of 
large  though  somewhat  ill-defined  authority.  It  has  grown 
with  the  growth  of  the  cabinet  itself;  and,  indeed,  the  ad- 
ministrations of  the  great  Prime  Ministers,  such  as  Walpole, 
Pitt  and  Peel,  are  landmarks  in  the  evolution  of  the  sys- 
tem.2 We  have,  fortunately,  from  two  of  the  chief  Prime 
Ministers  in  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  de- 
scriptions both  of  the  cabinet  and  the  premiership,  which 
are  authoritative;3  and  although  they  do  not  add  a  great 
deal  to  what  is  popularly  known,  they  enable  us  to  state 
it  with  greater  confidence. 

At  the   meetings  of  the  cabinet  the  Prime  Minister   as 

1  In  1906  the  position  was  recognized  by  being  accorded  a  place  in  the 
order  of  precedence.      Cf.  Hans.,  4  Ser.  CLVI.,  742. 

3  Walpole  repudiated  the  title  of  First  or  Prime  Minister,  although  he  was, 
in  fact,  the  first  man  to  occupy  such  a  position. 

3  See  Ashley,  "Life  of  Palmerston,"  II.,  329-30;  Gladstone,  "Gleanings 
of  Past  Years,"  I.,  242.  See  also  the  description  in  Morley,  "Life  of 
Walpole,"  150-65,  which,  as  already  pointed  out,  represents  Mr.  Glad- 
stone's views. 


Minister. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   MINISTERS  69 

chairman  is  no  doubt  merely  primus  inter  pares.  His 
opinion  carries  peculiar  weight  with  his  colleagues  mainly 
by  the  force  it  derives  from  his  character,  ability,  experi- 
ence and  reputation ;  but  apart  from  cabinet  meetings  he 
has  an  authority  that  is  real,  though  not  always  the  same 
or  easy  to  define. 

In  the  first  place  the  Prime  Minister  has  a  considerable 
patronage  at  his  disposal.  Subject  to  the  limitations  im- 
posed by  political  exigencies,  he  virtually  appoints  all  the 
members  of  the  ministry.  The  ecclesiastical  offices  also, 
from  the  bishoprics  to  the  larger  livings  in  the  gift  of  the 
Crown,  are  bestowed  on  his  recommendation ;  and  so  as  a 
rule  are  peerages  and  other  honours ;  and  he  has  a  general 
presumptive  right  to  nominate  to  any  new  office  that  is 
established  under  the  Crown.1 

He  is  both  an  official  channel  of  communication  and  an  His  Super, 
informal  mediator.  The  duties  of  the  Prime  Minister,  if  vlslon- 
one  may  use  the  expression,  surround  the  cabinet.  He 
stands  in  a  sense  between  it  and  all  the  other  forces  in  the 
state  with  which  it  may  come  into  contact,  and  he  even 
stands  between  it  and  its  own  members.  Matters  of  ex- 
ceptional importance  ought  to  be  brought  to  his  attention 
before  they  are  discussed  in  the  cabinet ;  and  any  dif- 
ferences that  may  arise  between  any  two  ministers,  or  the 
departments  over  which  they  preside,  should  be  submitted 
to  him  for  decision,  subject,  of  course,  to  a  possible  appeal 
to  the  cabinet.  lie  is  supposed  to  exercise  a  general  super- 
vision over  all  the  departments.  Nothing  of  moment  that 
relates  to  the  general  policy  of  the  government,  or  that 
may  affect  seriously  the  efficiency  of  the  service,  ought  to 
be  transacted  without  his  advice.  He  has  a  right  to  expect, 
for  example,  to  be  consulted  about  the  filling  of  the  highest 
posts  in  the  permanent  civil  service.2  All  this  is  true  of 
every  branch  of  the  government,  but  the  foreign  relations 
of  the   country  are  subject  to  his   oversight  in  a  peculiar 

1  Morley,  "Life  of  Gladstone,"  II.,  383. 
1  Morley,  "Life  of  Walpole,"  159-60. 


70  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

degree,  for  he  is  supposed  to  see  all  the  important  de- 
spatches before  they  are  sent,  and  be  kept  constantly 
informed  by  the  Foreign  Secretary  of  the  state  of  relations 
with  other  powers. 

The  extent  to  which  a  Prime  Minister  actually  super- 
vises and  controls  the  several  departments  must,  of  course, 
vary  in  different  cabinets.  One  cannot  read  the  memoirs  of 
Sir  Robert  Peel  without  seeing  how  closely  he  watched, 
and  how  much  he  guided,  every  department  of  the  govern- 
ment.1 A  score  of  years  later  we  find  Lord  Palmerston 
lamenting  that  when  able  men  fill  every  post  it  is  impos- 
sible for  the  Prime  Minister  to  exercise  the  same  decisive 
influence  on  public  policy ; 2  and  recently  Lord  Rosebery 
has  told  us  that  owing  to  the  widening  of  the  activity  of 
the  government  no  Premier  could,  at  the  present  day,  exert 
the  control  that  Peel  had  over  the  various  branches  of  the 
public  service.3  It  is  certain  that  a  Prime  Minister  cannot 
maintain  such  a  control  if  his  time  is  taken  up  by  the  con- 
duct of  a  special  department ;  and  this,  combined  with  some 
natural  recklessness  in  speech,  accounts  for  the  strange 
ignorance  that  Lord  Salisbury  displayed  at  times  about  the 
details  of  administration,  as  in  the  case  when  he  excused 
the  lack  of  military  preparation  for  the  South  African  War 
on  the  ground  that  the  Boers  had  misled  the  British  War 
Office  by  smuggling  guns  into  the  country  in  locomotives 
and  munitions  of  war  in  pianos.4  It  has  been  usual,  there- 
fore, for  the  Prime  Minister  to  take  the  office  of  First  Lord  of 
the  Treasury,  which  involves  very  little  administrative  work, 
and  leaves  its  occupant  free  for  his  more  general  duties.5 

1  "Sir  Robert  Peel,  from  his  Private  Correspondence";  cf.  Parker, 
"Sir  Robert  Peel";  Morley,  "Life  of  Gladstone,"  I.,  248,  298. 

2  Ashley,  "  Life  of  Palmerston,"  II.,  257;  cf.  Morley,  "  Life  of  Gladstone," 
II.,  35. 

3  In  his  review  of  Parker's  "Sir  Robert  Peel,"  in  the  first  number  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  Review.  4  Hans.,  4  Ser.  LXXVIIL,  27. 

6  At  the  end  of  his  first  ministry,  and  at  the  beginning  of  his  second, 
Mr.  Gladstone  held  the  office  of  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  With  this 
exception,  and  with  that  of  Lord  Salisbury,  no  Prime  Minister  has  been  at 
the  head  of  a  department  since  1835. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   MINISTERS  71 

The  Prime  Minister  stands  between  the  Crown  and  the  HeRepre- 
cabinet ;  for  although  the  King  may,  and  sometimes  does,  cabinet 
communicate  with  a  minister  about  the  affairs  relating  to 
his  own  department,  it  is  the  Premier  who  acts  as  the  con- 
necting link  with  the  cabinet  as  a  whole,  and  communi- 
cates to  him  their  collective  opinion.  To  such  an  extent  is 
he  the  representative  of  the  cabinet  in  its  relations  to  the 
Crown  that  whereas  the  resignation  of  any  other  minister 
creates  only  a  vacancy,  the  resignation  of  a  Premier  dis- 
solves the  cabinet  altogether;  and  even  when  his  successor 
is  selected  from  among  his  former  colleagues,  and  not  another 
change  is  made,  yet  the  loss  of  the  Premier  involves  tech- 
nically the  formation  of  a  new  cabinet. 

Unless  the  Prime  Minister  is  a  peer  he  represents  the  cabi- 
net as  a  whole  in  the  House  of  Commons,  making  there  any 
statements  of  a  general  nature,  such  as  relate,  for  example, 
to  the  amount  of  time  the  government  will  need  for  its 
measures,  or  to  the  question  of  what  bills  it  will  proceed 
with,  and  how  far  the  lack  of  time  will  compel  it  to  abandon 
the  rest.  The  other  ministers  usually  speak  only  about 
matters  in  which  they  are  directly  concerned.  They  de- 
fend the  appropriations,  explain  the  measures,  and  answer 
the  questions  relating  to  their  own  departments ;  but  they 
do  not  ordinarily  take  any  active  part  in  the  discussion 
of  other  subjects,  unless  a  debate  lasts  for  two  or  three 
days,  when  one  or  more  of  them  may  be  needed.  They 
are,  indeed,  often  so  busy  in  their  own  rooms  at  the  House 
that  it  is  not  uncommon,  when  a  government  measure  of 
second-rate  importance  is  in  progress,  to  see  the  Treasury 
Bench  entirely  deserted  except  for  the  minister  in  charge 
of  the  bill.  But  the  Prime  Minister  must  keep  a  careful 
watch  on  the  progress  of  all  government  measures;  and  he 
is  expected  to  speak  not  only  on  all  general  questions,  but 
on  all  the  most  important  government  lulls.  lie  can  do 
this,  of  course,  only  in  the  House  of  which  he  happens  to 
be  a  member;  and  the  strength  of  his  all-pervading  in- 
fluence upon  the  government  depends  to  no  slight  extent 


72 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Relation  of 
the  Minis- 
ters to  One 
Another. 


upon  the  question  whether  he  sits  in  the  Lords  or  the 

Commons. 

As  the  House  of  Commons  is  the  place  where  the  great 
battles  of  the  parties  are  fought,  a  Prime  Minister  who  is  a 
peer  is  in  something  of  the  position  of  a  commander-in-chief 
who  is  not  present  with  the  forces  in  the  field.  He  must 
send  his  directions  from  afar,  and  trust  a  lieutenant  to  carry 
them  out.  In  such  a  case  the  leader  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons stands  in  something  of  the  position  of  a  deputy  premier. 
He  is,  of  necessity,  constantly  consulted  by  his  colleagues 
in  the  House,  and  he  can,  if  so  disposed,  draw  into  his  own 
hands  a  part  of  the  authority  belonging  to  the  head  of  the 
cabinet.  As  Mr.  Gladstone  remarked,  "  The  overweight, 
again,  of  the  House  of  Commons  is  apt,  other  things  being 
equal,  to  bring  its  Leader  inconveniently  near  in  power  to 
a  Prime  Minister  who  is  a  peer.  He  can  play  off  the  House 
of  Commons  against  his  chief ;  and  instances  might  be  cited, 
though  they  are  happily  most  rare,  when  he  has  served  him 
very  ugly  tricks."  1  It  is  certainly  true  that  the  Prime 
Ministers  who  have  most  dominated  their  cabinets,  and  have 
had  their  administrations  most  fully  under  their  control, 
have  all  been  in  the  Commons.  It  may  be  added  that  a 
high  authority  has  declared  that  "no  administrations  are 
so  successful  as  those  where  the  distance  in  parliamentary 
authority,  party  influence,  and  popular  position,  between 
the  Prime  Minister  and  his  colleagues  in  the  cabinet,  is 
wide,  recognised  and  decisive."  2 

Not  only  does  the  Prime  Minister  stand  above  and  apart 
from  his  colleagues,  but  they  do  not  all  stand  upon  one  plane. 
The  influence  of  a  minister  depends  upon  his  personal  force, 
but  it  may  be  affected  by  the  office  that  he  holds,  and  per- 
haps by  his  nearness  to  the  Prime  Minister  himself ;  for 
although  there  is  no  formal  interior  junta,  or  cabinet  within 
the  cabinet,  yet  the  Premier  is  apt  to  take  counsel  informally 


1  "  Gleanings  of  Past  Years,"  I.,  242. 

2  Morley,  "  Life  of  Walpole,"   164-65. 
such  broad  terms  to-day. 


This  would  hardly  be  stated  in 


THE  CABINET  AND   THE  MINISTERS  73 

with  other  leading  ministers,  and  if  he  is  a  masterful  man 
those  who  can  command  or  win  his  confidence  have  the 
better  chance  of  shaping  the  policy  of  the  government  while 
it  is  still  formless  and  malleable.  The  cabinet,  moreover, 
does  not  always  act  as  a  whole.  It  sometimes  appoints 
committees  to  consider  special  subjects,  and  indeed  it  has 
an  old  and  well-established  practice  of  appointing  com- 
mittees to  prepare  important  government  bills.1 

It  is  commonly  said  that  the  ministers  are  severally  re-  Joint  and 
sponsible  to  Parliament  for  the  conduct  of  their  own  depart-  g^sfbUH 
ments,  and  jointly  responsible  for  the  general  policy  of  the 
government.  Like  many  other  maxims  of  the  British 
Constitution,  this  has  the  advantage  of  being  sufficiently 
vague  to  be  capable  of  different  interpretations  at  dif- 
ferent times.  With  the  growth  of  the  parliamentary  sys- 
tem, and  the  more  clearly  marked  opposition  between  the 
parties,  the  joint  responsibility  has  in  fact  become  greater 
and  the  several  responsibility  less.  The  last  instances  where 
a  single  minister  resigned  on  an  adverse  vote  of  the  House 
of  Commons  were  those  of  Mr.  Lowe,  who  retired  from  the 
vice-presidency  of  the  Committee  on  Education  in  1864  in 
consequence  of  a  vote  charging  him  with  improper  mutila- 
tion of  the  reports  of  inspectors,  and  Lord  Chancellor  West- 
bury,  who  resigned  in  18G6  on  account  of  a  vote  censuring 
his  grant  of  a  pension  to  a  registrar  in  bankruptcy  charged 
with  misconduct.2  If  at  the  present  day  the  cause  of  com- 
plaint were  a  personal  error  on  the  part  of  the  minister,  he 
would  probably  be  brought  to  resign  voluntarily  before 
there  was  a  chance  of  his  resignation  being  forced  by  a  hos- 
tile vote  in  the  House;    and  if  the  question  were  one  of 

1  During  the  late  war  in  South  Africa,  there  was  a  special  Cabinet  Com- 
mittee on  National  Defence,  which  was  afterwards  enlarged  and  made 
permanent,  as  explained  in  the  following  chapter. 

2  See  a  collection  of  instances  in  Todd,  "  Pari.  Govt,  in  England," 
2  Ed.,  IJ.,  471  et  set/.,  and  I.,  444-49,  068-87.  The  vote  in  1887  to 
adjourn  in  order  to  draw  attention  to  the  conduct  of  the  police  in  the 
ea,se  of  Miss  Cass  might  very  well  have  been  regarded  as  a  censure  upon 
the  Home  Secretary,  Mr.  Mai  thews;  hut  he  did  not  think  it  necessary  to 
resign.      Hans.,  3  Ser.  CCCXVI.,  1796-1S30. 


74  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

policy,  the  government  would,  save  in  very  exceptional  cases, 
assume  the  responsibility  for  that  policy,  treating  a  hostile 
vote  as  showing  a  want  of  confidence  in  itself.  The  ma- 
jority in  the  House  of  Commons,  on  the  other  hand,  while 
it  may  question,  criticise  and  blame  a  minister  in  debate, 
is  reluctant  to  permit  a  vote  of  censure  upon  him  which  is 
liable  to  involve  the  fall  of  the  ministry.1 

Each  minister  is  responsible  to  the  cabinet  for  the  con- 
duct of  his  department.  He  is  constantly  meeting  with 
problems  which  may  involve  criticism  in  Parliament,  and 
where  a  mistake  might  entail  serious  consequences  for  the 
whole  government.  In  such  cases  he  must  decide  how  far 
he  can  assume  to  settle  the  question  in  accordance  with  his 
own  opinion,  and  what  matters  he  ought  to  bring  before 
the  cabinet.  He  must  not,  on  the  one  hand,  take  up  its 
time  in  discussing  trivialities,  and  he  must  not,  on  the  other, 
commit  his  colleagues  to  a  course  of  action  which  really 
involves  general  policy.  If  in  doubt  he  can,  of  course,  con- 
sult the  Prime  Minister ;  but  in  spite  of  this  privilege  annoy- 
ing blunders  must  inevitably  occur. 

A  minister  naturally  has  charge  in  the  cabinet  of  the  busi- 
ness relating  to  his  own  department,  but  how  far  he  takes 
an  active  part  in  other  things  will  depend  upon  the  interest 
that  he  feels  in  them.  Lord  Palmerston,  for  example,  when 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  took,  as  his  letters  show,  little 
interest  in  anything  else ;  but  when  he  became  Home 
Secretary  he  took  not  only  an  active  but  a  leading  part  in 
directing  the  foreign  relations  of  the  country.  This  he  was 
fully  entitled  to  do,  because  the  cabinet  is  both  an  assem- 
blage of  ministers  at  the  head  of  the  separate  branches  of  the 
administration,  and  a  council  of  state  which  must  form  a 
collective  judgment  upon  the  questions  submitted  to  it.  A 
minister  is,  therefore,  justified  in  pressing  his  views  on  any 
subject,  whether  connected  with  his  own  department  or  not; 
and  on   no   other  basis   could    collective    responsibility  be 

1  The  vote  to  reduce  the  salary  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  in  1895 
was  anomalous.     It  was  a  trick  which  will  be  explained  in  a  later  chapter. 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE  MINISTERS  75 

maintained.  The  practice  is  particularly  marked  in  the 
case  of  foreign  affairs,  which  usually  form  a  large  part  of 
the  business  at  the  meetings. 

It  is  not  only  on  questions  of  general  policy,  brought  The  Treas- 
before  the  cabinet,  that  differences  of  opinion  between  min-  Qthe^De- 
isters  may  arise,  for  there  are  many  matters  of  current  ad-  payments, 
ministration  that  affect  more  than  one  department.  In 
such  cases  the  ministers  concerned  confer  together,  and  if 
they  cannot  agree  their  differences  must  be  submitted  to 
the  Prime  Minister,  and  ultimately  to  the  cabinet.  There 
is,  indeed,  one  department  which  is  continually  brought 
into  contact  —  one  might  almost  say  conflict  —  with  all 
the  others ;  that  is  the  Treasury.  Any  vigorous  branch  of 
the  public  service  always  sees  excellent  reasons  for  increas- 
ing its  expenditure,  and  proposes  to  do  so  without  much 
regard  for  the  needs  of  the  other  branches ;  while  the  Chan- 
cellor of  the  Exchequer,  who  is  obliged  to  find  the  money, 
must  strive  to  restrict  the  aggregate  outlay.  If  he  did  not, 
the  expenditure  of  the  government  would  certainly  be  ex- 
travagant. As  a  preliminary  step  to  the  preparation  of  the 
budget  the  Treasury  issues  in  the  autumn  a  circular  to  the 
other  departments  asking  for  estimates  of  their  expenses 
during  the  coming  fiscal  year.  These  are  made  up  in  the 
first  instance  by  the  permanent  officials,  and  then  laid  be- 
fore the  parliamentary  head  of  the  department,  who  revises 
and  perhaps  reduces  them.  When  they  reach  the  Treasury 
they  are  scrutinised  by  the  permanent  officials  there,  and  if 
anything  is  not  clear,  an  explanation  is  sought  from  the 
department  concerned.  The  estimates  are  then  submitted 
by  the  Treasury  officials  to  their  parliamentary  chiefs,  and 
if  there  is  an  objection  to  any  item  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
Financial  Secretary  to  the  Treasury  to  confer  with  the 
head  of  the  department  whose  estimates  are  in  question.1 
If  the  parliamentary  head  of  the  department  does  not  agree 
with  the  Financial  Secretary  he  may  go  to  the  Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer,  and  if  they  cannot  settle  the  matter  they 

1  Com   on  Nut.  Expenditure,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  1.3,  App.  1  and  3. 


76  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

must  appeal  to  the  Prime  Minister  and  as  a  last  resort  to 
the  cabinet.  Being  placed  in  such  a  relation  to  his  col- 
leagues, it  is  not  unnatural  that  the  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer should  often  differ  with  them.  As  Gladstone 
notes  in  his  diary  in  1865,  ''Estimates  always  settled  at  the 
dagger's  point."  x  Like  other  differences  in  the  cabinet, 
these  occasionally  come  to  light,  especially  when  they  have 
been  so  sharp  as  to  cause  the  Chancellor's  resignation. 
Lord  Randolph  Churchill  resigned  in  1886  because  the  cabi- 
net insisted  upon  appropriations  for  the  Army  which  he 
opposed ;  and  Sir  Michael  Hicks-Beach  has  told  us  recently 
that  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  his  protests  against 
the  growth  of  expenditure  were  received  with  indifference 
he  might  not  have  quitted  the  office.2  One  cause,  more- 
over, of  the  final  resignation  of  Mr.  Gladstone  —  who  al- 
though not  then  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  always  looked 
upon  matters  from  the  Treasury  standpoint  —  was  a  dif- 
ference of  opinion  between  him  and  his  colleagues  on  the 
question  of  the  cost  of  national  defence.3 

Whatever  the  policy  of  the  cabinet  at  any  moment  may 
be,  the  scale  of  expenditure  is  ultimately  determined  by 
the  feeling  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  this  in  turn  de- 
pends upon  the  state  of  public  opinion.  Except  for  a  few 
short  periods  of  extravagance,  the  seventy  years  that  fol- 
lowed the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  were  marked  by 
a  decided  tendency  in  favour  of  economy.  People  felt 
the  pressure  of  taxation,  worried  little  about  the  condition 
of  the  Army  or  the  Navy,  and  had  no  strong  desire  to 
increase  the  expenses  of  the  government  in  any  direction. 
Latterly  the  tendency  has  been  reversed.  The  country  has 
felt  rich ;  there  have  been  a  series  of  alarms  about  national 
defence,  and  at  the  same  time  the  general  growth  of  pater- 
nalism has  brought  in  a  desire  for  improvement  and 
expenditure  in  many  ways. 

1  Morley,  "Life  of  Gladstone,"  II.,  140. 

2  Hans.,  4  Ser.  CXXIIL,  348-49. 

8  Morley,  "Life  of  Gladstone,"  III.,  506-09. 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE  MINISTERS  77 

The  ministry  is  composed,  as  has  already  been  pointed  The  Cabinet 
out,  of  an  inner  part  that  formulates  the  policy  of  the  gov-  Ministry, 
ernment,  and  an  outer  part  that  follows  the  lines  laid  down ; 
the  inner  part,  or  cabinet,  containing  the  more  prominent 
party  leaders,  who  are  also  holders  of  the  principal  offices 
of  state,  while  the  outer  part  consists  of  the  heads  of 
the  less  important  departments,  the  parliamentary  under- 
secretaries, the  whips  and  the  officers  of  the  royal  household. 
All  of  these  persons  are  strictly  in  the  ministry,  and  resign 
with  the  cabinet ;  but  the  officers  of  the  household  have,  as 
such,  no  political  functions,  and  do  not  concern  us  here. 
The  heads  of  departments  without  seats  in  the  cabinet  have 
become,  with  the  increase  in  size  of  that  body,  very  few. 
By  far  the  greater  part  of  the  ministers  outside  of  the  cabi- 
net are  the  parliamentary  under-secretaries,  who  have  two 
distinct  sets  of  duties,  one  administrative  and  the  other 
parliamentary.  Their  administrative  duties  vary  very 
largely,  mainly  in  accordance  with  personal  considerations. 
Some  of  them  are  really  active  in  their  departments,  doing 
work  which  might  fall  upon  the  parliamentary  chief,  or 
upon  the  permanent  under-secretary,  while  others  have  little 
or  no  administrative  business ;  but  in  any  case  the  real 
object  of  their  existence  is  to  be  found  on  the  parliamentary 
side.  Whatever  duties,  parliamentary  or  administrative, 
may  be  assigned  to  an  under-secretary,  he  is  strictly  sub- 
ordinate to  his  chief,  who  retains  both  the  authority  and  the 
responsibility  for  the  decision  of  all  questions  that  arise 
in  the  department ;  '  although  an  active  under-secretary  in 
the  Commons  may  sometimes  attract  more  public  notice 
than  his  real  chief  in  the  Lords. 

It  is  commonly  said  that  as  a  minister  can  speak  only  in 
the  House  of  which  he  is  a  member,  there  must  be  two  par- 
liamentary  representatives   for  every   department,    one  in 

1  It  may  be  noted  that  the  Chief  Secretary  of  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ire- 
land is  not  a  parliamentary  under-secretary,  but  the  real  head  of  the  Irish 
Office,  unless  the  Viceroy  is  in  the  cabinet  ;  also  that  until  the  creation  of  the 
recent  Board  of  Education  the  relations  between  the  President  and  Vice- 
President  of  the  Committee  of  Council  on  Education  were  not  clearly  defined. 


78  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

each  House.  This,  however,  is  not  strictly  true.  Going 
back,  for  example,  over  the  period  of  a  generation,  we  find 
that  the  Foreign,  Colonial  and  Indian  Offices  have  practically 
always  been  represented  in  both  Houses.1  The  other  great 
departments  have,  of  course,  always  been  represented  in 
the  Commons;2  but  the  War  Office  and  the  Admiralty  have 
not  always  been  represented  in  the  Lords.  The  Board  of 
Trade  has  often,  and  the  Local  Government  Board  and 
Home  Office  have  usually,  had  no  spokesman  of  their  own 
there;3  while  all  the  parliamentary  officers  of  the  Treasury 
invariably  sit  in  the  Commons.  The  system  of  under- 
secretaries, therefore,  is  by  no  means  always  used  in  order 
to  give  a  representative  to  the  department  in  both  Houses. 
It  not  infrequently  happens  that  both,  or  in  the  case  of  the 
War  Office  and  the  Admiralty  all  three,  representatives  sit 
in  the  House  of  Commons.  An  under-secretary,  even  when 
he  sits  with  his  chief  in  the  Commons,  is,  however,  a  con- 
venience for  those  departments  which  have  a  great  deal  of 
business  to  attend  to,  and  many  questions  to  answer. 
Moreover,  the  large  number  of  under-secretaryships  has  the 
advantage  already  noticed  of  including  within  the  ministry 
a  considerable  number  of  lesser  party  lights  who  have  not 
achieved  sufficient  prominence  to  be  included  in  the  cabinet, 
and  yet  whose  interest  in  the  fortunes  of  the  ministry  it  is 
wise  to  secure. 
The  cabinet  One  of  the  great  changes  in  administrative  machinery 
p"ivy  e  that  has  taken  place  in  the  civilised  world  within  the  last 
Council.  two  hundred  years  is  the  substitution  of  an  informal  cabinet 
composed  of  the  heads  of  departments,  for  a  formal  gov- 
erning council  of  members  who  had  themselves  no  direct 
administrative  duties.  The  form  of  the  old  council  has  sur- 
vived in  England  under  the  name  of  the  Privy  Council,  but 

1  In  the  Liberal  cabinet  of  1905,  however,  both  representatives  of  India 
are  in  the  Commons. 

2  The  Hoard  of  Works  and  the  Post-Office  have  at  times  been  represented 
in  the  Commons  by  the  Treasury. 

3  Some  member  of  the  government  is  always  ready  to  answer  questions 
for  them,  and  if  need  be  to  defend  a  department  not  directly  represented. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE  MINISTERS  79 

its  functions  have  become  a  shadow.  The  Privy  Council 
never  meets  as  a  whole  now  except  for  ceremonial  purposes. 
Its  action  is,  indeed,  still  legally  necessary  for  the  perform- 
ance of  many  acts  of  state,  such  as  the  adoption  of  Orders  in 
Council,  and  the  like ;  but  this  is  a  formal  matter,  requir- 
ing the  presence  of  only  three  persons,  who  follow  the 
directions  of  a  minister,  for  all  cabinet  ministers  are 
members  of  the  Privy  Council.  The  Council  does  real 
work  to-day  only  through  its  committees.  Of  these  the 
most  notable  is  the  Judicial  Committee,  which  sits  as  a 
court  of  appeal  in  ecclesiastical  and  colonial  cases,  and  will 
be  more  fully  described  in  a  later  chapter.  Other  com- 
mittees, such  as  those  on  trade  and  on  education,  have  at 
times  rendered  great  service  to  the  state,  but  the  more 
important  administrative  committees  have  now  been  trans- 
formed into  regular  departments  of  the  government.  It 
is  by  no  means  certain,  however,  that  the  Privy  Council 
may  not,  through  its  committees,  become  in  the  future  an 
organ  by  means  of  which  important  political  functions, 
especially  in  connection  with  the  growth  of  the  empire, 
will  be  evolved.  At  present  it  is  mainly  an  honorary  body. 
Its  members  are  appointed  for  life,  and  bear  the  title  of 
Right  Honourable ;  and,  indeed,  of  late  years  membership 
in  the  Council  has  been  conferred  as  a  sort  of  decoration  for 
services  in  politics,  literature,  science,  war,  or  administration. 

Mr.  Gladstone  was  of  opinion  that  the  cabinet  had  "  found  Future  of 
its  final  shape,  attributes,  functions,  and  permanent  order- 
ing," 1  and  so  far  as  its  relation  to  Parliament  alone  is  con- 
cerned, this  may  very  well  be  true  ;  but  Parliament  is  gradu- 
ally ceasing  to  be  the  one  final  arbiter  in  public  life.  The 
cabinet  is  daily  coming  into  closer  contact  with  the  nation, 
and  what  modifications  that  may  entail  we  cannot  foresee. 
It  may  be  observed,  however,  that  while  the  members  of 
the  cabinet  present  a  united  front,  and  say  the  same  thing 
in  Parliament,  they  do  not  always  say  the  same  thing  to 
the  country.     The  ministers  agree  on   a  policy  before  an- 

1  Morley,  "Life  of  YValpolc,"   1G5. 


the  Cabinet. 


80  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

nouncing  it  in  Parliament,  but  they  are  not  always  in  the 
habit  of  taking  counsel  together  about  the  speeches  that 
they  make  upon  the  platform.  Mr.  Chamberlain's  sudden 
declaration  of  a  policy  of  preferential  tariffs  in  his  speech 
at  Birmingham  in  1903  is  only  an  extreme  example  of  what 
sometimes  occurs.  Absolute  unanimity  may  not,  indeed, 
prove  to  be  so  necessary  to  the  ministers  in  order  to  maintain 
their  authority  before  the  people  as  it  is  to  hold  their  position 
in  the  House  of  Commons.1  But  no  serious  changes  in  the 
structure  of  the  cabinet  are  probable  so  long  as  parlia- 
mentary government  continues  in  its  present  form;  and 
it  is  too  early  to  speculate  on  the  changes  that  may 
occur  if  the  parliamentary  system  itself  becomes  modified 
under  the  pressure  of  political  parties  acting  in  a  demo- 
cratic country. 

1  The  Duke  of  Argyle  found  fault  with  this  practice  as  early  as  the  cabinet 
of  1880-1885.  Morley,  "  Life  of  Gladstone,"  III.,  4.  Mr.  Gladstone  thought 
that  liberty  of  speech  should  be  used  by  a  cabinet  minister  "sparingly, 
reluctantly,  and  with  much  modesty  and  reserve"  (Ibid.,  113),  although 
his  own  incautious  remark  about  the  American  Civil  War  had  at  an  earlier 
time  caused  the  cabinet  of  which  he  was  a  member  no  little  embarrassment. 
Ibid.,  II.,  75-86. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENTS 

The  departments  of  state  are  very  different  from  one 
another,  both  in  historical  origin  and  in  legal  organisation ; 
and  they  have  gone  through  transformations  of  all  kinds,  un- 
til the  nomenclature  has  in  some  cases  almost  ceased  to  bear 
any  relation  to  the  facts.  The  title  of  an  officer  often  gives 
no  clear  idea  of  his  functions.  The  most  striking  case  is 
that  of  the  Treasury,  whose  regular  chief,  from  the  time  of 
Henry  VIII.  to  the  death  of  Anne,  was  the  Lord  High  Treas- 
urer. Since  1714  the  office  has  always  been  in  commission; 
that  is,  its  duties  have  been  intrusted  to  a  board  composed 
of  a  number  of  Lords  of  the  Treasury.  But  while  the  board 
is  still  regularly  constituted  by  Letters  Patent  whenever  a 
new  ministry  is  formed,  and  still  retains  its  legal  authority, 
all  political  power  has,  in  fact,  passed  from  its  hands.  The 
board  never  meets,  most  of  its  members  have  little  or  no 
connection  with  the  Treasury,  and  its  functions  are 
really  performed  by  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer, 
who  is  not  now  a  chancellor,  and  does  not  control  the 
work  of  what  is  more  properly  called  the  Exchequer. 
Thus,  by  a  strange  process  of  evolution  the  powers  of  the 
Lord  High  Treasurer  have,  by  law,  become  vested  in  a 
board ;  and  by  a  still  later  custom  they  are  actually  wielded 
by  quite  a  different  officer,  whose  title  indicates  neither  his 
succession  to  the  Treasurer  nor  the  nature  of  his  present 
duties. 

Although  in  origin  and  legal  organisation  the  departments 

of  state  are  very  unlike,  yet  the  growth  of  custom,  and  the 

exigencies  of  parliamentary  life,  have,  for  practical  purposes, 

forced   almost  all   of  them  into  something  very   near  one 

o  81 


82 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Origin  of 
the  Depart 
merits. 


Great  Of 
fices. 


common  type.  Whatever  the  legal  form  of  the  authority 
at  their  head,  the  actual  control  is  now  in  nearly  every  case 
in  the  hands  of  a  single  responsible  minister,  usually  assisted 
by  one  or  more  parliamentary  subordinates,  and  supported 
by  a  corps  of  permanent  non-political  officials,  who  carry 
on  the  work  of  the  office. 

The  historical  origin  of  most  of  the  departments  may  be 
traced  to  one  of  three  sources :  the  great  offices  of  an  ear- 
lier time ;  the  secretariat  of  state ;  and  the  more  recent 
boards  and  commissions.  Many  of  the  former  offices  of 
state  survive  as  honorary  posts,  or  with  duties  connected 
solely  with  the  royal  household.1  The  only  ones  that  are 
The  Former  still  in  touch  with  public  administration  are  those  of  the 
Lord  High  Chancellor,  who  has  retained  the  greater  part  of 
his  ancient  authority;  of  the  Lord  High  Treasurer,  the 
transformations  of  whose  office  have  already  been  men- 
tioned ;  and  of  the  Lord  High  Admiral,  whose  powers  have 
also  gone  into  commission,  and  are  vested  in  the  Admiralty 
Board. 

The  secretariat  is  an  old  institution,  although  the  standing 
of  its  members  has  varied  much  at  different  times.  There 
are  now  five  secretaries  of  state,  but  their  position  is  pecul- 
iar in  this,  that  they  all  share,  from  a  legal  point  of  view, 
the  same  office  ;  and  except  so  far  as  statutes  have  conferred 
special  authority  upon  one  or  another,  each  of  them  can 
perform  the  duties  of  all  the  rest.  During  the  greater 
part  of  the  eighteenth  century  there  were  two  secretaries, 
one  for  the  northern  and  the  other  for  the  southern  depart- 
ment, the  former  having  charge  of  the  relations  with  the 
northern  powers,  the  latter  of  those  with  the  southern 
powers  together  with  home  and  colonial  affairs.  A  series 
of  changes  made  at  the  end  of  the  century  resulted  in  an 
increase  of  the  number  of  secretaries  to  three,  and  a  redistri- 
bution of  their  work,  so  that  one  had  charge  of  foreign  re- 


The  Secre- 
tariat of 
State. 


1  Such  are  the  offices  of  the  Lord  Steward  and  the  Lord  Chamberlain, 
the  latter  having  in  his  charge  also  the  censorship  of  plays  and  theatrical 
performances. 


THE   EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  83 

lations,  another  of  home  affairs,  and  the  third  of  war  and 
the  colonies.  The  Crimean  War  brought  about  in  1854  the 
separation  of  the  colonial  and  war  departments,  with  the  cre- 
ation of  a  fourth  secretary  of  state  ;  and,  finally,  the  mutiny 
in  India,  and  the  consequent  transfer  of  the  direct  govern- 
ment of  that  country  to  the  Crown,  caused  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  fifth  secretary  of  state  to  take  charge  of  Indian 
affairs. 

The  third  great  source  of  public  departments  has  been  The  Re- 
the  creation  in  comparatively  recent  times  of  a  number  of  ^^  s 
administrative  boards  or  commissions,  whose  duties  (except  missions. 
in  the  case  of  the  Board  of  Works)  are  not  primarily  execu- 
tive;  that  is,  they  are  not  concerned  mainly  with  direct 
administration,  but  rather  with  the  supervision  and  control 
of  local  authorities  and  of  bodies  exercising  functions  of  a 
public  or  a  quasi-public  nature.  There  are  now  five  boards 
of  this  kind,  the  Board  of  Trade,  the  Local  Government 
Board,  the  Board  of  Works,  the  Board  of  Agriculture,  and 
the  Board  of  Education.  Some  of  them,  the  first  and  last 
named,  for  example,  have  developed  from  committees  of  the 
Privy  Council ;  while  others  have  grown  out  of  administra- 
tive commissions  which  were  not  originally  regarded  as 
political,  and  had  no  representatives  of  their  own  in  Parlia- 
ment. Except  in  the  case  of  the  Board  of  Trade,1  both 
their  organisation  and  their  functions  now  rest  upon  statutes,2 
and  in  general  character  they  are  all  very  much  alike. 
Each  of  them  consists  of  a  president,3  of  the  five  secretaries 
of  state,  and  of  other  high  dignitaries,  such  as  the  Lord 
President  of  the  Privy  Council,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Treas- 

1  The  name  of  the  Board  of  Trade  is  now  statutory  (25-26  Vie.,  c.  69, 
§  2:  52-53  Vie.,  e.  63,  §  12,  el.  8).  Its  composition,  however,  is  fixed  not 
by  statute  hut  by  Order  in  Council  at  the  beginning  of  each  reign,  save 
that  an  act  of  1867  (30-31  Vie.,  c.  72)  abolished  the  office  of  Vice-President, 
and  provided  instead  that  one  of  the  secretaries  to  the  board  might  sit  in 
Parliament. 

2  For  the  organisation  of  the  Hoard  of  Works,  see  11-15  Vie.,  c.  12; 
'■'<7  38  Vic,  e.  84;  for  the  Local  Government  Board,  34-35  Vie.,  c.  70;  Board 
of  Agriculture,  52-53  Vic,  c  30;   Board  of  Education,  62-63  Vic,  c  33. 

3  In  the  case  of  the  Board  of  Works  he  is  styled  First  Commissioner. 


Boards. 


84  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

ury,  or  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  and  sometimes, 
in  the  case  of  the  older  boards,  even  of  the  Archbishop  of 
Canterbury  and  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons. 
Sham  But  the  board  never  meets ;  the  president  alone  constitutes 

a  quorum,  and  he  conducts  the  business  of  the  department, 
with  the  assistance,  in  the  case  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  of  the 
Local  Government  Board  and  the  Board  of  Education,  of  a 
secretary  who  is  not  himself  a  member  of  the  board,  but  is, 
like  the  president,  capable  of  sitting  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  occupies,  in  short,  the  position  of  a  parliamentary 
under-secretary.  In  practice,  therefore,  these  boards  are 
legal  phantoms  that  provide  imaginary  colleagues  for  a  single 
responsible  minister ;  and,  indeed,  the  only  department  in 
the  English  government  conducted  by  a  board  that  really 
meets  for  the  transaction  of  business  is  the  Admiralty.1 
A  satirical  observer  has  remarked  that  the  English  Con- 
stitution is  a  bundle  of  shams ;  and  this  is  inevitable  where 
law  fails  to  keep  pace  with  custom  —  where  the  legal  organ- 
isation has  ceased  to  express  the  real  working  of  the  system. 
But  it  is  difficult  to  penetrate  the  motive  for  deliberately 
constructing  a  sham  ;  and  yet  that  was  done  in  the  creation 
of  the  Board  of  Agriculture  in  1889,  and  the  Board  of  Edu- 
cation ten  years  later.  In  the  last  case  the  measure  was 
criticised  upon  this  ground ; 2  and  Sir  John  Gorst  in  reply 
said  that,  as  there  were  other  boards,  the  general  desire  of 
the  House  was  thought  to  be  in  favour  of  a  Board  of  Educa- 
tion, and  that,  although  these  boards  did  not  often  meet, 
they  were  potential.3  He  denied  that  the  Committee  of 
Council  on  Education  had  never  met,  and  referred  to  an 
occasion,  about  twenty  years  earlier,  when  it  had  been 
called  together,  and  actually  transacted  business.4     A  better 

1  The  Council  of  India,  described  hereafter,  has  some  of  the  character- 
istics of  a  board. 

2  Hans.,  4  Ser.  LXVIIL,  678-9;    LXX.,  338,  351;     LXXIII.,  632,  666. 

3  Ibid.,  LXXIII.,  676. 

4  In  the  course  of  the  debate  Lord  Norton  declared  (Hans.,  4  Ser. 
LXVIII.,  676)  that  he  had  served  on  two  different  boards,  and  could 
remember  only  one  instance  where  a  board  had  been  called  together  or  con- 
sulted in  any  way. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENTS  85 

statement  of  the  reason,  or  rather  the  absence  of  any  reason, 
for  the  creation  of  a  sham  board,  was  made  with  characteris- 
tic frankness  by  the  Duke  of  Devonshire,  who  said,  "as  far 
as  I  remember,  the  point  was  mooted  when  the  bill  was  first 
prepared,  but  I  quite  admit  that  I  am  unable,  at  the  present 
moment,  to  recollect  the  reasons  which  weighed  in  favour 
of  a  board  rather  than  a  secretariat.  It  has  the  advantage, 
at  all  events,  of  numerous  precedents,  and  it  is  perfectly 
well  understood  that  there  will  be  no  board  at  all."1 

In  giving  in  this  chapter  a  sketch  of  the  executive  de- 
partments nothing  will  be  said  of  those  offices  to  which  no 
substantial  administrative  duties,  or  none  outside  of  the 
royal  household,  are  attached.  There  are  about  a  dozen 
such  posts,  which  are  regarded  as  so  far  political  that  their 
holders  retire  upon  a  change  of  ministry ;  but  they  are 
omitted  here,  because  the  object  is  to  describe  not  the  offices 
of  state,  but  the  different  branches  of  the  public  service 
and  the  distribution  of  business  among  them.  Most  of  the 
departments  require  for  our  purpose  only  a  few  words,  to 
point  out  the  general  nature  of  their  duties  and  anything 
unusual  in  their  structure  or  method  of  working.  The 
functions  of  some  others,  such  as  the  Colonial  Office,  the 
Local  Government  Board  and  the  Board  of  Education, 
can  be  passed  over  rapidly,  because  they  will  be  treated  more 
fully  in  the  chapters  devoted  to  the  subjects  under  their 
control;  while  the  Army,  the  Navy  and  the  Treasury  are  de- 
scribed at  greater  length  on  account  of  the  peculiarities  in 
their  organisation,  and  the  fact  that  their  work  is  not  dealt 
with  in  any  other  part  of  the  book. 

The  Foreign  Office  has  at  its  head  a  secretary  of  state,  who,  The  For- 
like  the  chief  of  every  normal  department,  is  supported  by  a  q^1 

1  Hans.,  4  Ser.  LXX.,  353.  There  may  have  been  good  reasons  for  not 
creating  a  sixth  secretary  of  state,  and  among  them  the  fact  that  a  secretary 
of  state  receives  a  salary  of  £5000,  while  the  president  of  the  board  receives 
£2000.  But,  as  Mr.  Bryce  pointed  out  (Hans.,  4  Ser.  LXXIII.,  632),  a 
secretary  might  have  been  appointed  who,  like  the  Secretary  for  Scotland, 
should  not  be  a  secretary  of  state.  The  salary  of  the  Secretary  for  Scotland 
is,  in  fact,  £2000. 


86 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Position  of 
the  Foreign 
Secretary. 


parliamentary  under-secretary  and  also  by  a  permanent  staff 
consisting  of  an  under-secretary,  several  assistant  under- 
secretaries —  in  this  instance  three  —  besides  clerks  and 
other  permanent  officials.  For  convenience  of  adminis- 
tration there  are  in  the  Foreign  Office  a  number  of  depart- 
ments, the  business  being  distributed  among  them  partly 
on  a  geographical  basis,  and  partly  according  to  the  nature 
of  the  subject.1  The  office  has,  of  course,  charge  of  foreign 
relations,  controlling  for  that  purpose  the  diplomatic  rep- 
resentatives and  the  consuls.  The  only  odd  thing  about  its 
duties  is  the  fact  that  in  addition  to  the  ordinary  functions 
of  a  foreign  office  it  governs  certain  dependencies  of  the 
Crown.  The  expansion  of  European  influence  over  the  less 
favoured  portions  of  the  globe  has  produced  among  other 
new  things  the  " protectorate,"  which  involves,  by  a  political 
fiction,  an  international  as  well  as  a  philanthropic  relation 
between  the  ruler  and  the  ruled.  The  result  is  that  protec- 
torates not  closely  connected  with  existing  colonies  are  ad- 
ministered by  the  Foreign  Office.  This  has  been  true  of  a 
number  of  protectorates  in  Africa,  and  notably  of  Egypt, 
which  is  still  nominally  ruled  by  the  Khedive  under  the 
suzerainty  of  the  Turkish  Sultan,  but  is  practically  gov- 
erned by  a  British  agent. 

The  conduct  of  the  relations  with  foreign  powers  requires 
from  its  very  nature  a  peculiar  method  of  procedure.  Much 
Of  the  work  of  the  Foreign  Office  consists,  no  doubt,  in  ex- 
amining and  pushing  the  private  legal  claims  of  British 
subjects,  and  to  some  extent  work  of  that  kind  has  a  routine 
character.     But  apart  from  this  there  is  comparatively  little 


1  Until  a  few  years  ago  the  departments  were :  (1)  the  Eastern  (Eastern 
Europe  and  Central  Asia);  (2)  Western  (Western  Europe,  Northwest 
Africa  and  the  Pacific  Islands);  (3)  American  and  Asiatic  (which  includes 
China,  Japan  and  Siam) ;  (4)  Consular  (including  East  and  West  Africa) ;  (5) 
Commercial;  (6)  The  Chief  Clerk's  (which  has  charge  of  financial  business)-, 
(7)  The  Library  (with  the  papers  of  the  office);  (8)  The  Treaty  Depart- 
ment. (Fourth  Rep.  of  the  Comn.  on  Civil  Establishments,  Com.  Papers, 
1890,  XXVII.,  1.)  Within  a  few  years  four  pew  departments  have  been 
created:  an  African,  an  African  Protectorates,  a  Far  Eastern  and  a  Parlia- 
mentary.    (See  the  Foreign  Office  List.) 


THE   EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  87 

of  the  detailed  administration  —  so  common  in  other  de- 
partments—  which,  involving  merely  the  application  of 
settled  principles  to  particular  cases,  can  be  conducted  by 
subordinates  without  consulting  the  political  chief.  Much 
of  the  correspondence  with  foreign  powers  may  entail  serious 
consequences,  and  hence  must  ordinarily  be  laid  before  the 
Secretary  of  State.  The  permanent  officials  play,  therefore, 
a  smaller  part  in  the  management  of  affairs  than  in  most 
branches  of  the  public  service,  a  matter  that  will  be  dis- 
cussed more  fully  in  a  subsequent  chapter.1  Moreover,  the 
representatives  at  foreign  courts  are  kept,  by  means  of  the 
telegraph,  under  more  constant  instructions  than  formerly, 
and  it  has  become  the  habit  in  all  countries  to  retain  dip- 
lomatic negotiations  very  closely  in  the  hands  of  the  home 
government.  Even  the  functions  of  foreign  envoys  as  the 
eyes  and  ears  of  the  state  have  declined  in  importance; 
and  it  has  been  observed  that  as  gatherers  of  political  in- 
formation they  have  been  largely  superseded  by  the  corre- 
spondents of  the  press. 

All  this  has  the  effect  of  concentrating  the  direction  of 
foreign  relations  in  the  hands  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 
At  the  same  time  he  is  singularly  free  from  immediate  parlia- 
mentary control.  Diplomatic  correspondence  is  ordinarily 
confidential,  and  it  is  usually  a  sufficient  answer  to  any 
question  in  Parliament,  touching  foreign  relations,  to  say 
that  the  information  sought  cannot  be  given  without  detri- 
ment to  the  public  service.  It  follows  that  the  presence  of 
the  minister  in  the  House  of  Commons  is  less  necessary  than 
in  the  case  of  other  departments;  while  his  arduous  duties 
make  it  hard  for  him  to  find  the  time  required  for  attendance 
at  the  long  sittings.  These  facts,  coupled  with  the  strange 
provision  of  law  which  permits  only  four  of  the  five  secreta- 
ries of  state  to  sit  there,  resulted  in  placing  peers  at  the  head 
of  the  Foreign  Office  continuously  from  1808  to  1005,  the 
under-secretary  alone   representing  the   department   in  the 

1  Ch.  viii.      The   permanent    under-socretary  at   the  head  of  the  stafF 
holds,  however,  an  important  place.. 


88  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

popular  chamber.  But  if  the  Secretary  of  State  for  For- 
eign Affairs  is  less  under  the  direct  control  of  Parliament 
than  other  ministers,  he  is  more  under  the  control  of  his 
colleagues.  We  have  already  seen  that  every  important 
despatch  ought  to  be  submitted,  before  it  is  sent  off,  both  to 
the  Prime  Minister  and  to  the  sovereign ;  and,  as  a  rule,  the 
telegrams,  together  with  correspondence  of  peculiar  interest, 
are  also  circulated  among  all  the  members  of  the  cabinet.1 
In  fact  there  is  probably  no  department  where  the  execu- 
tive action  of  the  minister  is  so  constantly  brought  to  the 
notice  of  his  colleagues. 
The  Colo-  Ever  since  England  began  to  extend  her  dominion  be- 

o'ffice.  yond  the  seas  her  foreign  relations  have  been  complicated 

by  her  distant  possessions,  and  it  is  therefore  natural  to 
pass  from  the  offices  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  on  one  side  of  the  doorway  in  Downing  Street  to 
those  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies  on  the 
other.  But  it  is  needless  to  speak  of  the  Colonial  Office  at 
length  here,  because  the  government  of  the  dependencies 
will  form  the  subject  of  later  chapters.  The  Secretary  of 
State  for  the  Colonies  is  assisted  by  his  parliamentary  and 
permanent  under-secretaries,  and  by  a  staff  of  subordinate 
officials.  There  are  in  this  office  four  permanent  assistant 
under-secretaries;  one  of  whom  has  charge  of  questions  of 
law,  and  also  at  present  of  business  connected  with  Canada, 
Australasia  and  a  number  of  islands;  another  of  South 
Africa ;  a  third  of  the  East  and  West  Indies,  emigration, 
prisons  and  hospitals,  with  a  mass  of  miscellaneous  matters ; 
and  the  fourth  of  East  and  West  Africa.2  But  the  division 
of  the  colonies  among  these  officers  is  not  fixed,  and  varies 
to  some  extent  with  their  personal  experience.  There  are, 
in  close  connection  with  the  office,  agents  for  each  of  the 
dependencies,  those  for  the  self-governing  colonies  being 
real  representatives  appointed  by  the  colonial  governments, 

1  See  Hammond,  "The  Adventures  (if  a    Paper  in   the   Foreign  Office." 
Rep.  of  Sel.  Com.  on  Trade,  Com.  Papers,  1864,  VII.,  I'?!),  Q.  1384. 

2  Colonial  Office   List.    1907,    XIII.     (N.  B.     Since    that    time    another 
change  has  been  made.) 


THE  EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  89 

while  the  three  who  act  on  behalf  of  the  crown  colonies 
are  selected  by  the  Colonial  Office  itself. 

It  may  be  observed  that  the  Colonial  Office  has  by  no 
means  charge  of  all  the  outlying  dependencies  of  the  Brit- 
ish Crown.  Besides  the  protectorates  governed  by  the  For- 
eign Office,  there  are  a  number  of  smaller  places  under  the 
care  of  other  departments.  The  Isle  of  Man  and  the  Chan- 
nel Islands,  for  example,  are  under  the  Home  Secretary; 
some  small  islets  are  used  only  for  lighthouses  by  the 
Board  of  Trade ;  while  by  an  official  fiction  the  Island  of 
Ascension  is  considered  a  vessel  of  war,  and  as  such  is  com- 
manded by  the  Admiralty.  But  larger  by  far  than  any  of 
these,  more  populous  than  all  the  other  parts  of  the  British 
Empire  put  together,  is  India.  It  is  not  classed  among 
the  colonies,  for  that  term  is  confined  to  the  places  under 
the  Colonial  Office,  and  does  not  extend  to  a  country  ruled 
by  a  distinct  administrative  system  of  its  own. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  India  has  the  usual  parlia-  The  India 
mentary  and  permanent  staff ;  but  he  has  in  addition  a 
Council  of  India,  composed  of  not  less  than  ten  or  more  than 
fourteen  members,  appointed  for  a  term  of  seven  years.  In 
order  to  insure  a  familiarity  with  Indian  conditions,  it  is  pro- 
vided that  nine  of  the  members  must  have  lived  in  India 
within  five  years  of  their  appointment.1  The  Council  is  a 
consultative  Body.  It  has  no  power  of  initiative,  but  except 
for  matters  requiring  secrecy  or  urgency  (such  as  war  and 
peace,  or  the  relations  of  India  with  foreign  powers  or  with 
the  native  states),  all  questions  must  be  brought  before  it 
for  consideration.  The  Secretary  of  State  is  not,  however, 
bound  by  its  decision,  save  in  a  few  cases,  of  which  the  most 
important  are  the  expenditure  of  the  Indian  revenues,  and 
the  issue  of  Indian  loans.2 

Legally,    the    government   of   India   is   directed    by   the 

1  Three  of  the  members  may,  however,  be  appointed  for  life,  and  any 
other  member  may  be  reappointed  for  five  years.  llbert,  "  (Jovernment 
of  India,"  112.      7  Edw.  VII.,  c.  35. 

2  Ibid.,  152-.').'). 


Office. 


90  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Secretary  of  State  and  his  Council.  Even  the  laws  made  in 
India  can  be  disallowed  by  the  Crown  on  their  advice ;  but 
in  spite  of  the  ease  of  communication  furnished  by  the  tele- 
graph, the  internal  affairs  of  the  country  are  still  in  the 
main  managed  by  the  authorities  in  India,  happily  without 
much  interference  from  England.  Parliament,  moreover, 
exercises  little  control  over  Indian  administration.  Some 
matters  —  the  use  of  the  Indian  revenues,  for  example,  to 
pay  for  expeditions  beyond  the  frontier  —  require  its  con- 
sent ;  and  in  other  cases  notice  of  action  taken  must  be 
laid  before  it  within  a  certain  time.  But  the  ordinary 
opportunities  for  bringing  pressure  to  bear  do  not  exist, 
because  the  salary  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  being 
paid  out  of  the  Indian  revenues,  does  not  furnish  an  occasion 
for  a  debate  in  Parliament ;  and  although  the  Indian  budget 
is  regularly  submitted,  it  does  not  need  to  be  approved.  On 
one  of  the  last  days  of  the  session,  when  the  work  of  the  year 
is  almost  done,  and  the  members  are  weary  of  attending,  this 
budget,  which  is  merely  a  financial  statement,  is  introduced, 
and  in  order  to  give  an  opportunity  for  debate  a  formal 
motion  is  made  that  the  Indian  accounts  show  such  and 
such  totals  of  receipts  and  expenses.  A  discussion  follows 
on  the  part  of  members  who  deem  themselves  qualified  to 
express  opinions  on  the  government  of  India,  and  then  the 
vote  is  passed.  An  illustration  of  the  small  authority  of 
Parliament  in  Indian  matters  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
in  1891  (April  10)  the  House  of  Commons  carried  against 
the  ministers  a  motion  condemning  the  opium  revenue ;  and 
in  1893  (June  2)  a  resolution  that  the  examinations  for  the 
Indian  Civil  Service  ought  to  be  held  in  India,  as  well  as  in 
England,  was  carried  in  the  same  way  ;  yet,  on  each  occasion, 
the  government  after  studying  the  subject  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  opinion  of  the  House  had  been  wrong,  and 
did  not  carry  it  into  effect.  Such  a  condition  of  things  is 
highly  fortunate,  for  there  is  probably  no  body  of  men  less 
fitted  to  rule  a  people  than  a  representative  assembly 
elected  in  another  land  by  a  different  race. 


THE   EXECUTIVF   BEPARTxMENTS  91 

If  the  vast  colonial  empire  has  complicated  foreign  rela- 
tions it  has  also  caused  England  to  become  the  greatest  of 
maritime  powers,  with  an  enormous  navy  to  protect  her 
dependencies,  her  merchant  ships,  and  not  least  important, 
the  routes  of  her  food  supply.  The  effective  organisation 
of  a  naval  force  is,  therefore,  of  more  importance  in  her 
case  than  in  that  of  any  other  nation. 

It  has  already  been  observed  that  the  Admiralty  is  the  The  Ad- 
only  department  of  state  conducted  by  a  board  that  really  miralty- 
meets  for  the  transaction  of  business,  yet  even  in  this  case 
the  statement  may  convey  a  false  impression  of  the  character 
of  the  body.  The  board  as  created  by  Letters  Patent  under 
the  Great  Seal  consists  of  a  First  Lord,  four  Naval  Lords  and 
a  Civil  Lord ;  but  by  a  series  of  Orders  in  Council,  and 
by  the  practice  of  the  department,  the  parliamentary  and 
permanent  secretaries  also  sit  as  members  of  the  board.1 
The  First  Lord,  the  Civil  Lord  and  the  parliamentary  sec- 
retary are  capable  of  sitting  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and 
are,  in  fact,  always  members  of  one  or  other  House  of 
Parliament.  The  permanent  secretary  is,  as  his  name 
implies,  a  permanent  official,  and  hence  excluded  from  the 
House  of  Commons  altogether.  The  Naval  Lords,  on  the 
other  hand,  although  eligible  to  Parliament,2  are  very  rarely 
members,3  and  yet  they  are  not  permanent  officials.  They 
occupy  the  anomalous  position  of  non-political  officials,  who 
nevertheless  retire  upon  the  fall  of  the  ministry.  This 
does  not  mean  that  they  belong  necessarily  to  the  party  in 
power,  or  that  they  may  not  be  reappointed  under  the  com- 
mission issued  when  a  new  ministry  conies  into  office.  In 
order  to  preserve  a  continuity  of  administration,  and  a 
knowledge  of  the  work,  the  new  patent  usually  includes  one, 
and  sometimes  more,  of  the  Naval  Lords  who  served  under 
the  preceding  cabinet,  and  commonly  another  who  held  the 

1  Report  of  Comrs.  on  Admn.  of  Naval  and  Mil.  Depts.,  Com.  Papers, 
1890,  XIX..  1.  pp.  viii-ix. 

2  2-3  Will.  IV.,  c   10.  §  1. 

3  Lord  Charles  Mcn-sford  was  a  Naval  Lord  and  a  member  of  t he  I  louse  of 
Commons  from  1880  to  1888. 


92 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Position  of 
the  First 
Lord. 


The  Other 
Lords. 


place  under  some  earlier  ministry  of  the  party  that  has 
taken  office. 

According  to  the  language  of  the  patent  all  of  the  members 
of  the  Board  of  Admiralty  are  equal  in  authority;  but  in 
fact  the  First  Lord,  who  is  always  in  the  cabinet,  is  held  by 
Parliament  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  the  department, 
and  as  the  other  members  of  the  board  can  be  changed  if 
necessary  on  his  recommendation,  they  must  adopt  the 
course  which  he  can  justify  in  Parliament.  With  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  cabinet  system,  therefore,  the  power  of  the  First 
Lord  has  increased  until  he  has  become  practically  a  minister 
of  marine  assisted  by  an  advisory  council.  The  relation 
was  sanctioned,  not  created,  by  Orders  in  Council  of  Jan. 
14,  1869,  and  March  19,  1872,  which  declared  the  First  Lord 
responsible  for  all  business  of  the  Admiralty,1  and  thus 
"the  department  now  possesses  more  the  character  of  a 
council  with  a  supreme  responsible  head  than  that  of  an 
administrative  board."  2 

The  Civil  Lord  and  the  financial  or  parliamentary  sec- 
retary are  subordinate  ministers,  who  occupy  substantially 
the  position  of  parliamentary  under-secretaries.  They  are 
civilians,  as  is  the  permanent  secretary  also  ;  while  the  four 
Naval  Lords  are  naval  officers,  usually  of  high  rank,  who 
bring  an  expert  knowledge  to  bear  upon  the  administration 
of  the  department.  But  the  members  of  the  board,  like  the 
cabinet  ministers,  have  individual  as  well  as  collective  duties. 
By  the  Orders  in  Council  of  March  19,  1872,  and  March 
10,  1882,  and  the  regulations  made  in  pursuance  thereof, 
the  work  of  the  office  is  distributed  among  the  members 
of  the  board,  each  of  whom  is  at  the  head  of  a  branch  of  the 
service,  and  responsible  for  it  to  the  First  Lord.  By  virtue 
of  this  arrangement  the  First  Lord  retains  in  his  own  hands 
the  general  direction  of  political  questions,  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  flag  officers  and  the  commanders  of  ships.    The  First 


1  Rep.  of  Comrs.  on  Admn.  of  Naval  and  Mil.  Depts.,  Com.  Papers,  1890, 
XIX.,  1,  p.  viii. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  x. 


THE   EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  93 

Naval  Lord,  who  is  also  the  principal  adviser  of  his  chief, 
has  charge  of  strategical  questions,  the  distribution  of  the 
fleet,  discipline,  and  the  selection  of  the  higher  officers  not 
commanding  ships.  The  Second  Naval  Lord  has  charge  of 
the  recruiting  and  education  of  officers  and  men,  and  the 
selection  of  the  lower  officers.  The  Third  Naval  Lord,  who 
is  the  "Controller,"  attends  to  the  dockyards,  and  to  con- 
struction, repairs  and  ordnance ;  while  the  Junior  Naval 
Lord  has  charge  of  the  transport  and  medical  service,  and 
the  victualling  and  coaling  of  the  fleet.  The  Civil  Lord  at- 
tends to  the  civil  establishments,  and  the  contracts  relating 
to  stores  and  to  land.  The  parliamentary  secretary  is 
responsible  for  finance ;  and  the  permanent  secretary  for 
the  personnel  in  the  Admiralty  Office,  for  routine  papers  and 
correspondence  and  for  the  continuity  of  business  on  the 
advent  of  a  new  board.1 

Thus  the  actual  administration  of  the  Navy  devolves  upon 
the  members  of  the  board  charged  with  the  superintendence 
of  the  different  branches  of  the  service,  while  the  full  board 
meets  frequently  for  the  consideration  of  such  questions 
as  the  First  Lord  wishes  to  refer  to  it.2  There  have  been  at 
times  complaints  about  the  working  of  the  board,  and  the 
existing  organisation  is  the  result  of  gradual  adaptations,3 
but  at  the  present  day  the  system  appears  to  be  highly 
satisfactory,  and  in  fact  it  is  constantly  held  up  as  a  model 
to  the  less  fortunate  chiefs  of  the  Army. 

The  organisation  of  the  War  Office  has  undergone    far  The  War 
more  changes  than  that  of  the  Admiralty,  and  has  been  the  °ffice- 
subject  of  a  great  deal  more  criticism  both  in  and  out  of 
Parliament.4       Like  other  countries  with  a  popular  form  of 

1  Return  on  the  Distribution  of  Business  between  the  Members  of  the 
Admiralty  Board,  Com.  Papers,  1890,  XLIV.,  605. 

2  Rep.  of  Comrs.  on  Admn.  of  Naval  and  Mil.  Depts.,  Com.  Papers, 
1890,  XIX.,  1,  p.  ix. 

3  Todd,  II.,  767  et  scq. 

*  The  military  forces  consist  of  the  regular  army  (with  the  reserves,  that 
is,  the  men  who  have  served  their  time  but  are  liable  to  be  recalled  in  case 
of  war);  and  of  the  militia,  yeomanry  and  volunteers.  The  militia  are  a 
little  more   like   regular   troops  than   the   volunteers.     They   are   formally 


94  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

government,  England  has  found  it  hard  to  reconcile  military 
command  and  civil  control.  In  the  War  Office,  as  in  the 
Admiralty,  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  transfer  supreme 
power  gradually  to  the  hands  of  the  parliamentary  chief; 
but  owing  to  a  number  of  causes  —  one  of  which  was  the 
tenacity  with  which  the  Queen  clung  to  the  idea  of  a  peculiar 
personal  connection  between  the  Crown  and  the  Army  — 
the  process  of  change  in  the  War  Office  has  been  slow  and 
Effect  of  the  halting.  Up  to  the  time  of  the  Crimean  War  the  Army  was 
War!ean  controlled  by  several  different  authorities,  whose  relations 
to  one  another  were  not  very  clearly  defined,  and  who  were 
subordinate  to  no  single  administrative  head.  This  natu- 
rally produced  friction  and  lack  of  efficiency,  which  was 
forcibly  brought  to  public  attention  by  the  sufferings  of  the 
troops  during  the  war.  The  result  was  the  creation  of  a 
distinct  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  and  the  concentration 
in  his  hands  of  most  of  the  business  relating  to  the  Army ; 
but  the  change  was  made  without  a  thorough  reorganisation 
of  the  War  Office,  and  without  defining  the  relative  authority 
of  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Commander-in-Chief.1 
This  last  office  was  held  at  that  time  by  the  Queen's  cousin, 
the  Duke  of  Cambridge ;  and  the  fact  that  he  was  a  royal 
duke,  coupled  with  the  Queen's  feelings  about  the  Army, 
threw  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  bringing  the  office  fully 
under  the  control  of  the  Secretary.     In  1870,  however,  the 

enlisted  and  their  period  of  training  is  longer.  None  of  the  auxiliary  forces 
can  be  ordered  out  of  the  United  Kingdom;  but  while  the  volunteers  are 
intended  solely  to  support  the  regular  army  in  defending  the  country  in 
case  of  invasion,  the  militia  have  always  offered  their  services  in  time  of 
war,  and  have  often  been  used  for  garrison  duty  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
and  even  for  field  service  abroad.  The  yeomanry  are  a  body  of  cavalry 
forming  part  of  the  militia.  A  royal  commission  on  the  militia  and 
volunteers  reported  in  1904  that  both  of  these  forces  were  unfit  to  take  the 
field  against  a  regular  army;  that  the  period  of  training  ought  to  be 
increased  in  each  case;  and  that  a  home  defence  army,  capable  of  protect- 
ing the  United  Kingdom  in  the  absence  of  the  greater  part  of  the  regular 
army  could  be  raised  only  by  universal  compulsory  military  service. 
(Com.  Papers,  1904,  XXX.,  175,  pp.  6,  9,  11,  15-16.)  This  last  suggestion 
was  received  with  general  disfavour.  In  1907  provision  was  made  for 
strengthening  the  auxiliaries  by  means  of  a  Territorial  Force  to  be  raised 
by  County  Associations.      7  Edw.  VII.,  c.  9. 

1  For  the  History  of  the  War  Office  up  to  this  time,  see  Clode,  "  Military 
Forces  of  the  Crown." 


THE   EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  95 

Queen  was  prevailed  upon  to  issue  an  Order  in  Council  pro- 
viding that  the  Commander-in-Chief  should  be  completely 
subordinate  to  the  Secretary  of  State.1  Unfortunately, 
this  order  by  no  means  settled  either  the  organisation  of  the 
War  Office,  or  the  relation  between  the  Secretary  and  the 
Commander-in-Chief. 

A  number  of  commissions  have  examined  the  subject,  Lord 
one  of  the  most  important  of  late  years  being  Lord  Harting-  tonVcom. 
ton's  Commission,  which  reported  in  1890. 2  At  that  time  3  mission. 
the  Adjutant  General,  who  was  charged  with  the  general 
supervision  of  the  military  department,  was  the  first  staff 
officer  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  as  such  was  re- 
sponsible to  him  for  the  efficiency  of  the  forces ;  while  the 
other  principal  military  officers  —  the  Quartermaster  Gen- 
eral, Military  Secretary,  Director  of  Artillery,  Inspector  of 
Fortifications,  and  Director  of  Military  Intelligence  —  were 
also  immediately  responsible  not  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
but  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  approached  the  latter 
through  the  Adjutant  General.  Thus,  while  all  the  officers 
in  the  department  were  nominally  subordinate  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  State,  practically  between  him  and  them  stood  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  who  had  the  privilege  of  approaching 
the  Crown  directly  and  without  the  intervention  of  the 
Secretary.  The  commission  thought  that  such  a  system 
failed  to  make  the  heads  of  the  different  branches  of  the 
service  effectively  responsible  to  the  Secretary,  or  to  pro- 
vide any  satisfactory  system  for  giving  him  expert  advice. 
They  recommended,  therefore,  the  virtual  abolition  of  the 
office  of  Commander-in-Chief,  and  a  division  of  the  duties 
among  a  number  of  officers,  who  should  be  individually 
responsible  for  their  administrative  work  to  the  Secretary, 
and  should  collectively  advise  him  as  a  War  Office  Council. 
They  recommended,  in  short,  a  system  not  unlike  that  of  the 
Admiralty. 

1  Order  in  Council,  Juno  4,  1870,  Com.  Papers,  XLII.,  683. 

2  Corn.  Papers,  1890,  XIX.,  1. 

3  By  virtue  of  Orders  in  Council  of  Dec.  29,  1887,  and  Feb.  21,  1888. 
Ibid.,  App.  viii. 


96  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

rhe  As  a  preliminary  to  bringing  about  a  change  of  this  kind 

of^fr  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman,  the  Liberal  Secretary  of 
State  for  War,  procured  the  resignation  of  the  Duke  of 
Cambridge  in  1895,  and  Lord  Wolseley  was  appointed 
Commander-in-Chief  for  five  years.  The  Secretary  then 
announced  a  plan  in  accordance  with  the  main  principles 
suggested  by  the  Hartington  Commission.  But  just  at 
that  time  the  Liberal  administration  fell,1  and  Lord  Lans- 
downe,  the  new  Secretary  of  State,  made  a  change  in  the 
plan,  which  left  more  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief.  The  policy  thus  adopted  was  embodied  in  an 
Order  in  Council  of  Nov.  21,  1895,  followed  by  a  memo- 
randum setting  out  in  greater  detail  the  duties  of  the  heads 
of  the  different  branches  of  the  service  thereunder.2  Ac- 
cording to  the  new  system  the  Commander-in-Chief  exer- 
cised the  general  command,  issued  army  orders,  inspected 
troops,  took  charge  of  the  distribution  of  the  Army,  and 
prepared  strategical  plans,  having  under  him  for  that  pur- 
pose the  Director  of  Military  Intelligence.  He  was  also  to 
have  the  general  supervision  of  all  the  military  departments, 
and  to  be  the  principal  military  adviser  of  the  Secretary  of 
State,  all  important  questions  going  to  him  before  sub- 
mission to  the  Secretary.  The  Adjutant  General  was  to 
have  charge  of  the  discipline  and  training  of  officers  and  men, 
and  the  patterns  of  their  uniforms,  —  a  matter  which  seems 
to  involve  as  many  changes  in  fashion  as  a  dressmaking 
establishment.  The  Quartermaster  General  had  charge  of 
food,  forage,  transports  and  remounts.  The  Inspector  of 
Fortifications  constructed  and  maintained  forts,  barracks, 
etc.,  and  supervised  the  engineer  corps.  The  Inspector 
General  of  Ordnance  looked  after  the  supply  of  warlike 
stores  and  equipments,  and  each  of  these  officers  advised 
the  Secretary  of  State  on  questions  connected  with  his 
department.     The   Financial   Secretary   had   charge   of   all 

1  On  account  of  a  vote  at  the  close  of  the  same  debate  in  which  this 
change  was  announced. 

2  Com.  Papers,  1896,  LI.,  483. 


suits. 


THE   EXECUTIVE    DEPARTMENTS  97 

questions  of  expenditure,  and  of  the  audit  of  accounts. 
Until  1899  he  was  also  at  the  head  of  the  manufacturing 
departments,  but  by  an  order  of  that  year  they  were  trans- 
ferred to  the  Inspector  General  of  Ordnance,  whose  title 
was  changed  to  Director.  By  the  memorandum  which 
followed  the  order  a  War  Office  Council  was  created,  con- 
sisting of  the  heads  of  the  military  departments,  the  under- 
secretaries of  state,  and  the  Financial  Secretary,  together 
with  any  other  officers  who  might  be  summoned ;  its  function 
being  to  discuss  subjects  referred  to  it  by  the  Secretary  of 
State.  An  Army  Board,  composed  of  the  heads  of  the  prin- 
cipal military  departments,  was  also  established,  which  was 
to  report  upon  promotions  to  the  higher  grades  in  the  Army, 
upon  estimates,  and  upon  other  questions  submitted  to  it 
by  the  Secretary  of  State. 

The  two  great  changes  made  at  this  time  were  the  modi-  Their  r» 
fication  in  the  powers  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and 
the  creation  of  consultative  boards  in  the  War  Office. 
Neither  of  them  can  be  said  to  have  attained  the  object 
aimed  at.  The  attempt  to  create  advisory  councils  of  that 
kind  has  been  tried  more  than  once,  but  after  working 
usefully  for  a  time  they  have  ceased  to  meet  regularly  and 
have  fallen  into  disuse.  This  appears  to  have  been  the  case 
with  the  War  Office  Council  and  Army  Board  created  in 
1895  and  reorganized  in  1899  and  1900. l 

The  position  of  Commander-in-Chief  under  the  Order  in 
Council  of  1895  has  been  the  subject  of  severe  criticism. 
At  the  expiration  of  his  term  of  five  years,  Lord  Wolseley 
recorded  in  a  memorandum  his  opinion  that  the  attempt  to 
give  the  Commander-in-Chief  a  supervision  over  the  depart- 
ments of  the  War  Office,  and  yet  make  their  heads  respon- 
sible to  the  Secretary  of  State,  involved  a  contradiction, 
and  had  resulted  in  depriving  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  all 
effective  control,  and  in  making  his  office  a  high-sounding 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  War  Office  Organisation,  Coin.  Papers,  1901,  XL., 
179,  p.  21  ;  Rep.  of  Com.  on  the  War  in  South  Africa,  Com.  Papers, 
1904,  XL.,  1,  pp.  138-42. 


98  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

title  with  no  real  responsibility.  He  insisted  that  no  army- 
could  be  efficient  unless  the  command,  discipline  and  training 
of  the  troops  were  in  the  hands  of  one  man,  and  that  man  a 
soldier;  and  he  urged  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  should 
either  be  made  the  real  head  of  the  forces,  or  that  the  office 
should  be  abolished,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War 
should  be  himself  a  military  man.1  The  only  direct  result 
that  the  memorandum  had  on  the  organisation  of  the 
War  Office  was  the  reestablishment  of  the  control  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  over  the  department  of  the  Adjutant 
General  by  an  Order  in  Council  on  Nov.  4,  1901. 2  But  a 
statement  by  Lord  Wolseley  of  his  views,  in  a  speech  in 
the  House  of  Lords  in  March,  1901,  led  to  an  unseemly 
altercation  with  Lord  Lansdowne,  the  late  Secretary  of 
State  for  War,  in  which  each  sought  to  cast  upon  the  other 
the  blame  for  the  lack  of  preparation  for  the  war  in  South 
Africa.3  The  occurrence  would  appear  to  show  that  the 
relations  between  the  military  and  civil  authorities  at  the 
War  Office  are  not  yet  upon  a  well-recognised  or  satisfac- 
tory basis ;  and  it  shows  also  that  this  relation  is  very 
different  from  that  which  ordinarily  prevails  between  min- 
isters and  their  expert  officials.  For  reasons  that  will  be 
explained  in  a  later  chapter,  such  a  dispute  in  any  other 
department  would  be  well-nigh  inconceivable.  From  a 
political  point  of  view  the  Army  and  Navy  officers  are,  in 
fact,  in  an  exceptional  situation.  They  are  not  subject  to 
the  general  rule  which  excludes  from  the  House  of  Com- 
mons all  office-holders  who  are  not  ministers.4  And  just 
as  military  officers  are  allowed  to  play  a  part  in  politics 
forbidden  to  other  public  servants,  so  those  among  them 
who  hold  high  administrative  posts  stand  in  a  position 
peculiar  to  themselves,  a  position  which  in  the  case  of  the 
Admiralty  is  definite  and  satisfactory,  although  anomalous, 

1  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XXXIX.,  243. 

3  Ibid.,  1902,  LVIII.,  717. 

3  Hans.,  4  Ser.  XC,  327  et  seq. ;  XCL,  6  et  seq. 

*  6  Anne,  c.  7,  §  28.     (In  the  Rev.  Sts.  it  is  c.  41,  §  27.) 


THE   EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  99 

but  in  the  case  of  the  Army  is  not  altogether  definite  or 
satisfactory. 

The  efficiency  of  the  War  Office  was  put  to  a  rude  test  Effect  of 
by  the  South  African  War,  and  some  branches  of  the  AfericSa°nuth 
service  did  not  stand  the  test  very  well.  The  results  re-  War- 
called,  although  in  different  respects,  the  experiences  of  the 
Crimean  War.  The  commission  on  the  war  found  that, 
both  as  regards  plans  and  stores,  there  had  been  a  grave 
lack  of  preparation  which  was  not  wholly  due  to  the  sud- 
denness of  the  emergency.1  There  was  not  merely  a  de- 
ficiency in  warlike  stores,  such  as  guns 2  and  ammunition 
for  them,3  cavalry-swords4  and  clothing;5  but  some  of  the 
stores  were  unfit  for  use.  Such  clothing,  for  example,  as 
there  was  on  hand  six  months  before  the  war  broke  out  was 
all  red  and  blue  cloth,  quite  unsuitable  for  the  campaign ; 
and  even  after  the  manufacture  of  khaki  suits  had  begun, 
changes  were  ordered  first  in  the  material  and  then  in  the 
pattern.6  More  than  one  third  of  the  small  arms  ammuni- 
tion on  hand  was  found  to  be  unserviceable  and  was  dis- 
carded;  7  and  all  the  reserve  rifles- were  wrongly  sighted,  so 
that  at  a  distance  of  five  hundred  yards  they  shot  eighteen 
inches  to  the  right  —  an  occurrence  the  more  extraordinary 
because  the  government  had  been  manufacturing  those 
weapons  for  some  years,  and  never  discovered  the  defect 
until  after  the  war  broke  out.8 

It  would  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  all  the  shortcomings 
in  the  South  African  War  arose  from  defects  in  the  War 
Office.  Some  of  them  were  of  a  kind  certain  to  occur  where 
a  military  organisation  is  suddenly  expanded  beyond  its 
normal  size.  Still,  the  errors  already  described  certainly 
showed  a  lack  of  efficiency,  and  they  have  led  to  a  remodel- 
ling of  the  office.  In  November,  1903,  another  commission 
was  appointed  for  this  purpose,  and  its  principal  recommen- 

1  Rep.  in  Com.  Papers,  1904,  XL.,  1,  pp.  28,  30.      6  Ibid.,  pp.  9-1-96. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  89.  *  Ibid.,  pp.  91   95. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  87.  7  Ibid.,  pp.  SO  -87. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  94.  8  Ibid.,  pp.  93-94. 


100  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

dations  l  were  put  into  effect  in  the  course  of  the  following 
year.2 
The  According  to  this  last  system,  for  which  the  Admiralty 

1904 geS  °f  served  as  a  pattern,  an  Army  Council  has  been  formed,  con- 
sisting of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  the  parliamentary 
under-secretary,  the  Financial  Secretary  to  the  War  Office, 
and  of  four  military  members.  The  post  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  having  been  abolished,  and  that  of  Chief  of  Staff 
created  instead,  the  four  military  members  of  the  council  are 
the  Chief  of  Staff,  the  Adjutant  General,  the  Quartermaster 
General,  and  the  Master  General  of  Ordnance.  By  the  terms 
of  the  Order  in  Council  the  military  members  are  responsible 
to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  so  much  of  the  business  relat- 
ing to  the  organisation,  disposition,  personnel,  armament 
and  maintenance  of  the  Army  as  he  assigns  to  them  or 
each  of  them,  while  the  Financial  Secretary  is  responsible 
for  finance,  and  the  parliamentary  under-secretary  for  the 
other  matters  that  are  not  strictly  military.  The  perma- 
nent under-secretary  acts  as  secretary  of  the  council,  which 
has  also  under  its  orders  a  new  officer,  the  Inspector  General 
of  the  Forces,  charged  with  the  duty  of  reporting  to  it 
upon  the  results  of  its  policy,  and  of  inspecting  and  report- 
ing upon  the  training  and  efficiency  of  the  troops,  and  the 
condition  of  the  equipment  and  fortifications.  But  the 
Army  Council  has  in  the  last  resort  only  advisory  powers, 
for  the  Secretary  of  State  is  expressly  declared  responsible 
to  the  Crown  and  to  Parliament  for  all  its  business. 
Lack  of  An  army,  and  especially  a  standing  army,  is  liable  during 

initiative      a  \oncr  period  of  peace  to  fall  into  habits  that  impair  its 

among  . 

Officers.  efficiency  in  war.  One  of  the  chief  criticisms  made  after 
the  South  African  War  related  to  the  lack  of  initiative,  and 
of  capacity  to  assume  responsibility,  on  the  part  of  the 
officers  both  in  the  War  Office  and  in  the  field.3     Now,  this 

1  Com.  Papers,  1904,  VIII.,  101. 

2  Cf.  Orders  in  Council  of  Aug.  10,   1904,  Com.  Papers,   1905,  XLVI., 
291,  295,  299. 

3  Rep.  of  Com.  on  War   in   South  Africa,  Com.  Papers,  1904,  XL.,  1, 
pp.  52-56. 


THE  EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  101 

is  precisely  the  defect  that  one  would  expect  to  find  under 
the  circumstances.  With  the  traditions  of  strict  discipline 
ingrained  in  military  men,  there  is  a  natural  tendency  in 
time  of  peace  to  regulate  everything  with  precision,  leaving 
to  subordinate  officers  little  independence  of  action.  And 
in  fact  the  Committee  on  War  Office  Organisation  in  1901 
reported  that  the  Army  was  administered  by  means  of  a 
vast  system  of  minute  regulations,  which  tended  on  the  one 
hand  to  suppress  individuality  and  initiative,  while  on 
the  other  their  interpretation  led  to  protracted  references, 
and  to  absorbing  the  time  of  high  officials  by  matters  of 
routine.1  The  evidence  presented  to  the  Committee  on 
the  war  in  South  Africa  pointed  to  the  same  evil,  for 
it  showed  that  the  deficiencies  of  the  officers  arose  from 
their  being  too  much  controlled  and  supervised  during 
their  training.2 

The  excessive  tendency  to  routine,  and  the  consequent  Their 
lack  of  initiative,  might  be  counteracted  in  some  measure  Traimn& 
by  a  keen  intellectual  interest  in  the  profession  on  the  part 
of  the  younger  officers ;  but  the  military  education  they  re- 
ceive is  hardly  of  a  character  to  stimulate  such  an  interest. 
As  a  rule  the  candidates  for  commissions,  after  leaving  the 
great  public  schools,  such  as  Eton,  Harrow  and  Rugby, 
where  the  sons  of  the  upper  classes  are  educated,  obtain 
admission  to  the  military  academies  by  means  of  competitive 
examinations  based  upon  the  curriculum  of  those  schools. 
The  ordinary  time  then  spent  in  studying  at  Woolwich,  where 
the  engineer  and  artillery  officers  arc  taught,  is  two  years ; 
that  at  Sandhurst,  the  school  for  the  infantry  and  cavalry, 
was  eighteen  months  before  the  South  African  War,  and  later 
only  a  year.  Periods  of  this  length  are  obviously  too  short 
to  give  a  thorough  training,  or  even  a  strong  interest,  in 
military  science  ;  and,  in  fact,  the  object  is  rather  to  produce 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  War  Office  Organisation,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XL., 
179,  p.  2. 

2  Rep.  of   Com.   on   War  in   South  Africa,  Com.  Papers,  1901,   XL.,   1, 
pp.  52-50. 


102  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

a  good  subaltern  than  a  highly  educated  officer.1  If  a  man 
is  ambitious  for  promotion  he  is  expected  to  pursue  his 
studies  by  himself,  or  to  attend  the  staff  college,  later  in 
life.  Now,  with  the  modern  application  of  science  to  war- 
fare, a  military  officer  has  become  a  member  of  a  learned 
profession.  But  in  England  the  preliminary  teaching  is  in- 
sufficient for  this  purpose ;  and  what  is  more,  the  conditions 
of  the  service  are  very  unlike  those  of  learned  professions, 
and  hardly  such  as  to  stimulate  intellectual  activity.  More- 
over, the  private  contributions  to  the  mess,  and  the  other 
expenses  of  an  officer,  are  often  so  great  that  it  is  difficult 
for  a  man  without  private  means  to  follow  the  Army  as  a 
career.  In  short,  after  the  abolition  of  the  purchase  of  com- 
missions in  1871,  the  Army  ceased  to  be  a  caste  without 
becoming  a  profession.2 
Advan-  The  fact  that  the  Navy  escapes  some  of  the  difficulties 

Navy°      B  that  beset  the  Army  is  not  due  altogether  to  better  organ- 
isation.    The  Navy  has  in  many  ways  great  natural  advan- 
*  tages  as  compared  with  the  Army.     Most  civilians  feel  that 

after  a  short  experience  they  could  lead  a  regiment,  but  few 
landsmen  have  the  hardihood  to  believe  that  they  could 
ever  command  a  ship.  The  Navy  is  a  mystery  which  ordi- 
nary men  do  not  pretend  to  understand,  and  with  which 
they  do  not  attempt  to  interfere ;  and  this  is  a  security  for 
expert  management.  Again  the  Navy  is  less  exposed  to 
the  dangers  of  peace.  Warships  are  constantly  in  service. 
If  they  do  not  fight,  at  least  they  go  to  sea ;  and  hence 
the   Navy  is  far  less  likely  than  the  Army  to  suffer  from 

1  The  recent  Committee  on  Military  Education  evidently  approved  of 
that  object.     Com.  Papers,  1902,  X.,  193,  p.  24. 

2  The  Committee  on  Military  Education  were  impressed  by  the  wide- 
spread dissatisfaction  with  the  education  of  army  officers,  and  in  Sand- 
hurst, especially,  much  was  found  to  criticise.  The  education  of  the  junior 
officers  after  leaving  the  military  academies  was  reported  to  be  in  a  most 
unsatisfactory  state.  They  were  said  to  be  lamentably  wanting  in  military 
knowledge,  and  in  the  desire  to  study  the  science  and  master  the  art  of  their 
profession  ;  while  the  examinations  for  promotion  encouraged  "the  customs 
of  idleness  with  a  brief  period  of  cram."  Com.  Papers,  1902,  X.,  193.  There 
may  well  be  some  exaggeration  in  the  criticism  of  the  moment,  due  to  a 
natural  revulsion  from  the  military  self-complacency  that  preceded  the  war. 


THE   EXECUTIVE    DEPARTMENTS  103 

the  demoralising  influence  of  minute  and  antiquated  regu- 
lations. 

This  has  an  effect  also  upon  the  training  of  naval  officers.  The 
Under  the  old  plan  which  is  now  being  superseded,  the  ^^lavai 
theoretical  education  given  them  was  by  no  means  high.  Officers. 
The  cadets  destined  for  executive  naval  officers  entered 
"The  Britannia"  at  the  age  of  about  fifteen,  and  spent  there 
a  little  less  than  a  year  and  a  half.  They  then  had  a  service 
of  about  three  years  at  sea,  where  besides  learning  the  prac- 
tical side  of  their  profession,  they  were  expected  to  study 
elementary  mathematics,  mechanics,  physics,  navigation, 
surveying,  etc.  Then  followed  a  couple  of  months  at 
Greenwich  preparing  for  the  final  examination  in  those 
subjects;  and,  lastly,  before  receiving  their  commissions  as 
sub-lieutenants,  five  or  six  months  at  Portsmouth  studying 
pilotage,  gunnery,  and  torpedo  practice.  Thus  the  average 
age  for  obtaining  the  commission  was  not  far  from  twenty 
years.  The  theoretical  study  pursued  was  certainly  not 
of  an  advanced  character.  In  mathematics,  for  example, 
it  did  not  include  the  calculus,  or  even  conic  sections. 
In  fact,  according  to  the  syllabus  as  revised  in  1899,  one  of 
the  optional  subjects  which  men  who  desired  to  go  farther 
than  the  rest  might  pursue,  if  they  desired,  was  projectiles, 
"treated  so  as  not  to  require  a  knowledge  of  conic  sections." l 

The  principal  changes  made  by  the  new  plan,  which  began 
to  go  into  effect  in  1903,  were,  first,  making  the  executive, 
engineer  and  marine,  officers  more  nearly  into  a  single  corps, 
and  therefore  giving  them  a  common  training  until  they 
reach  the  grade  of  sub-lieutenant ;  and,  second,  reducing 
the  age  for  entering  "The  Britannia"  to  between  twelve 
and  thirteen.  This  last  change  enables  the  cadets  to  remain 
at  the  school  four  years,  and  will, it  is  hoped,  insure  a  sounder 
education.  They  are  then  to  get  a  training  at  sea  for  three 
years,  followed  by  three  months  at  Greenwich  and  six  at 
Portsmouth.     At  that  point  they  are  to  receive  their  coni- 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Training  and  Examination  of  Junior  Naval  Officers, 
Com.  Papers,  1901,  XLII.,  621,  p.  15, 


mittee. 


104  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

missions  as  sub-lieutenants,  and  those  who  join  the  execu- 
tive branch  of  the  service  will  go  to  sea  again,  while  the 
engineer  and  marine  officers  attend  their  respective  colleges 
for  some  time  longer.1  Whatever  good  effects  the  new  plan 
may  have  in  other  directions,  it  can  hardly  increase  materi- 
ally the  scientific  education  of  the  cadet. 

But  if  the  education  in  the  theory  of  naval  science  has 
not  been  carried  far,  the  junior  naval  officer  has  much 
greater  opportunities  for  learning  the  practice  of  his  pro- 
fession than  the  officer  in  the  army.  In  fact,  if  not  a  master 
of  naval  science  he  becomes  an  excellent  seaman,  and  this, 
in  the  opinion  of  many  officers,  is  much  the  more  important 
of  the  two. 
The  De-  One  of  the   chief  criticisms  of  Lord  Harrington's  Com- 

mission on  the  administration  of  the  naval  and  military 
departments,  bore  upon  the  lack  of  combined  plans  of 
operation  for  the  defence  of  the  empire.  They  suggested 
the  formation  of  a  naval  and  military  council,  to  be  pre- 
sided over  by  the  Prime  Minister,  and  to  consist  of  the  par- 
liamentary heads  of  the  two  services,  and  their  principal 
professional  advisers.2  In  partial  fulfilment  of  this  recom- 
mendation a  committee  of  the  cabinet  was  formed,  con- 
sisting of  the  Prime  Minister,  the  parliamentary  heads  of 
the  Army  and  the  Navy,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury, 
with  the  addition,  if  need  be,  of  the  Colonial  Secretary. 
The  committee  was  intended  to  deal  with  questions  un- 
settled between  the  two  departments,  matters  in  which  a 
joint  policy  was  advisable,  and  questions  relating  to  the 
relative  importance  of  expenditures ;  and  it  differed  from 
other  committees  in  that  minutes  were  to  be  kept  of  its  pro- 
ceedings, and  formally  recorded  by  the  departments.  The 
committee  seems,  however,  not  to  have  fulfilled  the  inten- 
tions of  the  Hartington  Commission,  for  it  has  been  openly 

1  Memorandum,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  LXL,  675.  Since  this  was  written 
another  change  has  been  made  dividing  naval  officers  into  a  sea-faring  and 
fighting  branch  and  an  engineer  branch. 

2  Com.  Papers,  1890,  XIX.,  1,  pp.  vi-viii. 


THE  EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  105 

stated  in  Parliament  that  it  never  met ; '  and  even  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  War  admitted  that  it  acted  mainly  with 
regard  to  estimates,  and  to  questions  within  the  War  Office 
and  the  Admiralty,  while,  in  his  opinion,  it  ought  to  act 
on  larger  questions  of  policy.  A  new  Defence  Committee 
was,  therefore,  created  in  1903,  to  consist,  besides  members 
of  the  cabinet,  of  the  most  influential  experts  of  the  two 
services,  and  when  necessary  of  representatives  of  the  Indian 
and  Colonial  Offices.  The  committee  is  intended  to  deal  not 
only  with  estimates,  but  with  larger  questions  of  military 
policy.2  But  whether  this  result  will  be  permanently 
attained,  or  whether  the  committee  will  meet  with  the  usual 
fate,  and  find  itself  absorbed  by  details  of  administration 
and  of  expenditure,  is  yet  to  be  seen. 

The  departments  of  state  that  remain  to  be  considered 
in  this  chapter  need  not  detain  us  long.  They  are  all  con- 
cerned with  the  internal  government  of  the  kingdom,  and 
so  far  as  their  work  is  of  general  interest  it  will  be  touched 
upon  again. 

The  Home  Office  is  a  kind  of  residuary  legatee.  It  is  The  Home 
intrusted  with  all  the  work  of  the  secretariat  that  has  not 
been  especially  assigned  to  the  remaining  secretaries  of  state, 
or  to  the  other  administrative  departments.  Its  duties  are, 
therefore,  of  a  somewhat  miscellaneous  character.  As  the 
heir  to  the  residue  of  the  secretariat,  the  Home  Secretary  is 
the  principal  channel  of  communication  between  the  King 
and  his  subjects,  and  countersigns  the  greater  number  of  the 
King's  acts.  He  receives  addresses  and  petitions  addressed 
to  the  sovereign,  and  presents  them  if  he  thinks  best. 
Among  others  he  receives  petitions  of  right  —  that  is, 
claims  to  be  allowed  to  sue  the  Crown  —  and  consults  the 
Attorney  General  about  the  answer  to  bo  given.  Outlying 
places,  such  as  the  Channel  Islands  and  the  Isle  of  Man, 
which  are  not  from  an  administrative  point  of  view  a  part 

1  Lord  Charles  Bfrrsforri,  Hans.,  4  Scr.  CXI  I..  1  1  16,  1  1  17. 
5  Rep.  of  Com.   on    War   in    South  Africa,  Coin.    Papers,    1904,  XL.,    1, 
pp.  135-36.     Hans.,  4  Scr.  CXV1II.,  291. 


Office. 


106  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

of  the  United  Kingdom  and  yet  are  not  colonies,  fall  under 
his  jurisdiction.  He  has  charge  of  questions  of  naturalisa- 
tion and  extradition.  But  more  important  still,  the  central 
control  over  the  police,  not  having  been  transferred  to  the 
Local  Government  Board,  remains  in  his  hands,  and  this 
gives  him  wide  powers  of  supervision.  The  metropolitan 
police  of  London  is,  indeed,  administered  directly  by  the 
national  government  under  his  immediate  control ; *  and 
although  the  police  elsewhere  is  not  under  his  orders,  yet 
the  fact  that  the  central  government  pays  one  half  of  the 
cost  on  condition  his  regulations  are  observed,  enables  him 
to  prescribe  the  organisation,  equipment  and  discipline  of 
the  local  police  all  over  England.  Moreover,  all  by-laws  of 
counties  and  boroughs,  except  those  relating  to  nuisances, 
must  be  submitted  to  him  for  approval,  and  may  on  his 
advice  be  disallowed  by  the  Crown.2  As  a  part  of  his  au- 
thority in  matters  of  police  he  manages  the  prisons,  both  the 
national  prisons  for  convicts  and  the  county  and  borough 
gaols.  He  is  responsible  for  the  appointment  and  removal 
of  recorders  and  stipendiary  magistrates.  He  appoints 
the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  and  makes  regulations 
about  costs  in  criminal  proceedings.  By  virtue  of  special 
statutes  he  sees  to  the  enforcement  of  the  acts  relating  to 
factories,  mines,  burial-grounds,  inebriates,  anatomy,  vivi- 
section, explosives,  and  other  kindred  matters. 

He  is  assisted  by  a  parliamentary  under-secretary,  and 
by  a  large  staff  of  permanent  officials,  beginning  with  a  per- 
manent under-secretary,  and  including  a  prison  commis- 
sioner, a  metropolitan  police  commission,  and  a  host  of 
inspectors  for  factories,  mines,  police,  and  so  forth. 

It  will  be  observed  that  although  primarily  responsible 
for  public  order,  the  Home  Secretary  is  by  no  means  a 
minister  of  the  interior  in  the  continental  sense,  for  apart 
from  the  police  he  has  very  little  to  do  with  local  govern- 
ment.    The  supervision  of  matters  of  that  kind,  although 

1  The  "  City  "  of  London  is  an  oasis  with  its  own  police  force. 

2  Glen  on  Public  Health,  12  Ed.,  443,  1169,  1341. 


THE   EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  107 

in  part  scattered  among  different  departments,  is  mainly- 
concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the  Local  Government  Board. 
The  Home  Secretary  has,  on  the  other  hand,  some  of  the 
functions  of  a  minister  of  justice;  and  this  will  be  referred 
to  again  when  we  come  to  speak  of  the  Law  Officers  of  the 
Crown.     Pardons  are  granted  on  his  recommendation. 

The  Board  of  Works  is  not  regarded  as  a  department  of  The  Board 
great  political  importance,  and  for  this  reason  it  presents  one  of  ;Vorks- 
of  the  two  or  three  cases  where  the  minister  has  no  parlia- 
mentary under-secretary.  For  a  score  of  years  the  public 
lands  and  buildings  were  under  the  care  of  a  body  called  the 
Commissioners  of  Woods  and  Forests ;  but  in  order  to  keep 
the  revenue  from  land  separate  from  the  expenditure  upon 
buildings,  and  so  bring  the  latter  more  completely  under 
the  control  of  Parliament,  the  duties  were  divided  in  1852. 
The  Commissioners  of  Woods,  Forests  and  Land  Revenues 
were  made  a  permanent  non-political  body  under  the  Treas- 
ury, while  the  Board  of  Works  was  established  to  take 
charge  of  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  parks,  pal- 
aces and  other  buildings.  At  that  time  many  of  the 
public  buildings  were,  in  fact,  committed  to  the  care  of 
the  departments  that  occupied  them ;  but  by  a  series  of 
statutes  these  have  now  been  transferred  almost  wholly  to 
the  Board  of  Works.  Now,  although  the  amount  of  money 
that  passes  through  its  hands  is  very  large,  the  board  is  by 
no  means  entirely  free,  for  without  the  sanction  of  the 
Treasury  it  can  undertake  no  work  not  directly  ordered  by 
Parliament,  and  it  can  make  no  contracts  for  the  erection  of 
large  public  buildings  without  submitting  them  to  the  same 
authority,1  which  also  appoints  the  ordinary  permanent 
staff  of  the  office.2 

The  Board  of  Trade  occupies,  on  the  contrary,  a  position  The  Board 
of  great  and  growing  importance.     It  has  had  a  long  and  °     ra  e' 
chequered  history,  and  although  in  the  course  of  its  career 
it  has  lost  duties  enough  to  keep  an  active  department  busy, 

1  Rep.  Com.  on  Nat.  Expond.,  Coin.  Pupers,  1902,  VII.,  15,  Q.  1125. 

2  14-15  Vic,  c  42,  §§  IG,   17. 


108         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

these  have  been  more  than  replaced  under  that  modern 
tendency  toward  state  regulation  of  industry  which  is  con- 
stantly adding  to  its  burdens.  It  deals  not  only  with  trade, 
but  with  many  of  the  chief  agencies  of  trade,  and  especially 
with  transportation.  As  in  the  case  of  the  three  other 
boards  to  be  described  hereafter,  the  Board  of  Trade  is 
engaged  not  in  direct  administration,  but  in  supervising  and 
regulating  the  action  of  private  bodies  and  local  authorities, 
and  in  keeping  a  watch  upon  the  enforcement  of  the  law. 
Speaking  broadly,  its  powers  have  grown  by  the  process  of 
making  it  responsible  for  the  application  of  a  great  many 
statutes. 

Its  functions  may  be  classified  roughly  under  the  heads  of 
collecting  information,  registration,  inspection,  and  author- 
ising acts  or  undertakings  of  a  public  nature ;  although 
any  such  classification  is  sadly  confused  by  the  fact  that 
duties  of  more  than  one  kind  have  been  conferred  upon  the 
board  in  regard  to  the  same  subject-matter,  and  even  by 
the  same  statute.  To  the  first  of  these  classes  belong  its 
functions  in  collecting  and  publishing  statistics  relating  to 
domestic  and  foreign  trade,  and  giving  advice  on  com- 
mercial matters  to  other  departments  of  the  government. 
To  that  class  belong  also  its  functions  as  a  labour  bureau 
in  preparing  statistics  about  labour,  wages  and  other  matters 
touching  the  interests  of  workingmen.  In  this  connection 
it  has  power  also  to  act  as  a  board  of  conciliation  in  labour 
disputes,  and  to  name  arbitrators  or  conciliators.  Under 
the  head  of  registration  may  be  mentioned  its  duties  in 
maintaining  the  standards  of  weights  and  measures;  regis- 
tering joint-stock  companies;  examining  and  recording 
patents  and  trade-marks;  and  keeping  a  register  of  ships 
and  seamen.  Under  the  head  of  inspection  come  its  func- 
tions in  ascertaining  that  merchant  vessels  are  in  a  sea- 
worthy condition,  and  properly  laden,  officered,  manned 
and  equipped;  with  the  power  to  detain  unseaworthy 
craft.  I  rider  the  same  head  may  be  classed  its  control 
over  harbours,  its   duty   to   see  to  the  enforcement  of  the 


THE   EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  109 

laws  relating  to  railways1  and  to  inquire  into  the  causes 
of  railway  accidents  and  disasters  at  sea.  As  an  example 
of  the  final  class  of  powers  may  be  cited  the  fact  that  the 
by-laws  of  a  railway  company  require  for  their  validity  the 
approval  of  the  board ;  but  a  far  more  important  instance  is 
to  be  found  in  its  control  over  the  building  of  new  lines 
of  railway,  over  new  undertakings  for  the  supply  of  water, 
gas  and  electric  light,  and  over  the  construction  of  tram- 
ways and  light  railways,  the  last  being  a  recent  inven- 
tion legally  very  different,  but  physically  indistinguishable, 
from  tramways.  This  control  is  exercised  by  means  of 
provisional  orders,  prepared  by  the  board  after  an  investi- 
gation and  a  hearing  of  all  the  persons  interested,  and  then 
confirmed  by  Parliament.2  The  petitioner  is  not,  indeed, 
compelled  to  resort  to  a  provisional  order,  but  ma}T  avoid 
the  direct  control  of  the  Board  of  Trade  by  means  of  a 
private  bill  in  Parliament.  But  a  provisional  order  is  far 
less  expensive ;  and  even  when  the  procedure  is  by  private 
bill  the  board  endeavours  to  exert  its  influence  by  scruti- 
nising the  bill,  and  bringing  to  the  notice  of  the  officers  of 
the  House  any  departures  from  the  general  policy  of  leg- 
islation.3 The  result  is  that  the  board  has  an  effective, 
although  by  no  means  an  absolute,  control  over  these 
matters. 

The  subject  of  bankruptcy  has  also  been  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  and  except  for  legal  questions 
which  come  before  the  courts,  it  has  the  entire  charge  of  the 
cases,  maintaining  for  that  purpose  a  staff  of  inspectors, 
examiners  and  official  receivers. 

The  nearest  approach  to  actual  administrative  work 
intrusted  to  the  board  is  in  the  case  of  lighthouses,  buoys 

1  In  1873  the  settlement  of  railway  controversies  was  transferred  to  a 
judicial  body,  the  Railway  and  Canal  Commission. 

:  In  the  case  of  light  railways  the  orders  arc  made  by  the  Light  Railway 
Commission  and  confirmed  by  the  Board  of  Trade,  the  members  of  the  Com- 
mission being  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Board.  .">!)  00  Vic,  c.  48; 
1  Edw.  VII.,  c.  36. 

3  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Municipal  Trading,  Com.  Papers,  1900,  VII.,  183. 


110 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


The  Local 
Govern- 
ment 
Board. 


and  beacons,  which  are  maintained  by  Trinity  House,  an 
ancient  corporation  composed  of  self-elected  brethren  but 
financially  under  the  control  of  the  Board  of  Trade. 

Until  the  era  of  the  Reform  Bill  local  affairs  in  England 
were  managed  in  the  main  by  justices  of  the  peace  and  town 
councillors,  whose  powers  were  derived  from  a  host  of 
statutes  covering  many  subjects  in  great  detail.  These 
officers  were  kept  rigorously  within  the  limits  of  their 
authority  because  the  legality  of  their  acts  could  be  tested 
in  the  courts  of  law ;  but  they  were  almost  entirely  free 
from  administrative  control.  The  first  wide  breach  in  the 
system  was  made  by  the  Poor  Law  Amendment  Act  of  1834, 
which  aimed  at  a  reform  in  the  method  of  giving  poor  relief, 
and  set  up  for  the  purpose  a  commission  to  supervise  the 
local  bodies.  The  new  commissioners,  being  vigorous  and 
efficient,  aroused  hostility,  and  as  they  were  not  permitted 
to  sit  in  Parliament,  they  found  it  hard  to  defend  their  policy. 
In  fact  the  experience  they  went  through  is  used  by  Bagehot 
as  an  illustration  of  the  impotence  of  an  executive  depart- 
ment without  a  representative  in  the  House  of  Commons.1 
In  1847  the  body  was  reorganised  under  the  title  of  the 
Poor  Law  Board,  with  a  responsible  minister  at  its  head, 
and  thenceforth  received  from  time  to  time  additions  to 
its  duties.  Various  functions  relating  to  public  health  and 
local  government  had  in  the  meanwhile  been  intrusted  to 
the  Home  Secretary  and  the  Privy  Council ;  and,  finally, 
in  1871  the  greater  part  of  them  were  transferred  to  the  Poor 
Law  Board,  which  was  given  the  name  of  Local  Govern- 
ment Board. 

Legislation  of  this  kind  has  entirely  transformed  the  na- 
ture of  English  local  government.  Partly  by  bringing  the 
exercise  of  existing  powers  under  the  supervision  of  the  cen- 
tral government,  partly  by  subjecting  to  systematic  control 
the  new  powers  called  into  life  by  the  wants  of  the  time,  the 
old  system  of  local  self-government  —  limited  by  law,  but 
independent  of  any  administrative  superior  —  has  been 
1  "  English  Const.,"  1  Ed.,  228-30. 


THE  EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  111 

replaced  by  a  system  where  the  local  bodies,  and  especially 
those  outside  of  the  great  towns,  are  to  a  considerable  extent 
under  the  tutelage  of  the  state.  The  subjection  is  not  the 
same  as  that  which  prevails  in  other  European  countries, 
and  it  is  not  so  great,  but  it  is  in  some  respects  more  nearly 
akin  to  the  continental  system  than  to  that  of  England  in  the 
eighteenth  century. 

Except  for  such  matters  as  police,  education,  and  the 
supply  of  transportation,  light  and  water,  the  control  over 
the  local  authorities  is  almost  entirely  vested  in  the  Local 
Government  Board  ;  but  as  the  subject  of  local  government, 
and  therefore  the  powers  of  the  board,  will  be  considered  at 
some  length  in  another  part  of  this  book,  we  do  not  need 
to  enumerate  its  functions  here.  We  need  only  point  out 
that  it  has  the  unusual  number  of  five  assistant  under- 
secretaries, and  a  large  staff  of  clerks,  auditors  and  inspect- 
ors. But  although  the  amount  of  head  work  to  be  done, 
and  therefore  the  number  of  permanent  officials  of  high 
grade,  is  large,  yet  from  a  political  point  of  view  the 
department  is  not  regarded  as  of  the  first  class. 

The  creation  in  1889  of  a  new  department  of  state  to  at-  The  Board 
tend  to  the  matters  that  have  been  transferred  from  various  °tUTegricu ~ 
commissions  to  the  Board  of  Agriculture  hardly  seems  to 
have  been  necessary;  and,  indeed,  the  board  is  not  important 
enough  to  require  a  parliamentary  under-secretary.  It  has 
inherited  the  duty  of  shaking  the  dry  bones  of  ancient  ten- 
ures by  dealing  with  such  subjects  as  the  commutation  of 
tithes,  the  enfranchisement  of  copyhold,  the  enclosure  of 
commons,  allotments  to  labourers,  and  the  improvement 
of  land  by  limited  owners.  The  control  of  fisheries,  the 
promotion  of  agriculture  and  the  prevention  of  contagious 
diseases  among  animals  are  also  placed  under  its  care,  and 
it  has  been  given  power,  or  rather  authority,  to  muzzle 
dogs   and   destroy   the   Colorado  beetle. 

The  Board  of  Education  is  the  youngest  of  all  tin1  boards,  The  Board 
but  in  reality  it  is  only  a  committee  of  the  Privy  Council  "if0,1jjdu°a" 
reorganised  with  some  additional  powers.    The  most  remark- 


112         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

able  thing  about  the  act  creating  it  —  apart  from  the  erec- 
tion of  a  sham  board  —  is  the  extent  of  the  authority  dele- 
gated to  the  executive.  Instead  of  prescribing  minutely 
the  organisation  and  functions  of  the  department  of  educa- 
tion, the  act  empowered  the  government,  in  its  discretion, 
to  set  up  such  a  consultative  committee  as  it  saw  fit,  and  to 
transfer  to  the  board  any  educational  duties  of  the  Charity 
Commissioners  or  the  Board  of  Agriculture  that  it  thought 
best.1  Both  of  these  powers  have  been  exercised  by  Orders 
in  Council  of  Aug.  7,  1900,  and  the  Consultative  Commit- 
tee has  been  made  to  consist  of  representatives  selected  by 
the  universities  and  by  other  bodies  interested  in  education. 
But  the  subject  of  public  education  will  be  treated  in  sub- 
sequent chapters,  and  it  is  enough  here  to  note  that  by 
means  of  elaborate  regulations,  commonly  known  as  the 
Education  Code,  the  board  prescribes  the  instruction  to  be 
given  in  all  schools  aided  by  public  money  ; 2  that  it  inspects 
endowed  or  private  secondary  schools  at  their  request;3 
and  that  it  has  charge  of  the  museums  at  South  Kensington 
and  Bethnal  Green,  and  of  the  Geological  Museum  and 
Survey. 
The  Post  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  national  government  the 

Post  Office  has  two  functions.  It  is  a  great  administrative 
department  which  conducts  a  huge  business,  with  a  minister 
at  its  head ;  and  it  is  a  source  of  income,  its  gross  re- 
ceipts forming  about  one  seventh  of  the  total  revenues 
of  the  United  Kingdom,  its  disbursements  only  about 
one  tenth  of  the  total  expenditure.  For  that  reason  it  is 
under  a  financial  control  by  the  Treasury  so  strict  as  to 
leave  very  little  chance  for  independent  action,  and  this 
renders  the  position  of  Postmaster  General  far  less  important 

1  62-G3  Vic,  c.  3.3,  §§  1-4. 

2  This  docs  not,  of  course,  apply  to  special  establishments,  like  the  naval 
and  military  schools,  which  are  managed  by  other  departments. 

3  Throughout  this  chapter  statements  relating  to  local  government  must 
be  understood  not  to  apply  to  Scotland  or  Ireland;  but  in  this  case  Wales, 
with  Monmouthshire,  is  also  excluded  because,  by  the  Welsh  Intermediate 
Education  Act  of  1889,  a  special  board  chosen  by  the  local  authorities 
inspects  the  secondary  >chools  there. 


Office. 


THE  EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENTS  113 

than  it  would  otherwise  be.  The  office  has  been  regarded 
as  political  since  1837 ;  but  until  1866  the  holder  could  not 
sit  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  since  that  time  he  has 
occasionally  been  a  peer,  the  Post  Office  in  such  a  case  be- 
ing usually  represented  in  the  Commons  by  the  Financial 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  The  duties  of  the  Postmaster 
General  are  minutely  prescribed  by  statute,  and  while  he 
has  power  to  make  regulations  for  the  management  of  the 
postal  service,  it  is  not  easy  to  make  substantial  changes  or 
improvements  without  affecting  the  receipts  or  the  ex- 
penses, and  when  that  is  done  he  comes  at  once  under 
the  control  of  the  Treasury.  The  rates  of  postage,  for 
example,  and  the  compensation  for  carrying  the  mails,  when 
not  fixed  by  Act  of  Parliament,  are  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  Treasury ;  and  so  are  the  purchase  or  sale  of  land, 
and  any  lease  of  the  right  to  carry  on  a  telegraph  or  tele- 
phone business.  The  same  approval  is  also  required  for 
his  regulations  touching  money-orders,  post  office  savings- 
banks,  and  the  telegraph,  although  in  these  cases  the  rev- 
enue would  not  appear  to  be  necessarily  involved.  In  short, 
as  Sir  William  Anson  puts  it,1  "The  Postmaster  General  is 
no  more  than  the  acting  manager  of  a  great  business,  with 
little  discretionary  power  except  in  the  exercise  of  the  very 
considerable  patronage  of  his  office."  2 

The  business  of  the  department  is  certainly  enormous,  the 
number  of  persons  employed  being  little  short  of  two  hun- 
dred thousand.  In  addition  to  the  usual  work  of  transmit- 
ting letters,  books,  parcels  and  money-orders,  the  Post  Office 
in  England  maintains  savings-banks,  with  deposits  of  about 
£  150,000,000  ;  and  it  has  been  given  exclusive  control  of  the 
telegraph  by  provisions  which  have  been  held  to  include  the 
telephone  also.  But  while  the  administration  of  the  tele- 
graph  has  been   retained  by  the   government  in   its  own 

1  "Law  and  Custom  of  the  Constitution,"  IT.,  184. 

2  It  may  be  observed  that  for  many  years  after  1SG8  the  Postmaster 
General  was  rarely  in  the  cabinet,  and  hence  lie  has  not  acquired  the  au- 
thority possessed  by  a  regular  cabinet  minister.  He  lias,  however,  now 
been  in  the  cabinet  continuously  since  IS1.) J. 

i 


114         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

hands,  the  right  to  conduct  the  telephone  business  was 
granted,  by  means  of  temporary  licenses,  to  private  com- 
panies, and  to  some  extent  to  local  authorities  also ;  and 
the  government  has  only  recently  decided  to  take  over 
the  management  as  soon  as  the  licenses  expire. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   TKEASURY 

The  most  important  of  all  the  departments,  and  the  one 
that  exhibits  in  the  highest  degree  the  merits  of  the  English 
government,  is  the  Treasury.  It  is  the  central  department  of 
the  administration,  which  keeps  in  touch  with  all  the  others, 
and  maintains  a  constant  financial  control  over  them.  But 
before  considering  how  that  is  done  it  may  be  well  to  ex- 
plain the  process  by  which  money  flows  in  and  out  of  the 
national  purse.  The  part  played  by  Parliament  in  the 
imposition  of  taxes,  and  the  authorisation  of  expenditure 
by  means  of  appropriations,  will  be  described  in  chapter 
xiv,  and  we  are  concerned  here  only  with  the  machinery 
for  collecting  those  taxes,  and  giving  effect  to  the  appro- 
priations.1 

Until  the  Commonwealth,  taxes  were,  as  a  rule,  granted  The  Con- 
to  the  King,  who  used  the  proceeds  to  carry  on  the  govern-  Fund  and 
ment  as  he  saw  fit ;  but  under  Charles  II.  Parliament  began  the  Bank 
to  appropriate  parts  of  the  revenue  for  specific  purposes,  iand. 
and  after  the  revolution  of  1688  this  developed  into  a  com- 
prehensive system,  so  that  the  whole  revenue  was  appro- 
priated, to  be  used  only  for  the  objects,  and  in  the  sums, 
designated  by  Parliament.2     It  was  the  custom,  however, 
to  appropriate  for  specific  objects  the  proceeds  of  particular 
taxes,  a  practice  that  made  the  public  accounts  needlessly 
complex.     In    1787  William   Pitt,   following  earlier  partial 
experiments,  simplified   matters  by  creating  a  single  Con- 

1  An  excellent  description  of  the  existing  financial  procedure  may  bo 
found  in  Sir  Courtney  Ilbert's  "Legislative  Methods  and  Forms,"  284-99. 

2  This  did  not  apply  to  the  hereditary  revenues  of  the  Crown  until,  with 
the  exception  of  the  revenues  belonging  to  the  Duchies  of  Lancaster  and 
Cornwall,  they  were  surrendered  by  (leorge  III.,  in  return  for  ;i  fixed  Civil 
List. 

115 


116         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

solidated  Fund  into  which  all  revenues  from  every  source 
were  turned,  and  from  which  all  payments  were  made.1 
The  Consolidated  Fund  is  deposited  in  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land and  the  Bank  of  Ireland,  which  have  a  right  to  use  it 
like  any  other  deposit,  and  perform,  in  fact,  for  the  govern- 
ment much  the  same  service  that  an  ordinary  bank  does  for 
a  merchant.  This  method  of  dealing  with  the  national 
finances  continued  substantially  intact  until  a  few  years  ago,2 
when  it  was  complicated  by  two  innovations,  one  of  which 
allows  a  department  to  use  incidental  revenues,  under  the 
name  of  "appropriations  in  aid,"  to  defray  expenses,  and 
the  other  set  aside  certain  parts  of  the  national  income  to 
supplement  local  taxation,  in  each  case  without  passing 
through  the  Consolidated  Fund.3  The  second  of  these  ex- 
ceptions was  due  to  the  great  increase  of  local  expenditure, 
and  the  narrow  range  of  local  taxation,  which  have  caused 
a  demand  for  national  subventions,  and  have  resulted  in 
setting  apart  for  the  purpose  the  proceeds  of  specific  sources 
of  revenue.  In  this  way  the  income  from  the  local  taxation 
licenses,  and  a  portion  of  the  income  from  the  death  duties 
and  the  duties  on  spirits  and  beer,  were  collected  by  the 
central  government  and  paid  directly  into  the  Local  Taxation 
Account.4     But  saving  these  cases,  all  the  national  receipts 

1  27  Geo.  III.,  c.  13. 

2  The  rule  had  not  been  absolutely  without  exceptions,  for  the  Mercantile 
Marine  Fund,  derived  from  port  charges  on  vessels,  was  used  to  defray  part 
of  the  expenses  of  the  Board  of  Trade  without  going  through  the  Consolidated 
Fund.  Cf.  2d  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Estab.,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1, 
Qs.  18211-26.  In  1898  this  process  was  restricted  to  the  maintenance  of 
lighthouses,  buoys  and  beacons.  It  may  be  observed,  also,  that  the  Act 
of  1891  concerning  "  appropriations  in  aid"  (54-55  Vic,  c.  24,  §  2)  declares 
that  it  merely  gives  statutory  authority  to  an  existing  practice.  Such  ap- 
propriations are  now  regularly  granted  by  Parliament  in  aid  of  the  votes 
for  the  services  in  which  they  occur.  The  amount  in  aid  of  each  vote 
is  fixed,  and  listed  in  a  separate  column  in  the  schedule  to  the  Appropriation 
Act,  only  the  excess  above  that  amount  being  paid  into  the  Consolidated 
Fund. 

3  Ilbert,  "Legislative  Methods  and  Forms,"  294-95;  Glen,  "Law  of 
Public   Health,"   1343,   1344. 

4  This  innovation  has  been  vigorously  criticised  as  tending  to  confuse 
the  national  accounts.  See  a  memorandum  by  Sir  E.  W.  Hamilton,  Com. 
Papers,  1902,  VII.,  15,  App.  12.  It  was  abolished  in  1907.  7  Edw.  VII., 
c.  13,  §  17. 


THE  TREASURY  117 

are  paid  into,  and  all  the  disbursements  are  made  from,  the 
Consolidated  Fund. 

The  financial  procedure  of  the  Treasury  is  now  regulated  Method  of 
by  the  Exchequer  and  Audit  Departments  Act  of  1866/  Monlylnto 
and  the  Public  Accounts  and  Charges  Act  of  189 1.2  By  theConsoii- 
these  acts  the  gross  revenue  —  after  making  the  deductions 
already  mentioned  —  is  paid  into  the  "account  of  His 
Majesty's  Exchequer,"  at  the  Banks  of  England  and  Ire- 
land, to  be  used  as  a  single  fund.  The  three  chief  The  Sources 
collectors  of  revenue  are  the  Commissioners  of  Customs,  ot  evenue- 
the  Commissioners  of  Inland  Revenue  and  the  Post 
Office.  With  the  growth  of  the  principles  of  free  trade 
the  customs  duties  became  confined  to  coffee,  chicory, 
cocoa,  dried  fruit,  tea,  tobacco,  wine,  and  a  number  of 
articles,  such  as  spirits,  on  which  duties  are  laid  to  counter- 
vail the  excise  upon  similar  articles  produced  at  home.  To 
these  were  added  at  the  time  of  the  South  African  War  an 
export  duty  on  coal,  and  import  duties  on  sugar  and  grain, 
the  last  being  again  dropped  in  1903,  while  the  coal  duty 
was  repealed  in  1906.  Under  normal  fiscal  conditions  in 
times  of  peace,  the  customs  duties  yield  about  one  fifth  of 
the  total  revenue,  the  receipts  being  mainly  from  tobacco, 
tea  and  spirits.  The  gross  receipts  from  the  Post  Office 
(including  the  telegraphs)  form  about  one  seventh  of  the 
revenue,  but  this  is  really  misleading,  because  three  quarters 
of  those  receipts  are  paid  out  again  for  the  expenses  of  the 
department.  All  but  a  very  small  fraction  of  the  remaining 
receipts  come  through  the  Commissioners  of  Inland  Revenue, 
and  their  sources  of  income  are  of  a  miscellaneous  character. 
The  largest  item  is  the  excise,  mainly  on  beer  and  spirits, 
which  yields  more  than  a  quarter  of  the  total  national 
revenue.3  The  next  largest  is  the  income  tax,  which  varies 
very  much  from  time  to  time,  and  has  produced  during 
the  last  score  of  years  from  one  seventh  to  one  quarter  of 
the    total    revenue.     Then    there    are    the    death   duties,    a 

1  29-30  Vic,  c  39.  2  ">  1 -f>.">  Vic,  c  21. 

3  The  sums  paid  to  the  Local  Taxation  Account  not  being  included. 


118 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Permanent 
and  Annual 
Taxes. 


Accuracy 
of  the 
Budget. 


progressive  tax  on  property  passing  at  death,  which  yield 
one  tenth  of  the  revenue.  The  ancient  land-tax,  and  the 
inhabited-house  duty  produce  comparatively  small  sums ; 
and,  finally,  there  are  the  stamp  duties  on  all  kinds  of 
transactions,  articles  and  licenses  which  yield  all  together 
about  one  twelfth  of  the  revenue.  Some  of  the  license 
fees  collected  under  the  head  of  excise  are  so  small  as  to 
appear  rather  vexatious  than  productive,  such  as  one 
guinea  for  the  display  of  armorial  bearings  not  used  upon 
a  carriage,  fifteen  shillings  for  a  license  to  have  a  man- 
servant, or  keep  a  carriage  with  less  than  four  wheels,  and 
fourpence  a  day  for  the  privilege  of  occasionally  selling 
tobacco.1 

Neither  the  expenditure  nor  the  proceeds  of  taxes  being 
absolutely  constant,  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  maintain  a 
close  balance  between  them,  to  adjust  the  sources  of  revenue 
to  some  extent  from  year  to  year,  and  this  is  done  by  means 
of  a  small  number  of  variable  charges.  Most  of  the  taxes 
are  imposed  by  permanent  statutes,  changed  only  at  long 
intervals,  but  the  rates  of  assessment  under  the  tea  duty 
and  the  income  tax  are  fixed  each  year  in  the  annual 
Finance  Act ;  and  since  1894  certain  additional  duties  on 
beer  and  spirits  have  also  been  laid  for  a  year  at  a  time. 

It  has  been  the  aim  of  English  statesmen  to  make  the 
revenue  and  expenditure  of  each  year  balance  one  another 
as  closely  as  possible,  and  their  skill  in  doing  so  has  been 
extraordinary.  While  the  South  African  War  was  raging 
such  a  result  was  naturally  impossible,  but  during  the  pre- 
ceding twenty-five  years  the  difference  between  receipts  and 
expenditures  (including  payments  on  account  of  the  debt) 
was  never  more  than  about  four  per  cent,  and  in  fifteen  of 
those  years  it  did  not  exceed  one  and  a  half  per  cent.  The 
taxes  are,  indeed,  of  such  a  character  that  it  is  possible  to 
forecast  their  proceeds  with  great  accuracy.  The  Chancellor 
of  the  Exchequer  intends  to  make  his  calculations  so  as  to 

1  These  license  fees  go  into  the  Local  Taxation  Account,  not  into  the 
National  Exchequer. 


THE  TREASURY  119 

leave  a  margin  of  safety,  and  yet  during  the  period  under 
consideration  the  difference  between  the  estimated  and 
actual  receipts  was  never  more  than  about  three  and  a  half 
per  cent.1 

Accurate  fiscal  administration  is  very  much  promoted  by 
the  rule  that  any  part  of  an  appropriation  unexpended  at 
the  end  of  the  financial  year  in  which  it  is  voted  shall  lapse, 
and  cannot  afterwards  be  used  unless  it  is  granted  afresh  by 
Parliament.2  The  rule  has  been  thought  to  lead  to  waste- 
fulness by  provoking  improvident  haste  in  spending  the 
whole  appropriation  before  March  31.3  But  such  an  evil  is 
surely  far  smaller  than  that  of  allowing  the  appropriations 
to  run  on,  with  the  result,  well  known  in  France,  for 
example,  that  the  annual  accounts  cannot  be  finally  made 
up,  and  the  extent  of  the  deficit  determined,  until  several 
years  have  passed. 

Like  all  other  excellent  things  devised  by  men,  the  English 
system  of  finance  is  not  without  its  drawbacks.  If  it  pro- 
motes careful  administration,  and  rivets  attention  upon 
any  increase  in  the  budget,  it  also  makes  the  revenue  in- 
elastic in  emergencies.  A  great  deal  has  been  said  in  Parlia- 
ment of  late  about  broadening  the  basis  of  taxation,  but 
that  is  a  very  difficult  thing  to  do  suddenly,  without  dis- 
locating the  commercial  as  well  as  the  fiscal  system ;  and 
while  the  existing  taxes  are  elastic  up  to  a  certain  point, 
an  attempt  to  raise  them  too  much  would  diminish  rather 
than  increase  their  productiveness. 

1  It  is  noteworthy  that  from  1858  to  1895  the  amount  of  money  raised 
by  taxation  for  national  purposes  was  never  less  than  £2  4s.  5d.  and  never 
more  than  £2  9.s.  1  Id.  per  head  of  population.  Of  late  years  it  has  shown 
a  steady  tendency  to  increase.  In  1899,  the  year  before  the  war,  it  was 
£2  13s.  (id.;  and  "in  1902  it  was  £3  8.s.  M.,  the  expenditure  being  £4  13s. 
lb/.  Between  1857  and  1900  the  national  debt  was  reduced  by  gradual 
payments  from  £837,144,597  to  £028.978,783.  In  1902  it  had 'increased 
in  consequence  of  the  South  African  War  to  £747,91  1.107. 

2  Tor  the  history  of  this  rule  see  Todd,  "  Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  II., 
44-46. 

3  Rep.  of  the  Corn,  on  War  Office  Organisation,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XL., 
179,  p.  0.  But  see  3d  Rep.  Com.  Pub.  Accounts,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  V., 
47,  p.  iv. 


120 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Method  of 
Getting 
Money  out 
of  the  Con- 
solidated 
Fund. 


Just  as  there  are  two  kinds  of  taxes,  one  permanent  and 
the  other  annual,  so  there  are  two  classes  of  expenditure, 
one  regulated  by  standing  laws,  and  the  other  by  annual 
appropriations.  All  the  ordinary  expenses  of  the  govern- 
ment require  parliamentary  sanction  every  year,  both  on  the 
theory  that  the  money  collected  from  the  nation  ought  not 
to  be  spent  without  the  consent  of  its  representatives,  and 
also  in  order  that  Parliament  may  be  able  to  oversee  the 
administration  and  criticise  it  in  every  session.  But  there 
are  certain  matters  that  ought  to  be  kept  aloof  from  current 
politics,  and  ought  not  to  be  brought  in  question  in  the 
heat  of  party  conflict.  The  principal  charges  that  have  been 
regarded  in  this  light  are  the  interest  on  the  national  debt, 
the  Civil  List  or  personal  provision  for  the  King,  annuities 
for  the  royal  family,  certain  pensions,  and  the  salaries  of 
the  judges,  of  the  Comptroller  and  Auditor  General,  of  the 
Speaker,  and  of  a  few  officers  of  lesser  importance.  These 
charges  amount  to  nearly  one  quarter  of  the  total  expendi- 
tures ;  and  they  are  called  Consolidated  Fund  charges, 
because  by  statute  they  are  paid  directly  out  of  the  Con- 
solidated Fund  without  the  need  of  any  further  action  by 
Parliament.  The  other  expenditures  are  for  what  are  known 
as  the  supply  services,  because  the  appropriations  for  them 
are  voted  by  the  House  of  Commons  in  Committee  of 
Supply. 

The  administrative  procedure  for  getting  money  out 
of  the  Consolidated  Fund  to  pay  the  Consolidated  Fund 
charges  and  the  supply  services  is  not  precisely  the  same. 
In  the  case  of  the  supply  services  a  royal  order  for  the 
amounts  appropriated  by  Parliament  is  made  under  the 
King's  sign  manual,  countersigned  by  two  of  the  Commis- 
sioners of  the  Treasury.  The  Treasury  then  requires  the 
Comptroller  and  Auditor  General  to  grant  credits  at  the 
Banks  of  England  and  Ireland  for  those  amounts,  and  if  satis- 
fied that  the  authority  from  Parliament  is  complete,  he  makes 
an  order  on  the  banks  granting  the  credits.  From  time  to 
time  the  Treasury  requests  the  banks  to  transfer  to  the 


THE   TREASURY  121 

various  supply  accounts,  for  disbursement,  sums  of  money 
not  exceeding  the  credits  so  granted.1  The  procedure  in 
the  case  of  Consolidated  Fund  charges  differs  from  this 
only  in  the  fact  that  a  royal  order  is  not  needed,  and  the 
Comptroller  and  Auditor  General,  on  the  requisition  of  the 
Treasury,  grants  quarterly  credits  for  the  amounts  pre- 
scribed by  statute.2  By  this  process  a  highly  effective 
security  is  provided  that  no  money  shall  be  spent  without 
the  authority  of  Parliament.  The  Consolidated  Fund  is 
deposited  in  the  banks  of  England  and  Ireland,  which  are 
liable  if  any  of  it  is  withdrawn  without  an  order  from  the 
Comptroller  and  Auditor  General,  while  that  officer  is  given 
the  same  independence  as  the  judges.  Like  them  he  is 
appointed  during  good  behaviour,  with  a  salary  charged 
upon  the  Consolidated  Fund.  The  security  is  not  absolutely 
perfect,  for  there  are  some  moneys,  such  as  the  appropriations 
in  aid,  that  do  not  pass  through  the  Consolidated  Fund ; 
and  as  no  foresight  can  be  unfailing,  the  government  is 
given  a  limited  power  to  meet  unforeseen  contingencies, 
and  to  cover  expenses  that  have  inevitably  proved  larger 
than  was  anticipated.3  But  all  matters  of  this  kind  are 
fully  reported  to  Parliament  by  the  Comptroller  and  Auditor 
General. 

The  Treasury  lays  before  Parliament  annually  the  Fi-  Audit  of  tin 
nance  Accounts  of  the  preceding  year,  while  the  Comptroller  Accmmts- 
and  Auditor  General  submits  at  a  later  date  a  separate 
report.  Therein  he  examines  the  Consolidated  Fund 
charges,  and  makes  for  the  supply  services  more  elaborate 
statements,  called  the  Appropriation  Accounts,  in  three 
volumes,  relating  to  the  Army,  the  Navy  and  the  civil  ser- 
vice. The  accounts  are  rendered  to  him  by  the  several 
departments,  and  after  auditing  them  he  transmits  them  to 
the  House  of  Commons  with  his  comments.1 

1  29-30  Vic,  c.  39,  $§  13,  15.  2  Ibid.,  §  13. 

3  For  the  provision  made  for  such  cases,  see  page  lL'lj,  infra. 

4  The  Finance  Accounts  give  only  the  issues  to  the  departments  from  the 
Exchequer,  not  the  actual  expenditures.  These  last  are  contained  only 
in  the  Appropriation  Accounts  of  the  Auditor  General.      Except   for  cer- 


122  THE   GOVERNMENT    OF   ENGLAND 

The  money  granted  by  Parliament  is  divided  into  votes, 
of  which  there  are  in  all  about  one  hundred  and  forty.1  In 
the  estimates  these  votes  are  subdivided  into  subheads  and 
items ;  but  the  votes  would  appear  to  be  the  only  limitation 
expressly  placed  by  Parliament  upon  expenditure ;  for  the 
Annual  Appropriation  Act  provides  that  the  sums  granted 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  appropriated  "for  the  services  and 
purposes  expressed  in  Schedule  (B)  annexed"  thereto,  and 
that  schedule  gives  a  list  of  the  votes,  but  not  of  the  sub- 
heads or  items.  Nevertheless,  the  Comptroller  and  Audi- 
tor General  is  enjoined  by  the  Exchequer  and  Audit 
Departments  Act  of  1866  to  ascertain  whether  the  money 
expended  has  been  applied  to  the  purpose  or  purposes  for 
which  each  grant  was  intended  to  provide,2  and  hence  the 
reports  that  he  submits  note  the  excess  or  saving  with  the 
reasons  therefor,  under  each  subhead,  and  sometimes,  as 
in  the  case  of  votes  for  the  construction  of  new  buildings, 
under  each  item.  He  adds,  also,  his  own  comments  where- 
ever  it  seems  to  him  necessary  to  do  so.  All  this  is  done, 
even  where  the  saving  under  one  subhead  more  than  coun- 
terbalances the  excess  under  another  in  the  same  vote. 
When  that  happens,  however,  no  action  by  Parliament  is 
required ;  but  if  the  total  amount  of  a  vote  has  been  over- 
spent, the  excess  is  entirely  unauthorised,  and  must  be  cov- 
ered by  a  deficiency  appropriation,  which  Parliament  grants 
upon  the  reports  of  the  Comptroller  and  Auditor  General 
and  the  Committee  on  Accounts  of  the  House  of  Commons. 
To  the  last  rule  there  is  one  exception.     In  order  to  facili- 

tain  departments,  like  the  Navy,  where  Sir  James  Graham  began 
the  practice  of  submitting  them  as  early  as  1832,  the  actual  expendi- 
tures were  not  submitted  as  a  whole  to  Parliament  until  the  Act  of 
1866.  Memorandum  by  Lord  Welby,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  15, 
App.  13.  Hatschek,  Englisches  Staatsrecht,  I.,  495-502,  gives  an  interesting 
description  of  the  influence  of  French  methods  upon  the  English  system 
of  keeping  public  accounts,  including  the  introduction  of  double-entry  book- 
keeping. 

1  Fifteen  or  sixteen  relate  to  the  Navy;  as  many  more  to  the  Army; 
something  over  one  hundred  to  the  various  branches  of  the  civil  service, 
grouped  into  seven  classes;   and  five  to  the  revenue  departments. 

2  29-30  Vic,  c.  39,  §  27,  and  see  Todd,  II.,  53-67. 


THE  TREASURY  123 

tate  the  administration  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  the  Annual 
Appropriation  Act  declares  that  the  Treasury  may  authorise 
expenditure,  not  provided  for,  to  be  defrayed  temporarily 
out  of  any  surplus  effected  upon  other  votes  in  each  of  those 
departments ;  and  the  Act  goes  on  to  recite  and  sanction 
the  transfers  of  surplus  so  authorised  by  the  Treasury  in 
the  last  year  for  which  the  accounts  are  complete.1  This 
brings  us  to  another  important  question,  that  of  the  financial 
control  of  the  Treasury  over  the  other  branches  of  the 
administration. 

There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  discussion  about  Treasury  Treasury 
control  over  the  receipt  and  expenditure  of  public  money.  o°her°DeVer 
In  the  case  of  the  receipts  it  is  a  simple  matter,  for  the  partments. 
financial  control  over  the  Post   Office  has  already  been  de- 
scribed, and  the  other  great  revenue  departments  are,  as 
will    shortly    be    explained,    virtually    subordinate    to    the 
Treasury.     The    question    of    control    over    expenditure    is 
far  more  complicated.    Committees  of  the  House  of  Commons 
have,  at  different  times,  collected  evidence  on  the  subject,2 
but  the  statements  made  have  often  been  vague,  and  tend  control  over 
to  confuse  the  control  of  the  Treasury  over  the  estimates,   Lstimates- 
with  its  control  over  expenditure  after  the  appropriations 
have  been  voted  by  Parliament.     The  control  over  the  esti- 
mates has  been  discussed  in  the   preceding  chapter.      It  is 
only  necessary  here  to  repeat  that  such  a  control  is  by  no 
means  absolute,  because  any  important  question  of  expendi- 
ture becomes  a  question  of  policy  to  be  decided,  in  case  of 
disagreement,  by  the  Prime  Minister  or  the  cabinet;  and  to 
point  out  that  the  departments  supported  by  their  political 
chiefs  are  usually  too  strong  for  the  Treasury  to  resist.3 

1  For  the  history  of  this  matter,  see  Todd,  II.,  31-42. 

2  See,  for  a  history  of  the  question,  Todd,  II.,  27-43,  543-45,  and  for  recent 
collections  of  evidence  the  2d  and  3d  Reps,  of  Com.  on  Civil  Serv.  Exp., 
Com.  Papers,  1873,  VII.,  391,  415;  2d  Hep.  of  Com.  on  Civil  Estabs., 
Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1;  Hep.  of  Com.  on  War  Office  Organisation, 
Com.  Papers,  1901,  XL.,  179;  Reps,  of  Com.  on  Nat.  Expenditure,  Com. 
Papers,  1902,  VII.,  15;    1903,  VII.,  483. 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Civil  Estah.,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1.  Evid.  of 
Sir  R.  E.  W'elhy,  Perm.  Sec.  of  Treas.,  Qs.  10704-9,  10713,  10721-2(5,  10706. 


ture. 


124  THE  GOVERNMENT   OF  ENGLAND 

Control  over  It  might  be  supposed  that  after  the  appropriations  had 
^)endi~  been  voted  the  departments  would  be  free  in  expending  them, 
subject  only  to  their  responsibility  to  Parliament;  but  this 
is  not  altogether  true.  In  the  first  place  a  statute  some- 
times requires  that  the  expenses  of  a  department  shall  be 
sanctioned  by  the  Treasury.1  Then  it  is  not  infrequently 
provided  that  the  salaries  shall  be  fixed  by  the  Treasury, 
or  that  alterations  in  the  establishment  shall  require  its 
consent.  Moreover,  the  salaries  of  certain  grades  of  clerks 
are  regulated  by  Orders  in  Council,2  which  are  changed  only 
on  the  advice  of  the  Treasury.  Apart,  however,  from  stat- 
utes and  Orders  in  Council  there  is  a  general  customary 
principle  forbidding  any  increase  in  the  civil  establishment 
of  a  department,  —  that  is,  any  increase  in  the  number 
or  salary  of  permanent  officials,  —  without  the  approval  of 
the  Treasury ;  and  this  although  the  appropriations  would 
not  be  exceeded.3 

Over  certain  departments  the  control  is  even  more  exten- 
sive, for  not  only  do  the  contracts  made  by  the  Post  Office 
require  its  approval,  but  contracts  entered  into  by  the  Board 
of  Works  are  also  the  subject  of  discussion  between  the 
Treasury  and  the  First  Commissioner.4  In  the  case  of  the 
Army  and  Navy  the  fact  that  the  Treasury  can  authorise  a 

1  This  was  true,  for  example,  of  the  Act  creating  the  Board  of  Agriculture 
(52-53,  Vic,  c.  30,  §  5). 

2  For  clerks  of  the  second  division  by  Order  in  Council,  March  21,  1890, 
§§  3-6,  Com.  Papers,  1890,  LVIII.,  167.  Positions  of  higher  grade  are  regu- 
lated "by  the  heads  of  the  departments  to  which  they  belong,  subject  to 
approval  by  the  Commissioners  of  the  Treasury;"  Order  in  Council,  Feb. 
12,  1876,  §  3,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1,  p.  571;  but  no  vacancies  in 
these  positions  can  be  filled  or  new  appointments  made  until  the  Treasury 
is  satisfied  that  the  number  of  officers  in  the  department  with  salaries  higher 
than  those  of  the  second  division  will  not  be  excessive;  Order  in  Council, 
Nov.  29,  1898,  §  4,  following  Order  of  Feb.  12,  1876,  §  4.  The  evidence 
before  the  Committees  of  1873  and  1888  was,  however,  conclusive  on  the 
impotence  of  the  Treasury  in  forcing  reductions,  whatever  its  actual  power 
might  be  in  preventing  an  increase  of  establishment. 

3  Cf.  3d  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Serv.  Exp.,  Com.  Papers,  1873,  VII.,  415, 
Qs.  474,  4902-03;  2d  Rep.,  Com.  on  Civil  Estabs.,  Com.  Papers,  1888, 
XXVII.,  1,  pp.  xi,  xii,  and  Qs.  10957,  14090-91,14918-20,  18088;  Rep. 
Com.  on   Nat.   Exp.,  Com.   Papers,   1902,   VII.,   15,  Q.    1429. 

4  Rep.  Com.  on  Nat.  Exp.,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  15,  Q.  1425. 


THE  TREASURY  125 

transfer  of  the  surplus  under  one  vote  to  cover  a  deficiency  Transfer  of 
under  another  gives  it  a  certain  authority;  and,  indeed,  aSurPlus- 
its  sanction  is  to  some  extent  sought  even  for  transfers 
between  subheads  of  the  same  vote.  This  last  is,  of  course, 
a  matter  of  custom  rather  than  of  law,  and  practice  differs 
in  the  two  services.  The  Admiralty,  which  always  plays  the 
part  of  the  good  boy,  comes  very  frequently  to  the  Treasury  for 
permission  to  make  transfers  between  subheads  before  it  acts ; 
while  the  Army,  save  in  exceptional  cases,  comes  only  at 
the  end  of  the  year  for  a  formal  approval.1  The  exceptional 
cases  are,  however,  numerous.  They  sometimes  extend 
even  to  separate  items,  and  are  regulated  by  a  code  of  rules 
made  by  the  Treasury  and  the  department.2  Every  excess, 
for  example,  of  a  certain  size  in  an  item  for  a  new  building, 
the  payment  of  any  excess  to  a  contractor,  the  discharge  of 
a  loss,  or  the  insertion  of  a  new  item,  require  the  sanction 
of  the  Treasury ;  and  in  fact  the  Appropriation  Accounts 
of  the  Army  and  Navy  are  followed  by  many  pages  of  cor- 
respondence on  matters  of  this  kind  between  the  Treasury 
and  the  department.  In  the  case  of  the  civil  services, 
where  the  Treasury  has  no  authority  to  sanction  transfers 
between  votes,  the  system  is  less  elaborate  and  the  corre- 
spondence is  not  printed  in  full.  Still  there  are  frequent 
references  in  the  accounts  to  Treasury  letters  sanctioning 
expenditures  under  subheads  or  items,  especially  in  relation 
to  such  matters  as  salaries,  the  purchase  of  land,  large 
excesses  over  estimates  for  construction,  the  abandonment 
of  claims,  and  unforeseen  expenditures.3 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  War  Office  Org.,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XL.,  179,  Qs. 
3038-41.  An  excess  on  the  subheads  for  food  and  forage,  for  example, 
would  be  met  as  a  matter  of  course  by  a  saving  on  fuel  or  rents.  Ibid., 
p.  42.5. 

2  Memoranda  on  Treasury  control  by  F.  T.  Marzials,  Accountant  Gen- 
eral of  the  Army,  Ibid.,  pp.  424-26;  and  by  Robert  Chalmers,  Rep.  Com. 
on  Nat.  Exp.,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII..  l.">,  App.  3. 

3  The  control  of  the  Treasury  over  expenditure  connected  with  the  courts 
is  less  than  it  is  in  the  case  of  other  brandies  of  the  civil  service;  but  the 
salaries  of  the  clerks  are  fixed  as  a  rule  by  an  understanding  between  the 
judges  and  the  Treasury.  2d  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Serv.  Exp.,  Com.  Papers, 
1873,  VII.,  391,  pp.  vi-viii. 


126 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Effect  of 
Treasury 
Control. 


The  Or- 
ganisation 
of  the  Treas- 
ury. 


The  control  by  the  Treasury  is  sometimes  vexatious  in 
small  matters,1  but  it  does  not  seriously  hamper  the  admin- 
istration, or  impair  the  efficiency  of  the  service ; 2  and  while 
it  can  hardly  prevent  an  expenditure  on  which  a  depart- 
ment is  seriously  determined,3  the  very  need  of  consultation 
can  hardly  fail  to  act  as  a  restraint  upon  extravagance.4 

In  addition  to  its  control  over  the  application  of  the  sums 
voted  by  Parliament,  and  its  authority  to  permit  the  use 
of  appropriations  for  purposes  not  contemplated  in  the 
estimates,  the  Treasury  has  a  limited  power  to  open  the 
national  purse  in  case  of  necessity  when  no  grant  has  been 
made  by  Parliament.  For  this  purpose  it  has  three  sources 
of  supply  at  its  disposal :  the  Treasury  Chest  Fund,  limited 
to  £1,000,000,  may  be  used  to  make  temporary  advances  for 
carrying  on  the  public  service,  to  be  repaid  out  of  sums 
afterwards  appropriated ;  the  Civil  Contingencies  Fund, 
limited  to  £120,000,  is  available  on  similar  terms  for  un- 
foreseen contingencies  and  deficiencies ;  and,  finally,  any 
incidental  receipts,  not  granted  by  Parliament  as  appropria- 
tions in  aid,  may  be  used  as  such  under  the  authority  of  a 
Treasury  minute  to  be  laid  before  the  Houses.5 

In  the  remarks  on  the  history  of  the  Treasury  Board, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  last    chapter,   it  was  pointed  out 

1  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Estabs.,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1,  Qs. 
18076,  18088,  19150,  19165,  19171-75,  19178-82.  As  Lord  Farrer,  formerly 
permanent  under-secretary  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  expressed  it,  "  We  can 
cheat  them  in  big  things;  they  may  bully  us  in  little  things."  Ibid.,Q,. 
20,021. 

2  Rep.  of  Com.  on  War  Office  Org.,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XL.,  179,  p.  8; 
Rep.  of  Com.  on  War  in  South  Africa,  Com.  Papers,  1904,  XL.,  1,  p.  143. 

3  Cf.  Sir  R.  E.  Welby,  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Estabs.,  Com.  Papers,  1888, 
XXVII.,   1,  Qs.  20382-83. 

*  The  real  sanction  of  the  control  of  the  Treasury  lies  in  the  support  it 
is  almost  certain  to  receive  from  the  Committee  on  Accounts  of  the  House 
of  Commons.  In  1901,  for  example,  in  a  case  where  the  War  Office,  without 
exceeding  its  total  vote,  but  before  seeking  the  approval  of  the  Treasury, 
paid  to  a  contractor  an  addition  of  £1000  upon  a  contract  for  which  no  item 
appeared  in  the  votes  of  the  year,  the  Committee  of  Accounts  remarked, 
"Your  Committee  deprecate  in  the  strongest  manner  any  diversion  of 
Parliamentary  funds  without  Treasury  sanction."  3d  Rep.  Com.  of  Pub. 
Accounts,  Com.    Papers,   1901,   V.,   13,   pp.   iv-v. 

s  Public  Accounts  and  Charges  Act,  54-55  Vic,  c.  24,  §  2  (3). 


THE  TREASURY  127 

that  the  board  no  longer  meets.  The  Treasury  minutes  are 
still  drawn  up  in  the  name  of  "My  Lords/'  but  this  is  merely 
the  survival  of  a  form,  and  all  the  members  of  the  board, 
except  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  have  ceased  to  take 
part  in  directing  the  financial  administration.  The  three 
junior  lords  have  at  times  some  small  departmental  duties, 
but  their  real  functions  are  to  act  as  assistants  to  the  Par- 
liamentary or  Patronage  Secretary,  who  is  the  chief  govern- 
ment whip  in  the  House  of  Commons.  All  the  four  whips 
receive  salaries  from  the  state  on  the  theory  that  it  is  their 
duty  to  keep  a  House,  or  in  other  words  to  insure  the  pres- 
ence of  a  quorum,  while  the  supplies  are  being  voted.  But 
in  fact  they  are  officers,  not  of  the  state,  but  of  the  party  in 
power,  and  it  is  their  business  to  see  that  whenever  a  vote 
is  taken  in  which  the  ministry  is  interested,  their  partisans 
are  present  in  greater  force  than  those  of  the  Opposition. 
The  relation  of  the  First  Lord  to  the  Treasury  is  anomalous. 
He  is  usually  the  Prime  Minister,  and  as  such  is  supposed  to 
keep  a  general  supervision  upon  all  branches  of  the  admin- 
istration, and  to  act  as  a  sort  of  umpire  between  the  different 
ministers,  and,  therefore,  between  the  Treasury  and  the  other 
departments.  But  whether  he  is  Prime  Minister  or  not  he 
has  a  real  connection  with  the  Treasury.  The  functions  of 
that  office  cover  a  much  wider  field  than  its  name  would 
imply,  including  subjects  of  a  most  miscellaneous  character; 
and  while  the  finances  are  entirely  under  the  charge  of  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  —  who  is,  in  fact,  the  Minister 
of  Finance,  with  the  Financial  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  as 
his  parliamentary  under-secretary,  —  the  First  Lord  may 
be  said,  speaking  very  roughly,  to  be  at  the  head  of  the  out- 
lying departments  which  are  not  concerned  with  financial 
affairs. 

The  Treasury  has  been  described  as  a  superintending  and  The  Rub- 
controlling  office  that  has  properly  no  administrative  func-  onl'"atl' I)e 

"  i        i         «  partmeuts. 

tions ;  '  and  this,  in  a  sense,  is  true,  for  even  in  money  mat- 
ters its  duty  as  an  organised  department  is  financial  direction 

1  Todd,  II.,  545. 


128  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

and  control,  not  the  actual  collection  and  disbursement  of 
the  revenue.  It  prepares  the  budget,  reviewing  the  esti- 
mates submitted  to  it,  and  devising  the  means  of  defraying 
them ;  it  supervises  the  collection  of  the  revenue,  and  keeps 
watch  over  the  expenditure.  In  this  work  the  political 
chiefs  are  assisted  by  a  body  of  clerks,  headed  by  the  per- 
manent under-secretary,  whose  office  is  generally  regarded 
as  the  highest  in  the  permanent  civil  service.  The  offices 
that  have  direct  charge  of  the  collection  of  revenue  have 
separate  organisations  with  distinct  staffs  of  permanent 
officials;  but,  except  for  the  Post  Office,  they  have  no 
political  chiefs  of  their  own,  and  are  in  fact  subordinate 
branches  of  the  Treasury.  The  four  great  offices  of  this 
kind  are  the  Post  Office,  which  has  already  been  described ; 
and  the  departments  of  Customs,  of  Inland  Revenue,  and 
of  Woods,  Forests  and  Land  Revenues,  each  of  which  is 
managed  by  commissioners  who  are  members  of  the  per- 
manent civil  service,  and  do  not  change  with  changes  of 
ministry.1 

The  Treasury  bears  a  similar  relation  to  the  departments 
that  deal  with  purely  fiscal  payments,  the  National  Debt 
Office,  the  Public  Works  Loan  Board,  and  the  Paymaster 
General's    Office,  through  which  almost   all  disbursements 

1  The  organisation  of  all  these  offices,  and  their  relation  to  the  Treasury, 
has  been  described  at  great  length  in  Gneist,  Das  Engliscfie  Verwaltungs- 
recht,"  3  Auf.,  Buch  III.,  Kap.  4. 

The  office  of  Woods,  Forests  and  Land  Revenues  collects  the  revenue 
from  the  Crown  lands,  except  those  belonging  to  the  Duchies  of  Lancaster 
and  Cornwall,  the  revenues  from  these  last  never  having  been  surrendered 
to  the  nation,  and  being  still  enjoyed  by  the  King  and  the  Prince  of  Wales 
respectively.  It  collects  also  some  other  bits  of  hereditary  revenue;  but 
the  total  amount  of  its  receipts  is  small,  and  the  commissioners  are  only 
two  in  number.  The  Customs  Establishment,  which  collects  all  duties 
on  imports  and  exports,  is  managed  by  a  chairman,  a  deputy  chairman 
and  one  other  commissioner;  and,  finally,  the  Inland  Revenue  Office, 
which  collects  the  excises,  and  all  the  other  national  taxes,  is  a  huge 
concern,  and  has  at  its  head  a  chairman,  deputy  chairman  and  two  other 
commissioners.  This  department  was  formed  by  uniting  the  boards  of 
Excise,  of  Taxes  and  of  Stamps;  and  it  has  been  suggested  that  the  depart- 
ments of  Customs  and  of  Inland  Revenue  should  be  combined,  but  that  has 
been  thought  inadvisable.  (Cf.  3d  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Estabs.,  Com 
Papers,  1889,  XXL,  1.) 


THE  TREASURY  129 

are  now  made.  For,  although  the  Paymaster  General  is  a 
political  officer,  he  has  ceased  to  have  any  real  connection 
with  his  department,  and  it  is  administered  under  the 
direction  of  the  Treasury.1 

Besides  the  departments  subordinate  to  the  Treasury,  TheOut- 
there  are  a  number  of  outlying  departments  more  or  less  I^tmenia. 
closely  connected  with  it  which  have  already  been  referred 
to  as  having  nothing  to  do  with  financial  affairs ;  and,  indeed, 
one  may  say  that  in  theory,  at  least,  every  branch  of  the 
public  service  —  except  the  Ecclesiastical  and  Charity 
Commissions 2  —  that  does  not  have  a  political  chief  of  its 
own,  and  is  not  connected  with  some  other  department, 
is  under  the  supervision  of  the  Treasury  and  represented  in 
Parliament  thereby.  But  while  the  commissioners,  or  other 
heads  of  such  offices,  are  as  a  rule  appointed  on  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  First  Lord,  or  of  the  Prime  Minister, 
the  degree  of  control  exercised  over  them  by  the  Treasury 
varies  a  great  deal;  and  in  some  cases  its  responsibility, 
apart  from  regulating  the  amount  of  expenditure,  is  some- 
what illusory.  Several  institutions  in  this  position  are 
intended  to  be  entirely  outside  the  range  of  party  contro- 
versy ;  and  the  boards  of  trustees  of  the  British  Museum, 
the  National  Gallery,  and  the  National  Portrait  Gallery 
habitually    contain    members    of    Parliament    who    would 

1  The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  is  also  ex  officio  Master  of  the  Mint. 

2  The  Ecclesiastical  Commission  manages  the  episcopal  estates  and  other 
church  property,  using  the  revenues  to  pay  the  income  of  the  bishops,  and 
to  promote  the  work  of  the  Established  Church  in  poor  and  populous  places. 
It  is  not  connected  with  any  department  of  the  government,  and  in  fact  is 
rather  an  institution  belonging  to  the  Church  than  a  branch  of  the  public 
service.  The  commissioners  include  all  the  bishops,  several  cabinet  min- 
isters, and  a  number  of  other  laymen,  of  whom  a  couple  sit  in  Parliament. 

The  Charity  Commission,  a  body  possessing  semi-judicial  powers  in  the 
regulation  of  charitable  trusts,  occupies  a  position  more  like  that  of  an  ad- 
ministrative department.  Of  the  four  commissioners  one  is  unpaid,  and 
represents  the  body  in  Parliament. 

These  two  commissions  are,  therefore,  in  the  anomalous  position  of  hav- 
ing been  deliberately  provided  with  spokesmen  in  Parliament,  who  are  not 
responsible  ministers  of  the  Crown.  The  British  Museum,  the  National 
(lallery,  and  the  National  Portrait  Gallery  are  in  this  respect  in  the  same 
situation. 


130  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

never  think  of  resigning  their  posts  by  reason  of  a  change 
of  ministry.  The  principal  outlying  departments  of  the 
Treasury  directly  connected  with  national  administration, 
are :  the  Civil  Service  Commission,  which  examines  the  can- 
didates for  the  various  branches  of  the  civil  service;  the 
Parliamentary  Counsel's  office,  which  drafts  all  the  bills 
introduced  by  the  ministers ;  and  the  stationery  office, 
which  does  all  the   government  printing. 

Throughout  a  great  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
influence  of  the  commercial  classes  was  strong,  the  govern- 
ment was  conducted  on  strict  business  principles,  and  the 
Treasury  as  the  representative  of  those  principles  was 
the  keystone  of  the  administrative  arch,  or  to  change  the 
metaphor,  the  axle  on  which  the  machinery  of  the  state 
revolved.  For  a  long  time,  indeed,  there  was  a  marked 
tendency  to  consider  the  office  of  Chancellor  of  the  Ex- 
chequer as  the  most  important  in  the  cabinet  after  that  of 
the  Prime  Minister,  to  regard  the  person  who  held  it  as 
heir  presumptive  to  the  premiership,  and  to  make  him 
leader  in  the  House  of  Commons  when  his  chief  was  a  peer. 
But  with  the  waning  desire  for  economy,  and  the  growth 
of  other  interests,  the  Treasury  has  to  some  extent  lost  its 
predominant  position.  A  symptom  of  this  may  be  seen  in 
the  fact  that  during  the  last  dozen  years  of  Lord  Salis- 
bury's administrations,  the  Commons  were  led,  not  by  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  but  by  a  First  Lord  of  the 
Treasury  appointed  for  the  purpose.  The  turning  point 
came  at  the  beginning  of  that  period,  when  Lord  Randolph 
Churchill  in  1886  quarrelled  with  his  colleagues  over  the 
estimates  for  the  Army.  The  occurrence  did  not  produce, 
but  it  did  mark,  a  change  in  the  tone  of  public  opinion  ;  and 
although  the  Treasury  will  no  doubt  maintain  its  control 
over  the  details  of  expenditure,  one  cannot  feel  certain 
that  its  head  will  regain  the  powerful  influence  upon  gen- 
eral or  financial  policy  exerted  thirty  years  ago. 


CHAPTER  VI 

MISCELLANEOUS   OFFICES 

There  is  in  England  no  single  officer  corresponding  to  the  The  Gov- 
minister  of  justice,  or  attorney  general,  in  other  countries,   ^"the* 
some   of  the   duties   performed   by   them   elsewhere   being  Adminis- 
divided  in  England  among  a  number  of  authorities,  while  Law. 
others  are  not  performed  at  all.     The  principal  officers  who 
fill  this  important  gap  are  the  Lord  Chancellor,  the  Law 
Officers  of   the  Crown,  and  the  Director  of   Public  Prose- 
cutions. 

The  greatest  political  dignitary  in  the  British  government,  The  Lord 
the  one  endowed  by  law  with  the  most  exalted  and  most  Chancellor- 
diverse  functions,  the  only  great  officer  of  state  who  has 
retained  his  ancient  rights,  the  man  who  defies  the  doctrine 
of  the  separation  of  powers  more  than  any  other  personage 
on  earth,  is  the  Lord  Chancellor.  Apart  from  his  duties 
as  a  judge,  as  the  presiding  officer  of  the  House  of  Lords, 
and  as  a  member  of  the  cabinet,  all  of  which  have  been  or 
will  be  described  in  other  places,  he  has  many  powers  of  a 
miscellaneous  character  connected  for  the  most  part  with  the 
administration  of  the  law.1  He  is,  for  example,  at  the  head 
of  the  Crown  Office  in  Chancery.  This,  as  the  place  where 
the  Great  Seal  is  affixed,  is  legally  and  formally,  although  not 
politically,  important.  The  Commissioners  in  Lunacy,  also, 
report  to  him.     The  regulations  relating  to  public  prosecu- 

1  He  has  some  powers  that  have  no  relation  to  the  law,  such  as  the 
appointment  to  a  large  number  of  Crown  livings;  and  in  this  connection  it 
may  be  noted  that  the  offices  of  Lord  Chancellor  of  Great  Britain  and 
Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland  are  the  only  ones  that  cannot  be  held  by  Ro- 
man Catholics.  The  subject  is  not  free  from  doubt.  See  Anson,  II.,  1.">S,  and 
the  debate  in  1891,  Hans.,  3  Ser.  CCCXLIX.,  1733  et  seq.  On  that  occasion 
the  House  of  Commons  refused  to  remove  any  disability  that   might   exist. 

131 


132  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

tions  require  his  approval,  and  the  control  of  the  Land 
Registry  Office  devolves  mainly  upon  him.  Almost  all  the 
judicial  patronage,  moreover,  is  in  his  hands,  for  he  is  con- 
sulted about  the  highest  posts,  the  selection  of  the  puisne 
judges  of  the  High  Court  is  made  on  his  recommendation, 
and  he  appoints  and  removes  the  county  court  judges  and 
justices  of  the  peace.1 

Although  the  Lord  Chancellor  is  a  party  leader,  and  is  at 
once  an  active  member  of  the  legislative,  the  executive  and 
the  judicial  branches  of  the  government,  the  evils  that  might 
be  supposed  to  result  from  such  a  combination  of  powers  in 
the  same  hands  do  not  in  fact  appear.  He  might,  indeed, 
when  sitting  in  the  Judicial  Committee,  or  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  be  called  upon  to  construe  a  statute  which  he  had 
a  share  in  enacting,  but  this  does  no  great  harm.  The  really 
serious  matter  is  a  confusion  of  the  executive  and  judicial 
powers,  the  sitting  in  judgment  by  a  political  officer  upon  a 
question  on  which  he  has  acted,  or  which  may  affect  his 
future  action,  in  an  administrative  capacity.  But  since 
the  Chancellor  never  holds  court  alone  at  the  present  day, 
such  a  question  could  come  before  him  only  in  the  Court  of 
Appeal,  the  House  of  Lords,  or  the  Judicial  Committee, 
where  he  sits  with  other  judges,  who  have  no  connection 
with  the  ministry.  Moreover,  the  Chancellor,  although  the 
legal  member  of  the  cabinet,  is  not  its  sole,  nor  indeed  its 
official,  legal  adviser;  and  the  government  would  never 
think  of  acting  upon  any  doubtful  point  of  law  without 
obtaining  the  opinion  of  the  Law  Officers  of  the  Crown. 
These  gentlemen  hold  no  judicial  position;  and  curiously 
enough,  while  a  part  of  the  ministry,  are  never  in  the 
cabinet. 
The  Law  The  principal  Law  Officers  of  the  Crown  are  the  Attorney 

the  Crown.     General,  and  the  Solicitor  General,  who  is  his  colleague  and 

1  The  list  of  justices  of  the  peace  for  each  county  is  in  practice  drawn  up 
by  the  Lord  Lieutenant,  except  in  Lancashire,  where  it  is  made  by  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Duchy,  and  that  list  is  almost  always  adopted  by  the 
Lord  Chancellor.  No  little  controversy  has,  however,  arisen  of  late  over 
this  subject. 


MISCELLANEOUS  OFFICES  133 

substitute.1  Their  opinion  on  questions  of  law  may  be 
asked  by  the  government,  and  by  any  department,  although 
many  of  the  departments  are  provided  with  permanent  legal 
counsel  of  their  own  whose  advice  is  sufficient  for  all  ordi- 
nary matters.  The  Attorney  and  Solicitor  General  conduct 
personally  a  few  prosecutions  of  unusual  importance,  file 
criminal  informations,  and  appear  in  cases  where  the  rights 
of  the  Crown  are  involved,  or  where  their  intervention  is 
necessary  to  protect  charitable  endowments.  They  defend 
in  Parliament  the  legality  of  the  government's  action,  and 
explain  incomprehensible  legal  points  in  its  measures. 
While  they  are  no  longer  permitted  to  engage  in  private 
practice,  their  salaries  and  fees  are  so  large2  that  these  posts 
are  among  the  great  political  prizes  for  lawyers  who  have 
made  their  mark  in  the  warfare  of  the  House  of  Commons,3 
prizes  the  greater  because,  in  addition  to  the  direct  emolu- 
ments, they  confer  a  presumptive  claim  to  the  very  highest 
places  on  the  bench  that  may  become  vacant  while  the  party 
is  in  power. 

It  has  been  observed  that  the  Law  Officers  of  the  Crown  Public 
conduct  in  person  only   a  few   criminal   cases  of  unusual  Prosecu" 

-i  J  tions  in 

importance.  In  other  countries  the  prosecution  of  offenders  England, 
is  the  affair  of  the  state,  and  is  conducted  in  all  the  courts 
great  and  small  by  public  officers.  This  is  true  in  Scotland 
also,  where  the  matter  is  in  the  hands  of  a  body  of  officers, 
known  as  procurators  fiscal,  with  the  Lord  Advocate  at  their 
head ;  and  even  in  Ireland  a  similar  system  has  developed 
informally  by  the  employment  of  crown  counsel  acting  under 
the  control  of  the  Attorney  General  for  that  kingdom. 
But  in  England  criminal  prosecutions  in  the  vast  majority 
of   cases   are  still,    in   theory    at  least,  conducted  by  pri- 

1  There  are  also  a  Lord  Advocate  and  a  Solicitor  General  for  Scotland, 
and  an  Attorney  General  and  a  Solicitor  General  for  Ireland. 

2  The  salary  of  the  Attorney  General  is  £7000;  that  of  the  Solicitor 
General  £6000;  and  the  fees  in  each  case  amount  to  about  £1000  more. 

3  The  Solicitor  General  for  Scotland,  and  the  Attorney  and  Solicitor 
General  for  Ireland,  although  political  officers  who  change  with  the  ministry, 
are  not  always  in  Parliament. 


134  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

vate  persons.1  Any  one,  whether  a  person  injured  or 
not,  may  prosecute  the  offender.2  As  a  rule  the  examining 
magistrate,  after  committing  the  accused  for  trial,  binds 
some  one  over  to  prosecute  —  either  the  complainant,  the 
person  injured,  a  policeman,  the  magistrate's  own  clerk, 
or  a  solicitor  employed  for  the  purpose.  The  case  is  usually 
conducted  by  the  solicitor  to  the  local  magistrate,  but  the 
person  bound  over  may  employ  his  own  counsel  to  take 
charge  of  it.  The  costs  of  the  trial  are,  however,  at  the 
present  day,  allowed  by  the  court,  and  paid  out  of  the 
national  treasury,  under  regulations  made  by  the  Home 
Secretary. 
The  Director  It  has  always  been  the  habit  for  the  Attorney  General 
of  Public       ^0  conduct  great  state  trials,   cases,  for  example,  of  high 

Prosecu-  ,  , 

tions.  treason ;    and  it  gradually  came  to  be  the  practice  for  the 

legal  officers  attached  to  the  different  departments  to  prose- 
cute in  certain  other  cases,  such  as  offences  against  the 
coinage.  But  about  the  middle  of  the  last  century  there 
arose  a  demand  for  a  general  system  of  state  prosecutions 
under  the  charge  of  a  ministry  of  justice.3  This  movement 
culminated,  or  evaporated,  in  the  Acts  of  1879  and  1884, 4 
whereby  the  Solicitor  to  the  Treasury,  who  is  the  permanent 
legal  adviser  of  that  department,  and  is  also  charged  with 
a  number  of  other  duties  of  a  legal  nature,  was  made  the 
Director  of  Public  Prosecutions.  The  regulations  govern- 
ing his  actions  in  this  capacity  are  made  by  the  Attorney 
General  with  the  approval  of  the  Lord  Chancellor  and  the 
Home  Secretary.  They  provide  in  substance5  that  he  shall 
prosecute  in  all  capital  cases,  in  offences  against  the  coinage, 
cases  of  fraudulent  bankruptcy,  cases  where  he  is  directed 

1  See  the  excellent  chapter  on  prosecution  in  Maitland's  "Justice  and 
Police." 

2  The  prosecution  is,  however,  in  the  name  of  the  King,  and  the  Attorney 
General  can  put  a  stop  to  it  by  nolle  prosequi  if  he  considers  it  vexatious. 

3  In  an  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review  for  March,  1873,  entitled,  "The 
Organisation  of  a  Legal  Department  of  Government,"  Mr.  Bryce  showed 
the  need,  and  sketched  the  outline,  for  such  a  ministry. 

4  42-43  Vic,  c.  22;    47-48  Vic,  c.  58. 

6  Com.  Papers,  1886,  LILT.,  321.  By  an  Act  of  1908  (8  Edw.  VII. ,  c.  3) 
the  office  was  separated  from  that  of  Treasury  Solicitor. 


MISCELLANEOUS  OFFICES  135 

to  do  so  by  the  Attorney  General  or  the  Home  Secretary, 
and  cases  where  such  action  appears  to  him  necessary  in 
the  public  interest.  He  may  employ  counsel  to  conduct 
both  the  cases  that  he  brings,  and  any  other  criminal  pro- 
ceedings before  the  high  courts  where  no  counsel  has  been 
retained ;  and  he  may  also  assist  a  private  prosecutor  by 
authorising  special  expenses  for  evidence  or  counsel.  It  is 
his  duty  to  give  advice  to  the  clerks  of  justices  of  the  peace, 
and  to  police  officers ;  and,  finally,  he  is  in  all  these  matters 
subject  to  the  control  of  the  Attorney  General. 

The  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  makes  to  Parlia- 
ment an  annual  report  of  his  doings,  enlivened  by  narratives 
of  the  most  interesting  cases.  But  in  spite  of  his  activity 
the  vast  bulk  of  the  prosecutions  are  conducted  as  of  old 
under  private  direction ;  for  out  of  the  many  thousands  of 
criminal  cases  tried  every  year,  only  from  three  hundred 
and  fifty  to  five  hundred  are  in  his  charge,  and  the  number 
shows  no  marked  tendency  to  increase. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  justify  the  statement  that  no 
single  officer  exercises  any  considerable  part  of  the  functions 
of  a  minister  of  justice.  Such  duties  are  not  only  divided 
among  a  number  of  persons,  but  scattered  in  small  frag- 
ments among  different  departments.  An  illustration  of 
this  is  furnished  by  the  Return  of  Public  Prosecutions, 
which  is  submitted  to  Parliament  by  the  Home  Secretary, 
and  bears  his  signature  on  the  first  page ;  while  the  return 
itself  is  signed  by  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  and 
dated  from  the  Treasury.  Gneist,  in  his  work  on  the 
English  administrative  system,  portrays  the  Lord  Chan- 
cellor as  the  minister  of  justice  for  civil,  and  the  Home 
Secretary  for  criminal,  matters,1  but  such  a  generalisation 
is  overstrained  and  misleading,  and  it  is  safer  to  assert  that 
when  the  English  bring  confusion  into  any  administrative 
department  they  usually  succeed  in  confounding  utterly 
all  general  principles,  and  making  all  general  statements 
inaccurate. 

1  Englische  Verwaltungsrecht,  II.,  1022-26. 


136  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

The  If   there  is  no  minister  of  justice  in  England,  still  less 

is  there  a  minister  of  religion  such  as  is  commonly  found  in 
countries  that  possess  established  churches.  The  govern- 
ment of  the  Church  of  England  will  be  treated  in  another 
chapter,  and  it  is  only  necessary  here  to  point  out  that 
although  a  strictly  national  institution,  often  deeply  in- 
volved in  political  controversy,  the  Church  is  in  many  ways 
singularly  free  from  the  control  of  the  executive  government. 
It  is,  no  doubt,  regulated  by  laws  that  cannot  be  altered 
without  the  authority  of  Parliament.  Its  organisation,  its 
ritual,  and  its  articles  of  faith  can  be  changed  only  by 
statute.  But  in  administrative  affairs  its  dependence  upon 
the  state  is  very  much  less.  The  King  is,  indeed,  its  su- 
preme head ;  he  virtually  appoints  the  bishops  and  other 
high  dignitaries,  and  his  assent  is  necessary  to  the  exercise 
of  their  limited  powers  by  the  Convocations  of  the  two 
provinces.1  Beyond  this,  however,  the  Crown  does  not  in- 
terfere in  the  government  of  the  Church,  or  the  discipline  of 
its  members,  which  are  left  under  the  charge  of  its  own 
officers.  Proceedings  against  a  clergyman  for  doctrinal 
errors  or  violation  of  the  ritual  can  be  taken  only  with  the 
consent  of  the  bishop,  the  government  having  no  part  in  it ; 
and  although  the  Crown  appoints  a  portion  of  the  members 
of  the  Ecclesiastical  Commission,  which  manages  much  of 
the  Church  property,  the  bishops  form  a  large  majority  of 
the  body,  and  the  commission  itself  is  not  subordinate  to 
any  minister  of  state.  The  only  control,  therefore,  exer- 
cised by  the  cabinet  upon  the  administration  of  the  Church 
is  to  be  found  in  the  restraint  upon  Convocation,  and  in 
the  fact  that  the  responsibility  for  the  selection  of  high 
ecclesiastics  rests  with  the  Prime  Minister,  who,  curiously 
enough,  is  not  necessarily,  and  in  the  last  two  cabinets 
actually  has  not  been,  a  member  of  the  Church  of  England. 
The  Prime  Minister  also  nominates  the  incumbents  of  a 
number  of  large  livings,  while  the  Lord  Chancellor  presents 

1  Without  action  by  Parliament  these  extend  only  to  the  making  of 
canons  binding  on  the  clergy. 


MISCELLANEOUS  OFFICES  137 

to  several  hundred  others  that  happen  to  lie  in  the  gift  of 
the  Crown.1  Except  for  these  things  no  minister  is  re- 
sponsible for  the  conduct  of  the  Church  or  of  its  members. 

The  connection  between  Church  and  State  in  England  is 
thus  a  peculiar  one.  In  some  ways  the  relation  is  very 
close,  but  it  is  rather  legislative  and  judicial  than  adminis- 
trative. The  Church  is  minutely  regulated  by  state  laws, 
the  judge  of  its  principal  tribunal  must  be  confirmed  by  the 
Crown,  and  appeals  lie  to  a  secular  court ; 2  but  it  lives 
upon  its  own  revenues  without  any  grant  from  Parlia- 
ment, and  although  its  highest  officers  are  appointed  by  the 
state,  and  sit  in  the  upper  House  of  Parliament,  yet  once 
appointed,  they,  like  all  the  rest  of  the  clergy,  are  practically 
free  from  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  executive 
government. 

These  are  all  the  public  offices  in  the  English  govern-  Scotland, 
ment  that  it  is  necessary  to  mention.  A  description  of 
the  peculiar  institutions  of  Scotland  and  Ireland  is  not 
within  the  scope  of  this  book,  except  so  far  as  they 
affect  the  central  government.  Until  twenty  years  ago 
the  connection  of  the  government  with  matters  relating 
exclusively  to  Scotland  was  maintained  chiefly  through 
the  Home  Office,  but  the  Lord  Advocate  was  virtually  the 
parliamentary  under-secretary  for  Scotch  business,  and 
took  entire  charge  of  it,  unless  his  chief  was  a  Scotch- 
man, and  cared  to  assert  himself.  In  1885  a  Secretary  for 
Scotland  was  created,  one  might  perhaps  say  revived,  and 
to  him  were  intrusted  for  that  kingdom  duties  correspond- 
ing to  those  discharged  in  England  by  the  Home  Office,  the 
Local  Government  Board  and  the  Board  of  Education.  In 
fact  he  may  be  said  to  be  the  general  representative  for 

1  All  Crown  livings  with  loss  than  £20  of  yearly  revenue  are  in  the  gift 
of  the  Lord  Chancellor,  Hans.,  3  Ser.  CLXIX.,  1919,  and  so  are  many  livings 
of  considerable  size.  Flans.,  3  Ser.  CLXX.,  131.  The  Chancellor  of  the 
Duchy  of  Lancaster  nominates  to  Crown  livings  belonging  to  the  Duchy,  and 
the  Home  Secretary  to  those  in  the  Channel  Islands  and  the  Isle  of  Man. 
Hans.,  3  Ser.  CCCXLIX.,   174f>-46. 

2  The  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council. 


138         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Scotch  purposes  of  all  the  various  civil  departments  of  state ; 
and  in  particular  he  is  at  the  head  of  the  Scotch  Local  Gov- 
ernment Board  and  the  Scotch  Education  Department. 
He  is  not  one  of  the  secretaries  of  state  and  receives  a 
much  smaller  salary  than  they  do,  but  he  is  a  member  of 
the  ministry,  usually,  though  not  invariably,  with  a  seat 
in  the  cabinet,  and  he  is  always  a  member  of  one  or  the 
other  House  of  Parliament. 

The  contrast  between  the  relations  of  England  to  Scotland 
and  to  Ireland  is  striking.  By  the  Act  of  Union  of  1707 
England  and  Scotland  became  one  state,  with  a  common 
Parliament  and  a  common  executive  government,  but 
political  differences  have  not  been  obliterated.  The  Act 
of  Union  preserved  the  ecclesiastical  and  legal  institutions 
of  Scotland ;  and  at  the  present  day  she  has  her  own  estab- 
lished church,  which  is  Presb}rterian ;  her  own  system  of 
education,  which  is  quite  different  from  the  English ;  and 
her  own  system  of  law,  based  upon  the  Civil  not  the  Common 
Law,  and  adorned  by  a  nomenclature  so  disfigured  as  to 
pass  for  her  own.  With  such  differences  as  these  it  has  been 
not  uncommon  for  Parliament,  even  where  the  same  legis- 
lative principles  were  to  be  applied  on  both  sides  of  the 
Tweed,  to  enact  them  in  separate  statutes,  each  adapted  to 
the  institutions  of  the  country  in  which  it  is  to  operate. 
Socially,  also,  the  fusion  has  not  been  complete.  Every 
Scotchman  is  an  Englishman,  but  an  Englishman  is  not  a 
Scotchman.  The  Scotch  regard  themselves  as  an  elect  race 
who  are  entitled  to  all  the  rights  of  Englishmen  and  to  their 
own  privileges  besides.  All  English  offices  ought  to  be  open 
to  them,  but  Scotch  posts  are  the  natural  heritage  of  the 
Scots.  They  take  part  freely  in  the  debates  on  legislation 
affecting  England  alone,  but  in  their  opinion  acts  confined  to 
Scotland  ought  to  be,  and  in  fact  they  are  in  the  main,  gov- 
erned by  the  opinion  of  the  Scotch  members.  Such  a  con- 
dition is  due  partly  to  the  fact  that  Scotch  institutions  and 
ideas  are  sufficiently  distinct  from  those  of  England  to  re- 
quire separate  treatment,  and  not  different  enough  to  excite 


MISCELLANEOUS  OFFICES  139 

repugnance.  It  is  due  in  part  also  to  the  fact  that  the 
Scotch  are  both  a  homogeneous  and  a  practical  people,  so 
that  all  classes  can  unite  in  common  opinions  about  religion, 
politics  and  social  justice.  The  result  is  that  Scotland  is 
governed  by  Scotchmen  in  accordance  with  Scotch  ideas, 
while  Ireland  has  been  governed  by  Englishmen,  and 
until  recently,  in  accordance  with  English  ideas. 

The  Act  of  Union  with  Ireland  in  1801  abolished  the  Irish  Ireland. 
Parliament,  and  vested  the  whole  legislative  power  for  the 
United  Kingdom  in  the  joint  Parliament  at  Westminster; 
but  the  executive  government  for  Ireland  was  left  at  Dublin. 
It  is  conducted  in  the  name  of  the  Lord  Lieutenant  as 
the  representative  of  the  Crown.1  The  work  is  nominally 
done  by  him  in  his  Privy  Council,  subject  to  such  instructions 
as  may  be  sent  to  him  by  the  English  government  through 
the  Home  Secretary.  In  practice,  however,  matters  have 
worked  out  very  differently,  for  the  administration  of  Ireland 
has  been  far  too  important  to  rest  under  the  wing  of  the  Home 
Office.  The  Lord  Lieutenant  is  always  a  great  nobleman, 
and  he  is  expected  to  keep  up  a  vice-regal  state,  sometimes 
at  an  expense  exceeding  his  enormous  salary  of  £20,000  a 
year ;  but  he  is  not  ordinarily  the  real  head  of  the  Irish 
Office.  Since  18G8  he  has  been  a  member  of  the  cabinet 
less  than  eleven  years,  whereas  his  Chief  Secretary  has 
been  in  the  cabinet  during  the  whole  of  that  period, 
except  from  1882  to  1885,  and  for  three  other  intervals 
that  were  very  brief.  Moreover,  the  Chief  Secretary  is 
always  a  member  of  the  House  of  Commons,  where  he  must 
defend  the  administration  of  Ireland  against  the  attacks 
of  the  Irish  members,  and  often  of  the  English  Opposition 
also.  Thus  it  has  come  about  that  the  Chief  Secretary 
habitually  plays  the  part  of  minister  for  Ireland,  and  is 
practically  the  ruler  of  the  country.  He  is  at  the  head  of 
the    Irish    Local    Government    Board,    Congested    Districts 

1  The  provisions  of  the  Test  Act  still  apply  to  this  office,  so  that  the 
Lord  Lieutenant  must  necessarily  he  of  ;t  faith  different  from  that  of  the 
large  majority  of  the  people  he  is  appointed  to  rule. 


140         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Board  and  Department  of  Agriculture  and  Technical 
Instruction,  and  in  general  he  is  held  responsible  for  all 
administration  of  a  political  character,  except  in  the  case 
of  the  revenue  and  the  Irish  Board  of  Works,  which  are 
under  the  direct  control  of  the  Treasury.1  He  possesses, 
indeed,  not  only  the  authority  vested  in  a  number  of  min- 
isters in  England,  but  also  powers  not  conferred  upon  them 
at  all.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  time  since  the  Union 
in  1801,  Ireland  has  been  subject  to  a  long  series  of  coercion 
acts,  temporary  in  duration,  but  renewed  at  short  intervals 
under  different  names.2  The  provisions  have  varied,  but 
the  object  has  always  been  to  arm  the  Irish  government 
with  extraordinary  and  arbitrary  powers  for  the  suppression 
of  disorder.  Moreover,  the  police  of  Ireland,  instead  of 
being,  as  in  England  and  Scotland,  under  the  control  of  the 
local  authorities,  is  under  the  direct  orders  of  Dublin  Castle. 
This  force,  the  Royal  Irish  Constabulary,  contains  over 
twelve  thousand  men,  a  number  twice  as  large  in  propor- 
tion to  the  population  as  that  of  the  police  in  Great  Britain. 
Causes  of  The  administration  of  Ireland  has  been  the  conspicuous 

ment°Vern"  fan"ure  °f  the  English  government.  Its  history  for  a  century 
has  been  a  long  tale  of  expedients,  palliations  and  concessions, 
which  have  never  availed  to  secure  either  permanent  good 
order  or  the  contentment  and  loyalty  of  the  inhabitants. 
Each  step  has  been  taken,  not  of  foresight,  but  under  pres- 
sure. The  repressive  measures  have  been  avowedly  tem- 
porary, devised  to  meet  an  emergency,  not  part  of  a  per- 
manent policy ;  while  concessions,  which  if  granted  earlier 
might  have  had  more  effect,  have  only  come  when  attention 
to  the  matter  has  been  compelled  by  signs  of  widespread 
and  grievous  discontent.     Catholic  emancipation  was  vir- 

1  Public  non-technical  education  is  directed  by  the  Commissioners  of 
Irish  National  Education,  and  the  Board  of  Intermediate  Education. 
These  boards  are  not  political,  but  the  members,  who  must  be  partly  Protes- 
tant and  partly  Roman  Catholic,  are  appointed  by  the  Lord  Lieutenant,  and 
the  Chief  .Secretary  has  a  certain  measure  of  control  over  them. 

2  The  last  of  them,  the  Crimes  Act  of  18S7,  is  a  permanent  statute,  but 
its  provisions  come  into  force  only  on  a  proclamation  by  the  Lord  Lieuten- 
ant, which  is  revocable  at  any  time. 


MISCELLANEOUS  OFFICES  141 

tually  won  by  the  Clare  election ;  disestablishment  of  the 
Anglican  Church  was  hastened  by  the  Fenian  movement ;  the 
Home  Rule  Bill  followed  the  growth  of  the  Irish  parliamen- 
tary party,  culminating  in  Parnell's  hold  upon  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  House  of  Commons;  and  the  land  laws  have 
resulted  from  agrarian  agitation.  It  has  been  said  that  the 
same  thing  is  true  of  English  reforms,  that  Parliament  sel- 
dom gives  redress  until  a  wrong  has  been  brought  forcibly  to 
its  notice,  and  this  is  no  doubt  a  natural  if  not  an  inevitable 
result  of  the  parliamentary  form  of  government.  It  is  a 
part  of  the  general  tendency  to  treat  symptoms  rather  than 
causes,  to  which  we  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  again. 
But  while  Parliament,  now  that  all  classes  are  represented 
there,  is  certain  to  be  made  aware  of  an  English  grievance 
long  before  it  has  become  intolerable,  it  is  by  no  means  so 
keenly  sensitive  to  an  Irish  one.  The  fact  is  that  Irish 
problems  lie  beyond  the  experience  of  the  English  member 
and  his  constituents.  Being  unable  to  distinguish  readily 
a  real  grievance  from  an  unreasonable  demand,  he  does  not 
heed  it  until  he  is  obliged  to  ;  and  the  cabinet,  with  its  hands 
already  full,  is  not  inclined  to  burn  its  fingers  with  matters 
in  which  the  House  is  not  deeply  or  generally  interested. 
All  this  is  merely  one  of  many  illustrations  of  the  truth  that 
parliamentary  government  can  work  well  only  so  far  as  the 
nation  itself  is  fairly  homogeneous  in  its  political  aspirations. 

But  if  the  parliamentary  system  has  proved  an  instru-  Difficulty 
ment  ill-fitted  for  ruling  Ireland,  it  is  also  true  that  the  prob-  °f  the  Prob" 
lem  has  been  one  of  extreme  difficulty.  English  statesmen 
might  have  repeated  what  Lord  Durham  said  of  Canada 
in  his  famous  report  :  "I  expected  to  find  a  contest  between 
a  government  and  a  people.  I  found  two  nations  warring 
in  the  bosom  of  a  single  state."  '  For  centuries  Ireland  has 
remained  a  conquered  land  without  a  thorough  fusion  of  the 
victors  and  the  vanquished;  the  native  stock  has  been 
subjected  without  being  assimilated,  and  the  difference  of 
race  has  been  intensified  by  a  difference  of  creed.  The 
1  Com.  Papers,  1839,  XVII.,  1,  p.  8. 


142         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Celt  still  looks  upon  his  Saxon  landlord,  and  upon  the 
Orangemen  in  Ulster,  as  aliens,  and  upon  the  constabulary 
as  the  garrison  of  a  foreign  power.  This  has  not  only  made 
the  management  of  Ireland  an  exceedingly  hard  thing  for 
an  English  government  to  carry  on,  but  it  also  stands  in  the 
way  of  any  other  solution  of  the  problem.  To  allow  the 
Irish  to  govern  themselves  means  putting  the  under  dog  on 
top  and  the  upper  dog  underneath.  The  difficulty  has  been 
further  increased  by  a  deep-seated  divergence  in  the  con- 
ceptions of  law  and  justice.  Unlike  Scotland,  Ireland  has 
the  English  system  of  jurisprudence.  Her  courts  are  mod- 
elled on  those  at  Westminster,  and  administer  the  English 
Common  Law,  while  most  of  the  statutes  affecting  civil  rights 
are  the  same.  But,  as  men  have  often  pointed  out,  there 
are  in  times  of  agitation  two  laws,  and  two  governments, 
in  the  country ;  on  one  side  the  English  law,  administered 
by  the  English  government  through  its  officials,  and  on  the 
other  a  hostile  system  resting  upon  very  different  principles, 
and  applied  by  an  extra-legal  political  organisation,  but  in 
fact  more  vigorously  enforced  than  the  first,  and  often  more 
in  harmony  with  the  popular  sense  of  justice. 
The  Land  The  divergence  between  the  legal  conceptions  of  the 
Question.  English  and  Irish  is  most  marked  in  the  case  of  land.  Ac- 
cording to  the  ideas  of  Englishmen,  and  of  Irish  landlords, 
the  land  belongs  to  the  owner,  and  apart  from  special 
statutory  provisions,  the  tenant  has  only  a  contractual 
right  of  possession,  during  the  continuance,  and  subject  to 
the  terms,  of  his  contract.  But  the  tenants  feel  that, 
subject  to  somewhat  indefinite  duties  towards  the  landlord 
in  the  way  of  rent,  they  have  rights  in  the  land,  of  which 
their  forbears  were  robbed,  and  which  they  have  reclaimed 
from  the  waste.1  Such  a  difference  is  fundamental,  and  can- 
not be  adjusted  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  parties.  People 
speak  of  the  hunger  of  the  Irish  for  land,  as  if  that  were 
the  cause  of  the  difficulty,  but  the  Irishman  has  no  general 

1  The  fact  that  improvements  have  been  generally  made  by  the  landlord 
in  England,  and  by  the  tenant  in  Ireland,  has  much  to  do  with  this  feeling. 


MISCELLANEOUS  OFFICES  143 

land-hunger.  When  he  has  emigrated  to  America,  instead 
of  going,  like  the  Swede,  to  the  great  open  prairies  where  any 
industrious  man  can  easily  own  a  farm,  he  has  settled,  like 
the  landless  Hebrew,  in  the  great  cities.  What  the  Irish 
want  is  Irish  land,  and  to  this  they  think  they  have  a  right. 
Various  remedies  for  solving  the  relation  of  landlord  and 
tenant  have  been  tried.  First  came  the  Act  of  I860,  which 
based  that  relation  strictly  upon  contract,  though  restrain- 
ing to  some  extent  its  enforcement  by  summary  eviction. 
Ten  years  later  the  Act  of  1870  proceeded  upon  quite  a 
different  principle,  for  it  extended  the  Ulster  tenant-right 
over  the  whole  country,  giving  to  the  tenant  a  salable  prop- 
erty in  his  holding.  It  granted,  even  to  a  tenant  from 
year  to  year,  a  claim  against  his  landlord  for  disturbance ; 
and  it  conferred  a  right  to  compensation  for  past  as  well  as 
future  improvements.  But  these  provisions  did  not  set 
the  questions  at  rest.  Later  followed  in  1881  the  judicial 
reduction  of  rents,  —  the  fixing  by  public  authority  of  fair 
rents  as  they  were  called.  But  here  trouble  arose  on  both 
sides.  If  the  landlord's  views  were  right,  and  the  land  be- 
longed absolutely  to  him,  it  was  clearly  unjust  to  deprive 
him  of  its  market  value  in  rent,  and  he  was  entitled  to  feel 
that  the  government  was  giving  away  his  property  to  smooth 
its  own  political  difficulties.1  On  the  other  hand,  the  fair 
rents  did  not  end  the  matter  for  the  tenant.  The  English, 
deeply  impressed  with  the  sanctity  of  contract,  meant  the 
new  rents  to  be  paid  as  rents  are  paid  in  England ;  but  the 
Irishman,  living  in  what  might  almost  be  called  a  world  of 
status,  and  brought  up  under  a  system  of  rack  rent,  had  far 
less  respect  for  contract,  and  regarded  rents  as  tilings  to 
be  paid  approximately  rather  than  exactly.  The  result 
was  more  friction,  and  a  further  judicial  reduction  in  1887. 
Finally,  after  a  series  of  land-purchase  nets  designed  to 
promote?  peasant  proprietorship,  but  too  limited  in  scope 
to  affect  general  social  conditions,  had  been  tried,  a  number 

1  The  case  for  the  landlords  has  been  very  strongly  .stated  by  Mr.  Lecky 
in  his  "Democracy  and  Liberty,"  I.,  107-212. 


144         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

of  landlords  and  some  of  the  Irish  leaders  held  a  con- 
ference in  1902,  and  virtually  agreed  that  as  both  parties 
claimed  rights  in  the  land,  the  government  should  pay  the 
landlord  for  it  and  transfer  it  to  the  tenant,  an  arrange- 
ment the  more  easy  because  by  that  time  the  landlords' 
interest  had  fallen  greatly  in  value.  The  government 
undertook  to  carry  out  the  plan  by  the  Land  Purchase  Act 
of  1903,  making  not  indeed  an  immediate  gift,  but  a  loan  of 
its  credit,  and  charging  the  tenant  a  low  rent  which  is  ex- 
pected eventually  to  repay  the  advance,  and  leave  him  the 
owner  of  the  land.1  Since  that  time  the  purchase  and  dis- 
tribution of  estates,  under  the  act,  has  been  going  on,  but 
the  process  naturally  takes  time,  and  as  might  be  expected, 
it  has  been  far  more  rapid  in  the  prosperous  than  in  the  poor 
parts  of  the  country.  One  may  hope  that  by  this  means 
the  land  question  will  in  time  be  solved,  but  he  must  have  a 
blind  faith  who  believes  that  with  it  the  Irish  question  will 
disappear. 

A  crude  outline  of  the  land  legislation  has  been  given 
simply  to  show  the  enormous  difficulty  of  governing  a 
country  where  the  legal  conceptions  of  rulers  and  ruled  are 
irreconcilable,  and  yet  that  is  precisely  the  kind  of  obstacle 
that  arises  at  every  step  in  the  Irish  problem. 

1  3  Edw.  VII.,  c.  37.  The  Act  of  1903  was  hailed  with  joy,  but  the 
Irish  members  soon  complained  of  its  administration,  and  on  July  20,  1905, 
they  moved  successfully  to  reduce  by  £100  the  appropriation  for  the 
Land  Commission  as  an  expression  of  dissatisfaction.  Hans.,  Ser.  CXLIX., 
1409-86. 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE   PERMANENT   CIVIL  SERVICE 

The  history  of  the  permanent  civil  service  would  be  one  Sharp  Dis- 
of  the  most  instructive  chapters  in  the  long  story  of  English  twerTpo- 
constitutional  development,  but  unfortunately  it  has  never  lititaI  and 
been  written.     The  nation  has  been  saved  from  a  bureau-  Clli  offi- 
cracy,  such  as  prevails  over  the  greater  part  of  Europe,  cials- 
on  the  one  hand,  and  from  the  American  spoils  system  on 
the  other,  by  the  sharp  distinction  between  political  and  non- 
political  officials.     The  former  are  trained  in  Parliament, 
not   in    administrative    routine.     They   direct    the    general 
policy  of  the  government,  or  at  least  they  have  the  power 
to  direct  it,  are  entirely  responsible  for  it,  and  go  out  of  office 
with  the  cabinet ;   while  the  non-political  officials  remain  at 
their  posts  without  regard  to  party  changes,  are  thoroughly 
familiar  with  the  whole  field  of  administration,  and  carry 
out  in  detail  the  policy  adopted  by  the  ministry  of  the  day. 
The  distinction  has  arisen  gradually  with  the  growth  of  the 
parliamentary  system. 

A  dread  of  the  power  of  the  King  to  control  Parliament,   Exclusion  of 
by  a  distribution  of  offices  and  pensions  among  its  members,      ,  ^>htr 

1  °  '     cal  Oliicials 

gave  rise  to  a  provision,  in  the  Act  of  Settlement  of  1700,  from  Par- 
that  after  the  accession  of  the  House  of  Hanover  no  person 
holding  an  office  or  place  of  profit  under  the  Crown  should  be 
capable  of  sitting  in  the  House  of  Commons.1  But  before 
this  act  took  effect  the  disadvantages  of  excluding  entirely 
from  the  House  the  great  officers  of  state  was  perceived. 
The  provision  was,  therefore,  modified  so  as  to  shut  out 
absolutely    only   the    holders    of    new    offices    created    after 

1  12-13  Will.  III.,  c.  2,  §  'A.      For  a  description  of  earlier  efforts  to  the 
same  end,  see  Todd,  Pari.  (Jovt.  in  England,  II.,  11  1-121. 
l  145 


146         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Oct.  25,  1705,  and  of  certain'  specified  posts  already  ex- 
isting. Members  of  the  House  of  Commons  appointed  to 
other  offices  were  to  lose  their  seats,  but  be  capable  of  re- 
election.1 As  there  were  many  old  offices  the  number  of 
placemen  in  Parliament  continued  large,  and  no  sharp  line 
was  drawn  at  once  between  the  great  officers  of  state  and 
their  subordinates.  But  two  processes  went  on  which  in 
time  rendered  the  distinction  effective.  When  a  new  office  of 
a  political  nature  was  created  it  became  the  habit  to  make 
a  special  statutory  provision  permitting  the  holder  to  sit 
in  the  House  of  Commons;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  place 
bills  were  passed  from  time  to  time  excluding  from  Parlia- 
ment whole  classes  of  officials  of  a  lower  grade.  These 
acts  apply,  for  example,  to  all  the  clerks  in  many  of  the 
government  departments,2  and  together  with  the  provision 
excluding  the  holders  of  all  new  offices  created  since  1705, 
they  cover  a  large  part  of  all  the  officials  under  the  rank  of 
minister.3  The  distinction  between  the  offices  which  are 
and  those  which  are  not  compatible  with  a  seat  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  is  made  complete  by  the  regulations  of  the 
service  itself.  These  cannot  render  void  an  election  to  the 
House  which  is  not  invalid  by  statute.  They  cannot  make 
the  holding  of  office  a  disqualification  for  Parliament,  but 
they  can  make  a  seat  in  Parliament  a  reason  for  the  loss 
of  office.  They  can  and  do  provide  that  if  any  civil  servant 
intends  to  be  a  candidate  he  must  resign  his  office  when  he 
first  issues  his  address  to  the  electors.4 

1  4  Anne,  c.  8,  and  6  Anne,  c.  7,  §§  25,  26.  By  §  28  of  this  act  officers 
in  the  Army  and  Navy  are  exempted  from  its  operation.  They  may  sit  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  and  they  do  so  in  considerable  numbers,  although 
they  are  as  a  rule  required  to  resign  their  seats  when  given  an  active  com- 
mand. Military  officers  occupy,  indeed,  a  position  quite  different  from  that 
of  other  public  servants,  for  they  not  only  sit  in  Parliament,  and  take  an 
active  part  there  in  the  discussion  of  questions  relating  to  the  service;  but 
they  are  constantly  talking  to  the  public,  a  practice  that  would  not  be 
permitted  for  a  moment  in  the  case  of  civilians  in  government  employ.  The 
statements  in  this  chapter  are,  therefore,  confined  to  the  members  of  the 
civil  service.  2  Cf.  Rogers  on  Elections,  16  Ed.,  II.,  21-24. 

3  For  a  list  of  such  statutes,  see  Anson,  I.,  93-96. 

*  Treasury  Minute  of  Nov.  12,  1884,  Com.  Papers,  1884-1885,  XLV.,  171. 


THE   PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  147 

If  it  were  not  for  three  or  four  ministers,  such  as  the  Irish 
Law  Officers,  who  are  expected  to  get  themselves  elected  to 
Parliament  if  they  can,  but  whose  tenure  of  their  positions 
does  not  depend  upon  their  doing  so,  one  might  say  that 
the  public  service  is  divided  into  political  officers  who  must 
sit  in  Parliament,  and  non-political  officers  who  must  not. 

In  a  popular  government,  based  upon  party,  the  exclusion  Permanent 
of  the  subordinate  civil  servants  from  the  legislature  is  an  t&k^Q 
essential   condition   both   of   their   abstaining   from   active  Active  Part 
politics  and  of  their  permanence  of  tenure.     But  it  does 
not  by  itself  necessarily  involve  either  of  those  results.     This 
is  clear  from  the  example  of  the  United  States,  where  office- 
holders of  all  grades  are  excluded  from  Congress  by  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Constitution,  but  by  no  means  refrain  from 
party  warfare.     The  keeping  out  of  politics,  however,  and 
the  permanence  of  tenure  must,  in  the  long  run,  go  together ; 
for  it  is  manifest  that  office  can  be  held  regardless  of  party 
changes  only  in  case  the  holders  do  not  take  an  active  part  in 
bringing  those  changes  to  pass ;   and  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
they  are  doomed  to  lose  their  places  on  a  defeat  at  the  polls 
of  the  party  in  power,  they  will  certainly  do  their  utmost 
to  avert  such  a  defeat.     In  England  the  abstinence  and  the 
permanence  have  been  attained,  and  it  is  noteworthy  that 
they  are  both  secured  by  the  force  of  opinion  hardening  into 
tradition,  and  not  by  the  sanction  of  law.1     At  one  time, 
indeed,  large  classes  of  public  servants  were  deprived  of  the 
parliamentary  franchise.     An   Act    of    1782,   for   example,2 
withdrew  the  right  to  vote  from  officers  employed  in  collect-  But  are 
ing excises,  customs  and  other  duties,  and  from  postmasters;  "ot  ^'f' 
but    these   disqualifications   were    removed   in    1868. 3     The 

1  Electioneering  by  civil  servants  has  been  the  subject  of  legislation.  An 
Act  of  1710  (0  Anne,  c.  10,  $  11)  rendered  liable  to  line  and  dismissal  any 
post-office  official  who  "shall,  by  Word,  Message,  or  Writing,  or  in  any  other 
Manner  whatsoever,  endeavour  to  persuade  any  Elector  to  give  or  dissuade 
any  Elector  from  giving  his  Vote  for  the  Choice  of  any  Person  ...  to 
serve  in    Parliament."     Cf.    Eaton,   "Civil   Service  in   Great    Britain,"  85. 

2  22  Geo.  III.,  c.  41.      Rogers  on  Elections,  I.,   19G-97. 

3  31-32  Vic,  c.  73.  All  penalties  attaching  to  any  of  their  acts  in  re- 
lation to  elections  were  abolished  by  37-38  Vic,  c  22. 


148         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

police,  also,  were,  by  a  series  of  acts,  deprived  of  the  fran- 
chise in  the  constituencies  where  they  held  office.  Except 
as  regards  Ireland,  however,  these  statutes  were,  in  their 
turn,  repealed  in  1887 ; *  and  the  only  disqualifications  now 
attaching  to  public  officials  relate  to  such  positions  as  those 
of  returning  officers  at  elections.2 

England  enfranchised  her  officials  at  the  very  time  when 
she  was  enlarging  the  suffrage  and  the  number  of  office- 
holders. In  some  other  countries  the  political  danger  of  a 
large  class  of  government  employees  has  been  keenly  felt. 
This  has  been  particularly  true  of  the  new  democracies  in 
Australia  with  their  armies  of  public  servants  on  the  state 
railroads;  and,  indeed,  the  pressure  constantly  brought  to 
bear  in  the  legislature  in  favour  of  this  class  caused  Victoria 
in  1903  to  readjust  her  election  laws.3  The  employees  of 
the  government  have  not  been  disfranchised  altogether,  but 
they  have  been  deprived  of  the  right  to  vote  in  the  regular 
constituencies,  and  have  been  allotted  one  representative  in 
the  legislative  council  and  two  in  the  assembly  to  be  elected 
entirely  by  their  own  class.  They  have,  therefore,  their 
spokesmen  in  the  legislature,  but  they  are  no  longer  able  to 
influence  the  other  members  as  of  old. 

Effect  of  In  England  these  dangers  are  by  no  means  unknown ; 

vl?f"'gthem  k11*  "they  have  not  taken  the  form  of  work  done  by 
civil  servants  for  purely  party  ends.  From  that  evil  the 
country  has  been  almost  wholly  free  ;  for  although  all  office- 
holders, not  directly  connected  with  the  conduct  of  elections, 
have  now  a  legal  right  to  vote,  and  are  quite  at  liberty  to  do 
so,  it  is  a  well-settled  principle  that  those  who  are  non-politi- 
cal—  that  is,  all  who  are  not  ministers — must  not  be 
active  in  party  politics.  They  must  not,  for  example,  work  in 
a  party  organisation,  serve  on  the  committee  of  a  candidate 
for  Parliament,  canvass  in  his  interest,  or  make  speeches 
on  general  politics.  All  this  is  so  thoroughly  recognised  that 
one  rarely  hears  complaints  of  irregular  conduct,   or  even 

'Rogers,   I.,    197-200.  2  Ibid.,  207-08. 

'  Victoria  Constitution  Act,  Com.  Papers,  1903,  XLIV.,  109,  pp.  7-8. 


Votes. 


THE  PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  149 

of  actions  of  a  doubtful  propriety.  In  this  connection  it  is 
worthy  of  note  that  the  revenue  officers  were  disfranchised 
in  1782  at  their  own  request.  At  that  time  the  government 
controlled  through  them  seventy  seats  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  and  Lord  North  sent  them  notice  that  it  would 
go  hard  with  them  if  they  did  not  support  his  party.  His 
opponents  sent  them  a  similar  warning,  and  the  result  was 
that  in  self-protection  they  sent  up  a  strong  petition  asking 
for  exclusion  from  the  franchise.1  The  bill  to  reenfranchise 
them  was  carried  in  1868  against  the  wishes  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  day.2  But  on  that  occasion,  and  in  1874,  when 
the  acts  imposing  penalties  upon  their  taking  an  active  part 
at  elections  were  repealed,  it  was  perfectly  well  understood 
that  they  would  not  be  permitted  to  go  into  party  politics, 
and  that  the  government  was  entitled  to  make  regulations 
on  the  subject.3  Those  regulations  are  still  in  force,4  and 
it  is  only  by  maintaining  them  that  the  civil  servants  can 
continue  to  enjoy  both  permanence  of  tenure  and  the  right 
to  vote. 

The  danger  arising  from  the  votes  of  public  servants  has  Attempts  to 
been  felt  in  a  different  way.     While  the  government  employ-  J^'^'p,^;. 
ees  have  kept  clear  of  party  politics,  they  have  in  some  cases  tion. 
used  their  electoral  rights  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon 
members  of  Parliament  in  favour  of  increasing  their  own  pay 
and  improving  the  conditions  of  their  work.     This  has  been  Tin-  Dock- 
peculiarly  true  of  the  dockyards.     The  members  of  the  half  y  ' 
dozen  boroughs  where  the  state  maintains  great  shops  for 
the  construction  and  repair  of  warships  are  always  urging 
the  interests  of  the  workmen;  and  they  do  it  with  so  little 
regard  to  the  national  finances,  or  to  the  question  whether 
they  are  elected  as  supporters  or  opponents  of  the  ministry, 
that   they   have  become  a  byword  in  Parliament  under  the 
name  of  "  dockyard-members. "  5 

1  Cf.  Huns.,  4  Sor.  LIU.,  1  133-34.  2  Ibid.,  CXCIII.,  389  et  scq. 

3  In  fart  in  1874  the  hill  was  amended  so  as  to  make  this  clear.      Hans., 
3  Ser.  CCXIX.,  797-800.      ['or  1808  see  Hans.,  ii  Sir.  CXCIII.,   lO.VOii. 

4  Cf.   Hans.,  4  S«-r.   XVI.,    1218;     Id  11.,   1131. 

1  Cf.  Courtney,  "  The  Working  Constitution  of  the  Cnited  Kingdom,"  !."» 1 . 


150 


THE   GOVERNMENT    OF   ENGLAND 


Other 
Officials. 


Recent 
Efforts    of 
Postal    Offi- 
cials for 
More  Pay. 


Unfortunately  the  difficulty  has  not  been  confined  to  the 
dockyards.  At  the  time  when  the  revenue  and  post-office 
employees  were  enfranchised,  Disraeli  dreaded  their  use  of 
the  franchise  for  the  purpose  of  raising  their  salaries ; 1  and 
Gladstone  said  he  was  not  afraid  of  government  influence,  or 
of  an  influence  in  favour  of  one  political  party  or  another, 
but  of  class  influence,  "which  in  his  opinion  was  the  great 
reproach  of  the  Reformed  Parliament."  2  These  fears  have 
not  proved  groundless.  As  early  as  1875  it  was  recognised 
that  the  salaries  paid  by  the  government  were  above  the 
market  rate ; 3  and  ever  since  the  officials  in  the  revenue  and 
postal  departments  obtained  the  right  to  vote,  pressure  on 
behalf  of  their  interests  has  been  brought  to  bear  by  them 
upon  members  of  Parliament,  and  by  the  latter  upon  the 
government.  Complaints  of  this  have  been  constant.4 
It  has  been  a  source  of  criticism  that  members  should  have 
attended  meetings  of  civil  servants  held  to  demand  an 
increase  of  pay,5  and  that  they  should  receive  whips  urging 
their  attendance  at  the  House  when  questions  of  this  sort 
are  to  come  up.6  Owing  to  the  concentration  of  govern- 
ment employees  in  London  the  pressure  upon  the  metro- 
politan members  is  particularly  severe. 

For  nearly  a  score  of  years  a  continuous  effort  has  been 
made  in  Parliament  to  secure  the  appointment  of  a  com- 
mittee to  inquire  into  the  pay  of  postal  and  telegraph  em- 

1  Hans.,  3  Ser.  CXCIIL.  393.  2  Ibid.,  397. 

3  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Increased  Cost  of  Tel.  Service,  Com.  Papers,  1875, 
XX.,  643,  p.  5;  1st  Rep.  Civil  Serv.  Inq.  Com.,  Com.  Papers,  1875,  XXIII., 
1,  p.  9.  For  information  and  references  on  the  efforts  of  the  civil  ser- 
vants to  raise  their  pay,  and  on  their  pressure  upon  members  of  Parliament, 
I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  Hugo  Meyer,  who  kindly  showed  me  his  manuscript 
on  "The  Nationalisation  of  the  Telegraphs  in  England." 

4  See,  for  example,  Hans.,  3  Ser.  CCLXV.,  141;  CCLXXI.,  429;  4  Ser. 
XXXIX.,  596-98;  LI.,  351-52,  355;  LIII.,  1107  et  seq.;  LXVL,  1523  et 
seq.;  LXXIL,  119;  LXXXIL,  199  et  seq.;  XCIV.,  1382-83;  CVL,  680; 
CXXI.,  1023;  and  CXXXIX.,  1617,  1618,  1629,  1632.  2d  Rep.  Com. 
on  Civil  Estabs.,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1,  Qs.  17444-47,  17821-28, 
20238;    Rep.  Com.  on  Post  Office,  Com.  Papers,  1S97,  XLIV.,  1,  Q.  11706. 

6  2d  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Estabs.,  Com.  Papers,   1888,  XXVII.,  1,  Qs. 
10562-63,  10742,  10745-49,  17444-47. 
8  Hans.,  3  Ser.  CCCLII.,  870. 


THE   PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  151 

ployees,  and  into  grievances  which  are  said  to  exist  in  the 
service.  The  government  has  in  part  yielded,  in  part  re- 
sisted; but  in  trying  to  prevent  pressure  upon  members 
of  Parliament,  it  took  at  one  time  a  step  that  furnished  a 
fresh  cause  of  complaint.  The  story  of  this  movement 
illustrates  forcibly  the  dangers  of  the  situation.  In  1892 
the  Postmaster  General,  Sir  James  Fergusson,  called  the 
attention  of  the  House  of  Commons  to  a  circular  addressed 
by  an  association  of  telegraph  clerks  to  candidates  at  the 
general  election,  asking  whether  if  elected  they  would  vote 
for  a  committee  to  inquire  into  the  working  of  the  service.1 
He  then  sent  to  the  clerks  an  official  warning  that  it  is  im- 
proper for  government  employees  to  try  to  extract  promises 
from  candidates  with  reference  to  their  pay  or  duties.2 
Nevertheless  two  of  the  clerks,  Clery  and  Cheesman,  who  had 
been  chairman  and  secretary  of  the  meeting  which  had  voted 
to  issue  the  circular,  signed  a  statement  that  the  notice  by 
the  Postmaster  General  "does  not  affect  the  policy  of  the 
Association."  Immediately  after  the  election  these  two 
men  were  dismissed.3  That  became  a  grievance  in  itself, 
and  year  after  year  attempts  were  made  in  Parliament  to 
have  them  reinstated.  Shortly  after  they  had  been  dismissed 
Mr.  Gladstone  came  into  office ;  and  he  made  a  vague 
statement  to  the  effect  that  the  government  intended  to 
place  no  restraint  upon  the  civil  servants  beyond  the  rule 
forbidding  them  to  take  an  active  part  in  political  contests.4 
But  it  would  seem  that  Fergusson's  warning  circular  was  not 
cancelled,5  and  certainly  Clery  and  Cheesman  were  not 
taken  back. 

The  motions  for  a  parliamentary  committee   to  inquire  Demand  for 
into  the   conditions  of  the  service  were  kept  up ;    and  in  a  Parha- 

1  J    7  men  tar  y 

1805  the  government  gave  way  so  far  as  to  appoint  a  com-  Committee, 
mission,   composed  mainly  of  officials  drawn  from   various 
departments,  which    reported  in  1897  recommending  some 

1  Hans.,  4  Ser.  V.,  112:5  et  seq.  7  Ibid.,  1536  et  seq. 

1  Ibid.,  VII.,  188-90.  *  Ibid.,  XVI.,  1218. 

5  Ibid.,  LI II.,  1138-39. 


152  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

increases  of  pay  both  in  the  postal  and  in  the  telegraph 
service.  These  were  at  once  adopted,  and  in  fact  further 
concessions  were  made  shortly  afterward,  but  still  the  agita- 
tion did  not  cease.  The  employees  would  be  satisfied  with 
nothing  but  a  parliamentary  committee,  no  doubt  for  the 
same  reason  that  led  the  government  to  refuse  it,  namely  the 
pressure  to  which  members  of  Parliament  were  subject,1 
and  the  additional  force  that  pressure  would  have  if  brought 
to  a  focus  upon  the  persons  selected  to  serve  on  a  committee.2 
Pressure  Year  after  year  grievances  on  one  side,  and  on  the  other 
Bearghtt°  cnarSes  °f  almost  intolerable  pressure  were  repeated.  In 
1898  the  interest  centred  in  a  motion  to  the  effect  that  public 
servants  in  the  Post  Office  were  deprived  of  their  political 
rights.  A  long  debate  took  place  in  which  the  whole  history 
of  the  subject  was  reviewed,3  and  Hanbury,  the  Financial 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  exclaimed,  "We  have  done  away 
with  personal  and  individual  bribery,  but  there  is  a  still 
worse  form  of  bribery,  and  that  is  when  a  man  asks  a  candi- 
date to  buy  his  vote  out  of  the  public  purse."  4  In  1903 
Mr.  Austen  Chamberlain  stated  that  members  had  come  to 
him,  not  from  one  side  of  the  House  alone,  to  seek  from  him, 
in  his  position  as  Postmaster  General,  protection  in  the 
discharge  of  their  public  duties  against  the  pressure  sought 
to  be  put  upon  them  by  the  employees  of  the  Post  Office.5 
lie  consented,  however,  to  appoint  a  commission  of  business 
men  to  advise  him  about  the  wages  of  employees ;  but 
again  there  was  a  protest  against  any  committee  of  inquiry 
not  composed  of  members  of  Parliament.8  The  report  of 
the  commission  was  followed  in  1904  by  a  debate  of  the 
usual  character.7  Finally  in  190G  the  new  Liberal  ministry 
yielded,  and  a  select  committee  was  appointed.8 

1  Hans.,  4  Ser.  CXXL,  1023.  2  Ibid.,  LXVL,  1550. 

3  Ibid.,  LI II.,  1107  et  seq. 

4  Ibid.,  1 138.  In  the  course  of  his  speech  he  pointed  out  that  the  mem- 
bership of  the  trade-unions  in  the  postal  and  telegraph  service  had  grown 
very  much  of  late  years.  But  he  declared  that  they  were  accorded  all  the 
privileges  enjoyed  by  trade-unions  elsewhere. 

6  Ibid.,  CXXL,  1023.  «  Ibid.,  CXXII.,  329,  331,  333. 

7  Ibid.,  CXXXIX.,  1600-36.  8  Ibid.,  CLI1L,  357. 


THE  PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  153 

There  are  now  employed  in  the  postal  and  telegraph  ser- 
vices about  two  hundred  thousand  persons,  who  have  votes 
enough,  when  organised,  to  be  an  important  factor  at  elec- 
tions in  many  constituencies,  and  to  turn  the  scale  in  some  of 
them.  If  their  influence  is  exerted  only  to  raise  wages  in  a 
service  recruited  by  competitive  examination,1  the  evil  is 
not  of  the  first  magnitude ;  but  it  is  not  difficult  to  perceive 
that  such  a  power  might  be  used  in  directions  highly  detri- 
mental to  the  state.  There  is  no  reason  to  expect  the 
pressure  to  grow  less,  and  mutterings  are  sometimes  heard 
about  the  necessity  of  taking  the  franchise  away  from  gov- 
ernment employees.  That  would  be  the  only  effective 
remedy,  and  the  time  may  not  be  far  distant  when  it  will 
have  to  be  considered  seriously. 

As  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see  hereafter,  the  pressure 
in  behalf  of  individuals  is  comparatively  small,  and  it  is 
characteristic  of  modern  English  parliamentary  government 
that  political  influence  should  be  used  to  promote  class 
rather  than  personal  interests. 

Permanence  of  tenure  in  the  English  civil  service,  like  the  Permanence 
abstinence  from  party  politics,  is  secured  by  custom,  not  "[officials 
by  law,  for  the  officials  with  whom  we  are  concerned  here  are 
appointed  during  pleasure,  and  can  legally  be  dismissed  at 
any  time  for  any  cause.  Now,  although  the  removal,  for 
partisan  motives,  of  officials  who  would  be  classed  to-day 
as  permanent  and  non-political,  has  not  been  altogether 
unknown  in  England,  yet  it  was  never  a  general  prac- 
tice. The  reason  that  the  spoils  system  —  that  is,  the 
wholesale  discharge  of  officials  on  a  change  of  party  — 
obtained  no  foothold  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  peculiarly 
exalted  sense,  inherent  in  the  British  character,  that  every 
public  office  is  a  sacred  trust.  That  conception  is  of  com- 
paratively modern  origin ;  for  in  the  eighteenth  century 
the  abuse  of  patronage,  and  even  the  grosser  forms  of  politi- 

1  It  may  be  observed  that  the  use  of  competitive  examinations  was  made 
general  by  the  Act  of  1870,  passed  shortly  after  the  enfranchisement  of 
revenue  officials. 


154 


THE    GOVERNMENT    OF   ENGLAND 


Former 

Party 

Patronage. 


cal  corruption,  were  shamelessly  practised.  It  is  rather  to 
be  sought  in  quite  a  different  sentiment,  the  sentiment  that 
a  man  has  a  vested  interest  in  the  office  that  he  holds. 
This  feeling  is  constantly  giving  rise,  both  in  public  and 
private  affairs,  to  a  demand  for  the  compensation  of  per- 
sons displaced  or  injured  by  a  change  of  methods  which 
seems  strange  to  a  foreigner.1  The  claim  by  publicans 
for  compensation  when  their  licenses  are  not  renewed,  a 
claim  recognised  by  the  Act  of  1904,  is  based  upon  the  same 
sentiment  and  causes  the  traveller  to  inquire  how  any  one 
can,  as  the  result  of  a  license  ostensibly  temporary,  have  a 
vested  right  to  help  other  people  to  get  drunk. 

The  habit  of  discharging  officials  on  party  grounds  never 
having  become  established,  it  was  not  unnatural  that  with 
the  growth  of  the  parliamentary  system  the  line  between 
the  changing  political  chiefs  and  their  permanent  subordi- 
nates should  be  more  and  more  clearly  marked,  and  this 
process  has  gone  on  until  at  the  present  day  the  dismissal 
of  the  latter  on  political  grounds  is  practically  unheard 
of,  either  in  national  or  local  administration. 

While  the  discharge  of  public  servants  on  political  grounds 
never  became  a  settled  custom  in  England,  such  vacancies 
as  occurred  in  the  natural  course  of  events  were  freely  used 
in  former  times  to  confer  favours  on  political  and  personal 
friends,  or  to  reward  party  services.  Such  a  practice  was 
regarded  as  obvious,  and  it  continued  unchecked  until  after 
the  first  Reform  Act.  It  was  particularly  bad  in  Ireland, 
where  Peel,  who  was  Chief  Secretary  from  1812  to  1818, 
took  great  credit  to  himself  for  breaking  up  the  habit  of 
treating  the  Irish  patronage  as  the  perquisite  of  the  leading 


1  The  prevailing  American  sentiment,  on  the  other  hand,  is  expressed  in 
the  Declaration  of  Rights  of  the  Constitution  of  Massachusetts,  adopted  in 
1780,  which  says  (Art.  viii),  "In  order  to  prevent  those  who  are  vested 
witli  authority  from  becoming  oppressors,  the  people  have  a  right  at  such 
periods  and  in  such  manner  as  they  shall  establish  by  their  frame  of  govern- 
ment, to  cau.se  their  public  officers  to  return  to  private  life;  and  to  fill  up 
vacant  places  by  certain  and  regular  elections  and  appointments."  This 
lays  down  the  principle  of  rotation  in  office,  and  although  by  no  means  so 
intended  by  its  framers,  may  be  said  to  be  the  charter  of  the  spoils  system. 


THE  PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  155 

families,  and  for  dispensing  it  on  public  grounds,  that  is, 
using  it  to  secure  political  support  for  the  party  in  power.1 
That  the  patronage  was  used  for  the  same  purpose  in  Eng- 
land at  that  period  may  be  seen  in  the  reports  and  evidence 
laid  before  Parliament  in  1855,  1860  and  1873  after  a  differ- 
ent system  had  begun  to  take  its  place.2  It  was  no  doubt  an 
effective  means  of  procuring  political  service,  and  Lord 
John  Russell  speaks  of  the  Tories  in  1819  as  apparently 
invincible  from  long  possession  of  government  patronage, 
spreading  over  the  Church,  the  Law,  the  Army,  the  Navy, 
and  the  colonies.3  The  support  most  needed  by  the  ministry 
was  that  of  members  of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  they 
received  in  return  places  for  constituents  who  had  been, 
or  might  become,  influential  at  elections.  Thus  it  came 
about  that  the  greater  part  of  the  appointments,  especially 
to  local  offices,  were  made  through  the  members  of 
Parliament.4  The  system  hampered  the  efficiency  of  ad- 
ministration, and  harassed  the  ministers.  V/riting  in 
1829,  the  Duke  of  Wellington  used  words  that  might  have 
been  applied  to  other  countries  at  a  later  time,  —  "The 
whole  system  of  the  patronage  of  the  government,"  he  wrote, 
"is  in  my  opinion  erroneous.  Certain  members  claim  a 
right  to  dispose  of  everything  that  falls  vacant  within  the 
town  or  county  which  they  represent ;  and  this  is  so  much  a 
matter  of  right  that  they  now  claim  the  patronage  whether 
they  support  upon  every  occasion,  or  now  and  then,  or 
when  not  required,  or  entirely  oppose ;   and  in  fact  the  only 

1  Parker,  "  Sir  Robert  Peel,"  I.,  50,  1G0-G2,  222,  269.  At  this  time  the 
permanent  under-secretary  in  Ireland  was  expected  to  take  an  active  part  in 
politics,  for  we  find  Peel  writing  to  him  to  use  every  exertion  to  got  the  Irish 
members  to  support  the  government  on  the  Catholic  question.      Ibid.,  73. 

2  Dorman  B.  Eaton,  "Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain."  Although  not 
always  accurate,  this  is  the  best,  and  indeed  almost  the  sole,  history  of  the 
patronage  system  and  the  gradual  substitution  therefor  of  appointment  by 
examination. 

3  "  Recollections  and  Suggestions,"  33. 

4  Sir  Thomas  Erskine  May,  although  writing  when  this  system  was  pass- 
ing away,  seemed  to  regard  it  as  essential  to  party  government.  Speaking 
of  t he  effects  of  parliamentary  reform  upon  the  state  of  parties,  lie  says, 
"  But  throughout  these  changes,  patronage  has  been  the  mainspring  of  the 
organisation  of  parties."     "('oust.  Hi.^t.  of  England"  (\  Am.  lid.),  IE,  WJ. 


156        THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

question  about  local  patronage  is  whether  it  shall  be  given 
to  the  disposal  of  one  gentleman  or  another."  * 
The  in-  At  last  a  revulsion  of  feeling  took  place.     Between  1834 

o™ExamU  an(l  1841  pass  examinations,  which  discarded  utterly  incom- 
nationa  petent  candidates,  were  established  in  some  of  the  depart- 
ments, and  in  several  cases  even  competitive  examinations 
were  introduced.  But  the  great  impulse  toward  a  new 
method  of  appointment  dates  from  1853,  and  it  came  from 
two  different  quarters.  In  that  year  the  charter  of  the  East 
India  Company  was  renewed,  and  Parliament  was  not  dis- 
posed to  continue  the  privilege  hitherto  enjoyed  by  the 
directors  of  making  appointments  to  Haileybury  —  the 
preparatory  school  for  the  civil  service  in  India.  A  com- 
mission, with  Macaulay  at  its  head,  reported  in  the  following 
year  that  appointments  to  the  Indian  service  ought  to  be 
made  on  the  basis  of  an  open  competitive  examination  of 
a  scholastic  character.  The  plan  was  at  once  adopted, 
Haileybury  was  abandoned,  and  with  some  changes  in  detail, 
the  system  of  examination  recommended  by  the  commission 
has  been  in  operation  ever  since.2 

In  1853,  also,  Sir  Stafford  Northcote  and  Sir  Charles 
Trevelyan,  who  were  selected  by  Mr.  Gladstone  to  inquire 
into  the  condition  of  the  civil  service  in  England,  reported 
in  favour  of  a  system  of  appointment  by  open  competitive 
examination.  The  new  method  met  with  far  more  opposi- 
tion at  home  than  in  India,  and  made  its  way  much  more 
slowly.  Foreseeing  obstacles  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
Lord  Palmerston's  government  determined  to  proceed,  not 
by  legislation,  but  by  executive  order,  resorting  to  Parlia- 
ment only  for  the  necessary  appropriation.  An  Order  in 
Council  was  accordingly  made  on  May  21,  1855, 3  creating  a 
body  of  three  Civil  Service  Commissioners,4  who  were  to 
examine  all  candidates  for  the  junior  positions  in  the  vari- 

1  Parker,  "  Sir  Robert  Peel,"  IT.,  140. 

2  Cf.  Lowell  and  Stephens,  "  Colonial  Civil  Service." 

3  Com.  Papers,  1854-185'),  XLI.,  369. 

*  These  have  since  been  reduced  to  two. 


THE   PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  157 

ous  departments  of  the  civil  service.  The  reform  was  not 
at  the  outset  very  radical,  for  political  nomination  was  not 
abolished,  and  the  examinations  —  not  necessarily  com- 
petitive —  were  to  be  arranged  in  accordance  with  the  de- 
sires of  the  heads  of  the  different  departments.  The  change 
could  progress,  therefore,  only  so  fast  as  the  ministers  in 
charge  of  the  various  state  offices  might  be  convinced  of  its 
value ;  but  from  this  time  the  new  method  gained  favour 
steadily  with  high  administrative  officials,  with  Parliament 
and  with  the  public.  In  1859  x  it  was  enacted  that  (except  for 
appointments  made  directly  by  the  Crown,  and  posts  where 
professional  or  other  peculiar  qualifications  were  required)  no 
person  thereafter  appointed  should,  for  the  purpose  of  super- 
annuation pensions,  be  deemed  to  have  served  in  the  perma- 
nent civil  service  of  the  state  unless  admitted  with  a  certificate 
from  the  Civil  Service  Commissioners.  In  1860  a  parliament- 
ary committee  reported  that  limited  competition  ought  to  su- 
persede mere  pass  examinations,  and  that  open  competition, 
which  does  away  entirely  with  the  privilege  of  nomination, 
was  better  than  either.2  The  committee,  however,  did  not 
think  the  time  ripe  for  taking  this  last  step,  and  the  general 
principle  of  open  competition  was  not  established  until 
June  4,  1870.  An  Order  in  Council  of  that  date,3  which  is  OpenCom- 
still  the  basis  of  the  system  of  examinations,  provides  that  Petltlon- 
(except  for  offices  to  which  the  holder  is  appointed  directly 
by  the  Crown,  situations  filled  by  promotion,  and  positions 
requiring  professional  or  other  peculiar  qualifications,  where 
the  examinations  may  be  wholly  or  partly  dispensed  with) 
no  person  shall  be  employed  in  any  department  of  the  civil 
service  until  he  has  been  tested  by  the  Civil  Service  Com- 
missioners, and  reported  by  them  qualified  to  be  admitted 
on  probation.4     It  provides  further  that  the  appointments 

1  22  Vic,  c  26,  §§  4,  17. 

2  Coin.  Papers,  1860,  IX.,  1. 
5  Ibid.,  1870,  XIX.,  1,  p.  vii. 

«  5§2,  7,  and  Schedule  B.  Cf.  Orders  in  Council,  Aug.  19,  1871,  §  1;  Sept. 
l.">,  1902.  The  Order  of  1870  requires  a  certificate  of  qualification  from  the 
Civil   Service  Commissioners  as  a  condition  of  employment  in  "any  situa- 


158  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

named  in  Schedule  A,  annexed  to  the  Order,  must  be  made 
by  open  competitive  examination ;  and  this  list  has  been 
extended  from  time  to  time  until  .it  covers  the  greater  part 
of  the  positions  where  the  work  does  not  require  peculiar 
qualifications,  or  is  not  of  a  confidential  nature,  or  of  a  dis- 
tinctly inferior  or  manual  character  like  that  of  attendants, 
messengers,  workmen,  etc.1 
a  Test  of  Since  the  general  introduction  of  open  competition,  by 

rather'than  ^-e  Order  in  Council  of  1870,  two  tendencies  have  been  at 
Fitness.  work  which  are  not  unconnected.  The  first  is  towards 
simplification,  by  grouping  positions  that  have  similar 
duties  into  large  classes,  with  a  single  competition  for  each 
class,  and  thus  diminishing  the  number  of  examinations 
for  separate  positions.2  The  second  is  the  tendency  so  to 
examine  the  candidates  as  to  test  their  general  ability  and 
attainments,   and  hence  their  capacity  to  become  useful 

tion  or  appointment  in  any  department  of  the  civil  service,"  not  specially 
excepted  from  the  operation  of  the  Order.  The  exceptions  were  enumerated 
in  Schedule  B,  and  are  those  described  in  the  parenthesis  of  the  sentence  to 
which  this  is  a  note.  The  order  originally  applied,  therefore,  to  all  other 
positions  whatever  their  nature;  but  by  §  8  the  chief  authorities  of  any 
department  were  given  power,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Treasury,  to  add 
to  the  schedules,  or  withdraw  situations  therefrom ;  and  this  power  has  been 
used  to  add  to  Schedule  B,  and  thus  exempt  from  examination  altogether 
a  number  of  positions,  almost  exclusively  menial,  such  as  those  of  mes- 
sengers, porters,  charwomen,  etc.  The  Orders  in  Council  and  Treasury 
Minutes  relating  to  the  civil  service  may  be  found  at  the  end  of  the  Civil 
Service  Year  Book. 

1  Schedule  A  at  first  contained  a  list,  not  of  situations,  but  of  depart- 
ments; so  that  the  system  of  open  competition  applied  to  all  the  positions 
(not  specially  expected)  in  some  departments,  and  to  none  of  those  in  others. 
This  irrational  classification  recurs  constantly  in  the  history  of  the  civil 
service  examinations,  but  in  the  case  of  open  competitions  it  has  been 
changed  under  the  reserved  power  to  modify  Schedule  A.  Clerkships,  and 
other  posts,  in  departments  not  previously  included,  have  been  added  to 
the  schedule;  while  large  classes  of  situations  have  been  withdrawn  there- 
from. These  are,  for  the  most  part,  manual  occupations,  such  as  office 
keepers,  messengers,  porters,  foremen,  artisans,  labourers,  matrons  and 
domestic  servants.  Some  of  them,  as  explained  in  the  preceding  note, 
have  been  exempted  from  examination  altogether,  and  for  the  rest  the  can- 
didates are  nominated  subject  to  a  pass  examination,  or  a  limited  competi- 
tion. The  requirements  in  the  case  of  the  more  important  classes  among 
them  will  be  described  in  a  later  part  of  this  chapter. 

2  Cj.  45  Rep.  Civil  Serv.  Comrs.,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XVIII.,  129,  pp. 
lxxxiii-lxxxvii. 


THE   PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  159 

in  the  positions  assigned  to  them,  rather  than  the  technical 
knowledge  they  possess.1  This  distinction  marks  an  im- 
portant difference  between  the  system  of  civil  service 
examinations  as  it  exists  in  the  United  States,  and  the  form 
which  the  system  has  assumed  in  England.  For  in  the 
United  States  the  object  is  almost  entirely  to  discover  the 
immediate  fitness  of  the  candidates  for  the  work  they  are 
expected  to  do ;  in  England  the  object  in  most  cases  is  to 
measure  what  their  ability  to  do  the  work  will  be  after 
they  have  learned  it.  The  difference  arises  partly  from  the 
fact  that  in  America  the  examinations  were  superimposed 
upon  a  custom  of  rotation  in  office  and  spoils,  while  in 
England  permanence  of  tenure  was  already  the  rule ;  and 
partly  from  the  fact  that  the  system  is  applied  in  America 
mainly  to  positions  requiring  routine  or  clerical  work, 
whereas  in  England  it  affects  also  positions  involving, 
directly  or  prospectively,  a  much  greater  amount  of 
discretion  and  responsibility.  Now,  it  is  clear  that  if  men 
are  to  be  selected  young  for  a  lifelong  career,  especially 
if  that  career  involves  responsible  administrative  work, 
any  acquaintance  with  the  details  of  the  duties  to  be  per- 
formed, and  any  present  fitness  for  the  position,  are  of  far 
less  consequence  than  a  thorough  education,  keen  intel- 
ligence and  capacity  for  development.  Proceeding  upon 
this  assumption,  Macaulay's  commission  on  the  Indian  Civil 
Service  laid  down  two  principles :  first,  that  young  men 
admitted  to  that  service  ought  to  have  the  best  general 
education  England  could  give ;  and,  second,  that  ambitious 
men  should  not  be  led  to  spend  time  in  special  study  which 
would  be  useless  if  they  were  not  successful  in  the  com- 
petition. The  commission  urged,  therefore,  that  the  ex- 
aminations should  be  closely  fitted  to  the  studies  pursued 
in  the  English  universities.  This  plan  was  adopted,  and 
although  at  one  time  the  age  oi  admission,  and  with  it  the 
standard,  was  lowered,  they  were  afterwards  restored;  and 
the  same  principle  is  now  also  applied  to  the  higher  grades 
1  ('/'.   I hiil.,  |)|).  lxxiii-lxxv. 


160 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


The  Differ- 
ent Grades 
in  the  Civil 
Service. 


Their  Ori- 
gin. 


in  the  home  service.  For  the  lower  positions  in  that  ser~ 
vice,  where  the  work  is  of  a  clerical  nature,  and  hence 
less  discretion  and  responsibility  are  involved,  it  was 
formerly  the  habit  to  make  the  examinations  more  of  a 
test  of  immediate  preparation  for  the  duties  of  the  office ; 
but  this,  as  we  shall  see,  has  recently  been  replaced  by 
a  system  based  upon  Macaulay's  ideas,  though  applied,  of 
course,  to  an  inferior  scale  of  education. 

The  permanent  officials  of  a  typical  department  com- 
prise a  permanent  under-secretary  at  the  head,  and  one  or 
more  assistant  under-secretaries  and  chiefs  of  branches. 
These  offices  are  treated  as  not  subject  to  examination  under 
the  Order  of  1870,  either  because  they  are  filled  by  pro- 
motion, or  on  the  ground  that  the  positions  require  peculiar 
qualifications.1  As  a  matter  of  fact  such  posts  are  by  no 
means  always  filled  by  promotion,  and  persons  are  some- 
times selected  for  them  who  are  outside  of  the  service  al- 
together. Next  in  rank  come  the  principal  clerks ;  but  they 
are  recruited  entirely  by  promotion  from  the  first-class 
clerks,  who  are,  therefore,  the  highest  grade  of  officials 
entering  the  service  by  competitive  examination.  Below 
them  are  the  men  now  properly  called  clerks  of  the  second 
division,  although  the  title  of  this  class  of  civil  servants  has 
been  changed  so  often  that  one  finds  strange  variations  of 
nomenclature  in  the  different  departments.  Below  these 
again  come  the  assistant  clerks  (abstractor  class),  and 
finally  the  boy  clerks. 

The  sharp  separation  of  the  clerks  into  classes,  with 
distinct  examinations  for  each  class,  did  not  arise  at  once. 
The  first  examinations  under  the  original  order  of  1855  were 
required  only  for  a  "junior  situation  in  any  department," 


1  Under  Order  in  Council  June  4,  1870,  §  7,  and  Schedule  B. 

Playfuir's  commission  remarked  of  these  positions,  that  in  order  to 
obtain  superannuation  pensions  the  holders  must  have  been  appointed  with  a 
certificate  from  the  Civil  Service  Commissioners,  or  must,  under  Section  4 
of  the  Superannuation  Act  of  1859,  be  excepted  from  the  rule  by  the  Treas- 
ury on  the  ground  that  the  office  is  one  requiring  peculiar  qualifications. 
The  commission  found  that  in  fact  the  examination  was  not  in  general 
required.      (Com.  Papers,  1875,  XXIII.,  1,  p.  G.) 


THE  PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  161 

and  they  were  not  the  same  in  the  different  departments. 
They  were  elementary  affairs,1  evidently  designed  to  sift 
out  incompetence  rather  than  to  test  superiority ;  for  it 
must  be  observed  that  in  only  a  very  small  proportion  of 
these  examinations  was  there  even  a  limited  competition.2 
When,  however,  the  Order  of  1870  extended  the  admission 
examinations  to  all  positions  in  the  service,  not  specially 
excepted  or  filled  by  promotion,  and  set  up  the  principle 
of  open  competition,  it  became  necessary  to  distinguish 
between  the  higher  posts,  involving  discretionary  powers 
and  requiring  a  liberal  education,  and  the  lower  ones  where 
the  duties  are  of  a  clerical  kind ;  to  distinguish,  in  other 
words,  between  the  administrator  and  the  clerk.  Such  a 
distinction  was  made  by  the  commissioners  in  their  earliest 
regulations  under  the  Order  of  18 70,3  the  two  classes  being 
recruited  separately  by  examinations  of  different  character, 
the  first  of  which  was  adapted  to  university  graduates,  and 
the  second  to  young  men  from  commercial  life.  At  the 
outset  the  line  was  drawn  somewhat  at  haphazard  without 
sufficient  attention  to  the  real  nature  of  the  work  to  be  done, 
and  it  was  readjusted  several  times  before  it  assumed  its 
present  form.4 

1  They  covered  reading,  writing  and  arithmetic,  often  dictation,  precis, 
geography,  English  history,  Latin  and  French,  sometimes  bookkeeping, 
and  occasionally  something  more;  3d  Rep.  of  Civil  Serv.  Comrs.,  Com. 
Papers,   1857-1858,  XXV.,   1,  App.  B. 

2  Rep.  of  the  Com.  on  Civil  Service  Appointments,  Com.  Papers,  1860, 
IX.,  1.,  pp.  vii-viii. 

3  16th  Rep.  Civil  Serv.  Comrs.,  Com.  Papers,  1871,  XVII.,  1,  App.  1. 

*  In  1873  a  Committee  on  Civil  Service  Expenditure  suggested  abolishing 
the  distinction  altogether,  and  having  a  single  examination  for  admission  to 
each  department,  the  men  to  stand  upon  an  equality  as  regards  subsequent 
promotion  by  merit.  (3d  Rep.,  Com.  Papers,  1873,  VII.,  415,  p.  iv.)  No 
action  was  taken  on  this  recommendation;  and  two  years  later  Playfair'a 
Commission  on  Admission  to  the  Civil  Service  reported  (Com.  Papers, 
1875,  XXIII.,  1)  that  the  distinction  between  a  higher  division  to  do  the 
responsible  work,  and  a  lower  division  to  do  the  routine  work,  ought  to  be 
maintained.  But  they  criticised  the  existing  division  into  Classes  I  and 
1 1,  on  the  ground  that  there  was  no  possibility  of  promotion  from  the  second 
to  the  first,  and  that  the  distinction  did  not  correspond  with  the  real  difference 
in  the  nature  of  the  work,  so  that  mechanical  work  was  done  by  the  first 
class  and  responsible!  work  by  the  second,  while  the  clerks  in  sonic  of  the 
departments  belonged  wholly  to  one  class.  They  recommended  that  there 
M 


162 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Exceptional 
Positions. 


The  First- 
class  Clerk- 
ships. 


Aside  from  the  regular  grades  of  clerks  recruited  by  open 
competition,  there  are  various  kinds  of  inspectors,  clerks 
and  other  special  officials,  appointed  after  open  competition, 
limited  competition,  pass  examination  or  no  examination 
at  all.  In  fact  the  departments  are  full  of  anomalies,  some 
of  them  the  necessary  result  of  peculiar  conditions  of  service, 
and  others  due  apparently  to  no  very  rational  cause.  The 
reader  will,  no  doubt,  be  sufficiently  wearied  by  a  description 
of  the  more  common  methods  of  examination,  without  going 
into  the  eccentricities  of  the  system.  It  may  be  convenient 
to  consider  first  the  open  competitions,  and  then  the  ap- 
pointments that  are  made  in  other  ways. 

The  highest  posts  in  the  permanent  civil  service  to  which 
admission  is  obtained  by  competitive  examination  are 
known  as  the  first-class  clerkships.  In  1895  the  examina- 
tions for  these  positions  and  for  the  Indian  Civil  Service 
were  consolidated,  and  in  the  following  year  those  for  the 
Eastern  Cadets 1  were  added ;  so  that  a  single  annual  com- 
petition is  now  the  gateway  to  all  three  careers,  the  success- 
ful candidates  being  allowed,  in  the  order  of  their  rank  at 


should  be  in  every  department  a  lower  division  of  men  and  boy  clerks ;  that 
its  members  should  serve  in  any  department  to  which  they  were  appointed 
or  transferred ;  and  that  after  ten  years'  service  they  might,  if  they  had 
shown  exceptional  capacity,  be  promoted  to  the  upper  division.  These 
recommendations  were  embodied  in  the  Order  in  Council  of  Feb.  12,  1876. 
The  organisation  of  the  civil  service  was  thereby  simplified  and  improved, 
but  it  was  still  imperfect.  The  Commission  on  Civil  Establishments,  in 
their  second  report,  in  1888  (Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.  1),  said  that  in 
practice  the  work  of  the  two  divisions  had  overlapped,  and  the  line  between 
them  had  been  drawn  too  low.  They  suggested  also  that  the  name  of  the 
lower  division  should  be  changed  to  second  division.  This  was  carried  into 
effect  by  an  Order  in  Council  of  March  21,  1890,  which  constituted  thtrsecond 
division  of  the  civil  service,  with  a  higher  grade  to  be  reached  by  promotion, 
and  made  the  boy  clerks  into  a  separate  division.  The  rules  affecting  the 
second  division  have  since  been  embodied  in  a  new  Order  in  Council  of  Nov. 
29,  1898,  amended  by  another  Order  of  Sept.  15,  1902.  The  first  division, 
known  as  Class  I  of  the  Civil  Service,  was  regulated  afresh  by  an  Order  in 
Council  of  Aug.  15,  1890,  which  created  there  also  an  upper  grade  to  be 
reached  by  promotion. 

It  may  be  added  that  appointments  made  as  the  result  of  competitive  ex- 
amination arc  not  absolute  at  once,  but  are  probationary  for  a  certain  period. 

1  These  are  the  men  entering  the  civil  service  of  the  Eastern  colonies, 
Ceylon,  Uony  Kong,  the  Federated  Malay  States,  etc. 


THE  PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  163 

the  examination,  to  choose  the  service  they  will  enter.  In 
spite  of  the  smaller  pay  the  first  men  on  the  list  have 
usually  selected  the  home  service,  because  the  life  is  more 
agreeable  ;  and  so  far  as  the  vacancies  make  it  possible  they 
are  assigned  to  the  particular  department  they  prefer. 

Although  these  positions  are  called  clerkships,  the  work  The  En- 
is  not  of  a  clerical,  but  of  an  administrative,  and  in  the  up-  In^kiatSis. 
per  grades  of  a  highly  responsible,  character.  The  aim  of 
the  commissioners  is,  therefore,  to  recruit  young  men  of 
thorough  general  education  for  an  important  and  lifelong 
administrative  career.  With  this  object  the  candidates  are 
required  to  be  between  twenty-two  and  twenty-four  years 
of  age,  and  the  examination,  which  has  no  direct  connection 
with  their  subsequent  duties,  is  closely  fitted  to  the  courses 
of  study  in  the  universities.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  papers 
in  mathematics  and  natural  science  are  based  upon  the  re- 
quirements for  honour  degrees  at  Cambridge,  the  papers  in 
classical  and  other  subjects  upon  those  at  Oxford ;  and  thus 
it  happens  that  by  far  the  larger  part  of  the  successful 
candidates  come  from  one  or  other  of  these  two  great  uni- 
versities.1 The  range  of  subjects  is  naturally  large,  and  a 
candidate  is  allowed  to  offer  as  many  as  he  pleases,  but  by 
an  ingenious  system  of  marking  a  thorough  knowledge  of  a 
few  subjects  is  made  to  yield  a  higher  aggregate  of  marks 
than  a  superficial  acquaintance  with  a  larger  number.2 
The  examination  papers  are  set,  and  the  books  are  read,  by 
well-known  scholars,  instructors  at  the  universities  and 
others,  who  are  selected  for  the  purpose.     That  the  papers 

1  Of  the  514  successful  candidates  for  the  Class  I  clerkships,  the  Indian 
Civil  Service  and  the  Eastern  Cadets,  from  1896  to  1900  inclusive,  262  had 
studied  at  Oxford,  148  at  Cambridge,  83  at  other  universities  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  7  in  colonial  and  Indian  universities,  and  14  in  no  university  at 
all.  (45th  Rep.  of  the  Civil  Serv.  Comrs.,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XVIII.,  129, 
pp.  Ixxix-lxxxii.)  The  proportion  from  Oxford  and  Cambridge  in  the  Class  I 
clerkships  alone  would  be  somewhat  larger  still.  The  later  reports  of  the 
Civil  Service  Commission  show  that  these  proportions  have  not  been  very 
much  changed. 

2  A  more;  detailed  statement  of  the  method  of  conducting  the  examina- 
tion and  its  results  may  be  found  in  Lowell  and  Stephens,  "  Colonial  Civil 
Service." 


164         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

are  severe  any  one  may  convince  himself  by  looking  at  them. 
Moreover  the  number  of  candidates,  which  is  two  or  three 
times  as  large  as  the  vacancies  in  all  three  services  together, 
insures  a  rigorous  competition;  and  the  result  is  that  the 
candidates  who  win  the  appointments  are  men  of  education 
and  intellectual  power.  They  belong  to  the  type  that  forms 
the  kernel  of  the  professions ;  and  many  of  them  enter  the 
civil  service  simply  because  they  have  not  the  means  to  en- 
able them  to  wait  long  enough  to  achieve  success  in  a  profes- 
sional career.  They  form  an  excellent  corps  of  administra- 
tors, although  the  time  has  not  come  to  express  an  opinion 
on  the  question  whether  they  will  prove  the  best  material 
from  which  to  draw  the  permanent  under-secretaries  and 
the  other  staff  officers  at  the  head  of  the  different  services. 
As  yet  few  of  them  have  attained  positions  of  this  grade, 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  they  have  only  recently 
begun  to  reach  an  age  when  they  could  be  expected  to  do  so. 
Their  Social  When  the  government  was  considering  the  introduction  of 
competitive  examinations,  in  1854,  fears  were  expressed  that 
such  a  system  would  result  in  driving  the  aristocracy  out 
of  the  civil  service,  and  replacing  it  by  a  lower  social  class.1 
Mr.  Gladstone  himself  did  not  share  that  belief.  On  the 
contrary,  he  thought  the  plan  would  give  to  the  highly 
educated  class  a  stronger  hold  than  ever  upon  the  higher 
positions  in  the  service.2  In  this  he  proved  a  better  prophet 
than  his  critics.  By  far  the  greater  part  of  the  successful 
competitors  for  the  Class  I  clerkships  now  come,  as  we  have 
seen,  from  Oxford  and  Cambridge ;  and  the  men  educated 
at  those  universities  are  still  drawn  chiefly  from  the  upper 
classes,  from  the  aristocracy,  the  gentry,  the  sons  of  clergy- 
men, of  lawyers,  of  doctors,  and  of  rich  merchants  who  have 

1  Morley,  "  Life  of  Gladstone,"  L,  511. 

2  In  a  letter  to  Lord  John  Russell  he  wrote:  "It  must  be  remembered 
that  an  essential  part  of  any  such  plan  as  it  is  now  under  discussion  is  the 
separation  of  work,  wherever  it  can  be  made,  into  mechanical  and  intellec- 
tual, a  separation  which  will  open  to  the  highly  educated  class  a  career,  and 
give  them  a  command  over  all  the  higher  parts  of  the  civil  service,  which  up 
to  this  time  they  have  never  enjoyed."     Ibid.,  649. 


Effect. 


THE  PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  165 

made,  or  who  hope  to  make,  their  way  into  the  higher  strata 
of  society.  Men  of  more  humble  extraction  go,  as  a  rule, 
to  the  provincial  colleges.  The  Civil  Service  Commissioners 
have  given  in  some  of  their  annual  reports  the  occupations 
of  the  fathers  of  the  successful  candidates  at  the  chief  open 
competitions;  and  while  in  the  case  of  the  joint  examina- 
tion for  the  Class  I  clerkships  and  the  Indian  Civil  Service 
the  list  includes  no  peers,  and  does  include  some  tradesmen, 
yet  on  the  whole  it  consists  of  persons  belonging  to  the  upper 
and  the  upper  middle  class.  Thus  it  has  come  about  that 
competitive  examinations,  instead  of  having  a  levelling 
tendency,  by  throwing  the  service  open  to  a  crowd  of  quick- 
witted youths  without  breeding,  has  helped  to  strengthen  the 
hold  of  the  upper  classes  upon  the  government,  by  reserv- 
ing most  of  the  important  posts  for  men  trained  in  the  old 
aristocratic  seats  of  learning.  In  this  connection  it  may  be 
observed  that  the  highest  positions  in  the  civil  service  are 
often  held  by  men  of  noble  blood,  and  it  has  sometimes  hap- 
pened that  the  permanent  under-secretary  has  been  a  man 
of  higher  social  position  than  his  political  chief.  Sir  Robert 
Herbert  and  Sir  Courtenay  Boyle,  for  example,  who  were 
recently  the  permanent  heads  of  the  Colonial  Office  and  the 
Board  of  Trade,  were  scions  of  ancient  families  in  England 
and  Ireland;  and  the  latter  had  at  one  time  as  his  political 
chief  Mr.  Mundella,  who  had  begun  life  as  a  printer's  devil.1 

Ranking  below  the  Class  I  clerkships,  there  is  a  large  body  The  Second 
of  persons  whose  work  is  mainly  clerical.  These  are  known  cierksWps 
as  the  second  division  clerks,  and  they  are  recruited  by  open 
competition.  The  standard  of  education  required  by  the 
examination  is  naturally  much  less  high  than  in  the  case  of 
the  first-class  clerks,  and  the  candidates  are  consequently 
younger,  the  competition  being  now  limited  to  youths  be- 
tween seventeen  and  twenty  years  of  age.2 

1  For   Mundella's   origin    sec    Davidson,   "  Eminent    English   Liberals," 
Ch.   xii.;    Hinton,  "English  Radical  Leaders,"  Ch.  viii. 

2  As  in  all  such  cases,  the  upper  limit  is  extended  to  some  extent  for  men 
who  have  served  the  public  in  a  military  or  other  capacity. 


tions. 


166  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

Nature  of  As  the  work  done  by  the  second  division  is  of  the  same 
general  character  as  that  performed  by  clerks  in  commercial 
houses,  the  examination  was  at  first  devised  on  the  sup- 
position that  the  candidates  would  have  a  commercial  train- 
ing, and  it  was  adapted  to  test  their  immediate  fitness  for 
that  work.  Besides  the  elementary  general  subjects  of 
writing,  English  composition,  arithmetic,  geography  and 
English  history,  it  covered  copying,  indexing,  digesting 
returns  and  bookkeeping.  Such  a  test  was  not  inappropri- 
ate in  the  earlier  days,  when  appointments  were  made  by 
nomination  and  the  object  of  the  examination  was  simply 
to  eliminate  individual  appointees  who  were  unfit  for  their 
duties ;  but  it  was  continued  long  after  the  system  of  open 
competition,  with  its  crowd  of  eager  young  candidates  almost 
devoid  of  actual  commercial  training,  had  brought  in  a  very 
different  state  of  things.  In  1896  the  Association  of  Head 
Masters  pointed  out,  in  a  memorandum,  the  bad  effect  pro- 
duced on  general  education.  They  showed  that,  in  order  to 
improve  their  chance  of  success,  boys  were  prematurely 
taken  from  school  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  crammers  to 
acquire  "a  high  degree  of  polish  upon  a  rather  low  though 
useful  order  of  accomplishment";  and  they  asked  that  the 
examination  might  be  brought  more  into  line  with  the  cur- 
riculum of  the  schools.  This  was  done,  without  giving  up 
the  former  methods  altogether,  by  introducing  a  number  of 
options,  so  that  a  candidate  need  offer  only  the  subjects 
ordinarily  taught  in  a  secondary  school.1  The  result  in  the 
future  will  no  doubt  be  to  make  proficiency  in  regular  school 
work  the  real  test  for  appointment,  and  thus,  in  accordance 
with  Macaulay's  principle,  to  base  the  selection  upon  general 
education  instead  of  technical  knowledge. 

1  45th  Rep.  Civil  Serv.  Comrs.,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XVIII.,  129,  pp.lxxiii- 
iv.  Under  the  present  regulations,  writing  (with  copying),  arithmetic  and 
English  composition  are  required;  and  of  the  eight  optional  subjects  — 
precis  (including  indexing  and  adjusting  of  returns),  bookkeeping  and 
shorthand,  geography  and  English  history,  Latin,  French,  German,  element- 
ary mathematics  (plane  geometry  and  algebra),  and  chemistry  and  physics 
—  not  more  than  four  may  be  offered,  including  not  more  than  two  of  the 
three  languages. 


THE   PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  1(37 

Unlike  the  first-class  clerks,  the  clerks  of  the  second 
division  are  drawn  mainly  from  the  middle  and  lower  middle 
classes,  and  their  education  has  been  obtained  in  the  gram- 
mar schools  and  other  schools  of  a  similar  kind.  Although 
a  distinct  corps,  recruited  by  a  different  examination,  and 
intended  for  a  lower  grade  of  work,  they  are  not  altogether 
cut  off  from  the  higher  positions.  After  eight  years  of  ser- 
vice they  can,  in  exceptional  cases,  be  promoted  to  first- 
class  clerkships,  and  this  is  sometimes  done.  But  as  the 
number  of  second  division  clerks  appointed  each  year  is 
about  three  hundred,  and  the  number  promoted  to  first- 
class  clerkships  is  on  the  average  only  about  four,  the 
chance  of  reaching  that  grade  is  very  small.1 

Within  the  last  few  years  a  new  grade,  called  assistant  Assistant 
clerks  (abstractor  class),  has  been  formed,  recruited  at  pres- 
ent by  competitive  examinations  among  the  boy  clerks. 
The  work  is  chiefly  in  the  nature  of  copying,  but  an  assist- 
ant clerk  may  for  special  merit  be  appointed  to  the  second 
division  without  competing  in  the  examination.2 

The  lowest  grade  of  officials  recruited  in  common  for  a  Boy  cicrk? 
number  of  departments  is  that  of  boy  clerks.3  These  come 
from  much  the  same  class  in  the  community  as  the  clerks 
of  the  second  division,  and  the  competitive  examination, 
though  more  elementary,  is  of  the  same  character,4  the 
limits  of  age  being  fifteen  and  seventeen  years.  The  em- 
ployment is  essentially  temporary,  and  in  fact  boy  clerks 
are  not  retained  after  they  are  twenty ;   but  the  position  is 

1  During  the  thirteen  years  from  18SG  to  1898,  inclusive,  147  first-class 
clerks  were  appointed  by  open  competition,  34  were  promoted  from  the 
second  division  (or  the  corresponding  class  that  preceded  it),  and  8  came 
from  other  sources  (virtually  by  transfer  from  distinct  services).  During 
the  same  period  \'2'.i  second  division  clerks  were  promoted  to  other  posts 
carrying  an  increase  of  salary.  Coin.  Papers,  1899,  LXXVII.,  751.  From 
the  later  reports  of  the  Civil  Service  Commissioners  it  would  appear  that  the 
proportion  of  first-class  clerkships  filled  by  promotion  does  not  increase. 

2  Order  in  Council,  Nov.  29,  1898,  §  15. 

5  Or  boy  copyists.  They  were  formerly  two  separate  classes,  but  are 
now  combined. 

*  The  nature  of  the  examination  was  changed  at  the  same  time,  and  for 
the  same  reason  as  that  of  the  second  division  clerks. 


168  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

a  step  towards  further  advancement,  for  the  boy  clerks 
alone  can  compete  for  the  assistant  clerkships,  and  if  they 
go  into  the  examination  for  the  second  division  a  credit  for 
the  service  they  have  done  is  added  to  the  marks  they 
obtain.  Yet  the  examination  for  boy  clerks  is  one  of  the 
few  competitions  for  a  large  number  of  positions,  where  the 
quantity  of  candidates  is  insufficient, 
other  Besides  the  open  competitions  for  the  general  grades  of 

ExTmina-^  cleI%ks,  there  are  many  others  for  special  classes  of  employees 
tions.  in  the  different  departments.     Some  of  these  positions  re- 

quire no  peculiar  qualifications,  and  there  is  no  obvious  rea- 
son for  having  a  number  of  separate  examinations  differing 
slightly  from  one  another;  but  certain  departments  still 
cling  to  their  own  schemes,  and  the  Post  Office  to  several 
schemes.  All  this  is  being  gradually  simplified,  by  having 
the  same  examination  for  a  number  of  distinct  services, 
that  for  the  second  division  clerks,  for  example,  being  now 
used  for  recruiting  the  clerks  in  the  Custom  House.1  The 
examinations  for  the  second  division  could,  probably,  be 
combined  with  those  for  clerks  in  the  Customs  and  Inland 
Revenue,  just  as  a  combination  has  been  made  in  the  case 
of  the  first-class  clerkships,  the  Indian  Civil  Service  and  the 
Eastern  Cadets  —  and  that  will,  no  doubt,  be  the  tendency 
in  the  future.  The  same  criticism  does  not,  of  course, 
apply  to  all  the  examinations.  Some  of  them  require  very 
different  degrees  of  education ;  for  others,  such  as  those  for 
draughtsmen,  law  clerks,  and  many  more,  professional  or 
technical  training  is  obviously  necessary ;  while  certain 
positions  are  reserved  for  women.  Each  of  these  examina- 
tions is  governed  by  regulations  prescribing  the  age  of  the 
candidates,  the  fee  to  be  paid,  and  the  subjects  included, 
but  it  is  clearly  needless  for  our  purpose  to  follow  them 
in  detail.2 

In  most  of  the  departments  there  are  positions  in  the 

1  45th  Rep.  of  the  Civil  Serv.  Comrs.,  Com.  Papers,  1901,  XVIII.,  129, 
pp.  lxxxiii-vii. 

'  Ibid.,  129,  pp.  lxxxiii-vii. 


THE   PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  169 

permanent  civil  service  not  filled  by  competition,  because  Limited 
the  kind  of  experience  and  capacity  needed  cannot  be  tested,  S°™petI" 
or  fully  tested,  by  examination ;  and  in  that  case  the  exami- 
nation may  be  wholly  or  partially  dispensed  with  under  Clause 
VII  of  the  Order  in  Council  of  1870.  There  are  other  posi- 
tions where  open  competition  is  inapplicable  because  the 
places  to  be  filled  are  not  numerous  enough,  or  sufficiently 
tempting,  to  attract  competitors  at  large ;  or,  because,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  higher  class  clerks  in  the  Foreign  Office, 
of  attaches  of  legation,  and  of  inspectors  of  various  kinds, 
the  work  is  of  a  delicate  and  confidential  nature,  and  can  be 
intrusted  only  to  persons  whose  character  is  well  known. 
In  such  cases  it  is  common  to  have  competitive  examinations 
limited  to  candidates  selected  for  the  purpose.1  Even  a 
limited  competition  has  a  tendency  to  raise  the  standard, 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  order  to  obtain  a  chance 
to  compete  in  such  cases  some  influence,  direct  or  indirect, 
is  indispensable ;  although  the  power  of  nomination  does 
not,  in  fact,  appear  to  be  abused  for  political  purposes. 

There   are   positions  for  which   no   competition  is  held,  Nomina- 
but  where  a  single  person  is  nominated  subject  to  an  ex-  p°"s  ^mi* 
animation  to  test  his  competence.     Some  of  these  places  nation, 
might  very  well  be  open  to  competition,  and,  indeed,  there 
are  still  strange  anomalies  in  various  branches  of  the  civil 
service  ;    the  strangest  being  the  fact  that  the  employees  of 
the  Education  Department  are,  almost  invariably,  appointed 
without  any  examination  at  all,  and  this  is  true  not  only  of 
inspectors,  whose  work  requires  peculiar  qualifications,  but 
even  of  clerks  of  the  abstractor  class.      There  are,  however, 
positions  in  the  civil  service  where  the  technical  knowledge 
or  experience  needed  are  really  such  as  to  render  a  com- 
petition difficult.     Even  in  manual   occupations  this  is  be- 
lieved to  be  the  case.      In  the  royal  dockyards,  for  example, 
although  the  apprentices  are  recruited  by  open  competition, 

1  The  Committee  on  Civil  Establishments  reported  that  this  method  of 
appointment  was  a  necessity  in  the  Foreign  Office.  Com.  Papers,  1S90, 
XXVII.,   1,  p.  9. 


170         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

the  artificers  are  appointed  subject  to  a  pass  examination 
touching  only  their  skill  in  their  trade,  while  the  foremen 
are  usually  selected  by  a  limited  competition  which  in- 
cludes something  more.  Provincial  postmasters  also  form 
a  class  by  themselves.  Until  a  few  years  ago  they  owed  their 
positions  to  political  influence  ;  for  long  after  the  members  of 
Parliament  had  lost  all  control  over  other  appointments, 
they  retained  the  power  to  fill  any  vacancies  that  might  occur 
in  the  postal  service  within  their  constituencies,  provided, 
of  course,  they  belonged  to  the  party  in  power.  But  this 
last  remnant  of  parliamentary  patronage  was  abolished  in 
1896,  and  provincial  postmasters  are  now  appointed  on  the 
recommendation  of  the  surveyors  of  the  postal  districts.1 
Nomination  Finally  there  are  the  appointments  made  entirely  without 
Examma-  examination  of  any  kind,  either  because  examination  is 
tion.  dispensed  with  under  Clause  vn  of  the  Order  in  Council  of 

1870,  or  because  the  position  is  one  excepted  altogether  from 
the  operation  of  the  Order.  Such  posts  are  chiefly  at  the 
top  or  at  the  bottom  of  the  service.  They  include  positions 
of  responsibility  at  one  end  of  the  scale ;  and  those  of  mes- 
sengers,2 porters  and  servants  at  the  other. 
Promotions.  Political  influence  has  not  only  ceased  almost  entirely 
to  affect  appointments  to  office,  but  it  has  also  been  very 
nearly  eliminated  in  the  matter  of  promotion.  The  struggle 
on  this  subject  began  as  early  as  1847,  and  the  government 
has  been  strong  enough  to  declare  that  an  effort  to  bring 
influence  to  bear  will  be  treated  as  an  offence  on  the  part 
of  the  employee  ;  or  as  the  minutes  adopted  by  the  Treasury 
in  1867,  and  by  the  Admiralty  a  couple  of  years  later, 
ingeniously  and  forcibly  express  it,  the  attempt  by  a  public 
officer  to  support  his  application  by  any  solicitation  on  the 
part  of  members  of  Parliament,  or  other  persons  of  influence, 
"  will  be  treated  ...  as  an  admission  on  the  part  of  such 

1  Courtney,  "The  Working  Constitution,"  149-50.  The  local  member, 
however,  is  still  often  consulted,  but  rather  as  having  local  knowledge  than 
with  a  view  to  political  influence. 

2  Messengers  are  often  examined  in  the  three  R's. 


THE   PERMANENT  CIVIL  SERVICE  171 

officer  that  his  case  is  not  good  upon  its  merits. "  l     These 
measures  seem  to  have  had  the  desired  effect.2 

If  we  seek  to  understand  how  it  happened  that  the  baneful  Why  the 
influence  of  political  patronage  in  the  civil  service,  which  ^Easily* 
had  been  dominant  in  England  in  the  eighteenth  century,  Freed  from 
was  thrown  off  with  comparative  ease  a  hundred  years  fluence. 
later,  while  in  some  other  nations  that  influence  was,  at  the 
same  period,  growing  in  strength,  and  has  proved  extremely 
tenacious ;  if  we  seek  to  explain  this  contrast,  we  must  take 
account  of  a  striking  peculiarity  of  English  public  life  at  the 
present  day  that  has  come  with  the  evolution  of  the  parlia- 
mentary system.  For  reasons  that  will  be  discussed  here- 
after a  member  of  the  majority  of  the  House  of  Commons 
votes  on  the  side  of  the  government  with  singular  constancy ; 
and  as  compared  with  most  other  countries  under  a  popular 
form  of  government  politics  turn  to  an  unusual  extent  upon 
public  questions.  The  House  is  engaged  in  almost  ceaseless 
battles  between  the  two  front  benches  with  the  ranks  of  their 
followers  marshalled  behind  them ;  and  the  battles  are  over 
public  matters.  Questions  affecting  private,  personal  or  local 
interests  occupy  a  relatively  small  share  of  the  attention  of  the 
member  of  Parliament.  He  is  primarily  the  representative 
of  a  national  party  elected  to  support  or  oppose  the  cabinet, 
rather  than  the  delegate  of  a  district  sent  to  watch  over  the 
interests  of  his  constituents,  and  push  the  claims  of  influen- 
tial electors.  The  defence,  said  to  have  been  triumphantly 
made  elsewhere,  by  a  member  accused  of  absence  from  im- 
portant divisions,  that  he  had  procured  more  favours  for 
his  constituency  than  any  other  representative,  could  not  be 
pleaded  as  an  excuse  in  England.  Hence  the  ministry  is  not 
compelled  to  enlist  personal  support  either  in  the  legislature 
or  at  the  polls,  by  an  appeal  to  private  gratitude.  It  can 
afford  to  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  solicitations  for  patronage,  and 

1  Com.  Papers,  1883,  XXXVIII..  513. 

2  Thin!  liep.  of  the  Coin,  on  Civil  Serv.  Exp.,  Coin.  Papers,  1873,  VII., 
41"),  Qs.  1270-72,  4727,  4702,  1704.  There  was  at  that  time  some  trouble 
in  the  case  of  dismissals.      Ibid.,  <^s.  4271-72. 


172         THE  GOVERNMENT  OP  ENGLAND 

stand  upon  its  public  policy  alone.  In  short,  the  enormous 
strength  of  party,  in  the  legitimate  sense  of  a  body  of  men 
combined  for  a  common  public  object,  has  enabled  the  gov- 
ernment to  do  what  it  could  not  have  done  so  easily  had 
party  required  the  support  of  artificial  props.  The  political 
condition  that  has  strengthened  the  government  for  this 
work  is  not  in  itself  an  unmixed  good.  It  brings  with  it 
evils,  which  will  be  noticed  in  due  course ;  but  to  its  credit 
must  be  placed  the  purification  of  the  civil  service. 

At  the  outset  ministers  feared  that  the  change  would 
meet  with  resistance  in  Parliament,  but  using  one's  in- 
fluence to  procure  favours  for  others  is  not  a  wholly 
agreeable  task,  especially  when  more  supplicants  are  disap- 
pointed than  gratified.  The  reform  brought  to  the  House 
of  Commons  relief  from  pressure  by  importunate  con- 
stituents, and  all  the  later  steps  have  been  taken  with  the 
approval  of  the  members  themselves. 
Pensions.  With   the   elimination   of   politics   the    civil   service   has 

become  a  career,  steady  and  free  from  risk.  But  the  salaries 
are  not  high  in  relation  to  the  capacity  required,  and  as  a 
rule  they  begin  low  with  a  small  increment  for  each  year  of 
service.  They  are  not  large  enough  to  provide  for  illness 
and  old  age ;  and,  hence,  along  with  the  progress  of  reform 
there  grew  up  a  demand  for  pensions.  The  law  on  the 
subject,  although  frequently  amended,  is  still  based  upon  the 
Superannuation  Act  of  1859,  which  grants  to  "  persons  who 
shall  have  served  in  an  established  capacity  in  the  permanent 
civil  service  of  the  state"  for  ten  years,  and  retire  at  sixty 
years  of  age  or  by  reason  of  infirmity,  a  pension  equal 
to  ten  sixtieths  of  their  final  salary.  For  every  additional 
year  of  service  another  sixtieth  is  added  up  to  a  maximum 
of  forty  sixtieths.  Provision  has  been  made,  also,  for  the 
case  of  injuries  received  in  the  public  service;  while  more 
recent  statutes  have  authorised  gratuities  to  women  em- 
ployees upon  marriage  —  an  allowance  apparently  given, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  other  grants,  rather  in  a  spirit  of  com- 
miseration, than  in  order  to  encourage  matrimony. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

THE    MINISTERS    AND    THE    CIVIL   SERVICE 

As  scientific  and  technical  knowledge  increase,  as  the  The  Need 
relations  of  life  become  more  complex,  there  is  an  ever-  pe^nd^ 
growing  need  of  men  of  special  training  in  every  department  Layman, 
of  human  activity ;  and  this  is  no  less  true  of  the  govern- 
ment than  of  every  other  organisation.  Any  work,  there- 
fore, carried  on  at  the  present  day  without  the  assistance  of 
experts  is  certain  to  be  more  or  less  inefficient.  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  experts  acting  alone  tend  to  take  disproportion- 
ate views,  and  to  get  more  or  less  out  of  touch  with  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  They  are  apt  to  exag- 
gerate the  importance  of  technical  questions  as  compared 
with  others  of  a  more  general  nature  —  a  tendency  which 
leads  either  to  hobbies,  or,  where  the  organism  is  less  vigor- 
ous, to  officialism  and  red  tape.  These  evils  have  become 
so  marked  in  the  case  of  some  governments  as  to  give  rise 
to  the  ill  name  of  bureaucracy.  In  order,  therefore,  to 
produce  really  good  results,  and  avoid  the  dangers  of  in- 
efficiency on  the  one  hand,  and  of  bureaucracy  on  the  other, 
it  is  necessary  to  have  in  any  administration  a  proper  com- 
bination of  experts  and  men  of  the  world.  Now,  of  all  the 
existing  political  traditions  in  England,  the  least  known  to 
the  public,  and  yet  one  of  those  most  deserving  attention,  is 
that  which  governs  the  relation  between  the  expert  and  the 
layman. 

The  first  branch  of  the  English  government  to  reach  a  high  The  Judge 
point   of  development   was  that   which   dealt   with   the  ad- 
ministration of  justice;    and  it    is  here  that  we  first  see  the 
cooperation  of  professional  and  lay  elements.     They  appear 
in  the  form  of  judge  and  jury;    and  in  that  form  they  have 

178 


and  Jury. 


174         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

worked  together  from  the  Middle  Ages  to  the  present  day. 
The  judge,  a  royal  officer  of  high  rank,  supplies  the  expert- 
knowledge,  while  the  lay  influence  is  exerted  by  means  of  a 
panel  of  twelve  men  of  average  ignorance,  drawn  from  the 
community  by  lot  for  the  occasion;    and  although  this  is 
not  the  usual  method  of  combining  the  two  elements,  their 
reciprocal  control  has  certainly  been  effective. 
The  Justice        It  was  not,  however,  in  the  superior  courts  of  law  alone 
and  hisea  B  that  the   principle   made   itself  felt.     Its   working,   if  less 
Clerk.  evident  on  the  surface,  may  be  traced  no  less  clearly  in  the 

exercise  of  petty  jurisdiction  by  the  justices  of  the  peace 
sitting  without  a  jury.  But  here  the  mutual  relation  of  the 
two  elements  was  reversed.  The  justice  of  the  peace  was 
in  most  cases  a  landowner,  a  country  gentleman,  not  skilled 
in  law.  In  the  earlier  period  the  commission  included  a  num- 
ber of  trained  lawyers,  who  were  said  to  be  of  the  quorum, 
because  without  the  presence  of  one  of  them  the  justices 
were  not  by  law  competent  to  act.1  But  in  process  of  time 
the  trained  lawyers  ceased  to  be  appointed,  while  the  names 
of  almost  all  the  justices  came  to  be  inserted  in  the  quorum 
clause;2  and  thus  it  happened  that  judicial  authority  was 
vested  in  a  squire  who  knew  little  of  the  law  he  was  called 
upon  to  administer.  But  the  justice  supplied,  in  fact,  the 
lay,  not  the  professional,  element  in  his  own  court ;  the 
requisite  legal  knowledge  being  usually  furnished  by  his 
clerk,  who  was  learned  in  the  law ;  or,  at  least,  learned  in  the 
duties  of  the  justice  of  the  peace  as  set  forth  in  the  statutes 
and  in  the  manuals  published  for  the  purpose. 

The  office  of  clerk  of  the  peace  for  the  county  must  be 
of  considerable  age,  for  it  is  referred  to  in  a  statute  of  Rich- 
ard II.  in  1388. 3  But  besides  this  office,  which  is  a  public 
one,  it  has  been  the  habit  time  out  of  memory  for  an 
active  justice  to  retain  a  private  clerk  of  his  own  to  assist 
him  when  acting  as  a  single  magistrate ;   such  a  clerk  being 

1  Cf  Gneist,  "  Self-Government  in  England,"  3  Auf.,  196-97. 

2  Blackstone,  Bk.  I.,  351. 

3  12  Ric.  II.,  c.  10  (4).     Cf  32  Hen.  VIII.,  c.  1. 


THE   MINISTERS   AND  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  175 

paid  partly  out  of  the  justice's  pocket,  partly  from  the  fees 
that  accrued.1 

More  important  than  the  age  of  these  offices  is  the  question  As  Por- 
of  the  real  power  exerted  by  their  holders.  That  the  in-  Literature 
fluence  of  a  clerk  over  the  justice  who  employed  him  has 
long  been  both  great  and  notorious  is  clear  from  the  frequent 
references  to  it  in  literature.  Early  in  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury Fletcher,  in  "The  Elder  Brother,"  makes  Miramont 
say  to  Brissac  : 2  — 

"  Thou  monstrous  piece  of  ignorance  in  office ! 
Thou  that  hast  no  more  knowledge  than  thy  Clerk  infuses." 

Near  the  end  of  that  century  the  same  idea  was  expressed 
with  singular  frankness  in  a  manual  on  "The  Office  of  the 
Clerk  of  the  Peace,"  published  in  1682.  In  an  address  "to 
the  reader,"  which  precedes  the  second  part  of  the  volume, 
the  author  explains  the  object  of  the  book.  After  saying  of 
the  justices  of  the  peace  that  their  birth  is  a  glory  to  their 
seats,  he  continues  :  — 

"But  divers  of  these  Gentlemen  having  not  been  con- 
versant in  the  Practice  of  the  Ordinary  Courts  of  Justice, 
often  in  the  absence  of  those  worthy  Persons,  who  be  as- 
sociated with  them  for  their  Learning  in  the  Law,  meet  with 
many  difficulties  and  discouragements." 

Coming  down  to  the  eighteenth  century  there  is  the  case 
of  Squire  Western  and  his  clerk  in  "  Tom  Jones"  ;  and  later 
in  the  same  novel  the  scene  in  the  inn  at  Upton,  where  the 
strange  justice  is  unwilling  to  act  because  he  has  not  with 

1  Gneist,  "  Solf-Governmcnt,"  212. 

2  Ad  II.,  Sc.  I.  The  characters  of  the  play  purport  to  be  French,  but 
the  manners  and  customs  are,  of  course,  English.  Fletcher  died  in  1625. 
An  earlier,  though  less  definite,  reference  to  the  power  of  the  clerk  is  found  in 
William  Lambard's"  Firenarcha  or,  Of  the  Office  of  the  Justices  of  Peace," 
pulili.-hed  in  1/iNl  (p.  -108):  "  Ilowbeit,  1  do  not  thinke,  that  in  our  case,  this 
dutie  of  Estreating  is  so  peculiar  to  the  Clarke  of  the  Peace,  but  that  the 
Justices  of  the  Peace  themselves,  ought  also  to  have  a  common  and  carefull 
eye  into  it  .  .  .  least  otherwise,  it  lye  alfogither  in  t  he  power  of  the  Clarke 
of  the  Peace,  to  Save  or  Slay  (as  one  sayd)  the  Sparrow  that  he  holdeth 
closed  in  his  hand." 


176         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

him  his  book  or  his  clerk.  The  reader  will  probably  re- 
member Justice  Foxley  and  his  clerk  in  "Redgauntlet  " ; 
and  also  Dickens's  burlesque  of  the  relation  in  the  scene 
at  Ipswich,  where  after  much  whispering  between  the  jus- 
tice (Mr.  Nupkins)  and  his  clerk  (Mr.  Jinks)  the  magistrate 
says  to  Mr.  Pickwick :  — 

"An  information  has  been  sworn  before  me  that  it  is 
apprehended  you  are  going  to  fight  a  duel,  and  that  the  other 
man,  Tupman,  is  your  aider  and  abettor  in  it.  Therefore  — 
eh,  Mr.  Jinks?" 

"Certainly,  Sir." 

"Therefore,  I  call  upon  you  both  to  —  I  think  that's 
the  course,  Mr.  Jinks?  " 

"Certainly,  Sir." 

"To  —  to  —  what,  Mr.  Jinks?"  said  the  magistrate 
pettishly. 

"To  find  bail,  Sir." 

"Yes.  Therefore,  I  call  upon  you  both  —  as  I  was  about 
to  say,  when  I  was  interrupted  by  my  clerk  —  to  find  bail." 

The  satire  here  is  particularly  keen,  because  before  the 
public  the  magistrate  always  takes  the  whole  credit  to  him- 
self, and  is  very  sensitive  about  having  the  world  believe 
that  he  is  under  the  control  of  his  clerk. 
Lay  chief         Leslie   Stephen,   I  think,  remarks   somewhere    that   the 
pert  Sub-      characteristic  feature  of  the  English  system  of  government 
ordinate  an  is  a  justice  of  the  peace  who  is  a  gentleman,  with  a  clerk 
Usage.  who  knows  the  law  ;  and  certainly  the  relationship  between 

the  titular  holder  of  a  public  post,  enjoying  the  honours, 
and  assuming  the  responsibility,  of  office,  and  a  subordinate, 
who,  without  attracting  attention,  supplies  the  technical 
knowledge  and  largely  directs  the  conduct  of  his  chief, 
extends  throughout  the  English  government  from  the 
Treasury  Bench  to  the  borough  council.  Perhaps,  indeed, 
it  is  not  altogether  fanciful  to  attribute  the  ease  with  which 
the  principle  has  become  established  in  the  national  govern- 
ment to  the  fact  that  the  members  of  Parliament,  and  the 
ministers  as  well,  have  been  drawn  in  the  past  mainly  from 


THE   xMINISTERS   AND  THE   CIVIL  SERVICE  177 

the  same  class  as  the  justices  of  the  peace,  and  have 
brought  with  them  to  a  larger  sphere  the  traditions  of  the 
local  magistrate. 

The  extent  of  the  control  exerted  in  the  national  admin-  influence 
istration  by  the  permanent  officials  is  forcibly  illustrated  ^e^r^' 
by  the  history  of  the  Colonial  Office.     My  colleague,  Pro-  dais  in  the 
fessor  Edward  Channing,  has  pointed  out  to  me  that  the  office!3 
records  of  the  American   colonies  reveal  how  largely  the 
Committee  for  Trade  and  Plantations  was  in  the  hands  of 
Blathwayt,  its  secretary.     In  spite  of  all  the  violent  political 
upheavals  of  the  time  that  functionary  retained  his  post 
without  interruption  from  the  latter  part  of  the  reign  of 
Charles  II.  until  some  years  after  the  revolution  of  1688; 
and  if  a  colony  wanted  anything  done  by  the  home  govern- 
ment it  was  he  that  must  be  persuaded,  sometimes  by  in- 
ducements of  a  pecuniary  nature. 

The  power,  but  happily  not  the  corruption,  of  the  per- 
manent officials  in  the  Colonial  Office  can  be  traced  still 
more  clearly  at  a  much  later  time.  In  1839  Lord  Durham, 
in  his  famous  "  Report  on  the  Affairs  of  British  North  Amer- 
ica," complains  that  owing  to  the  repeated  changes  in  the 
political  chiefs  of  the  Colonial  Office,  the  real  management 
of  the  colonies  fell  into  the  hands  of  "the  permanent  but 
utterly  irresponsible  members  of  the  office";  and  he  quotes 
from  a  report  made  in  the  preceding  year  by  a  select  com- 
mittee of  the  Assembly  of  Upper  Canada,  to  show  that  this 
was  felt  by  the  colonists  themselves  as  a  grievance.1  The 
group  of  English  colonial  reformers,  with  whom  Lord  Dur- 
ham was  associated,  held  the  same  opinion.  Gibbon  Wake- 
field tells  us,  in  his  "View  of  the  Art  of  Colonization"  that 
"The  great  bulk,  accordingly,  of  the  labours  of  the  office  are 
performed,  as  the  greater  portion  of  its  legislative  and  ex- 
ecutive authority  is  necessarily  wielded,  by  the  permanent 
under-secretary  and  the  superior  clerks."  '  Wakefield  and 
his  school  disapproved  of  the  colonial  policy  of  the  day, 
and    disliked    cordially    the    permanent    officials    and    their 

1  Corn.  Papers,  1839,  XVII.,  1,  pp.  37-38.  2  P.  235. 


178         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

methods.  "Our  colonial  system  of  government,"  Wake- 
field adds,  "is  the  bureaucratic,  spoiled  by  being  grafted 
on  to  free  institutions."  *  He  had  a  special  aversion  for 
Sir  James  Stephen  —  long  the  legal  adviser,  and  afterwards 
permanent  under-secretary,  to  the  Colonial  Office  —  whom 
he  regarded  as  the  archetype,  if  not  the  founder,  of  the 
class  of  officials  that  had  become  the  real  arbiters  of  the 
destinies  of  the  colonial  empire.2 
Mr.  Mother-  Wakefield  quotes  from  Charles  Buller's  "Responsible 
country.  Government  for  Colonies  "  (a  work  published  in  1840,  but 
at  that  time  already  out  of  print),  an  extract  entitled 
"Mr.  Mothercountry,  of  the  Colonial  Office."3  Parliament, 
Buller  declares,  takes  no  interest  in  the  colonies,  and  ex- 
ercises no  efficient  control  over  the  administration  and  legis- 
lation affecting  them ;  and  hence  the  supremacy  of  Eng- 
land really  resides  in  the  Colonial  Office.  But  the  Secretary 
of  State  holds  a  shifting  position.  Perplexed  by  the  vast 
variety  of  questions  presented  to  him,  he  is  obliged  at  the 
outset  to  rely  on  one  or  other  of  the  permanent  officials, 
and  the  official  who  thus  directs  the  action  of  the  Brit- 
ish government  Buller  calls  "Mr.  Mothercountry."  He  is 
familiar  with  every  detail  of  his  business,  and  handles  with 
unfaltering  hand  the  piles  of  papers  at  which  his  superiors 
quail.  He  knows  the  policy  which  previous  actions  render 
necessary ;  but  he  never  appears  to  dictate.  A  new  Sec- 
retary of  State  intends  to  be  independent,  but  something 
turns  up  that  obliges  him  to  consult  Mr.  Mothercountry. 
He  is  pleased  with  the  ready  and  unobtrusive  advice  which 
takes  a  great  deal  of  trouble  off  his  hands.  If  things  go 
well,  his  confidence  in  Mr.  Mothercountry  rises.  If  badly, 
that  official  alone  can  get  him  out  of  the  colonial  or  parlia- 
mentary scrape ;  and  the  more  independent  he  is  the  more 
scrapes  he  falls  into.  Buller  goes  on  to  point  out  the  faults 
of  Mr.  Mothercountry ;  his  love  of  routine,  his  tendency  to 
follow  precedent,  his  dislike  of  innovation,  and  his  dread  of 
being  criticised. 

1  P.  235.  2  P.  268.  3  P.  279. 


THE   MINISTERS  AND  THE   CIVIL  SERVICE  179 

Any  one,  with  even  a  slight  knowledge  of  government  Memoirs  of 
offices  in  England,  will  recognise  that  the  portrait  of  Mr.  officials. 
Mothercountry  and  his  influence  is  hardly  overdrawn,  in 
cases  where  the  political  chief  either  holds  his  place  for  a 
short  time,  or  is  not  a  man  of  commanding  ability.  The 
impression  of  the  critics  of  colonial  administration  is,  indeed, 
strikingly  reenforced  in  this  respect  by  memoirs  of  the 
permanent  officials  themselves ;  although  some  allowance 
must,  no  doubt,  be  made  for  a  natural  overestimate  of  their 
own  importance.1  Sir  Henry  Taylor  confided  to  the  world 
in  his  autobiography  a  number  of  remarks  that  throw  light 
on  the  internal  working  of  the  Colonial  Office  in  the  second 
quarter  of  the  century.  While  never  its  permanent  under- 
secretary, he  was  for  a  great  many  years  a  highly  influential 
person  there,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  early  in  his 
career  he  drew  up,  on  his  own  judgment,  a  despatch  re- 
calling a  governor,  which  the  secretary  signed.2  Taylor  tells 
us  that  Lords  Goderich  and  Howick,  who  became  the  politi- 
cal chiefs  of  the  Colonial  Office  in  1831,  were  "not  more  in 
pupilage  than  it  is  necessary  and  natural  that  men  should 
be  who  are  new  to  their  work."  3  He  says  that  when  Lord 
Stanley  was  appointed  Secretary  of  State,  in  1833,  he 
asked  no  advice  from  his  subordinates,  and  a  measure  he 
prepared  was  blown  into  the  air  by  the  House  of  Commons ; 
whereupon  he  had  recourse  to  Mr.  Stephen,4  "who  for  so 
many  years  might  better  have  been  called  the  Colonial  De- 
partment itself  than  the  'Counsel  to  the  Colonial  Depart- 
ment.' '  A  little  later  he  repeats  this  last  statement, 
saying  that  while  Lord  Glenelg  was  Secretary  "Stephen 
virtually  ruled  the  Colonial  Empire." 6  Taylor's  own 
influence   was  shown   when   complaints   were   made   of  his 

1  For  the  quotations  from  those  memoirs  I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  Evan 
Randolph,  who  made,  while  a  student  at.  Harvard  College,  a  careful  exami- 
nation of  the  subject. 

2  "Autobiography,"  London   Ivl.  (l.NX.">>,  1.,  70. 

5  Ibid.,  130.  *  Ibid  .  133.  5  Ibid.,  136. 

■  Ibid  .  233,  if.  123.  It  was  during  Lord  Glenelg's  time  that  Stephen 
became  permanent  under-secretary. 


180         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

administration  of  the  West  Indies.  The  House  of  Com- 
mons appointed  a  committee  of  inquiry,  and  the  report  of 
that  committee,  with  the  exception  of  the  last  few  sentences, 
was  entirely  drawn  up  by  Taylor  himself.1 

Sir  Frederick  Rogers  (afterwards  Lord  Blachford),  who 
was  permanent  under-secretary  from  1860  to  1871,  has  left 
in  his  letters  suggestive  comments  upon  most  of  his  political 
chiefs.  The  Duke  of  Newcastle,  he  says,  is  "very  ready  to 
accept  your  conclusions,  very  clear  in  his  own  directions, 
and  extremely  careful  (which  I  respect  very  highly)  never 
to  throw  back  on  a  subordinate  any  shadow  of  responsibility 
for  advice  that  he  has  once  accepted."  2  "Card well,"  he 
remarks,  "is  happily  absent,  though  not  so  much  as  I  could 
wish";3  and,  finally,  he  writes  that  he  likes  Lord  Granville, 
who  "is  very  pleasant  and  friendly,  and  I  think  will  not 
meddle  beyond  what  is  required  to  keep  us  clear  of  political 
slips."  4  Some  people  outside  of  the  office  evidently  thought 
that  the  secretaries  of  state  had  not  meddled  overmuch, 
for  George  Higginbottom,  afterwards  Chief  Justice  of  Vic- 
toria, once  remarked  in  the  Assembly,  "It  might  be  said  with 
perfect  truth  that  the  million  and  a  half  of  Englishmen 
who  inhabit  these  colonies,  and  who  during  the  last  fifteen 
years  have  believed  they  possessed  self-government,  have 
been  really  governed  during  the  whole  of  that  time  by  a 
person  named  Rogers"  ;5  and  in  the  same  vein  Rees,  in  his 
"Life  and  Times  of  Sir  George  Grey,"  refers  to  Sir  Robert 
Herbert  (permanent  under-secretary  from  1871  to  1892)  as 
the  man  who  "controls  the  destinies  of  the  Colonial  Office."  6 
influence  of  With  the  growing  interest  in  the  empire,  there  has  come 
offidaiTin  a  cnange  I  but  until  a  very  recent  period  the  fact  that 
other  De-  British  statesmen  knew  little  of  the  subject,  and  did  not 
care  much  more,  no  doubt  made  the  power  of  the  per- 
manent   officials    peculiarly  great    in   the  Colonial    Office. 

1  "  Autobiography,"  II.,  38. 

2  Marindin,  "  Letters  of  Lord  Blachford,"  227. 

3  Ibid.,  252.  *  Ibid.,  275. 
B  Morris,  "  Memoirs  of  Higginbottom,"  183.  B  II.,  505. 


THE   MINISTERS  AND  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  181 

Their  influence,  however,  upon  the  policy  of  the  government 
in  the  other  departments,  if  less  absolute,  has  nevertheless 
been  very  large.  This  impression  one  obtains  both  from 
published  documents,  and  from  private  conversations, 
although  the  former  alone  can  be  cited  as  evidence.  As  far 
back  as  1845  we  find  the  Lord  Lieutenant  speaking  of  the 
permanent  under-secretary  as  "the  main-spring  of  your 
government  in  Ireland."  l  But  more  important  than  scat- 
tered statements  of  this  kind  is  the  information  derived 
from  the  testimony  taken  by  parliamentary  committees 
of  inquiry.  One  cannot  read,  for  example,  the  evidence 
collected  in  1900  by  the  Committee  on  Municipal  Trading  2 
without  being  convinced  that  not  only  the  efficiency,  but 
also  in  large  measure  the  current  policy,  of  the  Board  of 
Trade  depended  upon  the  permanent  official  at  its  head, 
and  this  is  true  of  every  branch  of  the  administration.3 
Sir  Lyon  Playfair  gave  the  reason  for  it  when  he  said :  "The 
secretary  being  a  very  busy  man  is  very  apt  to  take  the 
advice  of  the  clerk  who  has  been  looking  over  all  the  details 


1  Parker,  "  Sir  Robert  Peel,"  III.,  184. 

2  Com.  Papers,  1900,  VII.,  183. 

3  In  that  same  year  much  discussion  was  provoked  by  Lord  Salisbury's 
sweeping  remark  that  the  British  Constitution  was  not  a  good  fighting 
machine  on  account  of  the  power  of  the  Treasury  to  restrain  military  ex- 
penditure. (Hans.,  4  Ser.  LXXVIII.,  32,  237,  239.)  It  was  pointed  out 
that  if  the  political  chiefs  of  the  Army  and  Navy  want  to  increase  their 
expenditure  they  cannot  be  blocked  by  the  Treasury  clerks.  They  can 
confer  witli  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  and  if  he  will  not  consent,  they 
can  appeal  to  the  Prime  Minister,  and  ultimately  to  the  cabinet.  Never- 
theless it  is  true  that  if  the  political  chief  does  not  consider  a  matter  of  first- 
class  importance  —  and  many  of  the  most  far-reaching  matters  do  not 
appear  so  at  the  time — -or  does  not  want  to  fight  about  it,  the  opinion  of 
the  Treasury  officials  may  prevail,  even  to  the  extent  of  blocking  useful 
reforms  that  cost  a  little  money. 

Moreover,  if  a  matter  is  fought  out  between  the  political  chiefs,  their 
opinions  may  very  well  be  derived  from  their  permanent  subordinates. 
When  the  subject  of  Treasury  control  was  investigated  by  the  Committee 
on  Civil  Establishments,  Sir  Reginald  (now  Lord)  Wei  by  was  asked,  "  Is 
not  this  question  not  so  much  between  political  ministers  as  between  per- 
manent heads  of  departments?"  lie  answered  "Yes,  but  the  permanent 
heads  of  departments  to  (sir)  convince  their  political  chiefs  behind  whom 
they  fight,"  and  added  that  the  political  chiefs  commonly  support  their 
subordinates.      (Com.  Papers,  ISSN,  XXVII. ,  l,Qs.  10721,  10723.) 


182 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Theoretical 
Relation 
of  Political 
and  Per- 
manent 
Heads. 


and  the  correspondence  before  it  comes  to  him."  *  A  supe- 
rior, indeed,  lacking  the  time  to  become  thoroughly  famil- 
iar with  the  facts,  must  be. to  a  great  extent  in  the  hands  of 
a  trusted  subordinate  who  has  them  all  at  his  fingers'  ends. 
It  is  the  common  case  of  the  layman  and  his  confidential 
expert ;  and  it  must  be  observed  in  this  connection  that  with 
exacting  parliamentary  and  other  duties,  the  cabinet  min- 
isters cannot  devote  all  their  time  to  the  work  of  their 
departments. 

The  theoretical  relation  between  the  political  chief  and 
his  permanent  subordinate  is  a  simple  one.  The  political 
chief  furnishes  the  lay  element  in  the  concern.  His  function 
is  to  bring  the  administration  into  harmony  with  the  general 
sense  of  the  community  and  especially  of  Parliament.  He 
must  keep  it  in  accord  with  the  views  of  the  majority  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  and  conversely  he  must  defend  it 
when  criticised,  and  protect  it  against  injury  by  any  ill- 
considered  action  of  the  House.  He  is  also  a  critic  charged 
with  the  duty  of  rooting  out  old  abuses,  correcting  the 
tendency  to  red  tape  and  routine,  and  preventing  the  depart- 
ment from  going  to  sleep  or  falling  into  ruts ;  and,  being  at 
the  head,  it  is  for  him,  after  weighing  the  opinion  of  the  ex- 
perts, to  decide  upon  the  general  policy  to  be  pursued.  The 
permanent  officials,  on  the  other  hand,  are  to  give  their  advice 
upon  the  questions  that  arise,  so  as  to  enable  the  chief  to 
reach  a  wise  conclusion  and  keep  him  from  falling  into  mis- 
takes. When  he  has  made  his  decision  they  are  to  carry  it 
out ;  and  they  must  keep  the  department  running  by  doing 
the  routine  work.  In  short  the  chief  lays  down  the  general 
policy,  while  his  subordinates  give  him  the  benefit  of  their 
advice,  and  attend  to  the  details.  It  is  easy  enough  to  state 
a  principle  of  this  kind,  but  in  practice  it  is  very  hard  to 
draw  the  line.  The  work  of  a  public  department  consists 
of  a  vast  mass  of  administrative  detail,  the  importance  of 
which  is  not  self-evident  until  some  strain  is  brought  to 
bear  upon  it ;    and  all  the  acts  done,  however  trifling  in 

1  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1,  Q.  20168. 


THE   MINISTERS  AND  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  183 

themselves,  form  precedents,  which  accumulate  silently 
until  they  become  as  immovable  as  the  rocks  of  the  geologic 
strata.  To  know  how  far  the  opinion  of  an  expert  must  be 
followed,  and  how  far  it  may  be  overruled ;  to  know  what 
is  really  general  policy,  and  what  is  mere  detail ;  to  know 
these  things  is  the  most  valuable  art  in  life.  The  capacity 
of  an  administrator  on  a  large  scale  depends  upon  what  he 
attends  to  himself,  and  what  he  commits  to  others.  But 
the  political  chief  of  a  department  is  so  situated  that  it  is 
difficult  for  him  to  determine  what  questions  he  will  reserve 
for  himself  and  what  he  will  leave  to  his  subordinates. 
To  understand  why  that  is  the  case  it  is  necessary  to  know 
something  of  the  procedure  in  the  government  offices. 

The  method  of  doing  business  in  a  public   office   is  of  Procedure  in 
necessity  more  elaborate  than  in  a  private  concern.     There  depart- 1C 
is  more  responsibility  for  the  work  done  ;  more  subjection  to  ments. 
public  criticism  in  small  matters;   and  a  stronger  obligation 
to  treat  every  one  alike,  which  means  a  more  strict  adherence 
to   precedent.     All   this   entails   a   complicated   machinery 
that  is  less  needed  in  private  business,  where  a  man  can  say 
that  if  he  makes  a  mistake  the  loss  falls  upon  himself  and  is 
no  other  person's  affair.     In  a  public  office,  therefore,  more 
writing  is  done,  more  things  are  preserved  and  recorded, 
than  in  a  private  business,  and  there  are  more  steps  in  a 
single   transaction.1     Now   although   the    procedure   in   the 
English  departments  varies  somewhat  in  detail,  the  general 
practice  is  much  the  same  throughout  the  public  service. 

When  a  minister  wishes  to  prepare  a  measure  for  Parlia- 
ment, or  to  make  any  change  in  administrative  policy,  he 
consults  the  permanent  under-secretary  and  any  other 
officials  especially  familiar  with  the  subject  ;  if,  indeed,  the 
matter  has  not  been  suggested  to  him  by  them.  lie  weighs 
their  advice,  and  states  his  conclusion  to  the  permanent 
under-secret ary,  who  in  turn  gives  his  directions  to  the  proper 
subordinates  for  carrying  it  into  effect.      In  such  a  case  the 

1  Cf.  Giffen's  Ev.,  2d  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Estabs.,  Com.  Tapers,  1888, 
XXVII  ,  1.  Qs.  PJ 131-32,  19139. 


184  THE   GOVERNMENT    OF   ENGLAND 

procedure  is  obvious;  but  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the 
action  in  the  central  offices  begins  at  the  other  end,  and 
comes  from  the  contact  of  the  government  with  the  public, 
or  from  questions  that  arise  in  the  course  of  administration. 
When  anything  of  this  kind  occurs,  whether  it  be  in  the  form 
of  a  despatch,  a  petition,  a  complaint,  a  request  for  instruc- 
tions, or  a  communication  of  any  sort,  it  is  sent  by  the  official 
charged  with  the  opening  of  correspondence  to  the  principal, 
or  senior,  clerk  within  whose  province  it  falls.  The  senior 
clerk  intrusts  it  to  one  of  the  junior  first-class  clerks  in  his 
division.  He  examines  the  paper,  and  unless  it  is  of  such  a 
purely  routine  character  that  he  feels  authorised  to  dispose 
of  it,  he  affixes  to  it  a  minute  or  memorandum,  which  gives 
a  history  of  the  matter,  the  precedents  in  similar  cases, 
and  any  other  information  that  may  assist  his  superiors  in 
reaching  a  decision,  commonly  adding  a  suggestion  of  the 
course  to  be  pursued.  The  paper  then  goes  back  to  the 
senior  clerk,  who  inspects  it,  and  if  the  question  is  of  small 
consequence  approves  the  minute  or  directs  a  different 
disposition,  subscribing  his  initials.  If  the  affair  is  more 
weighty,  he  adds  his  own  comments  in  the  form  of  a  second 
minute,  and  transmits  the  paper  to  the  permanent  under- 
secretary.1 That  officer,  as  the  permanent  head  of  the  de- 
partment, gives  the  final  directions,2  and  returns  the  paper, 
unless  the  matter  is  of  great  importance,  or  involves  a  new 
question  of  policy,  or  is  likely  to  give  rise  to  discussion  in 
Parliament,  when  he  submits  it  to  his  political  chief  with  a 
further  minute  of  his  own.3 

Each  permanent  official  thus  performs  a  double  service 

1  If  there  is  an  assistant  under-secretary  the  paper  passes,  of  course, 
through  his  hands;  and  in  case  local  conditions  require  to  be  examined  an 
inspector  is  sent  down  to  report. 

2  It  has  already  been  observed  that  in  some  departments  the  parlia- 
mentary under-secretary  is  the  administrative  head  for  some  matters. 

3  Todd,  with  his  unfailing  industry,  searched  the  Blue  Books  for  informa- 
tion on  this  subject.  (Pari.  Govt,  in  England,  2  Ed.  II.,  542,  G14,  628-31, 
645-46,  671,  708.)  Since  he  wrote,  a  great  deal  of  evidence  on  the  pro- 
cedure in  the  several  departments  has  been  collected  by  the  Com.  on  Civil 
Estabs.  (2d  Rep.,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXV1L,  l,Qs.  10992-11001,  11849-51, 
12034-35,  12072-78,  12360-64,  12887-91,  19434,  19442-43). 


THE  MINISTERS  AND  THE   CIVIL  SERVICE  185 

for  his  immediate  superior.  He  collects  all  the  material  Each  offi- 
that  bears  upon  a  question,  presenting  it  in  such  a  form  that  ^J|er  for 
a  decision  can  be  readily  and  quickly  made  ;  and  he  acts  to  a  his  Supe- 
certain  extent  as  a  reader,  examining  a  mass  of  papers  that 
the  superior  would  be  quite  unable  to  go  through,  and  making 
up  his  own  mind  how  far  they  contain  anything  that  re- 
quires his  chief's  attention.1  This  system  runs  throughout 
the  department,  from  the  junior  first-class  clerks  to  the  par- 
liamentary head,  each  official  deciding  what  he  will  submit 
to  his  superior ;  in  the  same  way  that  the  minister  himself 
determines  what  matters  he  will  settle  on  his  own  authority, 
and  what  he  had  better  lay  before  the  cabinet.  No  doubt 
a  subordinate  in  undertaking  to  decide  a  question  occasion- 
ally makes  a  mistake  for  which  the  minister  must  assume 
the  responsibility ;  but  that  is  not  a  serious  danger.  The 
besetting  sin  of  bureaucracy  is  the  tendency  to  refer  too  much 
to  a  higher  authority,  which  cannot  become  familiar  with  the 
facts  of  each  case,  and  finds  its  only  refuge  in  clinging  to 
hard  and  fast  rules.  It  is  fortunate,  therefore,  that  the 
growth  in  the  machinery  of  central  administration  in  Eng- 
land has  been  accompanied  by  greater  deconcentration  within 
the  departments.2  The  process  has  not  been  without  effect 
on  the  position  of  the  permanent  under-secretary.  By 
relieving  him  of  detail  it  has  made  him  more  free  to  devote 
his  attention  to  general  policy ;  and,  in  fact,  a  departmental 
committee  reported  a  few  years  ago  that  he  ought  "to 
divest  himself  of  all  but  the  most  important  matters  in 
which  the  application  of  a  new  principle  is  involved."  No 
question,  the  report  continued,  ought  to  reach  him  until  it 
has  been  threshed  out  by  the  responsible  head  of  a  division, 
and  is  ripe  for  decision.  "The  permanent  secretary  should 
be  able  to  devote  himself  to  such  work  as  conferring  with  and 

1  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1,  Qs.  12072-78. 

2  In  the  Home  Office,  for  example,  the  minuting  for  replies  to  papers  was 
formerly  done  by  the  permanent  under-secretary  alone.  Later  the  senior 
clerks  were  allowed  to  make  minutes,  and  now  the  process  begins  with  the 
junior  clerks.  (Com.  Papers,  1888,  XXVII.,  1,  Qs.  10992-11001.)  The 
same  tendency  has  been  at  work  in  the  Foreign  Office,  as  will  be  explained 
later. 


186  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

advising  his  Parliamentary  chiefs,  framing  or  elaborating 
proposals  for  new  legislation  or  administrative  reform,  con- 
sidering all  questions  in  Parliament,  receiving  members  of 
Parliament,  or  representatives  of  the  Public  on  questions  of 
difficulty,  and  generally  controlling  and  directing  the  con- 
duct of  the  Department."  1 
Differences        The  point  to  which  deconcentration  is  carried  is  not  the 
Depart-  the  same  m  a^  branches  of  the  public  service.     Mr.  Gladstone 
ments.  declared  that  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  could  not  take 

as  active  a  part  as  other  ministers  in  the  current  business 
of  his  department ; 2  while  in  the  Foreign  Office,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  the  tradition  that  the  Secretary  of  State 
ought  to  see  almost  everything.  No  doubt  this  is  in  part 
due  to  the  very  nature  of  diplomatic  relations,  but  there  can 
also  be  no  doubt  that  in  the  past  it  has  been  carried  much  too 
far.  When  Mr.  Hammond  was  under-secretary  for  foreign 
affairs  he  insisted  on  making  the  first  minute  on  all  papers 
in  the  office.3  A  change  has  been  made  in  this  respect,  and 
the  practice  brought  more  into  accord  with  that  which 
prevails  in  other  departments ; 4  but  the  Foreign  Secretary 
is  still  expected  to  give  his  personal  attention  to  a  greater 
mass  of  detail  than  other  ministers.5 

1  Rep.  on  clerical  staff  of  Local  Gov.  Board,  Com.  Papers,  1898,  XL., 
429,  p.  12. 

2  He  said  "  The  relation  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  to  the  Treas- 
ury is  somewhat  anomalous;  it  does  not  correspond  at  all  with  that  of  a 
Secretary  of  State  to  his  department,  because  of  course  he  lies  a  good  deal 
out.-dde  the  Treasury,  and  a  good  deal  of  the  current  business  never  comes 
before  him  at  all."  (3d  Rep.  Com.  on  Pub.  Accounts,  Com.  Papers,  1862, 
XL,  467,  Q.  1640.) 

3  Cf.  Mr.  Hammond's  memorandum  entitled  "The  Adventures  of  a  Paper 
in  the  Foreign  Office,"  Rep.  of  Sel.  Com.  on  Trade,  Com.  Papers,  1861, 
VII.,  279,  Q.  I.'i84;  reprinted  in  1st  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Dip.  and  Cons.  Services, 
Com.  Papers,  1871,  VII.,  197,  Qs.  1145-46. 

4  Com.  Papers,  1871,  VII.,  197,  Qs.  1145-46.  Hans.  3  Ser.  CCXXXII., 
1058. 

5  4th  Rep.  Com.  on  Civil  Estabs.,  Com.  Papers,  1890,  XXVII. ,  1,  Ev.  of 
Mr.  Bryce,  Qs.  27927-31,  Sir  Charles  Dilke,  Q.  29252. 

The  position  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  and  the  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  although  in  most  ways  not  unlike  that  of  the  other  ministers,  is 
peculiar  in  the  fact  that  they  are  the  lay  heads  of  great  professions.  Their 
relation  to  the  military  officers  detailed  for  service  in  the  principal  admin- 
istrative posts  in  their  departments  has  already  been  discussed  in  Chap.  IV 


THE   MINISTERS  AND  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  187 

Now   any   subordinate   who   determines   what   questions  Effect  of  the 
he  mav  decide  himself,  and  what  he  will  refer  to  his  supe-  Pro<;edure 

'  r         on  the 

riors,  and  who  prepares  the  materials  for  a  final  judgment  Power  of 
in  the  cases  that  he  does  refer,  is  certain  to  exert  a  great  deal  cia  s' 
of  influence.  The  permanent  under-secret ary,  holding  his 
position,  as  he  does,  for  an  indefinite  period,  devoting  his 
whole  time  to  the  work,  and  becoming  thoroughly  familiar 
with  the  affairs  of  his  department,  can,  no  doubt,  regulate 
the  class  of  questions  that  shall  be  referred  to  him,  and  can 
acquire  complete  control  over  the  administration.  But  the 
minister,  who  is  usually  unfamiliar  with  the  department 
to  which  he  is  assigned,  who  remains  at  its  head  a  compara- 
tively short  time,  and  whose  attention  is  largely  engrossed 
by  the  more  exciting  scenes  enacted  in  the  cabinet,  in  Par- 
liament, and  on  the  platform,  must,  unless  gifted  with  ex- 
traordinary executive  capacity,  be  to  a  considerable  extent 
in  the  hands  of  his  permanent  subordinates. 

The  smooth  working  of  a  system  of  this  kind  evidently  Need  of 
depends  upon  the  existence   of  mutual   respect   and   confi-  MutualCon- 

11  l  ridenee  be- 

dence  between  the  minister  and  the  permanent  under-sec-  tween  Po- 
retary.  If  the  minister,  knowing  that  the  under-secretary  permanent 
does  not  share  his  own  political  views,  fails  to  treat  him  with  Heads- 
perfect  frankness,  or  if,  after  one  party  has  been  long  in  power, 
the  permanent  officials  have  little  sympathy  with  a  new 
ministry  from  the  other  party,  and  do  not  give  it  their  active 
and  cordial  help,  then  mistakes  are  certain  to  be  made,  the 
efficiency  of  the  service  suffers,  and  the  plans  of  the  govern- 
ment are  likely  to  miscarry.  The  permanent  under-secretary 
ought  to  feel,  and  in  fact  does  feel,  a  temporary  allegiance 
to  his  chief,  although  of  a  different  political  party,  lie  gives 
his  advice  frankly  until  the  chief  has  reached  a  decision, 
and  then  he  carries  that  out  loyally.  Confidential  com- 
munications —  and  they  are  numberless  —  he  treats  as 
sacred  even  from  the  next  parliamentary  chief.  If  one 
minister  prepares  a  measure  which  never  sees  the  light,  the 
permanent  under-secretary  might  refuse  to  show  the  docu- 
ments   to    the    succeeding    minister,    and    the    latter    would 


188 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Actual  Re- 
lation De- 
pends on 
Personality. 


recognise  the  propriety  of  such  a  course.  The  minister  on 
his  part  seeks  the  advice  of  the  under-secretary  on  all  ques- 
tions that  arise,  making  allowance  for  bias  due  to  pre- 
conceived political  or  personal  conviction.  This  does  not 
mean  that  if  a  government  comes  into  power  pledged  to  a 
definite  policy,  such  as  Home  Rule  or  a  preferential  tariff, 
the  under-secretary  would  be  consulted  about  the  general 
principle.  In  a  case  of  that  kind  the  policy  has  been  settled 
in  Parliament  or  by  a  general  election,  and  the  advice  of 
the  permanent  officials  would  be  limited  to  the  details  of  the 
measure  proposed. 

The  system  has,  of  course,  its  limits.  There  are  cases 
where  the  known  opinions  of  the  under-secretary  would 
make  it  almost  impossible  for  him  to  conduct  a  certain  policy 
effectively.  When  the  Conservatives,  for  example,  came  into 
office  in  1895  with  a  policy  of  coercion  for  Ireland,  they  found 
as  permanent  Irish  under-secretary  Sir  Robert  Hamilton, 
who  was  known  to  be  a  strong  Home  Ruler,  and  believing 
that  it  would  be  very  difficult  for  them  to  govern  the  country 
through  his  agency,  they  promoted  him  out  of  the  way ; 
such  cases  must  sometimes  occur,  but  they  are  extremely 
rare.  It  is,  indeed,  astonishing  how  far  the  system  can  be 
carried  ;  to  what  an  extent  an  under-secretary  can  act  as  the 
loyal  adviser  and  administrator  for  chiefs  of  totally  different 
political  opinions. 

The  actual  relations  between  the  minister  and  the  per- 
manent under-secretary  depend  in  any  particular  case  very 
much  upon  the  personality  of  the  men.  Peel  and  Glad- 
stone, for  example,  maintained  a  close  supervision  and  con- 
trol over  the  departments  under  their  charge,  while  John 
Bright  felt  that  his  real  field  of  usefulness  was  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  and  left  the  affairs  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
almost  altogether  in  the  hands  of  the  permanent  officials. 
The  system  naturally  works  at  its  best  when  minister  and 
under-secretary  are  both  strong,  good-tempered  men,  when 
each  is  active,  but  recognises  clearly  the  province  of  the  other. 
The  saying  has  become  almost  proverbial   that  the  most 


THE   MINISTERS  AND  THE   CIVIL  SERVICE  189 

valuable  minister  is  one  who  knows  nothing  about  his  de- 
partment when  appointed,  and  like  most  paradoxes  it  con- 
tains a  distorted  truth.  A  good  minister  must  be  a  good 
administrator,  but  he  must  look  to  results,  and  not  suppose 
that  he  knows  as  much  about  the  technical  side  of  the  work 
as  his  permanent  subordinate.  For,  as  Bagehot  quotes  Sir 
George  Cornewall  Lewis,  "  It  is  not  the  business  of  a  Cabinet 
Minister  to  work  his  department.  His  business  is  to  see  that 
it  is  properly  worked."1  If  he  attempts  to  go  beyond  his 
province,  to  be  dogmatic  and  to  interfere  in  details,  he 
will   cause   friction   and   probably   come   to  grief. 

The  permanent  officials  have,  indeed,  several  means  of  Methods  of 
controlling  a  minister  who  ventures  to  disregard  them.  a°Minbtei\ 
They  have  been  heard  to  say  that  a  fool,  if  given  rope 
enough,  will  hang  himself.  If  he  does  not  care  for  their 
advice  they  need  not  tender  it,  and  then  he  is  sure  to  make 
mistakes  for  which  he  alone  will  be  held  responsible.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  he  tries,  with  the  best  intentions,  to  go  too 
much  into  detail,  nothing  is  easier  than  the  trick,  familiar, 
probably,  to  every  bureaucracy,  of  overwhelming  him  with 
detail.  He  wishes  to  decide  questions  himself.  The  papers 
bearing  upon  them  are  brought  to  him  in  ever-increasing 
piles,  until  he  finds  himself  hopelessly  unable  to  cope  with 
the  mass  of  documents,  and  virtually  surrenders  at  discre- 
tion. Then  there  are  the  means  of  control  arising  from 
the  audit  of  accounts  ..ad  from  questions  in  Parliament. 
The  permanent  under-secretary  points  out  to  his  chief  that 
an  expenditure  he  proposes  is  likely  to  be  disallowed  by  the 
auditor,  or  that  an  action  he  suggests  may  very  well  give  rise 
to  an  embarrassing  question  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
and  to  these  things  a  minister  is  highly  sensitive.  Questions 
afford,  indeed,  a  means  of  mutual  control,  for  the  permanent 
officials  are  usually  far  more  afraid  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons than  the  minister  is  himself,  and  tend  to  be  reticent 
in  preparing  answers. 

The  Treasury  Bench  is  not  so  omniscient  as  it  appears 

1  "  The  English  Constitution,"  1  Ed.,  240. 


190         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

when  answering  questions  in  the  House.  After  notice  of  a 
question  has  been  given,  the  materials  for  a  reply  are  pre- 
pared, and  often  the  answer  itself  is  drawn  up,  by  some  per- 
manent official  in  the  department.  Sometimes  the  minister 
merely  reads  the  answer  as  it  has  been  placed  in  his  hands, 
but  more  commonly  while  keeping  the  substance,  he  puts  it 
into  words  of  his  own  that  he  thinks  better  suited  to  the 
temper  of  the  House.  The  labour  of  working  up  the  answers 
to  innumerable  questions  on  every  conceivable  subject, 
and  of  every  degree  of  importance  and  triviality,  is  in  the 
aggregate  very  great,  and  places  a  heavy  burden  upon  the 
permanent  officials  during  the  session  of  Parliament.  But 
no  satisfactory  method  of  limiting  the  privilege  has  yet  been 
devised,  and  although  abused,  it  has  the  effect  of  keeping 
the  administration  up  to  the  mark.  The  system  affords  an 
opportunity  for  constant  public  criticism,  and  while  it  gives 
the  permanent  officials  some  control  over  the  minister,  it  is, 
on  the  other  hand,  a  most  effective  means  of  preventing  the 
growth  of  a  bureaucratic  spirit. 
Evils  where  If  the  permanent  officials  can  restrain  a  minister  from 
interfering  overmuch,  there  is  no  similar  means  of  preventing 
him  from  neglecting  his  duties.  Yet  in  that  case  the  ser- 
vice suffers.  It  is  apt  to  become  numbed  and  bureaucratic. 
Permanent  officials  tend  to  follow  precedent,  and,  indeed, 
the  force  of  precedent  furnishes  the  basis  of  their  power, 
but  the  tendency  to  be  too  rigid  in  their  rules  is  the  curse 
of  all  their  tribe.  They  shrink  from  innovation,  rarely 
making  a  new  precedent  themselves.  This  is  particularly 
true  in  the  lesser  offices,  giving  rise,  at  times,  to  complaint ; 
and  the  political  chief  has  to  insist  upon  the  need  of  making 
exceptions  in  hard  cases,  without  allowing  the  hard  cases 
themselves  to  make  bad  law.  The  surest  remedy  for  an 
excess  of  routine  is  a  parliamentary  head  who  is  interested  in 
the  department,  and  with  him  a  permanent  under-secretary 
of  large  calibre  and  wide  experience  in  affairs. 

Speaking  in   1884  about  the  Reform  Bill  then  pending, 
Sir  Stafford  Xorthcote  predicted  that  an  extension  of  the 


a  Minister 
is  Inactive. 


THE   MINISTERS   AND  THE   CIVIL  SERVICE  19l 

franchise  would  increase  the  power  of  the  permanent  offi-  influence  of 
cials ; l  and  many  people  think  that  the  prophecy  has  been  oSdaiTnot 
fulfilled.  But  this  would  seem  to  be  one  of  the  cases  where  increasing, 
an  impression  is  due  not  so  much  to  a  real  change  of 
conditions,  as  to  the  fact  that  a  state  of  things  already 
existing  has  become  recognised.  The  power  of  the  civil 
service  has  undoubtedly  grown  very  much  within  the  last 
hundred  years ;  owing  partly  to  the  fact  that  the  ministers, 
instead  of  being  primarily  administrators,  have  become 
legislators,  engrossed  by  the  work  of  Parliament  and  by 
general  politics ;  partly  to  the  much  shorter  periods  for 
which  they  hold  office.  During  the  one  hundred  and  two 
years  from  1721  to  1823  there  were  nineteen  chancellors  of 
the  exchequer;  of  whom  five  held  office  for  more  than  ten 
years  apiece,  the  aggregate  length  of  their  services  being 
seventy-eight  years.  In  the  eighty-two  years  from  1823 
to  1905,  twenty-three  men  held  the  office,  one  of  them  for 
thirteen  years,  another  for  nine,  and  no  one  else  for  more  than 
about  six  years.  The  effect  of  such  a  shortening  of  the 
minister's  tenure  of  office  upon  the  position  of  his  permanent 
subordinates  is  self-evident.  But  the  present  conditions  of 
political  life  have  now  existed  with  little  change  for  a  gen- 
eration ;  and,  in  tue  opinion  of  men  well  qualified  to  form  a 
judgment,  the  power  of  the  permanent  officials,  while  vary- 
ing from  time  to  time  with  the  personnel  of  the  ministry,  has 
not  of  late  years  shown  any  general  tendency  to  increase. 

Although  the   civil    servant  enjoys  a  great    deal  of    the  Seif-Efface- 
substance  of  power,  yet  he  purports  to  act  only  under  the  civ^Ser- 
directions  of  his  political  chief.     Sir  Stafford  Northcote  was  vants. 
admonished   early   in   his   career  by   Mr.    Gladstone    "that 
references  from   the  Opposition  Bench   to  opinions  of  the 
permanent  officers  of  Government,  in  contradiction  to  the 
opinion  of  the   Minister  who  is  responsible  in   the  matter 

1  "After  that  there  will  conn-  a  bureaucrat  if  despotism;  that  is  to  say, 
the  permanent  officials  will  take  tin-  management  of  af lairs  into  their  hands, 
and  Parliament  will  have  little  to  do."  Andrew  Lang,  "  Life,  Letters,  and 
Diaries  of  Sir  Stafford  Northcote,"  2  Kd.,  I  L,  219. 


192  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

at  issue,  were  contrary  to  rule  and  to  convenience."  '  If 
this  were  not  so  the  principle  of  ministerial  responsibility 
could  hardly  be  maintained.  The  minister  is  alone  respon- 
sible for  everything  done  in  his  department,  and  he  receives 
all  the  credit  and  all  the  blame.  The  civil  servant  never 
talks  in  public  about  the  policy  of  his  department,2  never 
claims  anything  done  there  as  his  own  work ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  minister  ought  not  to  attribute  blunders  or 
misconduct  to  a  subordinate  unless  prepared  at  the  same 
time  to  announce  his  discharge.  This  rule  is  not,  indeed, 
always  observed  in  the  military  services,  for  within  a  few 
years  the  House  of  Lords  has  heard  the  late  Secretary  of 
State  for  War  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  charge  each 
other  with  the  responsibility  for  the  lack  of  preparation  in 
South  Africa ; 3  and  in  1901  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty 
in  the  House  of  Lords  laid  the  blame  for  the  capsizing  of  the 
royal  yacht  at  her  launching  upon  the  naval  constructor, 
while  praising,  at  the  same  time,  his  skill  in  designing  battle- 
ships.4 In  the  civil  services  the  principle  has  been,  as  a 
rule,  very  strictly  followed ;  although  here,  also,  in  the 
case  of  Sir  Antony  MacDonnell,  the  under-secretary  to 
the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland,  an  exception  occurred 
which  caused  no  small  stir  at  the  time.5     Nor  is  the  re- 

1  Lang,  "Life,  Letters, and  Diaries  of  Sir  Stafford  Northcote,"  I.,  160. 

3  After  resigning  his  post  in  the  Education  Department  in  1903,  Sir 
George  Kekewich  condemned  publicly  the  Education  Bill  which  had  been 
passed  while  he  was  in  office,  but  it  may  safely  be  said  that  even  this  is  not 
regarded  as  the  best  form. 

3  Hans.  4  Ser.  XC,  327  et  seq.,  XCL,  6  et  seq. 

*  Ibid.,  XCVI.,  969. 

5  Sir  Antony  MacDonnell,  who  had  distinguished  himself  greatly  as  an 
Indian  administrator,  and  had  just  been  given  a  place  on  the  Council  of 
India,  was  appointed  by  Mr.  Wyndham  under-secretary  for  Ireland  in  Sep- 
tember, 1902,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  was  an  Irishman,  a  Roman  Catholic 
and  a  Liberal  in  politics.  In  the  summer  of  1904,  believing  that  he  had  the 
approval  of  Mr.  Wyndham,  the  Chief  Secretary,  in  so  doing,  he  assisted 
Lord  Dunraven  to  formulate  the  policy  of  devolution  in  Ireland.  But 
Mr.  Wyndham  hastened  to  make  public  his  disapproval  of  that  policy  as  soon 
as  the  plan  appeared  in  the  press.  When  Parliament  met  in  February, 
190"),  Mr.  Wyndham,  in  reply  to  questions  of  the  Irish  Unionists,  stated  these 
facts,  adding  that  Sir  Antony  MacDonnell  had  been  censured  by  the  cabinet, 
which  was,  however,  thoroughly  satisfied  that  his  conduct  was  not  open  to 


THE  MINISTERS  AND  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  193 

sponsibility  of  the  minister  merely  formal  and  conventional, 
for  the  mistakes  of  the  officials  in  his  department  go  into  the 
great  balance  of  good  and  evil  report,  whereby  the  reputation 
of  the  cabinet  is  made,  and  its  fate  at  the  next  election  is 
determined.  In  short,  the  permanent  official,  like  the  King, 
can  do  no  wrong.  Both  are  shielded  by  the  responsibility 
of  the  minister,  and  in  fact  it  may  happen  that  a  policy 
adopted,  let  us  say  by  the  Foreign  Office,  which  is  popularly 
attributed  to  the  personal  wishes  of  the  King,  is  in  reality 
the  work  of  some  permanent  subordinate. 

Fifty  years  ago  the  public  was  not  aware  of  the  power  of 
the  civil  servants,  and  Parliament,  regarding  them  as  clerks, 
paid  little  attention  to  them.  But  now  that  their  impor- 
tance has  come  to  be  understood  there  is,  in  the  opinion  of 
some  of  their  own  members,  a  danger  that  they  will  be  made 
too  prominent,  that  the  screen  which  protects  them  from  the 
public  gaze  will  be  partly  drawn  aside,  and  that  they  will 


the  imputation  of  disloyalty.  (Hans.  4  Ser.  CXLI.,  324-26.)  The  oc- 
currence gave  rise  to  a  good  deal  of  hot  discussion  in  both  Houses  of  Par- 
liament in  the  latter  half  of  February,  in  the  course  of  which  Mr.  Wyndham 
said  that  he  could  not  invite  such  a  man  as  Sir  Antony  MacDonnell  to 
come  and  help  him  as  a  clerical  assistant,  that  he  was  invited  rather  as  a 
colleague  than  as  a  mere  under-secretary.  (Hans.  4  Ser.  CXLI.,  650,  and 
see  Lord  Lansdowne's  remarks,  Ibid.,  461.)  The  letters  that  passed  between 
Mr.  Wyndham  and  Sir  Antony  MacDonnell  at  the  time  of  his  appointment 
were  then  produced,  and  they  contain  a  stipulation  couched  in  language  that 
can  fairly  be  interpreted  as  implying  either  a  position  of  exceptional  im- 
portance, or  merely  such  influence  as  an  under-secretary  possessing  the  full 
confidence  of  his  chief  might  enjoy.  (Hans.  4  Ser.  CXLI.,  979-81.)  The 
debate  led  to  the  resignation  of  Mr.  Wyndham;  and  his  successor,  Mr.  Long, 
as  well  as  Mr.  Balfour,  insisted  that  no  agreement  made  with  Sir  Antony 
gave  him  a  position  different  from  that  of  other  under-secretaries  in  the  civil 
service.  (Hans.  4  Ser.  CXLI.,  99f>;  CXLIL,  1225-26;  CXLIV.,  647-48, 
1278-79).  An  aftermath  of  the  trouble  came  in  the  autumn  of  1906  when 
Mr.  Long  challenged  Sir  Antony  MacDonnell  to  publish  any  letters  bearing 
upon  the  events  of  1904-1905,  but  these  the  Conservative  government,  when 
in  power,  had  declined  to  produce  in  Parliament.  (The  Times,  Aug.  'A0,  31, 
Sept.  1.  4,  1906.)  Correspondence  of  this  nature  cannot,  of  course,  be  pub- 
lished, at  the  good  pleasure  of  the  possessor.  The  whole  episode  illustrates 
clearly  the  difficulties  that  arise  when  a  parliamentary  chief  fails  to  assume 
complete  responsibility  for  everything  that  happens  in  his  department.  It 
shows  also  that  the  relations  between  the  political  chief  and  his  permanent 
subordinate  are  fixed  by  the  nature  of  the  parliamentary  system,  and  can- 
not be  effectively  changed  in  special  cases. 


194 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Honours 
Conferred 
upon  Civil 
Servants. 


thereby  lose  their  complete  irresponsibility,  and  with  it  their 
permanence  and  their  non-political  character.  Whether 
such  a  danger  will  prove  serious  is  at  present  only  a  matter 
for  conjecture. 

While  the  permanent  official  can  win  no  credit  for  par- 
ticular acts,  a  life  of  exceptional  service  does  not  pass  un- 
recognised. Sir  Robert  Peel,  who  appreciated  their  impor- 
tance, lamented  that  honours  were  not  conferred  upon  them 
more  freely.1  Such  a  complaint  could  hardly  be  made  to-day, 
for  a  number  of  them  are  knighted  every  year,  and  occasion- 
ally a  permanent  under-secretary,  on  retiring  from  office, 
is  even  raised  to  the  peerage.  In  spite  of  self-effacement, 
therefore,  the  career  of  a  permanent  official  is  honourable  and 
attractive.  If  he  is  debarred  from  the  excitement  and  the 
glory  of  the  political  arena,  he  is  spared  its  hazards,  its 
vexations,  and  its  disappointments.  He  wields  great  power, 
takes  a  real  part  in  shaping  the  destinies  of  the  nation,  and 
if  capable  and  fortunate  he  may  end  his  days  in  the  subdued 
lustre  of  the  House  of  Lords. 


1  Parker,  "  Sir  Robert  Peel,"  II.,  35-36. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   HOUSE   OF   COMMONS 

Constituencies  and  Voters 

The  composition  of  any  representative  body  involves  two  Electors 
separate  things;   the  electors  and  the  constituencies.     Dur-  stiuiendes 
ing  the  first  part  of  the  nineteenth  century  public  attention  Offer  Dis- 
outside  of  England  was  mainly  concentrated  upon  the  elec-  ien^. 
tors,  or  in  other  words  upon  the  extension  of  the  franchise. 
But  now  that  something  like  universal  suffrage  has  been 
introduced  into  most  of  the  countries  which  have  a  popular 
element  in  their  government,  the  franchise  is  little  discussed, 
and  much  more  is  said  about  the  constituencies,  that  is, 
the   method   of   combining   the   voters   into   groups.     The 
change  is  largely  due  to  discontent  with  some  of  the  results 
of  democracy,  a  feeling  which  finds  vent  in  widespread  criti- 
cism of  representative  institutions.1 

It  was  formerly  assumed  that  the  interests  of  the  masses 
of  the  people  were  fundamentally  identical ;  and  hence  the 
mode  in  which  the  electors  were  grouped  was  comparatively 
unimportant,  the  main  question  being  the  enlargement  of 
the  basis  of  representation.  We  have  now  learned  that  the 
formation  of  the  constituencies  offers  a  distinct  problem 
with  grave  practical  effects,  and  popular  government  not 
having  brought  the  millennium  that  was  foretold,  men  seek 
a  remedy  in  different  methods  of  combining  the  voters. 
We  constantly  see  discussions  of  this  subject.  We  hear  of 
the  relative  advantage  of  scrutin  d'arrondissement  and  scru- 
tin  de  liste ;  that  is,  single  electoral  districts  or  large  areas 
choosing    a    number    of    representatives    apiece.     We    hear 

'This  fooling  was  forcibly  expressed  by  Godkin  in  his  essay  on  "The 
Decline  of  Legislatures." 

195 


196 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


How 

Treated  in 
England. 


The  Con- 
stituencies. 


about  the  grouping  of  voters  on  the  basis  of  their  natural 
economic  relations  into  urban  and  rural  constituencies ;  or  on 
the  basis  of  wealth,  as  in  the  three-class  system  of  Prussia. 
We  hear  suggestions  of  possible  grouping  on  the  basis  of 
occupations ; *  and  a  vast  amount  of  literature  has  been 
published  to  prove  the  advantage  of  a  grouping  on  the  basis 
of  opinions,  by  some  form  of  proportional  representation. 

In  England  the  two  questions  of  the  electors  and  the  con- 
stituencies, although  usually  considered,  and  made  the  sub- 
ject of  legislation,  at  the  same  time,  have  always  been  kept 
distinct.  Each  of  the  great  series  of  measures  of  parlia- 
mentary reform  has  touched  both  subjects,  but  in  unequal 
degree ;  and,  in  fact,  it  was  really  the  state  of  the  constitu- 
encies that  forced  both  problems  upon  public  attention. 

The  Reform  Act  of  1832  brought  in  a  general  franchise 
for  boroughs  in  place  of  the  multifarious,  and  on  the  whole 
highly  exclusive,  privileges  which  had  existed  before.  It 
also  changed,  though  in  a  less  radical  way,  the  franchise  in 
the  counties.  But  as  a  political  measure  its  greatest  im- 
portance lay  in  its  effect  upon  the  constituencies  by  the 
redistribution  of  seats.  It  took  from  small  boroughs  in 
various  stages  of  decay  and  rottenness  one  hundred  and 
forty-three  seats,  and  gave  them  to  the  counties,  and  to 
new  large  towns  hitherto  unrepresented.  The  Act  of  1867, 
on  the  other  hand,  while  transferring  seats  to  some  extent, 
was  mainly  a  measure  for  extending  greatly  the  borough 
franchise.  In  1884  and  1885  both  subjects  were  dealt  with 
radically.  By  the  Act  of  1884  the  franchise  for  counties 
was  much  enlarged;  and  by  that  of  1885  the  distribution 
of  seats  was  reorganised  upon  a  basis  closely  akin  to  equal 
electoral  districts. 

The  constituencies  for  the  English  Parliament  are  of 
three  kinds;  counties,  boroughs  and  universities.  The 
last  are  quite  different  from  the  others  in  nature  and  fran- 
chise, and  a  word  may  be  said  about  them  here. 


1  This  is  elaborately  discussed  by  Charles  Benoist,  La  Crise  de  I'titat 
Moderne. 


CONSTITUENCIES  AND  VOTERS  197 

Oxford  and  Cambridge  were  given  two  seats  apiece  by  Universities. 
James  I.  The  University  of  Dublin,  which  had  already  one 
seat,  obtained  another  by  the  Reform  Act  of  1832;  and, 
finally,  the  Act  of  1868  gave  one  member  to  London  Univer- 
sity, one  to  Glasgow  and  Aberdeen  combined,  and  another 
to  Edinburgh  and  St.  Andrews.  The  franchise  for  the  uni- 
versities belongs  in  general  to  the  registered  graduates.1 

Until  1832  each  county,  and  each  borough  that  had  the  The  Reform 
privilege  of  being  represented,  elected,  as  a  rule,  two  mem-  ct  of  1832' 
bers  of  Parliament.  This,  however,  was  not  true  of  the 
Scotch  boroughs,  which  were,  with  few  exceptions,  grouped 
into  districts  returning  a  single  member  apiece ;  a  system 
that  has  been  maintained  to  the  present  day.  Some  of  the 
English  boroughs  had  been  given  the  right  of  electing  mem- 
bers by  the  Tudors  and  the  early  Stuarts,  not  because  they 
were  places  of  importance,  but,  on  the  contrary,  because 
they  were  not  populous,  and  their  members  could  be  easily 
controlled  by  the  Crown  —  the  electoral  rights  being  com- 
monly vested  in  the  governing  council,  which  was  a  close 
corporation.  Other  boroughs  that  had  once  been  places  of 
consequence  had,  in  the  course  of  time,  fallen  into  decay. 
So  that  by  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  many 
members  of  the  House  represented  no  substantial  communi- 
ties, and  were  really  appointed  either  by  small  self-per- 
petuating bodies,  or  by  patrons,  who,  owning  the  land, 
controlled  the  votes  of  the  few  electors  in  the  constituency. 
This  condition  of  things  was  made  scandalous  by  the  open 
practice  of  selling  elections  to  Parliament  for  cash ;  and  the 
demand  for  reform,  which  had  been  checked  by  the  long 
struggle  with  France,  began  again  after  the  peace,  culmi- 
nating finally  in  the  Reform  Act  of  1832. 2  The  object  of 
this  measure  was  to  remove  a  manifest  abuse,  rather  than 

1  For  "keeping  one's  name  on  the  books"  the  university  sometimes  re- 
quires a  fee  which  diminishes  seriously  the  number  of  graduates  entitled  to 
vote  either  for  Parliament  or  on  academic  questions.  In  Cambridge,  for 
example,  the  electors  are  only  about  one  half  the  graduates. 

2  For  England,  2  Will.  IV.,  e.  45.  For  Scotland,  2-3  Will.  IV.,  e.  65. 
For  Ireland  2  li  Will.  IV.,  c.  88. 


198         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  reorganise  the  representation  of  the  country  on  a  new 
basis,  and  it  applied  to  the  conditions  a  somewhat  rough 
and  inexact  remedy.  The  parliamentary  boroughs  with 
less  than  two  thousand  population  were  disfranchised 
altogether,  those  with  more  than  two  thousand  and  less 
than  four  thousand  lost  one  member,  and  the  seats  thus 
obtained  were  divided  about  equally  between  the  counties 
and  the  new  large  towns  that  had  hitherto  been  unrepre- 
sented.1 But  the  constituencies  still  remained  very  uneven 
in  population  —  and,  indeed,  the  framers  of  the  act  had  no 
desire  for  equal  electoral  districts. 
The  Reform  The  same  process  was  continued  by  the  Act  of  1867, 
1867°  which  again  took  members  from  little  towns  and  gave  them 

to  larger  ones  and  to  the  counties.  While  there  was  no 
general  attempt  to  make  the  number  of  representatives  pro- 
portional to  the  size  of  a  constituency,  a  few  of  the  largest 
provincial  towns  were  given  three  members;  and  in  that 
connection  an  interesting  experiment  was  tried.  With  the 
object  of  providing  for  minority  representation,  the  electors 
in  the  boroughs  returning  three  members  —  the  so-called 
three-cornered  constituencies  —  were  allowed  to  vote  for 
only  two  candidates  apiece.  This  resulted  in  diminishing 
the  real  representation  of  the  borough,  as  compared  with 
the  rest  of  the  country.  If  Manchester,  for  example,  was 
Liberal,  she  would  probably  be  represented  by  two  Liberals 
and  one  Conservative.  But  in  a  party  division  the  Con- 
servative would  neutralise  one  of  the  Liberals,  so  that 
Manchester  would  count  for  only  one  vote,  and  would, 
therefore,  have  only  half  as  much  weight  as  a  much  smaller 
borough  with  two  members  both  belonging  to  the  same 
party.  The  experiment  gave  so  little  satisfaction  that  it 
wTas  afterward  abandoned ;  and  it  is  chiefly  interesting  to-day 
because  the  effort  to  organise  a  large  party  majority  so  as 
to  compass  the  election  of  all  three  members  gave  rise  to 
the  Birmingham  Caucus,  whose  birth  and  whose  progeny 
will  be  described  in  a  subsequent  chapter.  Except  for  the 
1  Scotland  obtained  eight  additional  members,  and  Ireland  five. 


CONSTITUENCIES   AND  VOTERS  199 

few  three-member  constituencies,  and  a  much  larger  num- 
ber of  boroughs  having  only  a  single  seat,  the  constituen- 
cies still  returned  two  members  apiece ;  and  this  continued 
to  be  the  rule  until  the  third  and  last  of  the  great  measures 
of  parliamentary  reform. 

The  Redistribution  Act  of  1885,  although,  like  all  English  The  Reform 
measures  of  reform,  to  some  extent  a  compromise  between  Act  of  1883' 
the  old  ideas  and  the  new,  rested  upon  the  principle  of  equal 
electoral  districts  each  returning  a  single  member.  The 
proportion  of  one  seat  for  every  54,000  people  was  roughly 
taken  as  the  basis  of  representation ;  and  in  order  to  adapt 
the  principle  to  the  existing  system  with  the  least  possible 
change,  boroughs  with  less  than  15,000  inhabitants  were  dis- 
franchised altogether,  and  became,  for  electoral  purposes, 
simply  a  part  of  the  county  in  which  they  were  situated. 
Boroughs  with  more  than  15,000  and  less  than  50,000  people 
were  allowed  to  retain,  or  if  hitherto  unrepresented  were 
given,  one  member;  those  with  more  than  50,000  and  less 
than  165,000,  two  members;  those  above  165,000  three  mem- 
bers, with  an  additional  memberfor  every  50,000  people  more. 
The  same  general  principle  was  followed  in  the  counties.1 

The  boroughs  that  had  hitherto  elected  two  members,  and 
were  entitled  to  the  same  number  under  the  new  scheme, 
remained  single  constituencies  for  the  election  of  those  two 
members.  Of  these  boroughs  there  are  twenty-three,2 
which,  with  the  City  of  London,  and  the  three  universities 
(Oxford,  Cambridge,  and  Dublin),  makes  in  all  twenty- 
seven  cases  where  two  members  are  elected  together.  All 
the  other  constituencies  are  single-member  districts,  a  result 
which  was  brought  about  by  a  partition  of  the  counties,  of 
boroughs  with  more  than  two  members,  and  of  the  new 
boroughs  with  only  two  members,  into  separate  electoral 
divisions,  each  with  its  own  distinctive  name. 

1  In  several  rases  small  Scotch  counties  are  combined  in  pairs  for  the 
election  of  a  single  member,  but  this  antedated  the  Act  of  1885. 

2  Whereof  twenty  are  in  England,  and  one  each  in  Wales,  Scotland,  and 
Ireland. 


200  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

It  may  be  interesting  to  note  that  the  Reforms  of  1832 
and  1867  did  not  change  the  total  number  of  members  of  the 
House,  but  merely  redistributed  the  existing  658  seats.  By 
the  disfranchisement,  after  1867,  for  corrupt  practices,  of 
four  boroughs  returning  six  members,  the  number  was  re- 
duced to  652 ;  and  the  Reform  Act  of  1885  increased  it  to 
670,  where  it  has  since  remained, 
inequaii-  The  distribution  of  seats  under  the  Act  of  1885  was  only 

ties  in  Rep-  a  r0Ugh  approximation  to  equal  electoral  districts ;  and  in 
time  it  has  become  far  less  close,  until  to-day  the  difference 
in  the  size  of  the  constituencies  is  very  great.  The  smallest 
is  the  borough  of  Newry  in  Ireland,  which  had  at  the  census 
of  1901  a  population  of  only  13,137 ;  or,  if  we  leave  Ireland 
aside  on  account  of  its  peculiar  conditions,  the  smallest  in 
Great  Britain  is  the  city  of  Durham  with  a  population  of 
14,935 ;  while  the  largest  is  the  southern  division  of  the 
County  of  Essex,  with  217,030  inhabitants;  so  that  the 
largest  constituency  to-day  is  nearly  fifteen  times  as  popu- 
lous as  the  smallest.1  Nor  are  the  inequalities  confined  to 
extreme  cases ;  for  they  exist  in  lesser  degree  throughout 
the  electoral  body,  many  of  the  constituencies  being  two  or 
three  times  as  large  as  many  others. 

But  unless  one  assumes  that  the  exact  equivalence  of  all 
votes  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  political  justice,  differ- 
ences of  this  kind  are  of  little  consequence,  provided  one 
part  of  the  community,  or  rather  one  set  of  opinions  or  in- 
terests, is  not  distinctly  over-represented  at  the  expense  of 
another.  Now,  in  Parliament  an  over-representation  of  this 
kind  does  exist ;  not,  indeed,  in  regard  to  the  different 
social  classes  or  economic  interests  in  the  nation  —  for  in- 
equalities of  that  sort  are  not  marked  enough  to  be  impor- 
tant —  but  between  the  different  parts  of  the  country. 

1  This  is  not  because  the  county  constituencies  are  essentially  larger  or 
smaller  than  those  of  the  boroughs.  The  Borough  of  Wandsworth,  for 
example,  had,  in  1901,  a  population  of  179,877.  These  figures  are  taken 
from  single-member  constituencies;  for  it  so  happens  that  the  two-member 
boroughs,  when  their  population  is  divided  by  two,  are  neither  among  the 
largest  or  the  smallest.     Com.  Papers,  1905,  LXII.,  333  ct  seq. 


CONSTITUENCIES   AND  VOTERS  201 

Some  parts  of  Great  Britain  have  grown  very  rapidly,  Over-Repro- 
while  the  population  of  Ireland  has  actually  diminished  j611,*'^1,011  of 
during  the  last  half  century ;  and  the  result  is  that  whereas 
in  the  United  Kingdom  as  a  whole  there  is  now,  on  the  aver- 
age, one  member  of  Parliament  for  every  62,703  people, 
England  has  only  one  for  every  66,971 ;  and  Ireland  one  for 
every  44,147.  If  a  redistribution  of  seats  were  to  be  made 
in  strict  proportion  to  population,  Ireland  would  therefore 
lose  thirty  members,  and  England  would  gain  about  as  many, 
while  Scotland  would  gain  one  seat,  and  Wales  would  lose 
three. 

The  question  of  the  proportional  representation  of  Eng- 
land and  Ireland  is  a  burning  one,  because  the  parliamentary 
system  cannot  work  well  unless  one  party  has  a  majority 
which  can  give  to  the  ministry  a  stable  support.  But 
eighty  of  the  Irish  members  are  Nationalists,  who  do  not 
belong  to  either  of  the  great  parties,  and  may  at  any  general 
election  acquire  a  balance  of  power,  and  cause  confusion  in 
politics,  as  they  did  after  the  election  of  1885.  The  loss 
of  twenty-five  seats,  which  they  would  suffer  by  a  reduction 
of  the  Irish  representation,  would  materially  lessen  that 
danger.  The  Conservative  government  was  constantly 
urged  by  its  supporters  to  make  the  transfer  of  seats  from 
Ireland  to  England,  and  was  actually  preparing  to  do  so  at 
the  time  it  resigned  in  1905.  On  behalf  of  Ireland  it  was 
argued  that  this  would  be  a  violation  of  the  Act  of  Union, 
which  was  in  the  nature  of  a  treaty,  and  allotted  to  Ireland 
one  hundred  members  in  the  House  of  Commons.1  On  the 
other  hand  the  advocates  of  the  policy  replied  that  the 
terms  of  the  Act  of  Union  cannot  be  forever  binding  under 
a  change  of  circumstances;  they  referred  to  the  fact  that 
in  1868  the  Church  of  England  was  disestablished  in  Ireland, 
notwithstanding  the  provision  in  the  Act  for  its  perpetual 
establishment  there;2  and  they  said  that  conditions  had  so 
changed  as  to  justify  a  redistribution  of  seats.     The  Irish, 

1  39-40  Geo.  III.,  c.  67,  Art.  4. 
1  Ibid.,  Art.  5. 


202         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

however,  claim  that  the  great  bulk  of  their  people  wanted 
disestablishment,  and  that  Ireland  could  waive  provisions 
made  in  her  behalf ;  but  it  may  be  urged  that  the  provision 
about  the  Church  was  made  for  the  benefit  not  of  Ireland, 
or  its  people,  but  of  a  minority  there. 

The  formation  in  England  of  new  constituencies  for  the 
seats  transferred  would  raise  great  practical  difficulties. 
Even  if  it  did  not  involve  a  general  redistribution  bill, 
it  would  necessitate  changing  many  of  the  districts.  Quite 
apart  from  the  danger  of  incurring  a  charge  of  gerrymander- 
ing for  party  purposes,  there  would  be  a  host  of  personal  in- 
terests of  members  of  Parliament  to  be  considered.  Each 
member  affected  would  be  anxious  that  the  change  should 
not  make  his  seat  less  secure  than  before  ;  and  claims  of  this 
sort  have  peculiar  weight  in  a  country  where,  as  in  England, 
the  sitting  member  has  almost  a  prescriptive  right  to  renom- 
ination  by  his  party. 
Effect  of  the  The  English  practice  of  rearranging  the  constituencies,  and 
M^rTd  of  apportioning  the  representatives  among  them,  only  at  long 
Distributing  intervals,  of  treating  a  bill  for  the  purpose  as  an  exceptional 
measure  of  great  political  importance,  instead  of  the  natural 
result  of  each  new  census,  has  the  advantage  of  preventing 
frequent  temptations  to  gerrymander.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  raises  the  matter  of  electoral  districts  to  the  height 
of  a  constitutional,  and  almost  a  revolutionary,  question, 
preceded  sometimes  by  long  and  serious  agitation,  and  always 
fought  over  on  party  grounds.  This  is  a  perpetual  diffi- 
culty, for  the  shifting  of  population,  which  must  always 
be  changing  the  ratio  of  representation,  will  from  time  to 
time  make  a  redistribution  of  seats  inevitable. 
T>h;LFran"  The  extension  of  the  franchise  was  long  a  grave  constitu- 
tional question  also,  but  it  has  now  been  so  nearly  worked 
out  that  it  can  hardly  be  regarded  in  that  light  in  future. 
Before  the  Reform  Act  of  1832  the  franchise  in  the 
counties  depended  entirely  upon  the  ownership  of  land,  an 
old  statute  of  1429,1  having  confined  the  right  of  voting  to 

1  8  Hen.  VI.,  c.  7. 


Seats. 


ciuse. 


CONSTITUENCIES   AND   VOTERS  203 

forty-shilling  freeholders;  that  is,  to  men  who  owned  an 
estate  of  inheritance,  or  at  least  a  life  estate,  in  land  of  the 
annual  value  of  forty  shillings.1 

In  the  boroughs  the  franchise  was  based  upon  no  uniform 
principle,  but  varied  according  to  the  custom  or  charter  of 
the  borough.  Sometimes  it  depended  upon  the  tenure  of 
land ;  and,  since  residence  was  by  no  means  always  neces- 
sary, it  might  happen  that  the  voters  did  not  live  in  the 
place,  and  there  were  even  cases  where  members  were  re- 
turned to  Parliament  by  boroughs  that  had  no  longer  a 
single  inhabitant.  Sometimes  the  right  belonged  to  the 
governing  body  of  the  town  ;  sometimes  to  all  the  freemen ; 
sometimes  to  all  householders  who  paid  local  taxes ;  and  in 
one  place,  at  least,  it  extended  to  all  the  inhabitants.  In 
these  last  cases  the  franchise  was  actually  wider  before  the 
Reform  Act  of  1832  than  it  was  afterward,  so  that  although 
the  act  enlarged  the  electorate  very  much  on  the  whole,  and 
preserved  the  rights  of  all  existing  voters,  it  narrowed  the 
franchise  seriously  for  the  future  in  a  few  places.2 

In  the  counties  the  Act  of  1832  continued  to  treat  the  Reform 
right  to  vote  as   dependent  upon   the  tenure   of  land,    al-     ct  °  *    2 
though  in  some  ways  restricting  and  in  others  much  more  Counties, 
largely  extending  it.     In  order  to  prevent  the  manufacture 
of  forty-shilling  freeholders   for   electoral  purposes,  the  act 
provided  that  a  voter  must  have  been  in  possession  of  his 
land  for  six  months,  unless  it  came  to  him  by  descent,  devise, 
marriage  or  promotion  to  an  office  ;3  and,  also,  that  if  he  held 
only  a   life  estate  he  must  either  have  acquired  it  by  one  of 
these  methods,  or  must  be  in  actual  occupation,  unless  again 
it   was   of  the  clear  yearly  value  of  ten  pounds.1     On  the 
other  hand  the  act  extended  the  right  of  voting  in  counties 

1  In  Scotland  the  value  of  the  land,  if  not  of  "old  extent,"  had  to  be 
£400  a  year.  In  Ireland  an  Act  of  1829  had  raised  the  limit  of  annual  value 
to  £10,  to  restrain  the  practice  of  manufacturing  fagot  voters  on  the  eve 
of  an  election. 

2  In  Ireland  the  borough  franchise  was  multifarious  as  in  England.  In 
Scotland  it  was  wholly  in  the  hands  of  the  councils  of  the  royal  burghs. 

1  2-3  Will.  IV.,  c  45,  J  26.  *  Ibid.,  §  IS. 


204         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  persons  entitled  to  copyholds,  and  leaseholds  for  sixty 
years,  of  the  annual  value  of  ten  pounds ;  to  leaseholds  for 
twenty  years  of  the  value  of  fifty  pounds ;  and  to  leaseholds 
of  fifty  pounds  annual  value  without  regard  to  the  length  of 
the  term,  if  the  tenant  was  in  actual  occupation  of  the  land.1 
Boroughs.  In  the  boroughs  the   Reform  Act  wrought  a  complete 

change.  Except  that  it  preserved  the  personal  rights  of 
living  voters,2  and  retained  the  privileges  of  freemen  in 
towns  where  they  existed,3  it  swept  away  all  the  old  quali- 
fications,4 and  replaced  them  by  a  single  new  franchise  based 
exclusively  upon  the  tenure,  or  rather  the  occupation,  of 
land.  The  new  qualification  was  uniform  throughout 
England,  and  included  every  man  who  occupied,  as  owner  or 
tenant,  a  house,  shop,  or  other  building,  worth,  with  the 
land,  ten  pounds  a  year.  But  while  the  franchise  in  the 
boroughs  was  thus  based,  like  that  in  the  counties,  upon 
land,  the  effect  was  entirely  different,  and  was  intended  to 
be  so.  It  has  been  said  that  the  framers  of  the  act  meant 
the  county  members  to  represent  property,  and  the  borough 
members  to  represent  numbers.  The  boroughs,  as  will 
appear  later,  did  not  really  stand  for  numbers,  but  the  coun- 
ties did  certainly  represent  property,  and  that  in  spite  of 
the  Chandos  Clause  which  admitted  fifty-pound  lease- 
holders and  was  resisted  by  the  authors  of  the  bill.  The 
electorate  in  the  counties  consisted  of  the  landholders  with 
a  few  large  farmers,  while  in  the  towns  it  comprised  the 
great  middle  class. 

Later  in  the  same  session  acts  of  a  similar  nature  were 
passed  for  Scotland5  and  Ireland;6  and  in  fact  it  was  the 
practice  until  1884  to  deal  with  the  franchise  in  the  three 
kingdoms  by  separate  statutes. 

1  2-3  Will.  IV.,  c.  45,  §§  19,  20.  The  last  provision  was  added  during  the 
passage  of  the  bill,  and  is  known  from  its  proposer  as  the  Chandos  Clause. 

2  Ibid.,  §  33. 

3  Ibid.,  §  32;  but  freemen  thereafter  admitted  could  vote  only  if  made 
such  by  birth  or  servitude. 

*  Ibid.,  §  33.  By  §  31,  40s.  freeholders  retained  the  franchise  in  bor- 
oughs that  are  counties  by  themselves. 

1  2-3  Will.  IV.,  c.  65.  •  Ibid.,  c.  88. 


1832. 


CONSTITUENCIES   AND  VOTERS  205 

As  the  practice  of  keeping  a  register  of  persons  entitled  Effect  of 
to  vote  at  parliamentary  elections  did  not  begin  until  this  f 
time,  it  is  impossible  to  say  precisely  how  much  the  Act 
of  1832  increased  the  size  of  the  electorate.  But  from 
returns  made  just  prior  to  the  passage  of  the  Act,1  it  would 
appear  that  the  number  of  borough  electors  in  England  and 
Wales  was  then  about  180,000;  whereas  immediately  after 
the  Act  had  gone  into  effect  it  was  282, 398.2  The  total  in- 
crease in  the  borough  electorate,  which  was  the  one  chiefly 
affected,  was  therefore  about  100,000,  and  a  great  part  of 
this  increase  consisted  of  the  voters  in  the  large  towns  that 
had  been  given  seats  for  the  first  time  by  the  Act. 

The  new  system  was  in  no  sense  either  democratic  or  pro- 
portionate to  population.  The  average  ratio  of  electors  to 
population  for  the  whole  United  Kingdom  was  about  one  in 
thirty ;  but  the  variation  in  different  constituencies  and 
different  parts  of  the  kingdom  was  very  great.  In  the 
English  and  Welsh  counties  the  ratio  ran  all  the  way  from 
one  in  five  in  Westmoreland,  to  one  in  thirty-seven  in  Lan- 
cashire, one  in  thirty-nine  in  Middlesex,  and  one  in  sixty 
in  Merioneth.  In  the  English  and  Welsh  boroughs  it  ran 
from  nearly  one  in  four  in  Bedford  and  Aylesbury,  where 
practically  all  adult  males  were  voters,  to  one  in  forty-five 
in  the  manufacturing  towns.  In  Scotland  even  a  smaller 
part  of  the  population  enjoyed  the  franchise.  In  the  coun- 
ties the  ratio  ran  from  one  in  twenty-four  in  Selkirk,  to  one 
in  ninety-seven  in  Sutherland ;  and  in  boroughs  or  dis- 
tricts, from  one  in  twenty  in  the  Elgin  district,  to  one  in 
forty  in  that  of  Linlithgow.  In  the  Irish  counties  it  ran 
from  one  in  fifty-eight  in  Carlow,  to  one  in  two  hundred  and 
sixty-one  in  Tyrone  ;  and  in  the  boroughs  from  one  in  nine  in 
Carrickfergus  and  Waterford,  to  one  in  fifty-three  in  Tralee. 

1  Com.  Papers,  1831-1832,  XXXVI.,  489 

2  It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  of  these,  108,219,  or  nearly  two  fifths 
were  freemen,  scot  and  lot  voters,  potwallopers  and  other  persons  whose 
ancient  rights  had  been  preserved.  They  belonged,  of  course,  only  to  the  old 
boroughs.  Election  Returns  (Boroughs  and  Counties),  Com.  Papers,  1866, 
LVII  ,  21.5,  p.  8. 


206         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

The  proportion  of  members  of  Parliament  to  population 
was  far  more  uneven  still.  As  reformers  at  a  later  date  were 
constantly  pointing  out,  one  half  of  the  borough  population 
of  England  was  contained  in  sixteen  boroughs,  and  elected 
only  thirty-four  members;  the  other  half,  numbering  less 
than  two  and  a  half  millions,  still  returning  two  hundred  and 
ninety-three  members ;  while  the  counties  with  eight  millions 
of  people  returned  one  hundred  and  forty-four  members. 
Thus  it  happened  that  less  than  one  fifth  of  the  population 
in  England  elected  nearly  one  half  of  the  representatives ; 
and  as  these  came  from  the  boroughs  it  can  hardly  be 
said  that  the  borough  members  represented  numbers.1 
Later  Re-  Mr.  G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  in  his  ''Development  of  Parlia- 
form  Bills.  ment  during  the  Nineteenth  Century,"  2  has  pointed  out 
that  while  the  framers  of  the  Act  of  1832  had  not  the  least 
intention  of  introducing  democracy,  the  measure  itself  could 
not  have  furnished  a  permanent  settlement  of  the  franchise, 
and  was  destined  inevitably  to  lead  to  further  steps  in  the 
direction  of  universal  suffrage.  The  first  step  was  a  slight 
reduction,  in  1850,  of  the  amounts  required  for  the  qualifi- 
cation of  voters  in  Ireland.3  This  was  followed  by  a  series 
of  moderate  English  reform  bills,  which  failed  to  pass  the 
House  of  Commons.4 
The  Act  In  1867  Disraeli,  who  had  educated   his  reluctant   party 

until  it  accepted  the  political  need  of  extending  the  fran- 
chise, brought  in  a  bill  with  elaborate  safeguards  against  the 
predominance  of  the  masses.  Under  the  existing  law  a  small 
fraction  of  the  working  classes  had  votes  in  the  boroughs ; 5 

1  These  figures,  about  the  proportion  of  electors  and  members  to  popula- 
tion, are  taken  from  a  Report  on  Electoral  Expenses,  Com.  Papers,  1834, 
IX.,  263,  App.  A.  2  Pp.  47  et  seq.  *  13-14  Vic,  c.  69. 

*  In  reading  the  debates  on  these  bills  a  foreigner  is  often  puzzled  by  the 
distinction  between  ratable  value  and  clear  yearly  value.  The  latter  is 
what  is  called  gross  estimated  rental  in  the  Rate  Book,  while  the  ratable 
value  i.s  supposed  to  be  the  net  yearly  value,  and  it  is  obtained  by  making  a 
reduction  from  the  gross,  which  varies  from  place  to  place,  but  is  on  the 
average  about  ten  per  cent. 

s  Of  the  borough  electors  in  England  and  Wales  26.3  per  cent  belonged  to 
the  working  classes;  Com.  Papers,  1866,  LVII.,  47,  p.  5.  In  Scotland  the 
proportion  was  18.3  per  cent.     Ibid.,  805,  p.  12. 


of  1867. 


CONSTITUENCIES  AND  VOTERS  207 

and  it  was  Disraeli's  intention  to  admit  a  larger  number  of 
the  more  prosperous  workingmen  without  giving  them  an 
overwhelming  weight  in  the  electorate.  But  the  parlia- 
mentary situation  was  peculiar.  The  Conservative  govern- 
ment, which  had  come  into  power  only  through  the  quarrels 
of  its  opponents,  had  not  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  could  not  insist  upon  its  own  policy ;  while  the 
Liberals  were  not  under  the  sense  of  responsibility  that 
comes  with  office.  The  result  was  that  the  bill  was  trans- 
formed by  amendments,  the  safeguards  proposed  by  the 
cabinet  were  swept  away,  and  a  far  longer  stride  toward 
universal  suffrage  was  taken  than  any  one  had  expected. 

In  the  counties  the  Act  of  1867  x  reduced  the  ten-pound 
qualification  for  owners  and  long  leaseholders  to  five  pounds, 
and  created  a  new  twelve-pound  occupation  franchise. 
But  a  far  greater  extension  was  made  in  the  boroughs,  where 
two  new  franchises  were  introduced.  The  most  important 
of  these  was  that  of  the  "householder,"  whereby  a  vote  was 
given  to  every  man  who  occupied,  as  owner  or  tenant  for 
twelve  months,  a  dwelling-house,  or  any  part  of  a  house  used 
as  a  separate  dwelling,  without  regard  to  its  value.2  The 
other  franchise  admitted  lodgers  who  occupied  for  the  same 
period  lodgings  of  the  clear  value,  unfurnished,  of  ten  pounds 

1  30-31  Vic,  c.  102. 

2  One  of  the  safeguards  in  the  bill  was  the  provision  that  householders 
must  be  separately  rated  for  the  relief  of  the  poor,  and  must  have  paid  their 
rates;  and  in  order  to  insure  personal  payment  by  the  householder,  the  Act 
forbade  the  common  practice  of  rating  the  owner  of  dwellings  in  lieu  of  the 
occupier.  But  the  practice  saved  the  local  authorities  much  trouble.  It 
enabled  them  to  receive  the  rates  in  a  single  payment  from  the  owner  of  a 
number  of  houses,  instead  of  collecting  small  sums  from  many  tenants; 
and  they  were  in  the  habit  of  allowing  a  commission  or  rebate  to  owners 
who  paid  in  this  way. 

The  convenience  of  the  old  practice  was  so  great  that  in  1869  it,  was 
again  permitted;  and  the  Act  (32-33  Vic,  c  41)  also  provided  that  such  a 
payment  by  the  owner  should  be  deemed  a  payment  by  the  occupier  for  the 
purpose  of  the  franchise,  thus  sweeping  away  the  safeguard  of  personal  pay- 
ment of  rates. 

The  practice  is  called  compounding  for  rates,  and  the  tenant  whose  rates 
were  paid  by  the  landlord  was  the  subject  of  fierce  discussion  under  the 
name  of  "compound  householder,"  although  it  was  in  fact  the  rate,  and  not 
the  house  or  the  holder  thereof,  that  was  compounded. 


fects. 


1884. 


208  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

a  year.1  In  the  course  of  the  next  session  acts,  in  general 
similar,  were  passed  for  Scotland  and  Ireland.2 

its  Ef-  From  1832  to  1862,  in  spite  of  the  general  gain  in  wealth, 

the  electors  had  increased  very  little  faster  than  the  popula- 
tion; in  England  and  Wales,  indeed,  the  voters  remained 
about  one  twentieth  of  the  people,3  while  in  Scotland  they 
had  risen  only  from  one  thirty  seventh  to  one  thirtieth.4 
But  the  Acts  of  1867  and  1868  almost  doubled  the  electorate. 
In  the  counties  the  voters,  who  numbered  768,705  just  before 
those  acts,  were,  by  1871,  1,055,467 ;  while  the  borough 
voters  increased  from  602,088  to  1,470,956.5 

The  Act  of  It  was  evident  that  the  qualifications  for  voting  could  not 
long  remain  far  wider  in  one  class  of  constituencies  than  in 
another;  that  the  franchise  of  the  boroughs  must,  in  time, 
be  extended  to  the  counties.  This  was  done  in  1884, 6 
and  the  change  more  than  doubled  the  county  electorate. 
The  franchise,  therefore,  is  now  substantially  uniform 
throughout  the  United  Kingdom,  except  that  certain  owners 

1  It  will  be  observed  that  the  £10  occupier  differed  from  the  householder 
in  the  fact  that  he  might  occupy  any  shop,  warehouse,  or  other  building, 
whereas  the  householder  was  qualified  only  by  a  dwelling-house.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  premises  occupied  by  a  £10  occupier  must  be  of  the  clear 
yearly  value  of  £10,  whereas  the  householder  was  qualified  without  regard 
to  the  value  of  the  house. 

By  the  Act  of  1867  the  householder  might  occupy  any  part  of  a  house  used 
as  a  separate  dwelling;  while  the  £10  occupier  must  occupy  a  whole  build- 
ing. This  difference  was,  however,  done  away  with  in  1878  by  an  act 
(41-42  Vic,  c.  26,  §  5),  which  provided  that  the  occupation  might  be  of  any 
separate  part  of  the  building,  if  that  part  were  of  the  yearly  value  of  £10. 

2  31-32  Vic,  cc  48,  49. 

3  They  ran  from  a  little  less  than  one  in  twenty-one  to  a  little  more  than 
one  in  twenty.     Cf.  Com.  Papers,  1866,  LVIL,  215,  569. 

4  Ibid.,  643.  The  extension  of  the  franchise  in  Ireland  in  1850  nearly 
trebled  the  number  of  county  voters  there,  in  spite  of  the  falling  off  in 
population. 

It  may  be  observed  that  the  growth  in  registered  voters  is  not  an  exact 
measure  of  the  increase  in  the  number  of  persons  qualified  for  the  franchise, 
because  with  the  organisation  of  the  political  parties  there  has  been  a  greater 
and  greater  effort  to  make  every  man  register  who  is  entitled  to  do  so. 

6  Com.  Papers,  1872,  XLVII.,  395. 

8  48-49  Vic,  c  3.  The  Act  also  extended  the  household  qualification  — 
both  for  counties  and  boroughs  —  to  men  who  occupy  a  dwelling-house  not 
as  owners  or  tenants,  but  by  virtue  of  their  office  or  employment,  provided 
the  employer  does  not  also  occupy  the  house,  the  object  of  that  proviso 
being  to  exclude  domestic  servants.  This  qualification  is  known  as  the 
"service  franchise." 


CONSTITUENCIES   AND   VOTERS  209 

and  leaseholders  have  a  right  to  vote  in  counties,  and  that  in 
some  old  towns  the  freemen  still  possess  the  suffrage.  Inas- 
much as  most  of  the  boroughs  are  included  in  counties,  the 
occupier,  householder,  or  lodger  would  be  entitled  on  the  same 
qualifying  property  to  vote  in  both ;  and  hence  a  man  in  a 
borough  would  have  two  votes  at  an  election,  while  another 
man  with  the  same  qualification  outside  of  the  borough 
would  have  only  one.  To  avoid  this  result  it  is  provided 
that  a  man  shall  not  be  entitled  to  vote  at  an  election  for  a 
county  in  respect  of  the  occupation  of  a  dwelling-house, 
lodging,  land  or  tenement  in  a  borough ; *  but  he  may 
vote  in  the  county  on  account  of  the  ownership  of  land  in  a 
borough  which  he  does  not  occupy,  or  on  account  of  land 
which  he  both  owns  and  occupies  if  he  occupies  other  land 
in  the  borough  sufficient  to  qualify  him  there.2 

Although   the   franchise   is   now    substantially    uniform,  The  Ex- 
it is  not  exactlv  the  same  for  the  different  parts  of  the  *tins 

.  .  Quahiica 

United  Kingdom ;  nor  is  it  by  any  means  simple.  The  tions. 
latest  acts  have  not  codified  the  law.  It  must  still  be  sought 
in  many  statutes,  whose  provisions  are  so  complicated,  and 
often  obscure,  that  they  can  be  understood  only  by  studying 
the  interpretation  put  upon  them  by  the  courts.  The  reader 
who  wishes  to  ascertain  the  law  on  a  special  point  must  refer 
to  treatises  upon  the  subject,  such  as  Rogers  on  "  Elections." 
It  will  be  enough  for  our  purpose  to  summarise  the  various 
franchises  as  they  exist  to-day. 

There    are   two    qualifications   which    are   not   universal.   Property. 
One  of  these,   relating  to  property  rights  in  land,   applies 
only  to  counties,  and  to  some  extent  to  boroughs  which  are 
counties  in  themselves.3     It  confers  the  right  to  vote  on 

1  48-49  Vic,  c.  3,  0;  and  see  also  2-3  Will.  IV.,  c.  45,  §  24,  and  30-31 
Vic  ,  c.  102,  §  59. 

2  Rogers  on  Elections,  I.,  64-66.  The  references  to  Rogers  are  to  the 
16th  Ed.  of  Vol.  I.,    to  the  17th  Ed.  of  Vol.  II. 

5  The  amount  required  for  the  qualification  of  freeholders  in  boroughs 
which  are  counties  is  not  exactly  the  same  as  in  counties;  and  the  leasehold 
qualifications  do  not  extend  to  them.  In  England  there  are  now  only  four 
boroughs  which  retain  the  e  rights:  Bristol,  Exeter,  Norwich,  and  Notting- 
ham.     Rogers  on  "Elections,"  I.,  160  <t  scq. 


210 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


owners  of  land  x  of  forty  shillings  yearly  value,  who  hold  an 
estate  of  inheritance ;  or  who  hold  an  estate  for  life,  and  are 
in  actual  occupation  of  the  land,  or  have  acquired  it  by  some 
means  other  than  purchase,  or  whose  land  is  of  five  pounds 
clear  yearly  value.2  Under  this  franchise  come,  also,  the 
leaseholders  of  land  of  five  pounds  yearly  value  if  the 
original  term  was  not  less  than  sixty  years,  and  fifty  pounds 
value  if  the  term  was  not  less  than  twenty  years.3  The 
corresponding  qualifications  for  Scotland  and  Ireland  are 
slightly  different  in  their  conditions  and  in  the  values 
required. 
Freemen.  The   other   franchise   which   is  not  universal  is  that  of 

freemen  in  those  towns  where  they  had  a  right  to  vote  before 
1832.     The  privilege  still  exists  in  a  number  of  old  boroughs, 
but,  except  in  the  City  of  London,  is  confined  to  freemen 
who  have  become  such  by  birth  or  apprenticeship. 
Occupiers,         The  three  remaining  franchises  are  universal,  though  not 
holders,  and  precisely  uniform.     They  are  those  of  the  ten-pound  oc- 
Lodgers.        cupiers,  the  householders,  and  the  lodgers.     The  first  of  these 
gives  the  right  to  vote  to  a  man  who  occupies,  as  owner  or 
tenant,  any  land  or  tenement  of  the  clear  yearly  value  of 
ten  pounds.     The  second  confers  the  right  on  a  man  who  oc- 
cupies, as  owner  or  tenant,  any  dwelling-house,  or  part  of  a 
house  used  as  a  separate  dwelling,  without  regard  to  its 
value.     The  qualification  extends  also  to  men  who  are  not 
owners  or  tenants,  but  who  occupy  by  virtue  of  an  office, 
service,  or  employment,  a  dwelling-house  in  which  the  em- 
ployer does  not  himself  reside.     The  third  of  these  fran- 
chises confers  the  right  to  vote  upon  a  man  who  occupies 
lodgings  of  the  value,  unfurnished,  of  ten  pounds  a  year. 
The  application  of  these  franchises  to  particular  cases  has 


1  Rent  charges,  whether  arising  from  the  commutation  of  tithes  or  other- 
wise, are  realty,  and  qualify  a  voter  as  land. 

2  If  the  land  is  copyhold  or  other  tenure,  it  must  in  any  case  be  of  the 
yearly  value  of  £.5. 

s  The  £50  leaseholders  admitted  by  the  Chandos  Clause  in  the  Act  of 
1832  were  required  to  occupy  the  land,  and  are  now  included  in  the  £10 
occupation  franchise. 


CONSTITUENCIES  AND  VOTERS  211 

given  rise  to  a  great  amount  of  litigation,  and  in  particular 
the  courts  have  found  it  almost  impossible  to  distinguish 
between  a  householder  and  a  lodger.  For  the  general  reader, 
who  is  concerned  with  the  study  of  the  English  government, 
and  not  with  the  effort  to  get  the  largest  possible  number  of 
party  members  registered,  such  questions  have  little  in- 
terest ;  but  there  are  two  or  three  matters  that  ought  to  be 
noted,  because  they  have  an  important  bearing  on  the  actual 
size  of  the  electorate. 

One  matter  of  political  consequence  relates  to  the  period  Period  of 
of  occupation  required.  Owners  of  land  in  counties,  who  ^upa" 
have  acquired  it  by  descent,  marriage,  promotion  to  an 
office,  etc.,  are  not  required  to  have  owned  it  for  any  period. 
All  other  owners  must  have  held  the  title  for  six  calendar 
months  before  the  15th  of  July  preceding  the  registration; 
and  all  other  voters,  except  freemen,  must  have  been  in 
occupation  of  the  qualifying  premises,  or  some  other  prem- 
ises within  the  same  constituency,  for  one  year  preceding 
the  15th  of  July.1  This,  of  course,  has  the  effect  of  disquali- 
fying entirely  persons  whose  occupation  has  not  been  con- 
tinuous for  the  whole  of  that  year,  and  as  the  register  does 
not  take  effect  until  the  1st  of  January  following,  and 
then  remains  in  effect  a  whole  year,  voters  who  have  moved 
to  another  part  of  the  country  within  eighteen  months 
after  their  year  of  occupation  can  vote  only  by  a  journey 
back  to  their  former  place  of  abode. 

A  second  matter  that  must  be  noticed  is  the  question  of  Residence, 
residence.  Before  the  Reform  Act  of  1832  the  qualification 
for  counties  was  based  upon  ownership ;  that  for  boroughs 
varied  very  much;  but  in  those  places  where  the  franchise 
was  broad  it  was  based  mainly  upon  residence.  This  dis- 
tinction has,  to  some  extent,  persisted.  In  general  it  may 
bo  said  that  for  English  and  Scotch  counties,  and  in  Ireland 
for  both  boroughs  and  counties,  residence  is  not  required, 
except  so  far  as  the  occupation  of  a  dwelling-house  or  lodg- 
ing may  involve  residence  and  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.2 
1  Rogers,  I.,  61-63,  125.  '  Ibid.,  27,  66. 


of  Rates. 


212  THE    GOVERNMENT    OF   ENGLAND 

In  English  boroughs  a  voter  must  have  resided  for  six 
calendar  months  previous  to  the  15th  of  July  in  the  borough, 
or  within  seven  miles  thereof ; 1  and  in  Scotland  he  must  have 
resided  there  for  a  whole  year. 

The  requirement  of  residence  does  not,  however,  imply 
quite  so  much  as  might  appear,  because,  according  to 
English  law,  the  possession  of  a  chamber  in  which  a  man 
occasionally  sleeps,  and  to  which  he  can  return  at  any  time, 
is  enough  to  constitute  residence ;  and,  hence,  he  may  have 
a  residence  in  more  than  one  place.2  In  the  counties,  there- 
fore, residence  is  unnecessary,  and  even  in  the  boroughs  the 
requirement  of  residence  does  not  limit  a  man  to  voting  in  a 
single  constituency.  The  importance  of  this  will  shortly  be 
pointed  out. 
Payment  The  third  matter  to  be  noticed  is  the  question  of  rating. 

We  have  already  observed  that  at  one  time  the  personal 
payment  of  rates  by  the  voter  was  much  discussed,  and  was 
regarded  as  an  important  guarantee  of  character.3  In  Eng- 
land poor  rates  are  assessed  upon  the  occupiers,  not  the 
owners,  of  the  property,  and  it  is  still  provided  that  all 
voters  whose  qualification  depends  upon  the  occupation  of 
land  (except  lodgers,  who  are  not  from  the  legal  point  of 
view  occupiers)  must  have  been  rated  and  must  have  paid 
their  rates.4  But  this  means  only  that  the  rates  must  have 
been  paid  on  their  behalf ;  and  the  practice  of  compounding 
by  the  landlord  for  small  tenements  is  so  universal  that 
practically  the  landlord  pays  the  rates  in  almost  all  cases 
where  the  occupiers  would  be  likely  to  fail  to  do  so.  In 
England,  therefore,  the  requirement  that  the  rates  must 
have  been  paid  has  little  or  no  effect  on  the  electorate.  In 
Scotland,  on  the  other  hand,  this  is  not  the  case.  There 
the  rates  are  divided  between  the  owner  and  the  occupier, 
and    the    practice    of    compounding   does   not    exist.      The 

1  Rogers,  I.,  148-49,  162.      In  the  City  of  London  he  may  reside  within 
twenty-five  miles. 

2  Ibid.,  149-50. 

3  Page  207,  note  2,  supra. 

4  Rogers,  I.,  27,  30,  126  et  seq.,  142  et  seq. 


CONSTITUENCIES  AND  VOTERS  213 

result  is  that  many  occupiers  are  omitted  from  the  parlia- 
mentary register  every  year  on  account  of  their  failure  to 
pay  rates.  For  the  whole  of  Scotland  the  number  reaches 
fifty  thousand.1 

A  comparison  of  the  number  of  electors  on  the  register  Actual  ex- 
with  the  total  population  shows  that  England  is  not  very  g^r°f*he 
far  to-day  from  manhood  suffrage.  The  ratio  is  about  one 
in  six,2  whereas  the  normal  proportion  of  males  above  the 
age  of  twenty-one  years  (making  no  allowance  for  paupers, 
criminals,  and  other  persons  disqualified  by  the  laws  of  all 
countries),  is  somewhat  less  than  one  in  four.  The  only 
classes  excluded  from  the  franchise  are  domestic  servants, 
bachelors  living  with  their  parents  and  occupying  no  prem- 
ises on  their  own  account,  and  persons  whose  change  of 
abode  deprives  them  of  a  vote.  Now,  these  are  not  neces- 
sarily the  worst  political  elements  in  the  community.  No 
doubt  the  provision  requiring  twelve  months'  occupation  ex- 
cludes vagrants,  but  it  also  excludes  excellent  artisans  who 
migrate  with  changes  of  trade,  and  other  persons  whose 
calling  compels  them  to  move  from  place  to  place.  In  1902 
a  school-teacher,  in  a  plaintive  letter  to  The  Tunes,3  described 
how  he  had  never  been  able  to  vote  at  a  general  election. 
He  had  graduated  with  honours  from  his  university,  was 
nearly  forty  years  old,  married,  and  prosperous;  but  his 
very  success  in  his  profession,  by  involving  changes  of  resi- 
dence, had  always  cost  him  the  right  to  vote.  It  is  a  com- 
mon saying  that  many  respectable  people  are  disfranchised 
from  this  cause,  although  the  slums,  which  move  little,  are 
not. 

The  present  condition  of  the  franchise  is,  indeed,  histori- 
cal rather  than  rational.  It  is  complicated,  uncertain,  ex- 
pensive in  the  machinery  required,  and  excludes  a  certain 
number  of  people  whom  there  is  no  reason  for  excluding, 
while  it  admits  many  people  who  ought  not  to  be  admitted 

•Com.  Papons,  1898,  LXXX.,  7.">. 

2  It  is  slightly  less  in  Scotland  than  in   Knglund  and  Ireland. 

3  Aug.  30. 


214  THE    GOVERNMENT    OF   ENGLAND 

if  any  one  is  to  be  debarred.  But  the  hardship  or  injustice 
affects  individuals  alone.  No  considerable  class  in  the  com- 
munity is  aggrieved,  and  neither  political  party  is  now 
anxious  to  extend  the  franchise.  The  Conservatives  are 
not  by  tradition  in  favour  of  such  a  course,  and  leading 
Liberals  have  come  to  realise  that  any  further  extension 
would  be  likely  to  benefit  their  opponents. 
Plural  Vot-  Although  there  is  no  urgent  demand  for  a  closer  approach 
"*•  to  manhood  suffrage,  there  has  long  been  a  strong  desire 

to  restrict  each  man  to  a  single  vote.  That  a  man  should 
have  a  vote  in  two  different  constituencies  is  as  clearly  a 
breach  of  political  equality  as  if  he  had  two  votes  in  the 
same  place ;  and  for  this  reason,  as  well  as  from  the  fact  that 
most  of  the  men  who  have  more  than  one  vote  are  Conser- 
vatives, a  demand  for  the  abolition  of  plural  voting  has  been 
for  many  years  an  article  in  the  Liberal  programme.  So 
far  as  the  franchise  is  not  dependent  upon  residence  there 
is  nothing  to  prevent  a  man  from  voting  in  every  constit- 
uency where  he  possesses  a  qualification.1  Now  for  the 
counties  and  the  universities  residence  is  not  necessary; 
and  even  in  the  boroughs,  where  it  is  required,  plural  voting 
is  restrained  only  in  part,  because  a  man  may  have  more 
than  one  residence,  and  because  residence  within  seven 
miles  of  the  borough  is  enough,  so  that  the  men  who  carry 
on  their  business  in  the  town  and  live  in  the  suburbs  are 
qualified  in  the  borough  by  reason  of  their  offices  or  work- 
shops, and  in  a  suburban  borough  or  the  county  by  reason 
of  their  dwellings. 

It  is  not  easy  to  determine  how  many  persons  are  entitled 
to  vote  in  more  than  one  constituency,  or  how  much  they 
affect  the  result  of  elections.  In  a  return  of  resident  and 
non-resident  voters  made  to  Parliament  in  1888,2  it  appeared, 

1  A  man  cannot  vote  in  more  than  one  division  of  the  same  borough. 
48-49  Vic,  c.  23,  §  8.  But  there  is  no  such  limitation  in  the  case  of  divi- 
sions of  a  county.  Ibid.,  §  9.  Metropolitan  London  is  not  a  single  borough, 
but  a  collection  of  boroughs,  several  of  which  contain  more  than  one  division, 
and  hence  the  effect  of  this  provision  is  quite  irrational  there. 

2  Com.  Papers,  1888,  LXXIX.,  907. 


CONSTITUENCIES   AND  VOTERS  215 

as  was  natural,  that  the  proportion  of  the  latter  was  greatest 
among  the  freeholders  in  the  counties,  nearly  one  quarter 
of  whom  were  non-residents.  In  all  there  were  about  two 
hundred  thousand  non-resident  voters  in  England  and 
Wales.  This  is  between  four  and  five  per  cent,  of  the  total 
electorate,  which  does  not  seem  an  important  fraction ;  but 
it  fails  to  express  the  full  effect  of  plural  voting,  because  it 
does  not  include  the  persons  who  have  more  than  one  resi- 
dence, or  who  live  outside  the  limits  of  a  borough  but  within 
seven  miles  of  it,  or  those  again  who  reside  in  a  borough 
that  forms  part  of  a  county  and  are  qualified  to  vote  in 
both.  Moreover,  the  men  with  more  than  one  vote,  although 
a  small  proportion  of  the  whole  electorate  of  the  kingdom, 
are  quite  numerous  enough  to  turn  the  scale  in  a  close 
constituency. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  new  Liberal  ministry  in  the 
session  of  1906,  was  to  bring  in  a  bill  to  abolish  plural  voting 
altogether.  This  could  not  be  done  simply  by  making  resi- 
dence a  condition  of  the  franchise,  because  in  England  a 
man  may  have  more  than  one  residence.  The  measure  pro- 
vided, therefore,  that  the  voter  must  elect  in  which  of  the 
places  where  he  possessed  a  qualification  he  would  be 
registered,  and  forbade  him  to  vote  anywhere  else.  The 
bill  was  passed  by  the  House  of  Commons,  but  rejected 
forthwith  by  the  Lords. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  the  number  of  voters  regis-  Number  of 
tered  under  the  different  franchises.     In  1906  the  figures  I',,octors  b-^ 

°  Classes. 

for  the  United  Kingdom  were  as  follows :  — 
Owners         Occupiers        Lodgers      Freemen,  etc.      Univs.  Total 

579,827    6,357,817    226,191       57,728      45,150     7,266,706 

By  far  the  greater  part  of  the  voters  are  registered  as  occu- 
piers, a  class  which  includes  both  the  householders  and  the 
ten-pound  occupiers.  The  table  contains  a  surprisingly 
small  number  of  lodgers;  and  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
whereas  the  lists  of  owners  and  freemen  are  virtually  per- 
manent, and  the  list  of  occupiers  is  made  up  by  the  over- 


216 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Disqualifi- 
cations for 
Voting. 


seers  of  the  poor  from  the  rate-book,1  a  lodger  alone  must 
make  every  year  a  personal  application  to  be  registered.2 
The  result  is  that  no  one  seeks  to  be  enrolled  as  a  lodger 
if  he  has  any  other  franchise ;  and  no  doubt  many  lodgers, 
who  have  no  other  qualification,  neglect  to  register  at  all. 

A  characteristic,  although  not  in  itself  a  very  important 
peculiarity  of  the  English  electoral  law,  is  the  rule  depriving 
peers  of  the  right  to  vote ; 3  and  in  fact  the  Commons  still 
profess  to  be  highly  jealous  of  any  part  taken  in  electoral 
campaigns  by  members  of  the  House  of  Lords.4  In  other 
respects  the  disqualifications  for  voting  in  England  are 
now  much  the  same  as  in  other  countries.  There  are  the 
usual  rules  excluding  aliens,  infants,  idiots,  paupers,  con- 
victs, and  persons  who  have  been  guilty  of  corrupt  practices 
at  elections.  Formerly  there  were  also  provisions  excluding 
large  classes  of  public  officers,  but  these  have  been  repealed, 
except  in  the  case  of  the  Irish  police,  of  certain  officers 
directly  concerned  in  the  conduct  of  elections,  and  of  per- 
sons employed  and  paid  by  the  candidates. 

Women  cannot  vote  for  members  of  Parliament,  although 
they  possess  the  franchise  for  almost  all  local  elections. 
This  question  has  of  late  aroused  much  interest.  Although 
both  of  the  political  parties  have  at  times  adopted  resolu- 
tions in  favour  of  woman  suffrage,  the  leading  men  in  both 
are  divided  about  it,  and  the  Labour  Party  may  be  said  to 
be  the  only  political  organisation  of  men  in  England  that 
want  it  heartily.  But  many  women  are  agitating  for  it 
very  vigorously,  and  the  most  enthusiastic  of  them  have 
sought  martyrdom  by  refusing  to  pay  taxes,  by  creating  a 
disturbance  in  the  ladies'  gallery  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons,  and   by  getting   arrested   for  speech-making  in  the 

1  Where  the  landlord  compounds  for  the  rates  he  is  required  to  give  to  the 
overseers  a  list  of  the  actual  occupiers.     Rogers,  I.,  130. 

2  Rogers,  I.,  265,  266,  268. 

3  An  Irish  peer  actually  sitting  for  a  constituency  in  Great  Britain  can 
vote. 

4  They  adopt  every  year  a  sessional  order  that  for  a  peer  "  to  concern 
himself  in  the  election  of  members"  is  "a  high  infringement  of  the  liberties 
and  privileges  of  the  Commons." 


CONSTITUENCIES   AND  VOTERS  217 

Palace  Yard.  They  are  known  as  Suffragettes,  and  evi- 
dently have  faith  in  the  old  adage  that  Parliament  never 
redresses  grievances  until  they  are  brought  forcibly  to  its 
notice.  Women  will  no  doubt  ultimately  obtain  the  suf- 
frage if  they  are  substantially  united  in  wanting  it,  and 
the  principle  is  certainly  making  great  headway  among 
them  in  England  to-day. 

It  is  not  enough  that  a  man  possesses  the  requisite  quali-  Rogistra- 
fications  for  the  franchise.  His  name  must  also  be  upon  the  tlon' 
register  of  voters  for  the  constituency,  and  the  process  of 
compiling  the  register  is  cumbrous  and  expensive.  This  is 
due  in  part  to  the  complicated  nature  of  the  various  fran- 
chises, which  may  involve  intricate  questions  of  law  and 
of  fact,  and  partly  to  the  practice  of  leaving  the  duty  of 
proving  claims  and  objections  mainly  in  the  hands  of  private 
individuals.  The  lists  are  made  up  in  the  first  instance  by 
the  overseers  of  the  poor  in  each  parish;  but  any  person 
whose  name  is  omitted  may  claim  to  have  it  inserted,  and 
any  person  whose  name  is  on  the  lists  may  file  an  objection 
to  any  other  name  which  he  thinks  ought  not  to  have  been 
included.  These  claims  and  objections  arc  heard  in  Sep- 
tember by  the  Revising  Barrister  —  a  barrister  of  not  less 
than  seven  years'  standing,  appointed  for  the  purpose  by 
the  judge  in  whose  circuit  the  constituency  lies,  and  paid 
by  the  Treasury.  It  is  his  duty  to  revise  the  register  by 
adding  the  names  of  persons  who  prove  their  claims,  and  by 
striking  off  names  improperly  inserted.  In  doing  this  he 
is  not  limited  to  names  against  which  objections  have  been 
filed,  for  lie  has  a  right  to  make  inquiries  and  summon 
witnesses  on  his  own  motion.1  In  practice,  however,  the 
cases  are  prepared  beforehand,  and  argued  before  him,  by  the 
local  agents  of  the  two  political  parties,  whose  object  is  to 
get  the  names  of  their  partisans  on  to  the  register  and  keep 
off  those  of  their  opponents. 

1  For  the  duties  of  the  Revising  Barrister,  see  Rogers,  I.,  207-330.  From 
the  decision  of  the  Revising  Barrister  an  appeal  lies  on  questions  of  law  to  the 
King's  Bench  Division  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice. 


218  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

The  process  is  repeated  every  year,  and  the  work  and  cost 
involved  are  considerable,  the  money  being  provided  by  the 
candidate  for  Parliament,  or  by  means  of  subscriptions  to 
the  party  funds.  This  is  one  of  the  things  that  makes  elec- 
tions expensive ;  and  it  helps  to  explain  the  desire  of  each 
party  in  a  constituency  to  have  a  candidate  at  all  times,  even 
when  an  election  is  not  impending.  In  Scotland  registra- 
tion is  far  less  of  a  burden  upon  the  parties,  and  costs  the 
candidate  very  little,  because  the  qualifications  of  all  the 
voters,  except  the  lodgers,  are  investigated  by  a  public 
officer,  called  the  assessor,  and  a  corps  of  assistants,  with 
the  result  that  there  are  few  claims  or  objections  for  the  po- 
litical agents  to  contest.  There  seems  to  be  no  self-evident 
reason  why  this  should  not  be  done  everywhere,  and  for 
every  class  of  voter. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   HOUSE   OF   COMMONS 

Electoral  Procedure 

All  elections  to  Parliament,  whether  general  elections 
following  a  dissolution,  or  the  so-called  by-elections  result- 
ing from  an  accidental  vacancy,  take  place  in  pursuance  of 
a  writ  under  the  Great  Seal,  issued  from  the  Crown  Office, 
and  directed  to  the  returning  officer  of  the  constituency. 
In  all  counties,  and  in  Scotch  and  Irish  boroughs,  the 
returning  officer  is  the  sheriff  or  his  deputy.  In  English 
boroughs  he  is  the  mayor. 

Until   1872   candidates  for  Parliament   were  nominated  Procedure 
viva  voce  at  the  hustings,  —  a  temporary  platform  erected  at    ec  lona* 
for  the  purpose.     If  more  names  were  proposed  than  there  Before  the 
were  seats  to  be  filled,  the  election  was  said  to  be  contested,  Ballot  Act* 
and  a  show  of  hands  was  called  for.     Many  of  the  persons 
present  were  probably  not  entitled  to  vote,  but  that  was  of 
no  importance,  because  the  show  of  hands  was  merely  for- 
mal, and  a  poll  was  always  demanded.     A  time  for  taking 
it  was  then  fixed,  extending  over  a  number  of  days,  during 
which  the  electors  declared  their  votes  publicly.     This  gave 
a  chance  for  bribery,   for  the  intimidation  of  voters,  and 
for   disturbances  of  various  kinds,  not  seldom  deliberately 
planned.      The    disorderly    scenes    that    accompanied    an 
election  have  often  been  described  both  in  histories,  and  in 
novels  such  as  "The  Pickwick  Papers"  and  "Coningsby," 
written  by  men  familiar  with  the  old  polling  days.     In  1872 
the  method   of  conducting  elections  was  changed  by  the 
Ballot  Act,1  which  introduced  secret  voting,  and  made  the 
procedure  more  orderly  in  many  other  respects. 
1  35-36  Vic,  c.  33. 
219 


220 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Existing 
Procedure. 


Nomina- 
tion. 


Election 
Days. 


Nominations  are  now  made  in  writing  by  proposer,  sec- 
onder, and  eight  others,  all  registered  voters.  If  only  one 
person  is  nominated  for  a  seat,  the  candidate,  or  candidates 
if  it  be  a  two-member  constituency,  are  at  once  declared 
elected ;  nor  is  this  a  hypothetical  case,  because,  for  rea- 
sons that  will  be  described  hereafter,  usually  more  than 
one  fourth,  and  sometimes  more  than  one  third,  of  the  seats 
are  not  contested  at  a  general  election. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  election  is  contested,  a  day 
is  fixed  for  the  poll ;  for  voting  is  now  confined  to  a  single 
day  in  each  constituency.  It  is  not  the  same  day  in  all  of 
them,  on  account  of  the  latitude  still  given  to  the  returning 
officer.  He  has  a  right,  within  certain  limits  which  are  differ- 
ent for  counties  and  boroughs,  to  determine  how  many  days 
shall  elapse  between  his  receipt  of  the  writ  and  the  election 
(that  is,  the  nomination)  and  how  many  between  the  elec- 
tion and  the  poll.1  The  result  is  that  in  boroughs  the  vot- 
ing may  take  place  anywhere  from  four  to  eight  days  after 
the  receipt  of  the  writ ;  and  in  counties  anywhere  from  six 
to  seventeen  days.  Now,  as  the  writs  are  sent  out  by  mail 
at  the  same  time,  the  voting  at  the  general  election  covers 
a  period  of  more  than  two  weeks. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  such  a  power  to  arrange  the 
order  of  elections  would  be  used  by  the  returning  officer 
to  help  his  own  party,  and  this  is  said  to  be  done,  not 
systematically  over  the  country,  but  in  particular  places. 
The  multiplicity  of  election  days  has  another  and  more 
important  political  effect ;  for  it  gives  time  to  the  out- 
voters, as  the  non-residents  are  called,  to  get  from  one  con- 
stituency to  another,  and  thus  it  facilitates  voting  in  more 
than  one  place.     For  this  reason  the  Liberal  party  —  which 

1  He  must,  within  a  day  after  receiving  the  writ  in  boroughs  and  two  days 
in  counties,  give  notice  of  the  day  of  election.  This  must  be  not  less  than 
three  days  in  boroughs,  or  four  in  counties,  after  the  notice  is  given;  and 
must  be  in  boroughs  within  four  days  of  the  receipt  of  the  writ,  and  counties 
within  nine  days.  If,  on  the  day  fixed  for  nomination,  the  election  is  con- 
tested, he  must  appoint  for  the  polling  a  date  felling  within  the  next  three 
days  in  boroughs,  and  not  less  than  two  nor  more  than  six  days  distant  in 
counties. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  221 

is  opposed  to  plural  voting  —  has  demanded  in  its  platform 
that  all  elections  should  take  place  on  the  same  day.  To 
this  it  has  been  objected  that  the  change  would,  by 
lengthening  the  electoral  period  in  the  boroughs,  increase 
the  fatigue  and  cost  to  borough  candidates ;  and  in  view 
of  the  rate  at  which  labour  and  money  are  expended  on 
such  occasions  the  objection  is  not  altogether  without 
foundation. 

For  the  convenience  of  voting  the  constituency  is  divided  Method  of 
into  a  number  of  polling  districts ;  and  when  an  election  is  Votins- 
contested,  the  vote  is  taken  in  these  districts  between  eight 
in  the  morning  and  eight  in  the  evening  of  the  appointed 
day.  The  method  of  voting  under  the  Australian  system  of 
secret  ballot,  which  was  adopted  in  1872,  need  not  be  de- 
scribed, because  in  some  form  its  use  has  become  well-nigh 
universal  in  civilised  countries.1  It  may  be  noted,  however, 
that  the  Ballot  Act  has  never  been  extended  to  the  univer- 
sities, where  voting  is  still  done  orally,  or  by  means  of  a 
voting  paper  tendered  at  the  polls  by  another  elector  to 
whom  it  has  been  intrusted.2  In  fact  most  of  the  university 
votes  are  given  by  proxy  —  a  practice  which  was  introduced 
in  1861,3  and  would  be  abolished  by  the  ballot. 

Before  the  Reform  Act  of  1832,  huge  sums  of  money  were  Legislation 
sometimes  expended  at  parliamentary  elections,  and  bribery  corruption 
and  corruption  were  rife.  Nor  did  the  disfranchisement  of 
rotten  boroughs,  and  the  extension  of  the  franchise,  by  any 
means  put  an  entire  stop  to  the  practice.  Even  as  late  as 
1880  the  special  commissions  appointed  to  inquire  into  the 
conduct  of  a  number  of  boroughs,  for  which  election  petitions 
had  been  filed,  found  a  bad  state  of  affairs.4     In  Macclesfield 

'  "In  one  only  of  the  three  kingdoms  the  ballot  helped  to  make  a  truly 
vital  difference;  it  dislodged  the  political  power  of  the  Irish  landlord.  In 
England  its  influence  made  for  purity,  freedom,  and  decency,  but  it  developed 
no  new  sources  of  liberal  strength."  Morley,  "Gladstone,"  II.,  370.  But 
the  ballot  is  also  said  to  have  slowly  strengthened  the  Liberal  party  in 
English  rural  districts  by  shielding  the  agricultural  labourer. 

2  35-30  Vic,  c  33,  §§27,  31.      Rogers,  II.,  118. 

•24-25  Vic,  c  53. 

♦Com.  Papers,  1881,  XXX VI II. -XL V. 


222 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Corrupt 
Practices. 


Bribery. 


Treating. 


and  Sandwich  about  half  the  voters  had  been  guilty  of  brib- 
ery and  other  corrupt  practices ; l  and  as  a  result  of  the 
investigation  those  two  boroughs,  which  were  decidedly 
the  worst,  were  entirely  disfranchised.  A  series  of  attempts 
have  been  made  to  root  out  the  evil  by  legislation.  They 
have  been  more  and  more  elaborate,  and  reached  their 
culmination  in  the  Corrupt  and  Illegal  Practices  Act  of  1883. 2 
These  laws  seek  to  restrain  improper  conduct  at  elections 
by  several  methods;  first,  by  forbidding  altogether  cer- 
tain classes  of  acts,  which  either  interfere  directly  with 
the  purity  of  elections,  or  have  proved  a  source  of  inordinate 
expense ;  second,  by  limiting  the  total  amount  that  can  be 
spent,  and  the  purposes  for  which  it  can  be  used ;  third,  by 
requiring  that  disbursements  shall  be  made  through  one 
recognised  agent,  who  is  obliged  to  return  to  the  government 
a  full  account  thereof ;  and,  fourth,  by  imposing  for  violation 
of  these  provisions  penalties,  political  and  other,  inflicted 
not  only  by  criminal  process,  but  also  summarily  by  the 
tribunal  that  tries  the  validity  of  a  controverted  election. 

The  most  demoralising  acts  forbidden  by  law  are  known 
as  corrupt  practices.  They  are  bribery,  treating,  undue 
influence,  and  personation.3 

Bribery  at  elections  is,  of  course,  criminal  in  all  countries  ; 
and  in  England  the  offence  is  defined  in  great  detail,  for 
just  as  there  are  seven  recognised  kinds  of  lies,  so  the  Eng- 
lish statutes  describe  seven  distinct  methods  by  which  brib- 
ery can  be  committed.4  It  is  unnecessary  for  anybody 
who  is  not  engaged  in  electoral  work  to  remember  these ; 
and  it  is  enough  here  to  point  out  that  they  include  a  prom- 
ise, or  endeavour,  to  procure  any  office  or  employment  for 
a  voter  in  order  to  influence  his  vote. 

Treating  differs  from  bribery  in  the  fact  that  bribery 
involves  a  contract  for  a  vote,  express  or  implied,  whereas 
the  person  who  treats  obtains  no  promise  from  the  voter, 


1  Com.  Papers,  1881,  XLIII.,  XLV.,  and  schedules  to  these  reports. 
5  46-47  Vic.,  c.  51.  3  Ibid.,  §  3. 

4  17-18  Vic,  c.  102,  §§  2,  3. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  223 

and  relies  only  upon  his  general  sense  of  gratitude.  But, 
as  one  of  the  judges  remarked  in  the  trial  of  an  election  pe- 
tition some  years  ago,  it  is  difficult  in  the  large  constituen- 
cies of  the  present  day  to  bribe  successfully,  while  a  small 
amount  of  treating  is  sufficient  to  procure  a  great  deal  of 
popularity.1  This  is  particularly  true  in  England,  where  the 
habit  of  treating  is  made  easy  by  the  existence  of  sharp 
class  distinctions.  Treating  was  forbidden  as  long  ago  as  the 
days  of  William  III.,  and  it  is  now  defined  2  as  giving,  or  pay- 
ing the  expense  of  giving,  "any  meat,  drink,  entertainment 
or  provision  to  or  for  any  person  for  the  purpose  of  corruptly 
influencing  that  person  or  any  other  person  to  give  or  refrain 
from  giving  his  vote." 

Undue  influence  is  defined  by  the  Act  of  1883  3  as  making  Undue  in- 
use,  or  threatening  to  make  use,  of  any  force,  violence,  or  fluence- 
restraint,  or  inflicting,  or  threatening  to  inflict,  any  tem- 
poral or  spiritual  injury  on  any  person  in  order  to  influence, 
or  on  account  of,  his  vote ;  or  by  duress  or  fraud  impeding 
the  free  exercise  of  the  franchise  by  any  man.  These  pro- 
visions cover  threats  by  an  employer  to  discharge  workmen,4 
and  the  denunciation  by  priests  of  spiritual  penalties  on 
political  opponents.5 

Personation  it  is  unnecessary  to  describe. 

All  these  corrupt  practices  are  criminal  offences  punish-  corrupt 
able  by  fine  or  imprisonment,  and  by  the  loss  of  political  P^^he 
rights  for  seven  years.8     What  is  more  important  for  our  Election, 
purpose,  they  are  liable  to  cost  the  member  his  seat ;    for 
if  upon  the  trial  of  a  controverted  election  the  court  reports 
that  any  corrupt  practice  has  been  committed  by  the  candi- 
date, or  that  bribery  or  personation  has  been  committed 
with  his  knowledge  and  consent,  his  election  is  void,  and  he 
is  forever  incapable  of  being  elected  to  Parliament  by  that 

1  Hexham  Div.,  4  O'M.  &  H.,  143,  at  147.  After  the  general  election  of 
1906  a  member  was  unseated  on  this  ground.  Bodmin  Div.,  5  O'M.  &  H  , 
225.  2 46-47  Vic.,  c.  51,  §  1. 

•  Ibid.,  5  2.  *  Rogers,  II.,  316-19. 

s  So.  Meath  &  Xo.  Meath,  4  O'M.  &  H  ,  130,  185. 

•46-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §  6. 


224 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


But  only 
if  done  by 
the  Candi- 
date or  his 
Agents. 


constituency.1  Moreover,  if  the  election  court  reports  that 
a  corrupt  practice  has  been  committed  by  his  agents,  al- 
though he  may  be  personally  quite  innocent,  his  election 
is  void,  and  he  is  incapable  of  being  chosen  by  that  con- 
stituency for  seven  years.2 

It  will  be  observed  that  in  order  to  set  aside  an  election, 
the  corrupt  practice  must  be  brought  home  to  the  candi- 
date, personally  or  through  his  agents.  In  accordance 
with  the  older  traditions  of  English  public  life,  the  election 
is  regarded  as  the  affair  of  the  candidates  alone.  The 
action  of  party  organisations,  or  other  bodies,  is  not  taken  into 
account,3  and  their  conduct  has  no  effect  upon  the  result, 
unless  their  relations  with  the  candidate  have  been  such 
as  to  make  them  his  agents.  So  long  as  a  political  asso- 
ciation is  urging  the  general  interests  of  the  party,  rather 
than  supporting  a  particular  candidate,  he  is  not  responsible 
for  their  acts.  It  has  been  held,  for  example,  that  a  candi- 
date is  not  responsible  for  treating  by  such  an  association, 
although  he  was  present  and  spoke  at  the  meeting  where 
it  was  done,  if  it  was  got  up  by  them  for  their  own  purposes, 
and  not  to  assist  in  his  election.4  It  has  been  held,  also, 
that  a  payment  by  a  party  organisation  of  bills  for  music  and 
beer  at  public  meetings,  previous  to  an  election,  and  even 
the  candidate's  subscription  to  their  funds,  need  not  be 
included  in  his  election  expenses,  unless  the  organisation 
was  a  sham  supported  by  him.5 

In  all  such  cases  it  is  difficult  to  prove  agency  to  the  satis- 
faction of  an  election  court.  The  time  must  come  in  any 
election,  however,  when  the  local  party  association  by  active 


1  46-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §  4.  2  Ibid.,  §  5. 

3  In  the  return  of  election  expenses  the  candidate  and  his  agent  must 
declare  that  to  the  best  of  their  knowledge  or  belief  no  person,  club,  society, 
or  association  has  made  any  payment  in  respect  to  the  conduct  of  the  elec- 
tion. Ibid.,  Sched.  2.  But  this  merely  requires  them  to  take  care  to  be 
ignorant  of  any  such  payment. 

*  Cockermouth  Div.,  5  O'.M.  &  H.,  155.  St.  George's  Div.,  5  O'M.  &  H., 
89,  at  97-98.  In  the  first  of  these  cases  the  treating  was  done  by  a  Liberal 
Unionist  Association;   in  the  second  by  an  Irish  Unionist  Alliance. 

6  Lancaster  Div.,  5  O'M.  &  H.,  39,  at  42-43. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  225 

assistance  to  the  candidate  becomes  his  agent.1  But  this 
is  not  true  of  other  bodies  less  directly  connected  with  the 
party  organisation,  which  are,  nevertheless,  in  the  habit 
of  doing  a  great  deal  of  work  at  elections.  Thus  it  has 
been  held  that  a  Licensed  Victuallers  Association,  having  a 
distinct  and  direct  interest  in  the  election,  did  not  become 
the  agent  of  the  candidate,  although  it  played  an  important 
part  in  the  campaign.2  That  this  leaves  a  door  wide  open 
for  corrupt  influence  is  self-evident. 

To  the  general  principle  that  a  corrupt  practice  must  be  General 
brought  home  to  the  candidate  there  is  one  exception.  If  CorruPtlon' 
bribery,  treating,  personation,  intimidation,  or  undue  influ- 
ence, whether  physical  or  ecclesiastical,  has  been  general 
in  the  constituency  —  that  is,  so  extensive  that  the  voting 
could  not  have  been  the  free  expression  of  the  will  of  the 
electorate  —  the  result  of  the  election  is  invalid  at  common 
law,  although  neither  the  candidate  nor  his  agent  is  directly 
implicated.3 

Besides  corrupt  practices,  certain  other  acts  are  forbidden  Distinction 
under  the  name  of  illegal  practices ;  but  the  provisions  relat-  cotnHt  am 
ing  to  them  are  mainly  designed  to  restrain  the  expense  of  nicgaiPrac 
elections,  and  will  be  described  under  that  head.  The  essen- 
tial distinction  between  the  two  practices  is  much  like  that 
which  lawyers  were  formerly  in  the  habit  of  drawing  in  the 
case  of  crimes  between  malum  prohibitum  and  malum  in  se. 
A  corrupt  practice  involves  moral  turpitude,  and  it  is  neces- 
sary to  prove  a  corrupt  intent.4  A  gift  to  a  voter,  for 
example,  is  not  bribery  unless  it  is  made  for  the  purpose  of 
influencing  his  vote ;  but  an  illegal  practice  is  simply  an 
act  forbidden  by  statute,  and  as  such  —  in  the  case,  for  in- 
stance, of  a  payment  of  expenses  above  the  maximum  fixed 
by  law  —  is  illegal  without  regard  to  the  motive  with  which 
it  is  done.     For  this  reason  a  corrupt  practice  cannot  be 

1  Walsall,  4  O'M.  &  II.,  123,  per  Pollock  B,  at  124. 
1  Ibid. 

'  Rogers,  II.,  293,  308,  325-329,  335. 

4  A  false  statement  in  the  return  of  election  expenses,  if  made  knowingly, 
is  a  corrupt  and  not  illegal  practice      40-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §  33  (7). 


tices. 


226 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Practices 
Tending  to 
Lower  the 
Tone  of 
Elections. 


Restraint  of 
Expendi- 
ture. 


Authorised 
Expenses. 


excused,1  while  the  election  court  may  grant  relief  from  the 
consequences  of  an  illegal  practice  where  it  is  trivial  in  itself, 
and  was  committed  without  the  connivance  of  the  candi- 
date who  took  all  reasonable  means  to  prevent  it ;  or  where, 
although  the  direct  act  of  the  candidate  or  his  election  agent, 
it  arose  from  inadvertence,  accidental  miscalculation,  or 
other  reasonable  cause ;  or,  finally,  where  a  failure  to  make 
a  return  of  expenses  has  been  due  to  illness. 

Some  acts  which,  without  involving  great  expense,  tend 
to  lower  the  tone  of  elections,  are  treated  as  illegal  practices, 
and  forbidden  by  statute.  Such  are  the  use  for  committee 
rooms2  of  premises  where  liquor  is  sold,  and  the  furnishing 
of  voters  with  cockades,  ribbons,  or  other  marks  of  distinc- 
tion,3 a  proceeding  which  is  believed  to  engender  broils. 

Other  acts  apparently  harmless  are  prohibited  in  order  to 
prevent  extravagance.  The  most  curious  example  of  this  is 
the  provision  forbidding  the  use  of  hired  carriages  to  take 
voters  to  the  polls.4  Such  a  rule  may  seem  unnecessary; 
but  before  the  Act  of  1883,  by  which  it  was  enacted,  thou- 
sands of  pounds  were  said  to  have  been  spent  in  certain  cases 
for  the  conveyance  of  electors.  The  Act  does  not  forbid  the 
use  of  carriages,  but  only  of  hired  ones;  and  the  result  is 
that  the  private  carriages  and  motor  cars  of  wealthy  part- 
isans, sometimes  blazoned  with  ancient  armorial  bearings, 
are  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  candidate.  In  fact  in 
estimating  the  chances  of  an  election  one  constantly  hears 
that  the  Conservative  has  the  advantage  of  a  larger  number 
of  carriages. 

But  by  far  the  most  systematic  effort  to  restrain  extrava- 
gance at  elections  is  found  in  the  provisions  that  prescribe 
on  the  one  hand  the  objects  of  expenditure,  and  on  the  other 
its  total  amount.     A  schedule  to  the  Act  of  1883  enumer- 


1  Here,  again,  there  is  an  exception;  for  relief  may  be  given  in  the  case 
of  treating  or  undue  influence  committed  by  an  agent,  other  than  the  elec- 
tion agent,  if  trivial  in  itself,  and  if  the  candidate  and  his  election  agent 
did  not  connive  at  it,  but  took  all  reasonable  means  to  prevent  corrupt  and 
illegal  practices.     46-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §  22.  2  Ibid.,  §  20. 

3  17-18  Vic,  c.  102,  §  7.  *  46-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §§  7,  14. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  227 

ates  the  objects  for  which  expenses  may  be  legally  incurred, 
and  the  first  part  of  the  schedule  deals  with  the  persons  who 
may  be  employed.  These  are :  one  election  agent  j1  a  polling  Employ- 
agent  to  watch  the  voting  at  each  polling  station ;  and  clerks  ment" 
and  messengers  in  proportion  to  population,  the  allowance 
being  somewhat  more  liberal  in  counties  than  in  boroughs 
on  account  of  the  greater  area  of  the  constituency.  The 
act  provides  that,  except  as  authorised  by  this  schedule, 
no  person  shall  be  employed  for  pay ; 2  and  that  no  paid 
employee  shall  vote.3  It  may  be  noticed  that  among  the 
list  of  persons  who  can  be  employed,  canvassers  are  not 
mentioned,  and  hence  the  use  of  paid  canvassers  is  illegal.4 
Now,  as  canvassing,  that  is  the  personal  solicitation  of 
votes,  is  by  far  the  most  effective  part  of  the  work  done 
at  an  election,  each  candidate  is  always  assisted  by  an  army 
of  volunteers.  Wherever  possible  he  is  also  helped  by  the 
agents  of  other  constituencies,  or  of  distinct  associations, 
who,  not  being  paid  by  him,  and  in  fact,  receiving  no  ad- 
ditional pay  for  their  services  on  this  occasion,  are  not 
within  the  prohibition  of  the  law. 

The  other  expenditures  authorised  by  the  schedule  are  other  Ex- 
printing,  advertising,  stationery,  postage,  and  the  like ;  pub-  Penses- 
lie  meetings ;  one  committee  room  for  every  five  hundred 
electors ; 5  and  miscellaneous  expenses  not  exceeding  two 
hundred  pounds  for  matters  not  otherwise  illegal.  The 
candidate  is  also  allowed  to  incur  personal  expenses  for 
travelling  and  hotel  bills ; 8  and,  finally,  there  are  the  charges 
of  the  returning  officer  for  the  cost  of  erecting  polling  booths, 
the  payment  of  persons  on  duty  thereat,  and  the  other  ex- 
penses attending  the  election.7  These  last  charges  are 
divided  between  the  candidates  and  they  are  by  no  means 

1  And  in  counties  a  sub-agent  for  each  polling  station. 
'  46-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §  17. 
"  Ibid.,  §  36  and  Sched.  I.,  Part  1  (7). 
4  Rogers,  II.,  1.56,  160,  350. 

*  In  counties  one  central  committee  room,  and  in  each  polling  district 
one  committee  room  for  every  five  hundred  voters. 
•46-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §  31. 
7  38-39  Vic,  c.  84;    48-49  Vic,  c  62 


228 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Maximum 
Expendi- 
ture. 


Penalties 
for  Illegal 
Payments. 


small,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  at  the  general  elec- 
tion of  1900  they  amounted,  for  the  whole  United  Kingdom, 
to  £150,278  10s.  lid.,  or  nearly  one  fifth  of  the  whole  ex- 
pense incurred.1  The  National  Liberal  Federation  has, 
indeed,  repeatedly  urged  in  its  programme  that  such  charges 
ought  to  be  defrayed  by  the  state,  instead  of  being  a  burden 
upon  the  candidates. 

In  order  to  reduce  the  cost  of  elections,  Parliament  has 
not  only  enumerated  the  objects  for  which  money  may  be 
used,  but  has  also  set  a  maximum  limit  to  the  amount  that 
may  be  spent.2  In  the  case  of  boroughs  this  is  fixed  at 
three  hundred  and  fifty  pounds  if  the  registered  electors 
do  not  exceed  two  thousand,  with  an  additional  thirty  pounds 
for  every  thousand  electors  above  that  number.  In  the 
counties  the  scale  is  somewhat  higher,  six  hundred  and  fifty 
pounds  being  allowed  where  the  registered  electors  do  not 
exceed  two  thousand,  with  sixty  pounds  for  each  thousand 
electors  more.3  These  sums  do  not,  however,  represent  the 
total  cost,  for  they  include  neither  the  personal  expenses  of 
the  candidate  to  an  amount  of  one  hundred  pounds,  nor  the 
charges  of  the  returning  officers. 

The  rules  in  regard  to  election  expenses  are  furnished 
with  sanctions  of  the  same  nature  as  those  attached  to  corrupt 
practices,  although  the  penalties  are  less  severe.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  criminal  punishments  that  may  be  inflicted,  it  is 
provided  that  a  candidate,  or  his  election  agent,  who  violates 
those  rules  shall  be  guilty  of  an  illegal  practice ; 4  and  that 
if  a  candidate  is  guilty,  personally  or  by  his  agents,  of  an 
illegal  practice  (from  the  consequences  of  which  he  has  not 
been  relieved  as  heretofore  described)  he  shall  lose  his  seat, 
and  cannot  be  elected  by  the  same  constituency  during  the 
life  of  that  Parliament.5 


1  Com.  Papers,  1901,  LIX.,  145,  p.  84. 

2  40-47  Vic,  c.  51,  Sched.  I,  Part  IV. 

3  In  Ireland  the  limit  both  for  boroughs  and  counties  is  somewhat  lower. 

4  46-47  Vie.,  e.  51,  §  21. 

6  If  the  ofTenee  was  committed  with  his  knowledge  and  consent,  the  in- 
capacity continues  seven  years.     Ibid.,  §  5. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  220 

It  is  one  thing  to  make  elaborate  regulations  about  elec-  The  Elec- 
tion expenses,  and  it  is  quite  a  different  thing  to  insure  their  tlon  Asent 
observance.  The  device  adopted  for  this  purpose  in  Eng- 
land is  that  of  requiring  each  candidate  to  appoint  an  elec- 
tion agent,  who  is  responsible  for  the  disbursements.  Ex- 
cept for  the  personal  expenses  of  the  candidate,  to  an  amount 
not  exceeding  one  hundred  pounds,  no  payment  of  election 
expenses  can  be  made  by  the  candidate,  or  by  any  person  on 
his  behalf,  except  through  the  election  agent,1  and  no  con- 
tract for  any  such  expenses  is  valid  unless  made  by  him.2 
Within  thirty-five  days  after  the  election  the  agent  must  give 
to  the  returning  officer  an  account  of  all  his  payments,  and 
of  all  sums  that  he  has  received  from  the  candidate  or  any 
one  else,  for  the  purposes  of  the  campaign ;  and  the  candi- 
date must  certify  that  the  account  is  true  to  the  best  of 
his  knowledge  and  belief.3 

The  class  of  person  selected  for  this  duty  is  not  only  a  mat- 
ter of  great  importance  to  the  candidate,  but  upon  it  depends 
also  in  large  measure  the  purity  of  elections.  A  candidate 
may  act  as  his  own  election  agent,  but  this  is  rarely  done. 
Usually,  though  by  no  means  invariably,  he  takes  the  paid 
secretary  of  the  local  political  association,  who  has  the  ad- 
vantage of  knowing  the  constituency  better  than  any  one 
else  ;  and  the  Practical  Manual  for  Parliamentary  Elections, 
issued  by  the  Conservative  party,  advises  that  course.4 
Rogers,  on  the  other  hand,  in  his  work  on  Elections,5  warns 
candidates  that  it  is  unwise  to  select  such  persons,  because 
"when  this  is  done  attempts  are  frequently  made  to  saddle 
the  candidate  with  responsibility  for  the  acts  of  the  associa- 
tion and  its  members."  "A  further  danger,"  he  remarks, 
"arises  in  such  cases  of  the  election  expenses  being  confused 
with  or  concealed  under  registration  or  other  expenses  of  the 
association."  With  the  modern  organisation  of  parties  a 
confusion  of  that  kind  is  liable  to  occur  in  any  event;  and 
perhaps  it  is  not  so   much  dreaded  by  candidates  as  the 

1  Ibid  ,  §§  28,  31 .  2  Ibid.,  §  27.  '  Ibid.,  $  33  and  Sched.  II. 

4  2  Ed .  ( 1 892;  ,14.  *  1 1.,  152-1 53 . 


230 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


The  Elec- 
tion Court. 


Results  of 
the  Corrupt 
Practices 
Act. 

Reduction 
ol  Expense. 


author  of  the  text-book  on  elections  might  imply.  In  spite 
of  any  dangers  that  may  lurk  in  the  practice,  it  is  not  only 
common,  but  apparently  growing ;  and  in  fact  the  occupation 
of  a  paid  secretary  and  agent  has  developed  into  a  profes- 
sion whose  characteristics  will  be  discussed  in  the  chapters 
on  party  organisations. 

Formerly  the  validity  of  elections  was  decided  by  the  House 
of  Commons  itself,  with  the  natural  consequence  that  poli- 
tics were  a  large  factor  in  the  result.  To  such  an  extent 
was  this  true  that  the  fall  of  Sir  Robert  Walpole  was  brought 
about  by  a  hostile  vote  on  an  election  case.  In  1770  the 
matter  was  placed  by  statute  in  the  hands  of  select  commit- 
tees of  the  House ;  but  that  did  not  put  an  end  to  political 
bias,  and  finally  in  1868,  the  trial  of  election  petitions, 
whether  filed  on  the  ground  of  a  miscount,  or  of  corrupt  or 
illegal  practices,  was  committed  to  a  judicial  body.  The 
tribunal  now  consists  of  two  judges  of  the  King's  Bench 
Division  of  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  selected  by  the 
other  judges  of  that  division.1 

A  defeated  candidate,  or  any  voter,  may  present  to  the 
court  a  petition  stating  the  grounds  on  which  he  claims  that 
the  election  is  invalid,  and  the  case  is  then  tried,  witnesses 
are  examined,  and  costs  are  awarded,  according  to  the  usual 
course  of  judicial  proceedings.  The  decision  takes  the  form 
of  a  report  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Commons,  but  it 
is  really  a  final  judgment  upon  the  questions  involved,  for 
if  the  court  finds  that  corrupt  or  illegal  practices  have  taken 
place,  the  report  has  the  effect  not  merely  of  avoiding  the 
election,  but  of  subjecting  the  candidate,  and  any  guilty  per- 
sons, to  the  political  incapacities  which  those  practices  entail.2 

So  far  as  the  reduction  of  the  cost  of  elections  is  concerned, 
the  English  method  of  dealing  with  the  subject  has  certainly 
been  successful.  According  to  the  returns  laid  before  Par- 
liament, the  total  aggregate  expenses  incurred  by  candidates 
throughout  the  United  Kingdom  at  the  general  election  of 

1  31-32  Vic, c  125;  42-43  Vic,  c.  75;  44-45  Vic,  c.  68,  §  13. 

2  46-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §§  4,  5,  11. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  231 

1880  —  the  last  that  took  place  before  the  Corrupt  Practices 
Act  of  1883  —  was  £1,736,781 ;  at  the  next  election  in 
1885  it  fell  to  £1,026,645,  and  on  every  subsequent  occasion 
it  has  been  less  than  that.  In  1900  it  was  £777,429,  which 
is  not  far  from  the  average  in  these  days.  The  expense 
of  English  elections  is,  however,  far  from  small  to-day. 
In  1900  the  average  cost  for  the  United  Kingdom  in  con- 
stituencies that  were  not  uncontested  was  four  shillings 
and  four  pence,  for  every  vote  cast.1 

Moreover  the  returns  undoubtedly  do  not  in  every  case  Returns  of 
include  all  that  is  spent.     A  recent  series  of  letters  to  The  Expenses 

1  Sometimes 

Times,  under  the  title  "The  worries  of  a  parliamentary  rep-  incompieta 
resent ative, "  throws  light  on  this  subject.2  It  opened  with 
a  letter  from  the  member  for  a  Welsh  borough  complaining 
that  about  a  month  after  he  had  signed  the  return  of  his 
election  expenses  he  received  a  note  from  his  agent  in  re- 
gard to  claims  by  workers  at  the  election ;  that  upon  his 
refusal  to  pay  any  such  claims  in  violation  of  the  Corrupt 
Practices  Act  the  agent  wrote  asking  whether  he  would  or 
would  not  fulfil  the  obligations  made  on  his  behalf  during 
the  election.  His  continued  refusal,  the  member  declared, 
had  made  him  unpopular  with  many  of  his  former  sup- 
porters, who  were  now  trying  to  prevent  his  renomination. 
In  answer  to  this  charge  the  agent,  in  a  letter  to  The  Times, 
explained  that  all  he  had  meant  was  that  the  member 
"should  find  some  way  —  legal,  of  course  —  of  expressing 
his  gratitude  to  men  who  had  worked  splendidly  in  his 
cause ;  "  and  he  added  that  this  way  had  eventually  been 
found,  its  name  being  "  undoubted  distress."  In  his  reply 
in  The  Times  the  member  denied  that  his  relief  of  distress 
in  the  constituency  had  any  relation  to  the  election,  or  was 
a  mode  of  expressing  gratitude  to  men  who  had  worked  for 
him.  It  would  be  rash  to  assert  that  indirect  means  of 
rewarding  party  workers  are  not  often  found  ;  and  in  fact 
another  election  agent  stated  in  a  letter  to  The  Times  3  in 

1  Com.  Papers,  1901,  LIX.,  145,  p.  85.  3  July  22,  26,  29,  1904. 

1  July  25,  1904. 


232 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Ease  of 
Evasion. 


Difficult  to 
Prove 
Agency ; 


the  course  of  the  foregoing  controversy,  that  promises  of 
such  a  nature,  made  in  behalf  of  the  candidate,  were  un- 
fortunately too  common. 

Apart  from  occasional  acts  involving  direct  violations 
of  the  Corrupt  Practices  Act  by  the  candidate  himself,  the 
statute  has  holes  through  which  others  can  pass  so  readily 
that  an  election  agent  has  been  known  to  speak  of  the  return 
of  expenses  as  largely  a  farce.  In  fact  the  elaborate  provi- 
sions of  the  law  can  easily  be  evaded  if  the  candidate  and  his 
agent  have  a  mind  to  do  so.  If  they  only  keep  their  eyes 
shut  tight  enough,  and  are  sufficiently  ignorant  of  what  goes 
on,  it  is  very  difficult  to  connect  them  with  corrupt  or  ille- 
gal practices  in  such  a  way  as  to  avoid  the  election.1  An 
agent  from  another  constituency  may  pay  the  railway  fares 
of  out-voters.  The  Primrose  League,  or  some  other  body, 
may  give  picnics,  teas  and  what  not,  which  would  be  corrupt 
treating  if  done  by  the  candidate,  but  for  which  he  is  not 
held  responsible.  The  brewers  may  furnish  free  beer  in 
public  houses  where  voters  are  collected  before  going  to  the 
polls,  and  yet  the  candidate  has  done  nothing  to  forfeit  his 
seat.  Nor  is  this  an  imaginary  danger ;  for,  with  the  intro- 
duction of  what  is  known  as  the  tied-house  system,  the  pub- 
licans have  come  under  the  control  of  the  great  brewing 
establishments,  which  have  to-day  a  huge  stake  in  the  results 
of  parliamentary  elections.  Agency,  in  short,  is  a  very 
difficult  thing  to  establish  in  such  cases.  As  Rogers,  who 
devotes  a  whole  chapter  to  the  subject,  remarks:  "It  is 
to  conceal  agency,  and  so  to  relieve  the  candidate  from 
the  consequences  of  corruption  practised  on  his  behalf,  that 
efforts  of  unscrupulous  men  engaged  in  the  conduct  of  an 
election  have  been  generally  directed,  and  it  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  an  election  inquiry  has  been  more  frequently 
baffled  from  a  failure  in  the  proof  of  agency  than  from  all 
other  causes  put  together."  2 

1  See  the  cases  already  cited  in  the  discussion  of  agency. 

1  Rogers,  II. ,  360.  In  a  case  at  the  general  election  of  1906,  where  bribery 
was  proved,  the  election  was  upheld  because  the  judges  disagreed  on  the 
question  of  agency.     Great  Yarmouth,  5  O'M.  &  H.,  176. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  233 

Then  there  is  the  uncertainty  when  the  election  period  0  Know 
begins,  and  hence  what  payments  must  be  included  in  the  // hen  Elec' 
return  of  election  expenses.  The  Act  of  1883  defines  a  Period 
candidate,  unless  the  context  otherwise  requires,  as  one  who 
is  nominated  or  declared  to  be  such  on  or  after  the  issue  of 
the  writ  or  the  dissolution  or  vacancy  in  consequence  of 
which  it  is  issued.1  But  clearly  this  does  not  mean  that  a 
corrupt  act  committed  earlier  will  not  avoid  the  election. 
On  the  contrary  it  is  settled  by  repeated  decisions  that  ?, 
man  may  become  a  candidate,  and  his  election  expenses  may 
begin,  before  that  date;2  although  it  is  impossible  to  lay 
down  an>  hard  and  fast  limit  of  time.3  A  great  deal  must 
depend  on  the  nature  of  the  expense  itself.  Registration, 
for  example,  is  something  entirely  distinct  from  the  election, 
and  the  cost  of  registration,  whenever  incurred,  need  not 
be  included  in  the  return  of  expenses.4  On  the  other 
hand  proof  of  the  actual  purchase  of  a  vote  at  any  time 
would  certainly  cost  the  candidate  his  seat.5  Between  these 
two  extremes  there  are  a  great  many  acts  whose  character 
is  affected  by  the  proximity  of  an  election.  A  subscription 
to  a  local  political  organisation,  made  when  the  dissolution 
was  impending,  has  been  held  to  be  a  part  of  the  election  ex- 
penses,6 when  it  would  not  be  so  under  other  circumstances  ;7 
and  in  the  same  way  the  question  whether  a  gift  of  money 
or  food  to  relieve  distress  in  the  constituency  is  or  is  not 
made  with  a  corrupt  purpose  of  influencing  votes  may  depend 
upon  the  expectation  of  an  election  in  the  near  future.8 

As  general  elections  in  England  come  at  irregular  inter-  Nursing 
vals,  and  at  short  notice,  it  is  common  to  select  candidates  Constltu- 
without  regard  to  the  prospect  of  a  dissolution,  sometimes 
years  before  it  occurs;   and  in  fact  the  sitting  member,  hav- 

1  40-47  Vic,  e.  51,  §  03.  2  Rogers,  II.,  157-58. 

'Counties  of  Elgin  and  Nairn,  5  O'M.  &  II.,  1. 

4  Rogers,  II.,  102.  6  Ibid.,  259,  208. 

•  Lichfield  Div.,  5  O'M.  &  II.,  27,  at  34-38. 
'Counties  of  Elgin  &  Nairn,  5  O'M.  *  H.,  I. 

•  Cy.  Lichfield  Div, 5  O'M.  &  H.,27;  Haggerston  Div.,  Ibid.,  68,  at  72-88, 
St.  George's  Div.,  Ibid.,  89.  So  of  treating,  Great  Yarmouth,  Ibid.,  170,  at 
198. 


234         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

ing  a  presumptive  right  to  stand  again,  is  regarded  in  the 
light  of  a  permanent  candidate.  Under  these  conditions 
it  is  the  habit  in  most  places  for  a  candidate,  who  can  afford 
it,  to  ingratiate  himself  with  his  constituents  by  subscribing 
liberally  to  public  and  charitable  objects ;  and  since  a  pay- 
ment to  be  corrupt  must  be  made  for  the  purpose  of  influenc- 
ing particular  voters  1  subscriptions  of  this  kind  are  not 
deemed  corrupt ;  nor,  unless  given  near  the  time  of  an  elec- 
tion, are  they  election  expenses  or  illegal  payments.2  The 
practice  is  called  nursing  a  constituency,  and  it  takes  a 
great  variety  of  forms,  from  a  subscription  for  a  cricket  club 
to  the  founding  of  a  hospital.  The  sums  expended  vary 
very  much  with  the  nature  of  the  place  and  the  wealth  of 
the  candidate,  and  no  one  knows  how  large  they  are  in  the 
aggregate,  because  men  do  not  state  publicly  what  they  give 
in  this  way ;  but  as  far  as  one  can  form  an  opinion,  it  would 
appear  that  such  gifts  by  a  member  of  Parliament  com- 
monly amount  to  a  number  of  hundred  pounds  a  year.  It 
is  obvious  that  the  custom  of  nursing,  combined  with  the 
uncertainty  about  the  time  when  the  election  period  begins, 
opens  a  door  to  abuse. 
Difficulty  in  Another  difficulty  in  a  strict  enforcement  of  the  election 
Evidence  ^aws  ^s  connected  with  the  proof  of  the  offence.  A  witness 
cannot,  indeed,  refuse  to  give  evidence  on  the  ground  that  it 
will  incriminate  him,  for  the  law  provides  that  he  must  testify ; 
and  if  he  tells  the  truth  he  is  entitled  to  a  certificate  of 
indemnity,  which  protects  him  against  prosecution.3  But 
the  facts  that  tend  to  establish  bribery,  for  example,  are 
directly  known,  as  a  rule,  only  to  persons  who  have  the 
strongest  motives  for  concealing  them ;  and  the  same  thing 
is  true  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  of  other  breaches  of  the 

1  Hastings,  1  O'M.  &  H.,  217,  at  218. 

7  Subscriptions  bona  fide  made  for  public  or  charitable  purposes  are  not 
election  expenses,  Rogers,  II.,  161-62.  But  it  is  not  easy  to  say  what  is 
bona  fides;  for  gifts  of  this  kind  by  a  candidate  for  Parliament  who  has  no 
other  connection  with  the  constituency  must  always  be  made,  in  part  at 
least,  for  the  sake  of  indirectly  gaining  votes  by  increasing  his  popularity. 

•46-47  Vic,  c.  .51,  §  59. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  235 

election  law.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  if  the  offence  must 
be  proved  by  legally  competent  evidence  beyond  reasonable 
doubt,  as  in  criminal  cases,  an  election  procured  by  improper 
means  may  well  stand,  just  as  many  criminals  escape  pun- 
ishment ;  and  this  brings  us  to  another  question,  that  of 
the  efficiency  of  the  election  courts. 

The  system  of  sending  petitions  for  trial  to  a  couple  of  Merita  of 
judges  selected  by  the  bench  itself  has  provided  a  court  as  tion  Courts 
free  as  any  human  tribunal  can  be  from  the  party  bias  that 
always  affects  the  decisions  of  such  questions  by  a  legislative 
body. 

But  no  institution  is  altogether  without  defects.     A  select  Their  De- 
committee  on  the  subject  of  election  petitions  reported  in  fects' 
1898  that  the  grievances  alleged  to  exist  in  the  present  sys- 
tem related  to  delay,  to  the  expense  involved,  and  to  the 
lack  of  security  for  costs  in  favour  of  the  successful  party; 
and  it  recommended  some  changes  in  procedure  to  improve 
these  matters.1     The  expense  of  an  election  trial  is  undoubt-  Expense 
edly  great  —  sometimes  thousands  of  pounds  —  and  since  of  Petltlona 
the  charges  are  borne  by  the  litigants,  and  a  favourable 
judgment  involves  a  fresh  election,  while  the  trial  itself  is 
likely  to  entail  a  certain  amount  of  unpopularity,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  a  defeated  candidate  hesitates  to  file  a  peti- 
tion. 

With  all  respect  to  the  select  committee  of  the  House  Uncer- 
of  Commons,  it  would  seem  to  a  foreign  observer  that  the  ^Rgf 
defects  it  reported  are  not  the  only  ones  to  be  found  in  the  sult- 
existing  system.     The  bringing  of  election  petitions  is  dis- 
couraged not  only  by  the  cost  involved,  but  also  by  uncer- 
tainty both  in  the  result  and  in  the  grounds  on  which  it  will 
be  based.     A  candidate  may  feel  convinced  that  his  defeat 
was  due  to  corruption  practised  by  his  opponent,  by  the 
publicans,  and  by  the  local  political  organisation,  and  yet 
the  court,  finding  some  of  these  charges  unproved,  may  think 
it  unnecessary  to  inquire  into  others  because  much  graver 
questions  are  decisive  of  the  case;   the  graver  matter  being 

•Coin.  Papers,  1898,  IX.,  555. 


236         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

that,  contrary  to  the  provision  forbidding  "  marks  of  dis- 
tinction," the  defendant's  agent  furnished  his  supporters 
with  cards  to  wear  in  their  hats.1  Where  serious  corrupt 
practices  are  charged,  the  election  may  be  set  aside  on  ac- 
count of  the  payment  of  a  railway  fare  to  an  out-voter.2 
And  in  a  case  where  the  facts  stated  by  the  court  portrayed 
a  bacchanalian  orgy  in  the  form  of  a  drunken  procession 
through  the  streets,  headed  by  the  candidate  himself  in  a 
barouche,  with  some  direct  evidence  that  he  offered  free 
drink  to  the  crowd,  the  judges  found  that  there  was  no  suffi- 
cient evidence  of  treating ;  but  avoided  the  election  on  ac- 
count of  the  payment  of  two  shillings  for  conveying  a  voter 
to  the  polls.3 
Attitude  of  Such  results  are  thoroughly  unsatisfactory  for  both  par- 
tbe  Judges.  ^eg .  ^Q  ^e  defeated  party  because  he  loses  his  seat;  to 
the  successful  party  because  he  does  not  want  to  have  an 
election,  which  he  believes  to  be  vitiated  by  gross  corruption, 
set  aside  on  account  of  a  trivial  breach  of  the  law.  The  main 
difficulty  seems  to  lie  in  the  attitude  of  mind  of  the  judges. 
They  require  a  degree  of  proof  of  corrupt  intent,  which  is 
very  proper  in  criminal  cases,  but  which  would  seem  to  be 
out  of  place  in  an  election  petition.  On  a  charge,  for 
example,  that  an  agent  of  the  candidate,  to  whom  pay  was 
promised,  had  voted,  it  was  held  necessary  to  prove  an  actual 
express  promise  of  payment,  and  not  such  an  implied  promise 
as  would  support  a  civil  action.4  So,  also,  where  a  candidate 
named  Lowles  caused  to  be  distributed  among  the  poor,  some 
time  before  an  election,  his  own  visiting  cards  exchangeable 
for  food,  and  it  was  announced  in  a  newspaper  that  gifts  of 
food  had  been  arranged  by  the  Unionist  candidate,  one  of 
the  judges  said:  "I  cannot  bring  myself  to  believe  in  the 
circumstances  of  this  case  that  the  motive  of  Mr.  Lowles  in 
giving  away  the  tickets,  months  before  any  election  was 

1  Walsall,  4  O'M.  &  H.,  123,  at  12G. 

2  Pontefract,  4  O'M.  &  H.,  200. 

3  Southampton,  5  O'M.  &  H.,  17. 

4  Lichfield  Div.,  5  O'M.  &  H.,  27,  at  29-30. 


ELECTORAL  PROCEDURE  237 

imminent,  was  to  influence  voters."  l  Nor  is  this  an  isolated 
instance.  Where  soup  and  coal  tickets  were  distributed 
largely  at  the  expense  of  a  candidate,  who  reminded  voters, 
when  the  election  came  on  some  months  later,  that  he  had 
given  away  soup,  the  court  said  that  "although  ...  it 
would  have  been  more  prudent  for  the  Respondent  had  he 
kept  aloof  from  the  immediate  distribution  of  the  relief,  we 
cannot  infer,  from  the  evidence  before  us,  that  his  motive  or 
conduct  was  corrupt."  2 

The  difficulty  seems  to  lie  to  some  extent  in  the  fact  that 
a  report  of  corrupt  or  illegal  practices  by  the  court  involves 
not  only  the  setting  aside  of  an  election,  but  the  same  loss 
of  political  rights  as  would  follow  upon  a  conviction ; 3 
and,  hence,  the  judges  tend  to  require  the  kind  of  evidence 
that  would  support  a  criminal  prosecution.  Moreover, 
they  seem  to  find  it  incredible  that  a  candidate  for  Parlia- 
ment can  be  guilty  of  the  grosser  kind  of  offences.  One 
feels  this  very  strongly  in  reading  the  opinions  in  election 
cases. 

If  the  present  system  of  trying  election  petitions  is  not  a  How  Much 
complete  success,  it  is  nevertheless  certain  that  the  old  gtiu^xists 
electoral  abuses  have  been  very  much  reduced.  There  is  a 
current  impression  both  in  England  and  elsewhere  that  the 
bribery  of  voters  in  Great  Britain  has  been  entirely  rooted 
out.  But  any  one  familiar  with  English  elections  knows 
that  this  is  by  no  means  altogether  true.4  That  the  cases 
where  gross  corruption  occurs  are  not  made  public  by  means 
of  election  petitions  is  due,  partly  to  the  reluctance  to  bring 
such  petitions  which  has  already  been  pointed  out,  and 
partly  to  the  fact  that  where  bribery  is  extensive  both  sides 
are  usually  guilty.  Bribery  in  England  is  disappearing. 
In  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  constituencies  it  does  not 
exist,   and  the  elections   are,  on  the  whole,  pure;   but  in  a 

1  Haggerston  Div.,  5  O'M.  &  H.,  08,  at  84. 

2  St.  George's  Div.,  5  O'M.  A:  H.,  89,  at  96. 
3 40-47  Vic,  c.  51,  §§  4,  11. 

*  After  the  general  election  of  1906  one  member  was  unseated  for  bribery 
by  his  agents.    Worcester.  5  O'M.  &  H.,  212. 


238  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

few  places  the  old  traditions  still  persist.  These  are  mostly 
boroughs  in  the  South  of  England  containing  a  considera- 
ble number  of  ancient  freemen,  among  whom  corruption 
is  sometimes  widespread.  The  writer  has  heard  the  num- 
ber of  such  places  estimated  by  persons  in  a  position  to 
know  the  facts  at  a  score  or  two  dozen.  The  names  of  sev- 
eral of  them  are  well  known  to  every  one  who  takes  an 
active  part  in  electoral  work ;  but  even  in  these  boroughs 
the  increase  in  the  number  of  voters  has  lowered  the 
price  paid  for  votes,  and  in  some  of  them  the  practice  is 
slowly  dying  out.  It  is  only  fair  to  add  that  it  does  not 
receive  any  countenance  or  encouragement  from  the  central 
authorities  of  the  great  political  organisations. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE   HOUSE   OF   COMMONS 

Disqualifications,  Privilege,  Sessions 

No  property  qualification  is  now  required  for  sitting  in  Disquaiifi- 
the  House  of  Commons,  and  any  male  British  subject  may  PaJliameiit 
be  elected,  who  is  not  specially  debarred.1 

Infants  are  excluded  both  at  Common  Law,  and  by  stat- 
ute, although  this  rule  has  been  disregarded  in  several 
notable  instances,  the  best  known  cases  being  those  of 
Charles  James  Fox  and  Lord  John  Russell  who  entered 
Parliament  before  they  came  of  age.  Incurable  insanity 
was  a  disqualification  at  Common  Law,  and  so  by  statute 
is  confinement  in  a  lunatic  hospital.  But  it  would  seem 
that  a  temporary  lunatic,  if  at  large,  is  not  incompetent  to 
sit  and  vote. 

Peers  are  also  excluded ;  and  this  is  true  even  of  those 
Scotch  peers  who,  not  having  been  chosen  among  the  six- 
teen representatives  of  the  peerage  of  Scotland,  have  no 
right  to  sit  in  the  House  of  Lords.  There  is  one  exception, 
however,  to  the  rule  that  peers  are  ineligible  to  the  House 
of  Commons,  for  a  peer  of  Ireland,  who  is  not  selected  to 
represent  that  kingdom  in  the  House  of  Lords,  may  sit  for 
any  county  or  borough  in  Great  Britain,  but  not  for  an 
Irish  constituency.  The  rule  excluding  peers  is  sometimes 
a  hardship  on  a  rising  young  man  transferred  by  the 
death  of  his  father  from  the  active  battlefield  of  politics 
in  the  House  of  Commons  to  the  dignified  seclusion  of  the 
House  of  Lords.  But  it  has  had,  on  the  other  hand,  some 
effect  in  preventing  the  House  of  Commons  from  absorbing 

1  In  a  couple  of  instances  natives  of   India  have  been  elected. 

239 


240  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

all  the  political  life  of  the  country,  and  has  thus  helped  to 
maintain  the  vitality  of  the  House  of  Lords.  Among  the 
peers  there  have  always  been  men  of  great  national  au- 
thority who  would  have  preferred  to  sit  in  the  other  House. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  in  the  year  1900  two  of  the  statesmen 
who  possessed  the  greatest  influence  with  the  people  — 
Lord  Salisbury  and  Lord  Rosebery  —  would  have  been  in 
the  House  of  Commons  had  it  not  been  for  the  rule  exclud- 
ing peers. 

The  clergy  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  and  the 
Church  of  England,  and  ministers  of  the  Church  of  Scotland, 
are  disqualified  by  statute ; *  but  these  provisions  do  not 
include  dissenting  ministers;  and  it  may  be  added  that  at 
the  present  day  a  clergyman  of  the  Church  of  England  may 
by  unfrocking  himself  remove  his  disqualification.2 

As  in  most  other  countries,  there  are  in  England  rules  dis- 
qualifying persons  who,  by  assuming  certain  relations  with 
the  government,  or  by  misconduct,  have  rendered  them- 
selves unfit  to  serve ;  such  are  government  contractors,  and 
holders  of  pensions  not  granted  for  civil  or  diplomatic  ser- 
vices; bankrupts,3  and  persons  convicted  of  treason  or  of 
felony,  or  guilty  of  corrupt  practices. 
Office-  The  exclusion  of  permanent  officials  has  already  been  dis- 

cussed ;  and  it  will  be  remembered  that  by  the  compromise 
effected  in  the  reign  of  Queen  Anne  the  holders  of  certain 
specified  offices,  or  of  any  offices  created  after  Oct.  25,  1705, 
are  absolutely  disqualified ;  while  a  member  accepting  any 
other  office  from  the  Crown  loses  his  seat,  but  can  be  re- 
elected.4 It  will  be  remembered,  also,  that  by  later  statutes 
or  by  custom  all  holders  of  civil  offices  not  distinctly  political 

1  The  question  was  raised  in  1801  in  the  famous  case  of  Home  Tooke, 
and  set  at  rest  for  the  future  by  an  Act  of  that  year:  41  Geo.  III.,  c.  63. 
The  provision  in  regard  to  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy  was  made  in  1829: 
10  Geo.  IV.,  c.  7,  §  9.  2  33-34  Vic,  c.  91. 

3  A  cause  that  disqualifies  will  not  always  unseat.  For  the  latter  pur- 
pose bankruptcy  and  lunacy  must  have  continued  six  months.  Rogers,  II., 
43,  44. 

*  G  Anne,  c.  7,  §§  25,  26.  Referred  to  in  the  Revised  Statutes  as  6  Anne, 
c.  41. 


MEMBERS   AND  SESSIONS  241 

are  now  excluded  from  the  House  of  Commons ;  and  so  are 
the  judges  of  the  higher  courts,  and  most  of  those  in  the 
lower  ones. 

Now  the  offices  held  by  ministers  are  either  old  offices 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Act  of  Anne,  and  therefore  com- 
patible with  a  seat  in  Parliament,  or  new  offices  that  have 
been  taken  out  of  the  rule  by  special  statutes  passed  usually 
when  the  office  was  created.  This  is  not,  indeed,  universally 
true  ;  for  by  special  provision  of  statute  only  four  of  the  five 
secretaries  of  state,  and  four  of  their  under-secretaries,  can 
sit  in  the  House  of  Commons  at  one  time.  With  that 
limitation  every  minister  is  capable  of  sitting;  but  on  his 
appointment  he  loses  his  seat,  and  must  go  back  to  his  con- 
stituents for  a  new  election.  The  last  rule,  however,  like 
every  other,  has  its  exceptions.  The  under-secretaries  of 
state  occupy  old  offices,  but  as  they  do  not  accept  them  from 
the  Crown  they  are  not  obliged  to  undergo  a  fresh  election 
on  their  appointment ;  and  they  are  not,  in  fact,  in  the  habit 
of  doing  so.1  The  same  privilege  has  been  extended  by  stat- 
ute to  the  Financial  Secretary  of  the  War  Office.  There  is, 
indeed,  no  self-evident  reason  to-day  why  it  should  not  be 
extended  to  all  the  ministers.  The  original  fear  of  influence 
on  the  part  of  the  Crown  no  longer  applies ;  and  the  only  im- 
portant effect  of  the  rule  is  that  if  a  new  cabinet  comes  into 
power  when  Parliament  is  in  session,  all  business  there  has 
to  be  suspended  while  the  ministers  are  seeking  reelection. 
A  number  of  attempts  have  been  made  to  do  away  with  the 
rule,  and  they  have  been  supported  by  very  eminent 
statesmen,  but  they  have  been  constantly  defeated,  mainly 
on  the  ground  that  a  constituency,  having  elected  a  man 
while  he  was  in  an  independent  position,  has  a  right  to  recon- 
sider its  choice  when  he  assumes  the  burden  of  public  office.2 
Such  reasoning  is  characteristic  of  English  political  life.  It 
either  proves  nothing  or  it  proves  too  much,  for  if  it  is  sound, 
the  same  principle  applies  with  quite  as  much  force  to  the 

1  Statement  by  the  Attorney  General,  Huns.  3  Ser.,  CLXXIV.,  123(3-37. 
'Todd,  "Pari    Govt,  in  England,"  2  Ed.,  II.,  331-39. 


242 


THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Extinct 
Disqualifi- 
cations. 


Resigna- 
tion. 


imder-secretaries,  and  with  a  great  deal  more  force  to  the 
Speaker.  This  objection  to  a  change  was  avoided,  while  a  part 
of  the  practical  inconvenience  was  removed,  by  a  provision 
in  the  Reform  Act  of  1867  that  a  person  who  has  been 
elected  to  Parliament  since  he  became  a  minister  shall  not 
vacate  his  seat  on  account  of  accepting  a  different  office 
in  the  ministry.1 

Formerly  there  were  a  number  of  other  qualifications  and 
disqualifications  that  have  now  been  swept  away,  such  as 
the  requirement  of  ownership  of  land,  and  of  residence  in 
the  constituency,2  and  the  provision  for  oaths  and  declara- 
tions intended  mainly  to  exclude  Roman  Catholics.  It  is 
curious  that  after  the  disabilities  of  the  Roman  Catholics 
were  removed  in  1829  the  oath  continued  to  be  an  impedi- 
ment to  the  admission  of  Jews  and  atheists,  although  it 
had  never  been  aimed  at  them.  In  each  case  the  law  was 
changed,  but  only  after  the  matter  had  been  brought  some- 
what violently  to  the  attention  of  the  House.  The  last 
religious  impediment  was  taken  away  in  1888  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  unseemly  wrangle  with  Mr.  Bradlaugh. 

A  disqualification  not  only  prevents  a  person  from  sitting 
in  the  House,  but  is  also  the  only  way  in  which  he  can  volun- 
tarily get  out  of  it.  A  man  cannot  resign  his  seat,  and  hence 
the  regular  method  of  accomplishing  the  same  result  is  the 
acceptance  of  a  disqualifying  office.  Two  or  three  sinecures 
are  retained  for  that  purpose,  the  best  known  being  the 
stewardship  of  the  Chiltern  Hundreds,  a  position  which  the 
member  desiring  to  leave  Parliament  applies  for,  accepts, 
and  immediately  gives  up.  The  place  is,  in  fact,  not  an 
office,  but  an  exit.  It  may  be  added  that  the  House  has 
power,  for  reasons  satisfactory  to  itself,  to  declare  a  seat 
vacant,  and  to  expel  a  member. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  say  much  here  about  the  privileges 


1  30-31  Vic,  c.  102,  §  52,  and  Sched.  H. 

2  This  became1  obsolete  by  long-continued  disregard.  It  is  said  to  be  the 
only  case  of  a  statute  which  is  deemed  to  have  been  annulled  by  "contrarius 
usus."      It  was  afterwards  expressly  repealed  by  statute.     Rogers,  II.,  38 


Speech. 


MEMBERS  AND  SESSIONS  243 

of  the  House  of  Commons.     Most  of  them  are  matters  of  Privileges 
historical  rather  than  present  political  significance.     At  the  House 
opening  of  each  new  Parliament,  the  Speaker,  after  being 
confirmed  by  the  Crown,  demands  the  ancient  and  undoubted 
rights  and  privileges  of  the  Commons,  the  most  important  of 
which  are  freedom  from  arrest  and  liberty  of  speech.     The 
freedom  from  arrest,  which  is  enjoyed  by  members  during  Freedom 
the   session  and   forty  days  before  and   after  it,  does  not  {^™st 
protect  a  member  from  the  consequences  of  any  indictable 
offence,  or  of  contempt  of  court ;  nor  in  civil  actions  does  it 
now  prevent  any  process  against  him  except  arrest. 

Freedom  of  speech  was  not  acquired  without  a  long  Liberty  of 
struggle ;  but  since  the  Bill  of  Rights  of  1689  it  has  been  a 
settled  principle  that  "the  freedom  of  speech,  and  debates 
or  proceedings  in  Parliament,  ought  not  to  be  impeached  or 
questioned  in  any  court  or  place  out  of  Parliament."  A 
man  cannot,  therefore,  be  prosecuted  criminally,  or  made 
civilly  responsible,  for  anything  he  has  said  in  the  House ; 
although  the  House  itself  may  punish  what  it  deems  an 
abuse  of  the  forms  of  debate. 

Curiously  enough  the  privilege  of  free  speech  in  the  House  Public 
does  not  necessarily  include  the  right  to  publish  that  speech 
outside.  This  matter  has  had  an  eventful  history.  Until 
about  one  hundred  years  ago  the  House  attempted  to  pre- 
vent the  report  of  its  debates  in  the  public  press,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  struggle  became  entangled  in  the  memorable 
controvnrsy  with  Wilkes.  The  question  has  never  been 
dealt  with  by  legislation,  and  it  is  still  assumed  that  the 
House  might  declare  the  publication  of  its  debates  a  breach 
of  privilege,  and  put  a  stop  to  it.  But  the  struggle  came  to 
an  end  because  the  House  changed  its  mind.  Instead  of 
objecting  to  the  publication  of  the  debates  it  came,  in  time, 
to  desire  it ;  and  whereas  it  had  attempted  earlier  to  keep 
out  reporters,  it  now  strove  to  protect  them. 

The  privilege  of  free  speech  covered  only  words  uttered 
in  the  House  and  matter  printed  for  circulation  among  the 
members  alone.    It  did  not  extend  to  the  printing  of  a  speech, 


tion  of  De- 
bates. 


244  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

or  to  documents  intended  for  general  distribution  even 
though  issued  by  order  of  the  House  itself ;  and  in  its  later 
attempt  to  insist  upon  its  right  of  publication,  as  in  its  earlier 
effort  to  insist  upon  its  right  to  prevent  publication,  the 
House  came  into  conflict  with  the  judiciary.  In  the  case 
of  Stockdale  v.  Hansard  1  the  Queen's  Bench  held  that  a 
publisher  might  be  liable  in  damages  to  a  person  injured  by 
defamatory  matter  contained  in  a  report  made  to  the  House 
of  Commons,  although  the  printing  was  ordered  by  the 
House  itself.  The  question  was  then  set  at  rest  by  a  stat- 
ute 2  providing  that  publication  by  order  of  either  House 
should  be  a  defence  to  any  civil  or  criminal  proceedings. 
But  this  has  no  effect  upon  the  newspapers,  and  although  a 
fair  account  of  a  debate  published  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  reporting  is  not  in  itself  libellous,  even  if  it  contain 
defamatory  matter,  yet  a  faithful  report  of  a  speech  pub- 
lished with  a  malicious  intent  is  still  libellous,  and  it  is  never 
safe  to  go  to  a  jury  on  a  question  of  intent. 

If  the  attitude  of  the  House  of  Commons  toward  the  pub- 
lication of  its  debates  has  changed  entirely,  it  is  because  its 
relation  to  the  public  has  undergone  a  complete  transfor- 
mation. Every  member  of  Parliament  to-day  is  seeking  for 
the  approbation  of  his  constituents,  and  far  from  dread- 
ing publication  of  what  he  says  in  the  House,  his  effort  is 
rather  to  attract  attention  to  himself  by  the  reports  in  the 
local  press  of  his  remarks  in  Parliament.  Moreover,  the 
House  as  a  whole  depends  more  than  ever  upon  popiTar  sup- 
port ;  and  one  may  find  a  striking  illustration  of  the  way 
the  same  thing  produces  different  political  effects  under  dif- 
ferent conditions  by  observing  that  while  the  cabinet  would 
lose  authority  if  its  discussions  were  not  secret,  Parliament 
would  suffer  if  its  debates  were  not  public. 
Privilege  Sir  William  Anson  remarks  that  "  The  Privileges  of  Par- 

Courts  of       hament,  like  the  Prerogative  of  the  Crown,  are  rights  con- 
Law,  f erred  by  Law,  and  as  such  their  limits  are  ascertainable  and 
determinable,  like  the  limits  of  other  rights,  by  the  Courts 
'9A.&E,1.  2  3-4  Vic,  c.  9. 


MEMBERS  AND  SESSIONS  245 

of  Law."  !  This  principle  has  not  always  been  accepted 
by  the  House,  which  has  on  several  occasions  come  into  col- 
lision with  the  courts ;  but  the  latter  have  always  maintained, 
and  maintained  successfully,  that  when  a  question  involving 
a  privilege  of  the  House  comes  before  them  for  decision,  it 
is  their  duty  to  ascertain  whether  the  privilege  exists  or  not, 
and  to  determine  its  effect  upon  the  case  before  them.  They 
have  further  maintained  that  they  must  decide  the  question 
for  themselves,  and  that  a  claim  to  the  privilege  on  the  part 
of  the  House  is  not  conclusive. 

In  one  respect  the  authority  of  the  courts  is  incomplete ; 
for  the  House  has  a  right  to  order  a  man  committed  to 
prison  for  contempt,  and  the  question  what  constitutes  a 
contempt  is  so  far  within  the  discretion  of  the  House  that  the 
court  will  not  order  the  prisoner  set  at  liberty  on  habeas 
corpus  where  the  return  to  the  writ  simply  states  that  he  is 
committed  for  contempt  by  order  of  the  House.  Referring 
to  this  subject,  Professor  Dicey  says :  "The  powers  exercised 
by  the  Houses,  and  especially  in  practice  by  the  House  of 
Commons,  make  a  near  approach  to  an  authority  above 
that  of  the  ordinary  law  of  the  land."  2  Such  a  power, 
however,  is  exceedingly  unlikely  to  be  used  in  any  dissen- 
sion with  the  courts  to-day ;  and  if  it  were  used,  the  courts 
would  be  almost  certain  to  win,  because  the  commitment 
by  the  House  terminates  with  the  session. 

There  remain  to  be  considered  only  the  methods  of  calling  summons 
Parliament  together,  and  of  putting  an  end  to  its  labours. 

Parliament  can  be  summoned  and  dissolved,  and  its  ses- 
sions can  be  opened  and  closed  by  the  Crown  alone,  tin'  only 
legal  restraint  upon  the  arbitrary  power  of  the  sovereign  in 
the  matter  being  the  Act  of  William  and  Mary,  which  pro- 
vides that  a  new  Parliament  shall  lie  summoned  within 
three  years  after  a  dissolution.3  This  statute  is  now,  of 
course,  unnecessary ;    and,  in  fact,  the  same  proclamation 

1  "  Law  and  Custom  of  the  Constitution,"  I.,  17.5. 

2  "Law  nf  the  Constitution,"  5  Ed.,  56,  note. 

3  Anson,  I.,  287-SS. 


ami  Dis- 
solution. 


246 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Proroga- 
tion and 
Adjourn- 
ment. 


Effect  on 

Unfinished 

Business. 


which  dissolves  one  Parliament  always  announces  the  issue 
of  writs  for  the  election  of  another.  If  Parliament  is  not 
dissolved  by  the  Crown,  its  term  expires  at  the  end  of  the 
seven  years  prescribed  by  the  Septennial  Act  of  1716;  but, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  Parliament  never  dies  a  natural  death, 
and  if  its  life  is  not  cut  off  earlier,  a  dissolution  takes  place 
shortly  before  the  end  of  the  seven  years. 

Until  1867  the  death  of  a  sovereign  always  wrought  a 
dissolution  of  Parliament ;  but  this  rule,  which  depended 
more  on  ancient  theory  than  on  modern  convenience,  was 
abolished  by  the  Reform  Act  of  that  year. 

While  a  session  can  be  brought  to  a  close  only  by  proro- 
gation, either  house  may  adjourn  for  any  period  at  its  pleas- 
ure, subject  only  to  the  right  of  the  Crown  to  terminate  an 
adjournment  of  more  than  fourteen  days.  Although  a  pro- 
rogation is  made  by  the  Crown,  and  adjournment  by  the 
House  itself,  practically  both  are  virtually  in  the  hands  of 
the  ministry  to-day,  and  the  really  important  difference  be- 
tween them  is  that  a  prorogation  terminates  all  unfinished 
business,  while  an  adjournment  does  not.  For  that  reason 
a  government  which  has  business  that  it  cannot  put  through 
during  the  regular  session,  and  does  not  want  to  abandon, 
will  sometimes  resort  to  an  adjournment  instead  of  a  pro- 
rogation. This  was  done,  for  example,  in  1902  in  order  to 
complete  the  stages  of  the  Education  Bill  in  the  autumn, 
and  again  in  1906  chiefly  in  order  that  the  House  of  Lords 
might  consider  the  pending  government  measures.  The 
wisdom  of  the  rule  that  the  close  of  the  session  puts  an  end 
to  all  measures  that  have  not  finished  their  course  in  both 
Houses  is  not  so  clear  in  the  case  of  Parliament,  as  in  that 
of  legislative  bodies  where  a  vast  number  of  measures  are 
brought  in  by  irresponsible  members.  In  such  bodies  the 
rule  may  result  in  killing  a  great  many  bills  that  had  better 
die,  but  in  Parliament  this  is  far  less  true.  Almost  all 
important  legislation  relating  to  public  affairs  is  now  in- 
troduced by  the  ministers;  and  every  year  measures  to 
which  both  they  and  the  House  have  devoted  much  time 


MEMBERS   AND  SESSIONS  247 

and  thought  are  killed  by  the  close  of  the  session.  A  day 
comes  when  the  leader  of  the  House  arises  and  states  what 
bills  he  is  obliged  by  lack  of  time  to  drop,  a  process  com- 
monly known  as  the  slaughter  of  the  innocents.  The  neces- 
sity would  seem  to  be  unfortunate. 

In  fact  the  House  of  Commons  spends  so  much  time  in 
debating  each  bill  that  it  gets  through  its  work  slowly;  and 
whereas  many  other  popular  chambers  are  reproached  with 
legislating  too  much,  Parliament  is  accused  of  legislating  too 
little.  Moreover  the  House  of  Commons  suffers  less  from  an 
excess  of  the  easy  good  nature,  which,  in  America  at  least, 
is  the  parent  of  many  ill-considered  and  unwise  laws ;  yet 
the  present  rule  does  act  as  a  serious  check  upon  the  per- 
sistent member  with  a  mission,  and  perhaps  it  kills  off,  on 
the  whole,  more  bad  bills  than  good  ones. 

There  is,  however,  a  class  of  measures  on  which  the  rule,  Suspending 
if  carried  out  strictly,  would  have  a  distinctly  injurious  g^16 
effect.  These  are  the  private  bills  —  a  term  applied  to 
projects  which  relate  to  private  or  local  interests,  such  as 
bills  for  the  extension  of  a  railway,  or  for  authority  to  supply 
water,  gas,  tramways  and  the  like.  Legislation  of  that  kind 
is,  as  we  shall  see,  conducted  in  Parliament  by  a  semi- 
judicial  process,  and  as  it  is  highly  expensive  for  both  sides, 
it  would  be  unreasonable  that  the  closing  of  the  session, 
for  reasons  quite  unconnected  with  these  matters,  should 
oblige  the  promoters  and  objectors  to  incur  the  cost  of 
beginning  proceedings  all  over  again.  In  practice  this  sel- 
dom happens,  for  in  the  few  cases  where  such  a  bill  cannot 
be  completed  before  the  end  of  the  session  it  is  usually 
suspended  by  a  special  order  providing  that  the  stages  it 
has  already  passed  shall  be  formally  taken  at  the  opening 
of  the  next  session,  so  that  the  bill  really  begins  its  prog- 
ress again  at  the  point  it  had  already  readied.  When,  as 
in  1895,  Parliament  comes  to  an  untimely  end  in  the  midst 
of  a  session,  a  general  provision  of  this  kind  is  made  sus- 
pending all  unfinished  private  bills,  and  thus  a  great  deal 
of  unnecessary  hardship  is  avoided. 


CHAPTER  XII 

PROCEDURE   IN   THE    HOUSE    OF   COMMONS 

The  House,  its  Rules  and  Officers 

To  the  traveller  who  cares  for  history,  either  of  the 
past  or  in  the  making,  there  is  no  place  more  interesting 
than  the  long  sombre  building  with  a  tower  at  each  end, 
that  borders  the  Thames  just  above  Westminster  Bridge. 
Apart  from  occasional  meetings  elsewhere,  chiefly  in  the 
Middle  Ages,  the  Mother  of  Parliaments  has  sat  close  to 
this  spot  for  more  than  six  hundred  years.  Except  for 
old  Westminster  Hall,  almost  the  whole  of  the  present 
structure  was,  indeed,  built  after  the  fire  of  1834.  Yet  if  it 
contains  little  that  is  really  venerable,  save  memories, 
the  smoke  of  London  has  given  to  the  gothic  panelling  of 
the  outer  walls  the  dignity  of  apparent  age.  The  interior 
has  a  more  modern  air,  for  it  is  not  only  well  planned 
with  a  view  to  its  present  use,  but  in  some  parts  it 
expresses  with  peculiar  fitness  the  purposes  it  serves. 
From  opposite  sides  of  the  large  central  lobby  corridors 
lead  to  the  two  Houses,  but  the  hall  of  the  Lords  seems 
designed  for  ornament,  that  of  the  Commons  for  doing 
work.  The  House  of  Commons  is  seventy-five  feet  long 
by  forty-five  feet  wide  and  forty-one  feet  high,  panelled  in 
dark  oak,  and  lit  by  long  stained  glass  windows  and  sky- 
lights in  the  ceiling.  From  the  main  entrance  a  broad 
aisle  runs  the  whole  length  of  the  chamber,  with  the 
clerks'  table  filling  nearly  the  whole  upper  end  of  it,  and 
beyond  this  a  raised  chair  for  the  Speaker  with  a  canopy 
over  his  head.  Facing  the  aisle  on  each  side  long  rows 
of  high-backed  benches,   covered  with  dark  green  leather, 

248 


THE  HOUSE  AND  ITS  OFFICERS  249 

slope  upward  tier  above  tier  to  the  walls  of  the  room ; 
and  through  them,  at  right  angles  to  the  aisle,  a  narrow 
passage,  known  as  the  gangway,  cuts  across  the  House. 
There  is  also  a  gallery  running  all  around  the  room,  the 
part  of  it  facing  the  Speaker  being  given  up  to  strangers, 
while  the  front  rows  at  the  opposite  end  belong  to  the 
reporters,  and  behind  them  there  stands,  before  a  still  higher 
gallery,  a  heavy  screen,  like  those  erected  in  Turkish  mosques 
to  conceal  the  presence  of  women,  and  used  here  for  the 
same  purpose.  The  structure  and  arrangement  of  a  legisla- 
tive chamber  are  not  without  influence  upon  the  mode  of 
transacting  business.  The  whole  number  of  seats  in  the  Small 
House  of  Commons  is  far  from  large,  not  large  enough  for  of11™^^ 
all  the  members.  The  two  side  galleries  are  reserved  for 
them,  but  they  are  very  narrow,  containing  only  a  little 
more  than  one  hundred  seats  apiece,  and  although  they 
are  occupied  on  very  crowded  nights,  they  are  practically 
useless  for  any  one  who  intends  to  take  part  in  debate. 
A  small  portion  of  the  space  under  the  strangers'  gallery 
is  also  appropriated  for  visitors,  and  the  rest  of  the  floor 
contains  only  three  hundred  and  sixty  seats,  enough  for 
little  more  than  one  half  of  the  six  hundred  and  seventy 
members  of  the  House.  During  the  greater  part  of  the 
time  even  those  seats  are  not  filled,  for  they  are  adapted 
only  for  the  transaction  of  the  business  of  the  House. 
They  are  merely  benches  with  no  means  for  writing.  If 
a  member  wants  to  carry  on  his  correspondence,  he  goes  to 
the  library,  or  to  one  of  the  other  rooms  near  by.  In  the 
House  he  can  only  speak,  listen,  and  applaud. 

On  a  great  occasion,  like  the  introduction  by  Mr.  Glad-  Attendance 
stone  of  his  first  Home  Rule  Bill,  everv  seat  in  the  House  ?fte" 

1  J  _  Small. 

is  taken.  At  the  opening  of  an  ordinary  sitting,  also, 
while  questions  to  the  ministers  are  asked  and  answered, 
and  at  a  time  when  the  leaders  of  the  two  great  parties  are 
speaking  about  a  measure  of  general  interest,  most  of  the 
seats  on  the  floor  are  occupied  ;  but  as  soon  as  the  lesser 
lights  arise  the  members  begin  to  drop  off,   going  to   the 


250         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

lobby,  the  library,  the  smoking-room,  the  dining-room,  or 
the  terrace.  Nor  is  it  always  the  lesser  lights  alone  that 
speak  to  nearly  empty  benches,  or  rather  to  the  reporters' 
gallery.  The  writer  well  remembers,  on  the  first  occasion 
when  he  saw  the  House,  now  more  than  twenty  years  ago, 
that  Sir  William  Harcourt,  then  Home  Secretary,  made  a 
speech  an  hour  and  three  quarters  long  upon  a  bill  which 
he  had  brought  in  to  reform  the  government  of  London,  and 
that,  during  a  great  part  of  the  time,  the  only  persons  present 
besides  the  officers  of  the  House,  were  the  Lord  Mayor,  the 
Chairman  of  the  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works,  and  a  casual 
who  sat  on  one  of  the  upper  benches  behind  the  minister. 
This  is  the  smallest  number  of  members  the  writer  has  ever 
beheld  in  the  House,  but  to  see  only  a  score  or  two  on  the 
benches  is  by  no  means  unusual.  Many  more,  however, 
although  not  within  ear-shot,  are  potentially  present. 
Forty  members  constitute  a  quorum,  but  if  any  one  suggests 
that  they  are  not  there,  electric  bells  are  rung  all  over  the 
building,  summoning  the  members  into  the  House,  a  two- 
minute  sand-glass  is  turned,  and  the  members  are  not 
counted  until  it  has  run  out.  The  same  process  takes  place 
whenever  a  division  —  that  is  a  vote  by  count  —  is  chal- 
lenged. 
Effect  of  The   small  size  of  the  chamber   makes   it  easy  to   hear 

an  ordinary  tone  of  voice ;  and  this,  coupled  with  the  still 
smaller  attendance,  discourages  flights  of  oratory  or  popular 
eloquence,  and  gives  to  the  debates  a  businesslike  and 
almost  conversational  character.  Moreover,  the  very  fact 
that  members  do  not  stay  in  the  House  if  not  interested  in 
what  is  being  said,  prevents  the  distracting  hum  of  conver- 
sation which  is  sometimes  annoying  in  other  representative 
bodies.  All  this  makes  the  spectator  feel  that  the  members 
are  present  for  public  business  and  nothing  else.  Except  for 
occasional  scenes  enacted  for  the  most  part  by  the  Irish 
members,  the  proceedings  are  orderly,  and  respect  for  the 
dignity  of  the  House,  and  the  authority  of  the  chair,  are 
almost  universal. 


This  on 
Debates. 


THE   HOUSE   AND   ITS  OFFICERS  251 

Even  the  arrangement  of  seats  in  the  House  is  not  without  The  Ar- 
its  bearing  upon  political  life  ;  and  although  a  small  matter,  ofn|^nt 
it  affords  another  illustration  of  the  principle  that  an  in- 
stitution which,  instead  of  being  deliberately  planned,  is 
evolved  slowly,  will  develop  in  harmony  with  its  environ- 
ment, or  force  its  environment  into  harmony  with  itself. 
The  front  bench  at  the  upper  end  of  the  aisle,  close  at  the 
right  hand  of  the  Speaker,  is  called  the  Treasury  Bench,  and  is 
reserved  for  the  ministers ;  the  corresponding  bench  on  the 
other  side  being  occupied  by  the  former  ministers  of  the 
party  now  in  Opposition.  Behind  these  two  benches  sit 
for  the  most  part  men  whose  fidelity  to  their  respective 
parties  is  undoubted,  members  whose  allegiance  is  less 
absolute  generally  preferring  seats  below  the  gangway  on 
either  side. 

Of  course,  on  a  crowded  night  members  cannot  always 
find  seats  that  express  their  exact  sentiments.  Still,  the 
arrangement  is  fairly  well  preserved,  especially  in  the  case 
of  prominent  men,  with  whom  it  is  sometimes  a  matter  of 
no  little  consideration.1  Any  group  that  desires  to  empha- 
sise its  freeedom  from  regular  party  control  always  sits 
below  the  gangway.  The  Fourth  Party,  for  example,  sat 
in  1884  below  the  gangway  on  the  Opposition  side,  the  La- 
bour Party  has  sat  there  since  the  election  of  190G,  and  the 
same  position  is  occupied  by  the  Irish  Nationalists  under 
every  ministry  ;  while  the  Liberal  Unionists  at  the  time  of 
their  breach  with  Mr.  Gladstone  over  his  first  Home  Rule 
Bill  took  up  their  seats  below  the  gangway  on  the  govern- 
ment side.  The  House  at  a  great  debate  resembles  a  mar- 
tial array,  with  the  leaders  face  to  face  in  the  van,  sup- 
ported by  their  troops  in  ranks  behind  them.  The  minister 
leans  over  the  table,  and  points  in  indignation  or  in  scorn  at 
the  "  honourable  gentlemen  opposite."  All  this  expresses 
the  idea  of  party  government,  and  lends  a  dramatic  effect 
to  parliamentary  warfare. 

1  The  question  where  the  Peelites  should  sit  in  1852  was  much  discussed 
among  themselves.     Morley,  "Life  of  Gladstone,"  I.,  422-23. 


252         THE  GOVERNMENT  OP  ENGLAND 

Mode  of  Nowhere  in  the  whole  range  of  British  institutions  does 

Subjecntgofhe  "the  interaction  of  law  and  custom  baffle  any  attempt  at 
Procedure,  logical  description  so  much  as  in  the  case  of  procedure  in 
Parliament.  The  cabinet,  which  is  becoming  more  and  more 
exclusively  the  motive  force  in  all  important  legislative 
action,  is  not,  indeed,  so  completely  unknown  to  the  rules  of 
the  House  as  it  is  to  the  statute-book ;  and  yet  a  study  of  the 
rules  alone  would  give  but  a  faint  idea  of  the  authority  of 
the  Treasury  Bench.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  impossible 
to  understand  how  the  government  is  attacked,  and  how 
it  carries  through  its  plans,  unless  one  is  familiar  with  the 
rules  themselves.  At  the  present  day  the  discussions  con- 
nected with  appropriations,  for  example,  turn  little  on  finan- 
cial questions,  and  are  used  mainly  as  an  opportunity  for 
criticising  administrative  conduct ;  but  to  understand  how 
this  is  done,  and  to  what  extent  the  government  has  sought 
to  limit  the  practice,  a  knowledge  of  the  process  of  grant- 
ing supply  is  essential. 

The  actual  working  of  the  House  of  Commons  involves 
three  problems :  first,  the  regular  forms  of  procedure  ;  second, 
the  action  of  the  cabinet  and  of  private  members,  operating 
subject  to  those  forms ;  and  third,  the  methods  by  which  the 
cabinet  maintains  a  control  over  its  own  supporters,  and 
through  them  over  the  House  itself.  To  deal  with  these 
three  matters  together  would  involve  so  much  confusion, 
that  it  has  seemed  better  to  take  up  one  of  them  at  a  time. 
This  chapter  and  the  two  succeeding  ones  are,  therefore, 
devoted  solely  to  the  organisation  of  the  House  and  the 
forms  of  procedure  on  public  matters,  the  relation  of  the 
government  to  the  work  of  the  House  being  described  in 
the  chapters  that  follow,  while  the  machinery  for  keeping  the 
majority  compact  and  under  the  lead  of  the  Treasury  Bench 
will  be  dealt  with  at  a  later  stage  under  the  head  of  "Party 
Organisation  in  Parliament."  Legislation  for  private  and 
local  objects,  which  has  had  a  peculiar  and  instructive 
development,  is  treated  in  a  chapter  by  itself. 

Before  describing  the  organisation  and  procedure  of  the 


THE  HOUSE  AND  ITS  OFFICERS  253 

House  it  may  be  well  to  explain  the  method  of  voting,  be-  The  Method 
cause  frequent  reference  must  be  made  to  it,  and  the  terms  of  Votine- 
are  technical.  After  stating  the  question  to  be  voted  upon, 
the  Speaker,  or  the  Chairman,  calls  in  the  ordinary  way  for 
the  ayes  and  noes.  According  to  the  apparent  preponder- 
ance of  voices  he  then  says,  "I  think  the  ayes  (or  noes)  have 
it."  If  no  objection  is  raised,  he  adds  a  moment  later, 
"The  ayes  (or  noes)  have  it,"  and  the  vote  is  so  recorded. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  any  of  the  minority  doubt  the  result, 
or  wish  the  numbers  and  names  recorded,  they  cry  out  con- 
trary to  the  Speaker,  "The  noes  (or  ayes)  have  it."  Where- 
upon the  Speaker  directs  strangers  to  withdraw  (except  from 
the  places  reserved  for  them),  the  division  bells  are  rung  all 
over  the  building,  the  two-minute  sand-glass  is  turned,  and 
when  it  has  run  the  doors  are  locked,  and  the  question  and 
vote  are  repeated  in  the  same  way.1  If  the  Speaker's 
opinion  of  the  result  is  again  challenged  —  and  this  is  almost 
always  done  —  he  orders  a  division  of  the  House,  that  is,  a  Division, 
he  directs  the  ayes  to  go  to  the  right,  the  noes  to  the  left ; 
and  he  appoints  two  tellers  from  each  side,  one  of  each  pair 
to  count  the  ayes,  and  the  other  the  noes,  in  order  to  check 
one  another.  The  ayes  then  go  into  the  lobby  that  runs 
parallel  to  the  House  on  the  Speaker's  right,  the  noes  into 
that  on  his  left ;  and  until  1906  every  member  in  the  House, 
except  the  Speaker,  was  obliged  to  go  into  one  lobby  or 
the  other,  unless  he  was  physically  disabled,  when  his  vote 
might  be  counted  in  the  House.2     The  tellers,  standing  at 

1  Standing  Orders  28-29,  Com.  Papers,  1905,  LXIL,  1.59.  Under  the  new 
rule  adopted  in  1906  the  Speaker  orders  the  lobby  to  be  eleared,  and  the 
members  begin  to  pass  through  it  at  once. 

2  To  refuse  to  do  so  has  been  treated  as  such  a  disregard  of  the  authority 
of  the  chair  as  will  justify  suspending  the  member.  -May,  "  Pari.  Practice," 
10  Ed.,  338. 

On  March  5,  1901,  twelve  Irish  Nationalists,  who  refused  to  go  into  the 
lobby  because  they  had  had  no  chance  to  speak  when  the  closure  was  moved 
on  a  vote  on  account,  were  suspended;  Hans.  1  Ser.  XC,  092  90;  and  on 
Aug.  5,  190  1,  the  Welsh  members  refused  to  vote  as  a  protest  against 
the  use  of  closure  on  the  Education  (Local  Authorities  Defaults)  Bill. 
After  they  had  persisted  so  far  that  the  Chairman  reported  the  matter  to 
the  House,  they  consented  to  withdraw  altogether,  and  no  further  steps 
were  taken  against  them.     Hans.  4  Ser.  CXXXIX.,  1259-68. 


254         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

the  door  of  each  lobby,  count  the  members  as  they  pass 
between  them  in  returning  to  the  House,  while  clerks  at 
tables  in  the  lobbies  take  down  their  names. 

Ever  since  1836,  when  the  method  of  taking  a  division 
assumed  its  present  form,  the  names  of  members  voting 
on  each  side  have  been  printed  and  preserved,  although 
curiously  enough  these  division  lists  are  not  included  among 
the  parliamentary  papers.  The  process  may  seem  a  clumsy 
way  of  counting  votes,  but  under  the  system  in  force  until 
1906  it  took,  on  the  average,  only  twenty  minutes,  and  under 
the  new  system,  whereby  the  recording  of  names  begins 
when  the  sand-glass  is  turned,  it  takes  not  much  more  than 
half  as  long.  This  is  less  time  than  would  be  consumed  by 
a  roll-call,  and  the  system  has  been  found  so  satisfactory  that 
it  was  adopted  by  the  House  of  Lords. 

Until  recently  a  division  was  the  only  means,  apart  from 
an  oral  vote,  of  taking  the  sense  of  the  House ;  and  any  one 
member  could  force  a  division  by  challenging  the  result  of  an 
oral  vote,  or  rather  any  two  members  could  do  so,  for  a 
division  cannot  take  place  unless  two  tellers  can  be  found 
for  each  side.  In  1888,  however,  as  a  part  of  the  movement 
to  prevent  obstruction  and  waste  of  time,  the  Speaker  or 
Chairman  was  empowered,  if  he  thinks  a  division  frivolously 
or  vexatiously  claimed,  to  call  upon  the  ayes  and  noes  to 
rise  in  their  places.  He  can  then  count  them,  and  declare 
the  result ; l  but  this  is  in  fact  rarely  done. 

The  names  of  the  men  selected  as  tellers  indicate  the 
political  nature  of  the  vote.  If  the  government  intend  to 
treat  the  question,  I  will  not  say  as  one  of  confidence,  (for 
there  are  cases  of  secondary  importance  where  a  ministry 
may  be  beaten  without  feeling  that  they  have  lost  the  con- 
fidence of  the  House  and  must  resign),  but  if  they  intend  to 
treat  it  as  one  where  an  adverse  vote  is  a  defeat  for  them, 
if  they  desire  to  rally  their  followers  to  vote  solidly  upon  it, 
then  the  government  whips  are  appointed  tellers.  If  in  the 
same  way  the  Opposition  want  to  treat  it  as  a  party  ques- 

1  S.O.  30. 


THE   HOUSE   AND   ITS  OFFICERS  255 

tion,  their  whips  are  appointed  tellers  upon  the  other  side. 
But  if  on  one  side  or  the  other  this  is  not  the  case,  private 
members  who  have  made  or  seconded  the  motion  or  taken 
an  active  part  in  debate  are  selected  by  the  chair  as  tellers, 
and  if  so  any  member  ma}',  without  disloyalty  to  his  party, 
vote  according  to  his  own  unaided  convictions. 

Like  other  legislative  bodies  the  House  of  Commons  has  standing 
printed  rules,  and  the  most  important  of  these,  the  standing  l"^\S~ 
orders,  are  published  every  year  among  the  parliamentary  Orders, 
papers.  But  the  standing  orders  are  by  no  means  a  code 
of  procedure,  for  they  cover  only  a  fraction,  and  so  far  as 
they  relate  to  public  business  a  small  fraction,  of  the  subject.1 
The  procedure  rests  essentially  upon  custom,  to  be  gathered 
in  part  from  precedents  and  the  rulings  of  Speakers,  in  part 
from  unrecorded  tradition  known  by  personal  experience. 
Many  standing  orders  have,  in  fact,  been  adopted  from 
time  to  time  in  order  to  modify  or  forbid  an  existing 
practice,  and  hence  their  effect  is  mainly  negative.  No 
particular  formality  is  required  for  the  adoption  of  these 
rules,  but  in  1902,  when  extensive  changes  were  made,  the 
proposals  were  read  several  times,  and  were,  in  fact,  sub- 
mitted to  a  procedure  similar  to  that  for  the  enactment  of 
a  bill.2 

The  standing  orders  differ  from  the  rules  of  legislative  standing 
bodies  in  some  other  countries  in  two  important  respects.   Endure 
In  the  first  place  they  do  not  have  to  be  adopted  afresh  fm,n.  °ne 

1  x  Parliament 

by  each  new  House  of  Commons,  but  once  established  they  to  An- 
continue    in    force    from    Parliament    to    Parliament    until  ot  ier' 
repealed.     There  are,  indeed,  sessional  orders  which  require 

1  The  standing  orders  relating  to  private  business  are  much  more  elaborate 
and  come  far  nearer  to  a  code  of  procedure. 

2  This  had  not  been  the  practice  earlier;  but  the  discussion  of  changes  in 
the  standing  orders  has  sometimes  been  very  long.  In  1SS2  the  new  rules, 
which  dealt  with  closure,  the  suspension  of  disorderly  members  and  the 
creation  of  standing  committees,  were  debated  for  thirty-three  days.  On 
the  other  hand,  a  change  was  made  in  1901  on  the  motion  of  a  private  mem- 
ber, at  a  single  sitting.  Hans.  4  Ser.  XCII.,  ">").">  -75.  In  1900  the  changes 
were  referred  to  a  select  committee  and  then  each  of  them  adopted  on  a 
motion  by  the  government.      Hans.  4  Ser.  CIA'.,  197  et  scq. 


256         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  be  renewed  at  the  beginning  of  each  session,  and  some- 
times a  new  rule  after  proving  its  utility  in  this  way  is 
given  the  permanent  form  of  a  standing  order.  Orders  or 
resolutions  without  any  fixed  duration  are  also  adopted  at 
times.  These  expire  upon  prorogation,  but  it  sometimes 
happens  that  without  being  formally  revived  they  continue 
to  be  observed  as  a  part  of  customary  practice  of  the  House.1 
They  Can  The  second  peculiarity  of  the  standing  orders  lies  in  the 

be  s,us~         fact  that  thev  can  be  suspended  by  a  simple  majority  vote. 

pended  bv  "  *■  J  L  *  ^ 

a  simple'      Notice  of  a  motion  for  that  purpose  is  usually  required  and 
>te'  given,  but  it  may  be  dispensed  with ;    and  it  is  not  even 

necessary  to  refer  in  the  motion  to  the  standing  orders  at  all. 
Any  order  or  resolution,  inconsistent  with  their  terms,  has, 
if  adopted,  the  effect  of  suspending  them,2  and  the  House  is, 
in  fact,  constantly  adopting  special  orders  which  change  the 
course  of  procedure  as  prescribed  by  the  standing  orders  or 
the  customary  practice.  This  has  often  been  done  when  the 
government  has  needed  to  take,  for  its  own  measures,  part 
of  the  time  allotted  to  private  members,  or  has  wanted  to 
extend  the  sitting  beyond  the  usual  hour.  Many  of  these 
cases  are  now  provided  for  by  the  new  rules  adopted  in  1902  ; 
but  the  most  effective  form  of  cutting  short  debate,  the 
process  known  as  the  "guillotine,"  although  now  regulated 
by  standing  order  in  the  case  of  supply,3  is  still  applied 
in  the  case  of  all  other  bills  solely  by  a  special  order  of  the 
House  adopted  for  a  particular  bill  on  the  motion  of  a 
minister. 
Tendency  Most  of  the  changes  in  the  standing  orders  made  during 

m  the1"1       the  last  fifty  years  have  been  aimed  at  preserving  order,  or 
standing       preventing  waste  of  time,   or  altering  the  distribution  of 
time.4     Those   of   the   first    class,    such   as   the   provisions 

1  May,  14.5.  2  Ibid.,  145.  »  S.O.  1.5. 

*  In  his  excellent  Recht  und  Technik  des  Englischen  Parlamentarismus  — 
the  only  systematic  history  of  procedure  in  the  House  of  Commons  —  Dr. 
Rcdlich  dwells  on  two  tendencies  in  the  evolution  of  the  standing  orders  since 
1S32.  One  of  these  consists  in  giving  to  the  ministry  an  ever  greater  control 
over  the  time,  and  hence  over  the  activity,  of  the  House;  the  other  in  keep- 
ing the  House  more  and  more  strictly  to  its  prearranged  order  of  business  for 


THE   HOUSE   AND   ITS  OFFICERS  257 

authorising  the  suspension  of  a  member  for  disorder,  arose 
from  the  conduct  of  the  Irish  members,  and  may  be  regarded 
as  an  accident  unconnected  with  the  normal  evolution  of  the 
parliamentary  system.  This  is  not  true  of  the  rules  designed 
to  prevent  waste  of  time ;  for  although  the  provisions  to  cut 
off  debate  grew  out  of  Irish  obstruction,  the  subsequent 
history  of  closure  has  shown  that  some  process  of  this  kind 
was  certain  to  come  sooner  or  later  in  the  natural  course  of 
things,  and  that  the  Irish  merely  hastened  it.1 

The  changes  made  in  order  to  save  time  are  commonly  Efibitsto 
attributed  to  the  increase  in  the  amount  of  business  the  SaveT,me- 
House  is  called  upon  to  despatch,  and  if  in  that  business  be 
included  the  enlarged  control  of  the  House  over  adminis- 
trative detail  by  means  of  questions  and  otherwise,  this  is 
undoubtedly  true,  but  so  far  as  legislation  is  concerned,  it 
would  be  more  accurate  to  attribute  the  changes  to  the  fact 
that  it  requires  more  time  to  transact  business  than  it  did 
formerly.  There  are  a  far  larger  number  of  members  who 
want  to  interrogate  and  criticise  the  ministers,  and  to  take 
part  in  debate.  The  pages  of  Hansard  are  more  numerous 
in  proportion  to  those  of  the  statute-book.  Now  the  old 
procedure  was  very  elaborate.  In  the  passage  of  an  ordi- 
nary public  bill  through  the  House  there  were,  apart  from 
amendments,  more  than  a  score  of  different  steps,  upon 
each  of  which  debate  might  take  place,  and  a  division  might 
be  claimed.  Then  motions  to  adjourn,  and  other  dilatory 
tactics  could  be  used  indefinitely.     Moreover,  the  general 

the  day.  Now  the  manifestations  of  this  last  tendency,  which  he  makes  very 
clear,  can  also  be  classed  as  changes  made  to  save  time  or  to  arrange  the 
distribution  of  time.  Whether  in  the  form  of  forbidding  motions  to  vary 
the  prescribed  order  of  business,  or  to  confine  amendments  and  debate  to 
matters  relevant  to  the  main  question,  or  to  exclude  dilatory  motions  and 
others  that  open  an  indefinite  field  for  discussion,  they  have  the  effect  either 
of  preventing  waste  of  time  by  debating  trivial  questions  or  matters  that  the 
House  does  not  care  to  take  up,  or  of  preventing  the  use  for  some  other 
purpose  of  time  allotted  to  the  government  or  to  a  private  member. 

Since  this  was  written  Dr.  Redlich's  book  has  happily  been  translated 
into  English,  but  as  the  English  edition  ha-  not  yet  been  received  the  ref- 
erences to  the  (Herman  edition  arc  left  unchanged. 

1  This  is  also  Dr.  Redlich's  opinion,  Ftecht  und  TecJtnik,  246. 


258         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

rule  that  amendments  and  debate  must  be  relevant  to  the 
question  before  the  House1  was  subject  to  wide  exceptions, 
if,  indeed,  there  could  be  said  to  be  any  such  general  rule 
at  all.  The  debate  upon  a  dilatory  motion,  for  example, 
was  not  limited  to  the  motion  itself;2  and  every  time  a 
motion  was  made  to  go  into  Committee  of  the  Whole  on 
Supply,  any  grievance  could  be  brought  forward  and 
discussed.3 

All  this  was  unimportant  so  long  as  the  battles  between 
the  parties  were  confined  to  occasional  full-dress  debates, 
and  the  rest  of  the  time  was  devoted  to  the  real  work  of 
legislation.  But  when  systematic  obstruction  arose,  and 
when  without  any  intent  to  obstruct  it  became  the  recog- 
nised business  of  the  Opposition  to  oppose,  and  in  the  case 
of  measures  that  aroused  strong  party  feeling  to  oppose  at 
every  step,  the  opportunities  for  doing  so  were  too  numerous 
to  endure.  Some  of  the  steps  in  the  enactment  of  a  bill, 
such  as  engrossment,4  passage,5  and  first  and  second  reading 
in  the  Committee  of  the  Whole,6  have  been  discontinued 
altogether.  Others,  such  as  taking  up  the  consideration 
of  a  bill,7  or  going  into  Committee  of  the  Whole  on  a  bill,8 
or  bringing  up  a  report  from  Committee  of  the  Whole,9  are 
taken  as  a  matter  of  course  without  question  put.  In  other 
cases  again  the  question  is  put,  but  no  debate  is  allowed.10 
With  the  same  object  debate  upon  a  dilatory  motion  has 
been  limited  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  motion,  and  the 
Speaker  or  Chairman  has  been  empowered  to  forbid  debate 
upon  it,  or  even  to  refuse  to  put  the  question  at  all,  if  he 
considers  the  motion  an  abuse  of  the  rules  of  the  House.11 

The  opportunities  for  criticising  the  government  both  in 
going  into  Committee  of  Supply,  and  by  other  means,  have 
also  been  limited  in  various  ways,  and  above  all  the  sys- 
tem of  cutting  short  debate  by  means  of  closure  has  been 
brought  of  late  years  to  a  condition  of  great  efficiency.     These 

1  May,  299.  *  Ibid.,  471.  f  S.O.  40. 

2  Ibid.,  301.  5  Ibid.,  472-73.  8  S.O.  32,  51. 
1  Ibid.,  571.                       «S.O.  36.  "S.O.  53. 

10  E.g.  S.O.  1  (7),  18,  26,  31,  91.  "  S.O.  22,  23. 


THE  HOUSE  AND  ITS  OFFICERS  259 

matters,  and  the  distribution  of  time  between  the  govern- 
ment and  private  members  will  be  considered  more  fully 
hereafter,  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  remark  now  that 
the  tendencies  noted  are  permanent,  because  although  a 
party  while  in  Opposition  may  object  to  changes  in  the  rules 
that  enhance  the  control  of  the  government  over  the  con- 
duct and  time  of  the  House,  it  finds  itself  compelled  to  main- 
tain them  when  it  comes  into  office.  The  tendencies  are,  in 
fact,  the  natural  result  of  the  more  and  more  exclusive  re- 
sponsibility of  the  ministry  for  all  public  action,  legislative 
as  well  as  executive. 

The  Commons  are  always  summoned  to  the  bar  in  the  The 
House  of  Lords  to  hear  any  formal  communication  from  the  pea  e 
Crown,  and  when  after  a  general  election  they  meet  on  the 
day  appointed,  they  are  summoned  there  to  hear  the  formal 
opening  of  the  new  Parliament.  They  are  then  desired  in 
the  name  of  the  sovereign  to  choose  a  Speaker,  and  retire 
to  their  chamber  for  the  purpose.  As  soon  as  he  has  been 
chosen,  the  mace  is  placed  on  the  table  before  him,  as  a 
symbol  of  his  authority  and  a  token  that  the  Commons  are 
sitting  as  a  House.  But  he  is  still  only  Speaker-elect,  until 
the  next  day,  when,  followed  by  the  Commons,  he  again  pre- 
sents himself  at  the  bar  of  the  Lords,  announces  his  elec- 
tion, and  asks  for  the  royal  confirmation,  which  is  now,  of 
course,  never  refused. 

If  only  one  person  is  nominated  for  Speaker,  he  is  called  His  Eiec- 
to  the  chair  without  a  vote.  If  more  than  one,  they  are  voted  tlD1 
upon  successively,  a  majority  being  required  for  election.1 
The  proposer  and  seconder  are  always  private  members, 
for  it  is  considered  more  fitting  that  the  ministers  should 
not  be  prominent  in  the  matter.2  The  Speaker  is,  however, 
always  selected  by  the  government  of  the  day,  and  a  new 
Speaker  is  always  taken  from  the  ranks  of  the  party  in 
power.  Sometimes  the  election  is  not  uncontested,  and 
this  happened  when  Mr.  Gully  was  chosen  in  1895.  But 
although  the  Speaker   may  have  been  opposed  when  first 

1  May,  151.  2  Cf.  ibid.,  150,  note  3. 


over  De 
bate 


260  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

chosen,  and  although  he  is  elected  only  for  the  duration  of 
the  Parliament,  it  has  now  become  the  invariable  habit  to 
reelect  him  so  long  as  he  is  willing  to  serve.  The  last  cases 
where  a  Speaker's  reelection  was  opposed  occurred  in  1833 
and  1835,  and  on  the  second  of  those  occasions  he  was  de- 
feated. The  principle  is  well  illustrated  by  the  career  of 
Mr.  Gully.  He  was  elected  by  a  small  majority,  during  the 
last  few  months  of  a  moribund  Liberal  cabinet.  His  selec- 
tion had  not  pleased  the  Conservatives,  and  he  was  warned 
that  they  held  themselves  at  liberty  not  to  reelect  him  if 
they  came  to  power  in  the  next  Parliament.  Contrary  to 
the  ordinary  rule  his  constituency  was  contested  at  the  next 
general  election,  but  although  the  Conservatives  obtained  a 
large  majority  in  the  new  Parliament,  he  was  returned  to 
the  chair  without  opposition. 
His  Powers  The  Speaker  is  purely  a  presiding  officer.  He  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  appointing  any  committees,  or  guiding  the 
House  in  its  work.  He  is  not  a  leader  but  an  umpire,  other- 
wise he  could  not  remain  in  the  chair  through  changes  of 
party.  As  an  umpire,  however,  his  powers  are  very  great, 
and  in  some  cases  under  the  modern  changes  in  the  standing 
orders  they  are  autocratic.  He  decides,  for  example,  whether 
a  motion  to  closure  debate  may  be  put,  or  whether  it  is  an 
infringement  of  the  rights  of  the  minority ; 1  he  can  refuse 
to  entertain  a  dilatory  motion  if  he  considers  it  an  abuse  of 
the  rules  of  the  House ; 2  and  he  can  stop  the  speech  of  a 
member  who  " persists  in  irrelevance,  or  tedious  repetition."  3 
Moreover,  from  his  decision  on  those  matters,  or  on  any 
points  of  order,  there  is  no  appeal.4  The  House  can 
suspend  or  change  its  own  rules  by  a  simple  majority  vote, 
but  it  cannot  in  a  concrete  case  override  the  Speaker's 
construction  of  them.5     This  is  a  general  principle  of  Eng- 

'  S.O.  26.  2S.O.  23.  3S.O.  19. 

4  But  the  Speaker  himself  may  submit  a  question  to  the  judgment  of  the 
House.      May,  331. 

s  The  action  of  the  Speaker  can  be  brought  before  the  House  only  by  a 
motion  made  at  another  time  after  due  notice,  but  this  is,  of  course,  almost 
useless  for  the  purpose  of  reversing  the  ruling  complained  of :   Hans.  3  Ser. 


THE  HOUSE   AND   ITS  OFFICERS  261 

lish  parliamentary  law,  which  is  applied  in  almost  all  public 
bodies.1  It  may  render  a  conscientious  man  more  careful  in 
his  rulings,  but  it  certainly  places  in  his  hands  enormous 
power. 

Familiarity  with  representative  bodies  seems  to  breed  His  Power 
contempt,  for  the  last  half  century  has  been  marked  by  an  order, 
increase  of  disorderly  scenes  in  the  legislatures  of  many 
countries.  In  England  such  things  were  brought  about  by 
the  growth  of  the  Irish  Home  Rule  party,  which  regarded 
the  government  of  Ireland  by  the  British  Parliament  as  un- 
just on  principle,  and  oppressive  in  fact;  and  which,  to  say 
the  least,  was  not  distressed  by  loss  of  dignity  on  the  part 
of  the  House  of  Commons.  In  1880  the  Speaker  was  given 
the  power  to  repress  disorder,  now  embodied,  with  sub- 
sequent modifications,  in  Standing  Order  18.  He  can  name 
a  member  who  disregards  his  authority  or  obstructs  busi- 
ness, and  then  a  motion  is  in  order,  to  be  decided  at  once 
without  amendment  or  debate,  to  suspend  that  member.2 
When  the  standing  orders  were  revised  in  1902  they  con- 
tained a  clause  prescribing  the  duration  of  the  suspension  for 
the  first  and  subsequent  offences,  but  this  was  struck  out 
during  the  discussion,  and  a  suspension  is  now  indeterminate. 
It  is  obvious  that  to  a  party,  in  a  hopeless  minority,  which 
denies  the  authority  of  Parliament,  a  disorderly  scene  fol- 
lowed by  a  suspension,  and  an  opportunity  to  go  home  and 
make  stirring  speeches,  may  not  be  an  undesirable  form  of 
protest. 

Apart  from  occasional  outbursts  chiefly,  though  not  ex- 
clusively, on  the  part  of  the  Irish  members,  a  stranger  in  the 
gallery  is  much  impressed  by  the  respect  paid  to  the  Speaker, 

CCLVIII.,  10,  14.  On  the  occasion  when  Speaker  Brand  made  this  ruling 
he  intimated  that  a  member  making  on  the  spot  a  motion  to  disagree 
with  it  would  be  guilty  of  disregarding  the  authority  of  the  chair,  and 
liable  to  suspension  under  the  standing  orders.      Ibid.,  9. 

1  The  Lord  Chancellor  has  far  less  power  as  presiding  officer  of  the  House 
of  Lords.    May,  LSI),  2<M>,  .'507,  331. 

2  SO.  IS.  If  a  member  who  is  suspended  refuses  to  leave  the  House, 
the  Speaker  may,  on  his  own  authority,  suspend  him  for  the  remainder  of 
the  session.      Ibid. 


Only  in  Case 
of  a  Tie. 


262  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

and  by  his  moral  control  over  the  House.1  His  emoluments 
are  in  proportion  to  the  dignity  of  his  position.  He  enjoys 
a  salary  of  five  thousand  pounds  a  year,  with  an  official  resi- 
dence in  the  Houses  of  Parliament  and  other  perquisites; 
and  although  standing  aloof  from  political  leadership,  he  is 
regarded  as  the  first  commoner  of  the  realm.  He  is,  indeed, 
on  the  threshold  of  the  House  of  Lords,  for  it  has  been  the 
habit  of  late  years  to  make  him  a  peer  when  he  retires. 

He  Votes  As  late  as   1870   the   Speaker   occasionally   took  part  in 

debate,  when  the  House  was  in  Committee  of  the  Whole 
where  he  does  not  preside ; 2  but  it  would  now  be  thought 
inconsistent  with  his  position  of  absolute  impartiality  to 
speak  or  vote  in  committee.  He  therefore  never  votes  un- 
less he  is  obliged  to  do  so  by  a  tie  occurring  when  he  is  in  the 
chair.  It  is  commonly  said  that  he  always  gives  his  casting 
vote  in  such  cases  so  as  to  keep  the  question  open ;  but  this 
is  not  strictly  true.  When,  however,  his  vote  involves  a 
final  decision,  he  bases  it,  not  upon  his  personal  opinion  of  the 
merits  of  the  measure,  but  upon  the  probable  intention  of 
the  House  as  shown  by  its  previous  action,  or  upon  some 
general  constitutional  principle;3  and  it  may  be  added  that 

The  chair-  the  chairman  of  a  Committee  of  the  Whole,  when  called  upon 
to  break  a  tie,  follows  the  same  practice.4  The  chair  in  Com- 
mittee of  the  Whole  is  regularly  taken  by  the  Chairman  of  the 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  —  commonly  called  for  that 
reason  the  Chairman  of  Committees  —  who,  like  the  Speaker, 
withdraws,  on  his  appointment,  from  political  contests, 
speaking  and  voting  in  the  House  nowadays  only  on  ques- 
tions relating  to  private  bills.  Pie  is  nominated  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Parliament  by  the  ministry,  from  among 

1  In  1902  the  provision,  common  in  continental  legislatures,  which 
authorises  the  Speaker  to  suspend  the  sitting,  in  ease  of  grave  disorder,  was 
embodied  in  SO.  21.  This  has  been  used  only  once,  on  May  22,  1905, 
when  the  Opposition,  thinking  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Prime  Minister  to  give 
an  immediate  explanation,  refused  with  great  disorder  to  hear  another 
member  of  the  government.  (Hans.  4  Ser.  CXLVI.,  1061-72.)  One  may 
hope  that  it  will  rarely  be  necessary  to  apply  this  undignified  process  of 
taking  off  the  lid  to  allow  the  tea-pot  to  cool  down. 

2  May,  348-49.  »  May,  344-48.  *  May,  361-62. 


man  of  Com- 
mittees 


THE  HOUSE  AND  ITS  OFFICERS  263 

their  prominent  supporters,  and  retires  from  the  position 
when  they  resign.  Considering  that  his  duties  consist  in 
presiding,  like  the  Speaker,  with  strict  impartiality,  and  in  a 
purely  non-partisan  supervision  of  private  bill  legislation, 
it  is  somewhat  strange  that  he  should  go  in  and  out  of  office 
with  the  cabinet,  but  in  fact  one  hears  no  criticism  of  his 
conduct  on  that  score,  largely,  no  doubt,  because  he  always 
takes  the  Speaker  as  his  model.  Since  1855  he  has  acted  as 
deputy  speaker,  when  the  Speaker  is  unavoidably  absent/ 
and  in  order  to  prevent  any  possible  inconvenience  from  the 
absence  of  both  of  these  officers  from  the  House,  or  of  the 
Chairman  of  Ways  and  Means  from  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole,  provision  was  made  in  1902  for  the  election  of  a 
deputy  chairman  who  can  fill  the  vacant  place.2 

The  only  other  officers  of  the  House  that  need  be  mentioned  other 
here  are  the  Sergeant-at-Arms,  who  acts  as  the  executive  A.ffi^ra  of 

°  '  the  House. 

officer  and  chief  of  police  of  the  House  under  the  direction 
of  the  Speaker;  the  Clerk  of  the  House;  and  the  Counsel 
to  Mr.  Speaker,  who  is  a  legal  adviser,  and  has  important 
duties  in  connection  with  private  bill  legislation.  It  is  a 
curious  survival  that  the  Sergeant-at-Arms,3  and  the  Clerk 
of  the  House  with  his  chief  assistants,4  are  appointed  by  the 
Crown,  and  hold  office  permanently.  Their  work  is,  of 
course,  of  a  non-partisan  character,  and  they  do  not  always 
belong  to  the  party  of  the  ministry  that  appoints  them.  Sir 
Courtenay  Ilbert,  for  example,  the  present  Clerk  of  the 
House,  although  a  Liberal,  was  appointed  by  the  Conserva- 
tive government,  and  not  by  way  of  promotion  in  the  ser- 
vice of  the  House,  for  he  was  at  the  time  Parliamentary 
Counsel  to  the  Treasury. 

1  May,  191;    SO.  81  (formerly  SO.  83). 

2  SO.  81  (2).  By  S.O.  1  (9),  the  Speaker  nominates  a  panel  of  not  more 
than  five  members  to  aet  as  temporary  chairmen  of  committees,  hut  this 
would  seem  to  have  been  rendered  less  necessary  by  the  new  provision  for 
a  deputy  chairman. 

3  May,  198. 

4  May,  19.5. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

PROCEDURE    IN  THE   HOUSE   OF   COMMONS 

Committees  and  Public  Bills 

The  Com-  No  great  representative  assembly  at  the  present  day  can 

do  all  its  work  in  full  meeting.  It  has  neither  the  time,  the 
patience  nor  the  knowledge  required.  Its  sittings  ought  not 
to  be  frittered  away  in  discussing  proposals  that  have  no 
chance  of  success;  while  measures  that  are  to  be  brought 
before  the  whole  body  ought  to  be  threshed  out  beforehand, 
their  provisions  carefully  weighed  and  put  into  precise  lan- 
guage, objections,  if  possible,  met  by  concession  and  com- 
promise, or  brought  to  a  sharp  difference  of  principle.  In 
short,  they  ought  to  be  put  into  such  a  shape  that  the  assem- 
bly is  only  called  upon  to  decide  a  small  number  of  perfectly 
definite  questions.  To  enable  it  to  do  so  intelligently  it 
may  be  necessary  also  to  collect  information  about  doubt- 
ful facts.  Modern  assemblies  have  sought  to  accomplish 
these  results  mainly  by  committees  of  some  kind;  and  in 
England  where  the  parliamentary  form  of  government  has 
reached  a  higher  development  than  anywhere  else,  the  chief 
instrument  for  the  purpose  is  that  informal  joint  committee 
of  the  Houses,  known  as  the  cabinet.  But  unless  Parlia- 
ment were  to  be  very  nearly  reduced  to  the  role  of  criticis- 
ing the  ministers,  and  answering  yes  or  no  to  a  series  of  ques- 
tions propounded  by  them,  it  must  do  a  part  of  its  work 
through  other  committees.  The  reasons  why  those  com- 
mittees have  not  become  —  as  in  some  other  European  na- 
tions that  have  adopted  the  system  of  a  responsible  ministry 
-  dangerous  rivals  of  the  cabinet,  at  times  frustrating  its 
objects  and  undermining  its  authority,  will  be  discussed  in 
the  chapters  on  the  relation  between  the  cabinet  and  the 

264 


COMMITTEES  AND  PUBLIC  BILLS  265 

House  of  Commons.      We  must  consider  here  their  organi- 
sation and  duties. 

The  most  important  committee,  the  Committee  of  the  The  Com- 
Whole,  is  not  in  this  sense  a  committee  at  all.  It  is  simply  ™h,0e1eeof  the 
the  House  itself  acting  under  special  forms  of  procedure ; 
the  chief  differences  being  that  the  Chairman  of  Committees 
presides,  and  that  the  rule  of  the  House  forbidding  a  mem- 
ber to  speak  more  than  once  on  the  same  question  does  not 
apply.  But  the  fact  that  a  member  can  speak  more  than 
once  makes  it  a  real  convenience  for  the  purpose  for  which  it 
is  chiefly  used,  that  is,  the  consideration  of  measures  in  detail, 
such  as  the  discussion  and  amendment  of  the  separate  clauses 
of  a  bill,  or  the  debates  upon  different  items  of  appropria- 
tions. The  Committee  of  the  Whole  has  had  a  long  his- 
tory.1 It  is  called  by  different  names  according  to  the  sub- 
ject-matter with  which  it  deals.  For  ordinary  bills  it  is 
called  simply  the  Committee  of  the  Whole.  When  engaged 
upon  appropriations  it  is  called  Committee  of  the  Whole  on 
Supply,  or  in  common  parlance  the  Committee  of  Supply. 
When  providing  money  to  meet  the  appropriations  it  is 
called  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means;  and  when  re- 
viewing the  revenue  accounts  of  India  it  is  named  from  that 
subject.  The  committees  of  the  whole  called  by  these  names 
are  so  far  distinct  that  each  of  them  can  deal  only  with  its 
own  affairs,  and  the  House  must  go  into  committee  again  in 
order  to  take  up  any  other  matter.  But  the  simple  Com- 
mittee of  the  Whole  can  take  up  one  bill  after  another 
which  has  been  referred  to  it  without  reporting  to  the  House 
and  being  reconstituted.2 

Of  the  real  committees  the  most  numerous  are  the  select  Select  Com 
committees.     Their  normal  size  is  fifteen  members,  although  mit  ccs- 
ihey  are  often   smaller,  and  occasionally,  by  special  leave 
of  the   House,3  they   are  somewhat    larger.     They   may  be 
nominated   from  the   floor,   and  elected   by  the   House,1  or 
chosen  by  ballot  ;   but  in  order  to  avoid  loss  of  time,  and  to 

1  Of.  Rndlich,  474-78.  "  Cf.  SO.  55. 

>  S.O.  33.  *  Cf.  SO.  50-57. 


of  Selec- 
tion 


266  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

secure  impartiality,  the  appointment  of  a  part,  at  least,  of  the 
members  is  usually  intrusted  to  the  Committee  of  Selection. 

Committee  Some  of  the  select  committees  are  appointed  regularly 
every  year,  and  are  therefore  known  as  sessional  committees. 
One  of  these,  the  Committee  of  Selection,  has  already 
been  mentioned.  It  has  been  enlarged  from  time  to  time, 
and  now  consists  of  eleven  members,  chosen  by  the  House 
itself  at  the  beginning  of  the  session.1  The  members  are, 
in  fact,  designated  by  an  understanding  between  the 
leaders  of  the  two  great  parties  in  the  House.  But  the  ob- 
ject is  to  create  an  impartial  body,  and  so  far  is  this  object 
attained  that  in  the  memoir  of  Sir  John  Mowbray,  who  was 
its  chairman  continuously  for  thirty-two  years,  we  are  told 
that  divisions  in  the  committee  are  rare,  and  never  on  party 
lines.2  Its  duties,  so  far  as  public  business  is  concerned,  con- 
sist in  appointing  members  of  select  and  standing  commit- 
tees. It  appoints  also  the  committees  on  all  private  and 
local  bills,  and  divides  those  bills  among  them.3  This  is, 
indeed,  the  primary  object  of  its  existence,  but,  together 
with  a  description  of  the  various  committees  employed  in 
private  bill  legislation,  it  must  be  postponed  to  a  later 
chapter.  It  may,  however,  save  confusion  in  the  mind  of  a 
reader  unfamiliar  with  parliamentary  practice  to  insist  here 
upon  the  distinction  between  a  private  member's  bill  and  a 
private  bill.  The  former  is  a  bill  of  a  public  nature  intro- 
duced by  a  private  member,  whereas  a  private  bill  is  one  deal- 
ing only  with  a  matter  of  private,  personal,  or  local  interest. 

other  Res-  The  remaining  sessional  committees  are  the  Committee 
on  Public  Accounts,4  which  goes  through  the  report  of  the 
Auditor  and  Comptroller  General,  considers  in  detail  objec- 
tions to  the  legality  of  any  expenditures  by  the  public  de- 
partments, examines  witnesses  thereon,  and  reports  to  the 
House ;  the  Committee  on  Public  Petitions,  appointed  to  in- 
spect the  numerous  petitions  presented  to  the  House  ; 5   and 

1  Standing  Orders  (relative  to  private  business),  98. 

'  "  Seventy  Years  at  Westminster,"  267  et  scq. 

1  Ibid.,  103-15.  4  S.O.  75.  5  S.O.  76-80. 


sional  Com 

mittces. 


COMMITTEES   AND  PUBLIC  BILLS  267 

the  Committee  on  the  Kitchen  and  Refreshment  Rooms, 
which  has  importance  for  the  members  of  the  House,  though 
not  for  the  general  public.1 

The  other  select  committees  are  created  to  consider  some  other  Se- 
special  matter  that  is  referred  to  them,  either  a  bill,  or  a  sub-  lect  Com- 

_ r  '  '  mittees. 

ject  upon  which  the  House  wishes  to  institute  an  inquiry.2 
In  either  case  the  chief  object  of  the  committee  is  to  ob-  Their  Ob- 
tain and  sift  information.  Even  where  a  particular  bill  is  Ject' 
referred  to  it  the  primary  object  is  not  to  take  the  place  of 
debate  in  the  House,  and  in  fact  by  the  present  practice  a 
select  committee  saves  no  step  in  procedure,  a  bill  when  re- 
ported by  it  going  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  for  discus- 
sion in  detail,  precisely  as  if  no  select  committee  had  been 
appointed.3  Select  committees  are  the  organs,  and  the  only 
organs,  of  the  House  for  collecting  evidence  and  examining 
witnesses ;  *  and  hence  they  are  commonly  given  power  to 
send  for  persons,  papers  and  records.  They  summon  before 
them  people  whose  testimony  they  wish  to  obtain ;  but 
although  a  man  of  prominence,  or  a  recognised  authority  on 
the  subject,  would,  no  doubt,  be  summoned  at  his  own  re- 
quest, there  is  nothing  in  their  procedure  in  the  least  corre- 
sponding to  the  public  hearings  customary  throughout  the 

1  "At  the  commencement  of  every  session  an  order  is  made  'That  a  com- 
mittee of  privileges  be  appointed,'  but  no  members  have  been  nominated  to 
it  since  1847."  "Manual  of  Procedure  of  the  House  of  Commons,"  pre- 
pared in  1904  by  Sir  Courtenay  Ilbert,  Clerk  of  the  House,  §  110.  There 
are  also  a  couple  of  sessional  committees  whose  work  is  wholly  concerned 
with  private  bills  and  are  described  therewith. 

2  The  question  often  arises  whether  inquiry  shall  be  conducted  by  a 
committee  of  the  House,  or  by  a  commission  appointed  by  the  government. 
When  the  matter  is  distinctly  political  a  committee  of  the  House  is  the 
proper  organ;  but  when  the  judgment  of  outside  experts  is  needed  the 
other  alternative  is  obviously  preferable,  several  members  of  Parliament 
being  often  included  in  such  cases.  Naturally  enough,  the  ministry  and 
the  members  chiefly  interested  in  pushing  an  inquiry  do  not  always  agree 
about  the  matter.  One  instance  of  a  dispute  on  this  point  has  already 
been  referred  to  —  that  in  relation  to  the  grievances  of  Post  Office  employees. 
Another  famous  example  occurred  upon  the  charges  made  by  The  Times 
against  Parnell  in  connection  with  the  forged  Pigott  Letters. 

3  May,  Ki'J-70. 

*  The  private  bill  committees  to  be  described  in  a  later  chapter  are  se- 
lect committees. 


268         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

United  States,  where  anybody  is  at  liberty  to  attend  and 
express  his  views  —  a  practice  that  deserves  far  more  atten- 
tion than  it  has  yet  received. 
Their  Pro-  In  select  committees  the  procedure  follows  as  closely  as 
cedure.  possible  that  of  a  Committee  of  the  Whole  j1  but  they  choose 
their  own  chairman,  who  has  no  vote  except  in  case  of  a 
tie.  They  keep  minutes,  not  only  of  their  own  proceedings, 
but  also  of  all  evidence  taken  before  them;  and  these, 
together  with  the  report  of  their  conclusions,  are  laid  before 
the  House,2  and  published  among  the  parliamentary  papers 
of  the  session.  Strictly  speaking,  a  minority  report  is  un- 
known to  English  parliamentary  usage,  although  the  habit 
of  placing  upon  select  committees  representatives  of  the 
various  groups  of  opinion  in  the  House  makes  a  disagreement 
about  the  report  very  common.  Practically,  however,  the 
minority  attain  the  same  object  by  moving  a  substitute  for 
the  report  prepared  by  the  majority,  and  as  the  standing 
orders  provide  that  every  division  in  a  select  committee 
must  be  entered  upon  its  minutes,3  the  substitute  with 
the  names  of  those  who  voted  for  it,  is  submitted  to  the 
House,  and  has  the  effect  of  a  minority  report. 

The  fact  that  men  with  all  shades  of  opinions  sit  upon  these 
committees,  and  have  an  opportunity  to  examine  the  wit- 
nesses, lifts  their  reports,  and  still  more  the  evidence  they 
collect,  above  the  plane  of  mere  party  documents,  and  gives 
them  a  far  greater  permanent  value.  Many  committees 
are  not  directly  concerned  with  legislation,  that  is,  with  a  bill 
actually  pending,  but  only  with  inquiry  into  some  grievance, 
some  alleged  defect  in  the  law  or  in  administration,  yet  their 
reports  often  lay  the  foundation  for  future  statutes ;  and, 
indeed,  a  large  part  of  the  legislative  or  administrative  re- 
forms carried  out  by  one  or  both  of  the  great  parties  in  the 
state,  have  been  based  upon  the  reports  of  select  committees 
or  royal  commissions. 
Joint  Com-  From  obvious  motives  of  convenience  joint  select  com- 
mittees from  the  Lords  and  Commons  have  been  occasionally 

1  May,  383-89,  471.  2  S.O.  59-61,  63.  3  S.O.  61. 


mittees. 


COMMITTEES  AND  PUBLIC  BILLS  269 

appointed,1  but  owing  to  the  different  standing  of  the  two 
Houses  they  are  used  chiefly  for  private  bills,  and  for  regu- 
lating the  intercourse  between  the  two  bodies.2  The  prin- 
cipal exceptions  of  late  years  have  been  the  joint  committees 
on  statute  law  revision  bills  and  on  the  subject  of  munici- 
pal trading. 

As  the  pressure  for  time  in  the  House  of  Commons  grew  standing  01 
more  intense,  select  committees  that  collected  information  commit- 
were  not  enough.  Something  was  needed  that  would  save  tees- 
debate  in  the  House,  and  for  this  purpose  resolutions  were 
adopted  on  Dec.  1,  1882,  for  setting  up  two  large  committees 
on  bills  relating  to  law  and  to  trade,  whose  deliberations 
should  take  the  place  of  debate  in  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole.  Such  committees  were  at  first  an  experiment, 
tried  for  a  couple  of  sessions,  but  in  1888  they  were  revived 
by  standing  orders,  and  made  permanent  organs  of  the 
House.3  As  distinguished  from  select  committees,  which 
expire  when  they  have  made  a  report  upon  the  special  mat- 
ters committed  to  their  charge,  they  were  made  standing 
bodies,  lasting  throughout  the  session,  and  considering  all 
the  bills  from  time  to  time  referred  to  them ;  one  of  them 
being  created  to  deal  with  bills  relating  to  law,  courts  of 
justice,  and  legal  procedure;  the  other  with  those  relating 
to  trade,  shipping,  manufactures,  agriculture,  and  fishing. 
They  consist  of  not  less  than  sixty  nor  more  than  eighty 
members  of  the  House,  appointed  by  the  Committee  of  Se- 
lection, which  has  power  to  discharge  members  and  sub- 
stitute others  during  the  course  of  the  session.  In  order  to 
secure  the  presence  of  persons  who  may  throw  light  on  any 
particular  bill,  the  same  committee  can  also  appoint  not 
more  than  fifteen  additional  members  for  the  consideration 
of  that  bill. 

A  peculiar  provision  was  made  for  the  designation  of  the  Tiioir  p™- 
chairman.     At  the  beginning  of  each  session  the  Committee  <,('(1"n>- 
of  Selection  appoints  a  chairman's   panel  of  not   less  than 
four   nor    more    than    six    members,   and   this    body    selects 

1  May,  398  99.  2  Rodlich,  4G.3.  3  S.O.  46-50  ;  May,  .'571-77. 


270         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

from  among  its  members  the  chairmen  of  the  standing 
committees  *  —  a  device  intended  to  secure  continuity  of 
traditions  and  experience  in  the  presiding  officer.  For  the 
rest,  the  standing  orders  prescribed  that  the  procedure  in 
standing  committees  should  be  the  same  as  in  select  com- 
mittees ; 2  but  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say,  as  May 
does,3  that  their  proceedings  were  assimilated,  as  far  as 
possible,  to  those  of  a  Committee  of  the  Whole  House,  for 
they  were  created  to  do  precisely  the  same  work.4  They 
were  to  collect  no  evidence,  examine  no  witnesses,  but  simply 
to  debate  the  clauses  of  the  bill  in  detail,  being  in  fact  a 
substitute  for  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  ;  that  step  in  the 
procedure  upon  a  bill  being  entirely  omitted  when  a  bill  goes 
to  a  standing  committee.  For  this  reason  they  are  minia- 
tures of  the  House  itself,  representing  all  the  parties  there 
in  proportion  to  their  numbers.  They  are  samples  that 
stand  for  the  complete  House,  and  like  the  Committee  of 
the  Whole  they  do  not  report  their  opinions,  but  report  the 
bills  referred  to  them  with  or  without  amendments. 

In  one  respect  only  does  their  position  differ  materially 
from  that  of  a  Committee  of  the  Whole.  If  the  Committee 
of  the  Whole  makes  any  amendments  in  a  bill,  they  can  be 
considered  again,  and  further  amendments  can  be  made, 
upon  the  report  stage.  But  if  it  makes  no  amendments, 
there  is  no  report  stage.  This  was  equally  true  of  the  stand- 
ing committees,  so  that  if  they  did  not  amend  a  bill  referred 
to  them,  the  House  never  had  an  opportunity  to  do  so,  but 
must  pass  or  reject  the  bill  as  first  introduced;  and,  in  fact, 
standing  committees  have  been  charged  with  refraining 
from  minor  changes  in  order  to  prevent  amendments,  which 
might  hinder  or  delay  the  passage  of  the  bill,  from  being  pro- 
posed in  the  House  itself.5  This  raised  so  much  objection 
that  in  1901  the  standing  orders  were  changed  so  as  to  re- 

1  S.O.  49.  2  S.O.  47.  3  May,  374. 

*  As  in  the  House  itself,  the  attendance  during  debate  is  sometimes  small. 
Complaints  arc;  heard  of  this,  and  of  the  practice  of  fetching  members  in  to 
take  part  in  divisions.  Hans.  4  Ser.  XCII.,  570.  The  divisions,  by  the  way, 
are  taken  by  roll-call.  *  Hans.  4  Ser.  XCII.,  562,  566. 


COMMITTEES  AND   PUBLIC  BILLS  271 

quire  a  report,  stage  in  the  House  on  all  bills  from  standing 
committees  whether  amended  or  not.1 

The  standing  committees  were  designed  primarily  to  deal  Kind  of 
with  a  technical  class  of  bills,  where  the  discussion  of  details  J^JLTto 
would  not  be  of  general  interest.2     For  reasons  that  will  Them, 
be  described  hereafter,  it  has  been  recognised  that  the  bills 
referred  to  them  ought  to  be  of  a  non-contentious  nature, 
that  contentious  measures,  which  arouse  strong  party  feel- 
ings,  are  not  suited  for  their  consideration.      This  is  the 
general  principle,  not  always  observed  in  practice,  and  there 
is  sometimes  a  sharp  difference  of  opinion  upon  the  question 
whether  a  particular  bill  is  contentious  or  not. 

Within  their  limits  the  utility  of  the  standing  committees  Their 
in  legislation  cannot  be  doubted.  On  the  average  about  Utlllty- 
one  seventh  of  the  public  bills  enacted  year  by  year  have 
passed  through  their  hands,  and  the  proportion  has  shown 
a  slight  tendency  to  increase.3  Moreover,  the  pressure  for 
time  in  the  House  of  Commons  has  become  so  great  that  a 
bill  has  a  better  chance  of  getting  through  if  referred  to  a 
standing  committee  than  if  it  has  to  undergo  the  ordeal 
of  a  long  debate  in  Committee  of  the  Whole.  Every  year  the 
government  is  obliged  by  lack  of  time  to  drop  something  like 
one  third  of  the  bills  it  has  introduced,  but  those  of  its  bills 
that  are  referred  to  the  standing  committees  rarely  fail  to 
be  enacted.  In  the  case  of  bills  brought  in  by  private  mem- 
bers the  contrast  is  even  more  striking;  for  while  scarcely 
one  tenth  of  all  such  bills  become  law,  more  than  one  half 
of  those  among  them  fortunate  enough  to  reach  a  standing 
committee  are  enacted.4    In  fact  these  committees  furnish 

1  SO.  50.     Cf.  Hans.  4  Scr.  XCII.,  555-75. 

2  See  the  remarks  of  Gladstone  in  proposing  them  in  1882,  Hans.  3  Ser. 
CCLXXV.,  145-46. 

3  In  the  sixteen  years  from  1888  (when  these  committees  were  revived) 
through  1903,  1080  public  bills  were  enacted,  of  which  109  passed  through 
their  hands.  During  the  eight  years  from  1896  to  190:-!,  this  was  true  of  73 
bills  out  of  the  440  enacted. 

4  From  1SSS  to  1903,  77  of  the  S3  government  bills  referred  to  a  standing 
committer-  were  enacted;  from  1S90  to  1900,  48  were  so  referred,  and  all 
but  two  of  them  were  enacted.  From  1SSS  to  1903,  32  out  of  58  private 
member^'  bills  so  referred  were  enacted;    and  from  1896  to  1903,  27  out  of 


272         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

by  far  the  best  chance  of  passing  private  members'  bills 

through  the  House  of  Commons.1 
standing  When  the  two  great  committees  were  revived  in  1888, 

Committee     mo^jons  were  made  to  create  others  to  consider  bills  relating 

tor  Scot- 

land.  to  Scotland  and  Wales.     The  motions  were  all  rejected  at 

the  time;  but  in  1894  the  Liberal  government  took  the 
matter  up  in  the  case  of  Scotland,  and  in  that  year  and  the 
next  carried  resolutions  establishing  such  a  committee  for  the 
session.  It  consisted  of  all  the  members  for  Scotch  constitu- 
encies, seventy-two  in  number,  and  of  fifteen  or  twenty  others 
appointed  by  the  committee  of  selection.  On  each  occa- 
sion the  plan  was  vigorously  opposed,2  the  chief  objections 
being;  that  it  tended  toward  legislative  dismemberment 
of  the  United  Kingdom ;  that  such  a  committee  would  not, 
like  the  other  standing  committees,  reflect  fairly  the  pro- 
portion of  the  parties  in  the  House,  because  two  thirds  of  the 
Scotch  members  were  Liberals; 3  and  that  the  bills  referred 
to  it  would  not  be  exclusively  of  a  non-contentious  nature. 
When  the  Conservatives  came  to  power  they  quietly  dropped 
this  committee.  Even  had  they  felt  no  other  reason  for 
doing  so,  it  would,  no  doubt,  have  been  enough  that,  in  spite 
of  considerable  losses  at  the  general  election  of  1895,  the 
Liberals  were  still  in  a  majority  among  the  Scotch  members. 
The  creation  of  such  a  body  illustrates,  however,  the  excep- 
tional position  of  Scotland  in  the  British  Parliament ;  and 
any  one  who  has  followed  a  debate  on  an  ordinary  Scotch 
bill,  and  observed  how  largely  it  is  confined  to  Scotch  mem- 
bers, will  realise  that  practically  the  resolution  of  1894  did 
little  more  than  sanction  formally  by  means  of  a  standing 
committee  the  kind  of  discussion  that  habitually  takes  place 
in  the  Committee  of  the  Whole. 

41.  Cf.  Return  in  Com.  Papers,  1902,  LXXXII.,  229,  and  the  Annual 
Returns  for  1901-03. 

1  Cf.  Hans.  4  Ser.  XCII.,  563,  567. 

2  Cf.  Hans.  (1888)  3  Ser.  CCCXXIII.,  403  et  seq.,  474  et  seq.;  (1894)  4  Ser. 
XXII.,  1116  et  seq.,  1487  et  seq.;  XXIII.,  648  et  seq.,  991  et  seq.,  1589  et  seq.; 
(1895)  XXXIII.,  822  et  acq.;    XXXIV.,  170  ct  seq. 

3  This  objection  was  partially  met  by  a  provision  in  regard  to  the  ad- 
ditional members.     Hans.  4  Ser.  XXIII.,  1613;   XXXIV.,  1881. 


COMMITTEES  AND  PUBLIC  BILLS  273 

With  a  view  to  enlarging  the  legislative  capacity  of  Par-  The  Four 
liament  a  select  committee  on  Procedure  in  the  House  of  committees 
Commons  reported  on  May  25,  1900,  in  favour  of  increasing  of  19«7. 
the  number  of  standing  committees  from  two  to  four,  and 
making  the  reference  of  bills  to  them  the  normal,  instead  of 
an  exceptional,  proceeding.  In  pursuance  of  this  recommen- 
dation the  House  on  April  16,  1907,  changed  standing  orders 
46,  47,  and  48  *  so  that  there  should  be  four  standing  com- 
mittees, one  of  which  is  in  effect  the  former  Scotch  Commit- 
tee, while  the  other  three  are  to  consider  any  bills  that  may 
be  referred  to  them,  and  not  as  heretofore  only  those  relating 
to  law  or  to  trade.2  All  bills,  except  money  bills  and  bills  for 
confirming  provisional  orders,  are  to  be  referred  to  one  of 
the  standing  committees,  unless  the  House  otherwise  order 
on  a  motion  to  be  decided  without  amendment  or  debate; 
and  the  bills  are  to  be  distributed  among  the  committees  by 
the  Speaker. 

The  object  of  the  change  was  to  give  a  better  chance  of 
enactment  for  measures  which  there  is  not  time  to  debate  in 
Committee  of  the  Whole ;  and  the  provision  that  the  House 
may  vote  not  to  send  a  bill  to  a  standing  committee  was  de- 
signed chiefly  for  the  great  party  measures  of  the  government 
which  must  always  be  debated  in  the  House  itself.  The 
new  procedure  has  not  been  in  operation  long  enough  to 
judge  of  its  effects,  but  something  will  be  said  of  its  rela- 
tion to  the  parliamentary  form  of  government  in  the  chap- 
ter on  the  "Cabinet's  Control  of  the  Commons." 

The  steps  through  which  an  ordinary  public  bill  must  still  The  Pro- 
pass  are  very  numerous,  but  while  formerly  a  debate  and  public  ° 
division  might  take  place  at  each  of  them,  of  late  years  the   Hills- 
opportunity  for  this —  and  practically  the  number  of  steps — 
has   been    much    reduced    by    causing  some  of  them  to  be 
taken  as  a  matter  of  course  without  a  vote,  and  by  permit- 

1  Cf.  Hans.  4  Ser.  CLXXII.,  pp.  Ixxix   Ixxx. 

2  A  committee  to  whirl)  a  bill  relating  exclusively  to  Wales  and  Mon- 
mouthshire is  referred  must  comprise  .-ill  the  members  from  that  part  of  the 
kingdom.  In  order  to  provide  chairmen  enough,  the  maximum  oi  the 
chairmen's  panel  was  raised  from  six  to  eight. 

T 


274 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Introduc- 
tion and 
First  Read- 
ing. 


Second 
Reading. 


ting  no  debate  on  others.  This  is  well  illustrated  at  the 
outset  of  a  bill's  career,  where,  indeed,  an  old  complex  pro- 
cedure and  a  later  and  simpler  one  continue  to  exist  side 
by  side. 

A  bill  may  be  introduced  in  one  of  three  ways.  A  motion 
may  be  made  for  an  order  for  leave  to  bring  it  in,  accom- 
panied by  a  speech  explaining  its  objects,  and  followed  by 
a  debate  and  vote.  This  was  formerly  the  only  method, 
and  debates  lasting  over  several  days  have  occurred  at  this 
stage.1  Amendments  might  be  moved  hostile  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  bill.  In  fact  the  adoption  of  such  an  amend- 
ment to  a  militia  bill  caused  the  fall  of  Lord  John  Russell's 
ministry  in  1852.  Now  only  important  government  bills  are 
introduced  in  that  way ;  for  by  a  standing  order  adopted 
in  1888  a  motion  to  bring  in  a  bill  may  be  made  at  the  com- 
mencement of  public  business,  and  after  brief  explanatory 
statements  by  the  mover  and  one  opponent  the  Speaker 
may  put  the  question.2  From  the  length  of  time  taken  by 
the  speeches  this  is  known  as  the  ten-minute  rule.  After 
an  order  to  bring  in  a  bill  has  been  obtained  in  either  of  these 
ways,  the  question  that  the  bill  be  read  a  first  time  is  voted 
upon  without  amendment  or  debate.3  Finally,  in  1902,  a 
still  more  expeditious  process  was  established.  It  permits 
a  member  to  present  his  bill,  which  is  read  a  first  time  with- 
out any  order  or  vote  of  the  House  whatever.4 

The  next  step,  and,  except  on  great  party  measures,  the 
first  occasion  for  a  debate,  is  the  second  reading.  This  is  the 
proper  stage  for  a  discussion  of  the  general  principles  of  the 
bill,  not  of  its  details,  and  amendments  to  the  several  clauses 
are  not  in  order.  The  methods  of  opposing  the  second 
reading  are  somewhat  technical.  The  form  of  the  question 
is  "that  this  bill  be  now  read  a  second  time";  and  a 
negative  vote  does  not  kill  the  bill,  because  it  does  not  pre- 
vent a  motion  to  read  it  being  made  on  a  subsequent  day.5 


'May,  437,  note  1.  *  S.O.  11. 

3  S.  O.  31.     This  is  also  true  when  a  bill  is  brought  from  the  Lords. 

4  S.  O.  31.  »  Cf.  Hans.  4  Ser.  CLVIL,  744. 


COMMITTEES  AND  PUBLIC  BILLS  275 

In  order  to  shelve  the  bill  without  forcing  a  direct  vote  upon 
it,  the  habit  formerly  prevailed  of  moving  the  previous  ques- 
tion ; *  but  this  was  open  to  the  same  objection,  and  had,  in 
fact,  the  effect  of  the  American  practice  of  moving  to  lay 
the  bill  upon  the  table.  A  similar  difficulty  arises  when  an 
amendment  is  moved  stating  some  special  reason  for  not 
reading  the  bill.  It  may  express  the  sense  of  the  House, 
but  it  does  not  necessarily  dispose  of  the  measure.  Of  late 
years,  therefore,  it  has  been  customary  to  move  that  the  bill 
be  read  this  day  six  months,  or  three  months,  the  date  being 
such  as  to  fall  beyond  the  end  of  the  session.  On  the  gen- 
eral principle  that  a  question  which  the  House  has  decided 
cannot  be  raised  again,  such  a  vote  kills  the  bill.  Nor  does 
it  make  any  difference  that  the  House  happens  to  be  sitting 
at  the  end  of  six  months,  for  that  date  is  treated  as  a  sort  of 
Greek  calends  that  never  comes.2 

After  the  second  reading  a  bill,  until  1907,  went  normally  to  Committee 
the  Committee  of  the  Whole,  with  or  without  instructions,3  nJ  , 

'  >      \\  hole. 

and  now  it  goes  there  if  the  House  so  decides.  When  the 
order  of  the  day  for  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  is  reached 
the  Speaker  leaves  the  chair,  and  the  House  goes  into  com- 
mittee without  question  put.4  This  is  the  stage  for  consid- 
eration of  the  bill  in  detail,  and  the  clauses  are  taken  up 
one  after  another,  the  amendments  to  each  clause  being  dis- 

1  Until  1888  the  form  of  the  motion  was  "  that  that  question  be  now  put," 
and  the  mover  voted  in  the  negative;  but  after  the  closure  was  introduced 
with  a  motion  in  these  same  words,  the  previous  question  was  changed,  and 
put  in  the  form  "that  that  question  be  not  now  put."  May,  269.  If  under 
either  form  the  House  decided  in  favour  of  putting  the  question,  the  vote 
upon  the  second  reading  was  taken  without  further  debate.  May,  Ibid. 
But  as  the  previous  question  was  itself  subject  to  a  discussion  which 
might  cover  the  principles  of  the  bill,  it  did  not  have  the  effect  of  cutting  off 
debate.  (Cf.  Report  of  Com.  on  Business  of  the  House.  Com.  Papers, 
1871,  IX.,  1,  Qs.  54-55.) 

1  May,  44G. 

3  By  S.O.  34,  committees  of  the  whole  are  instructed  to  make  such 
amendments,  relevant  to  the  bill,  as  they  think  fit.  The  object  of  a  special 
instruction  is  merely  to  empower  the  committee  to  make  amendments, 
within  the  general  scope  and  framework  of  the  bill,  which  it  would  not 
possess  under  the  standing  order.      Ilbert,  ".Manual,"   §§  175-7(5. 

4  S.O.  51.     Adopted  in  1888. 


276 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Reference 
to  a  Select 
Committee 


or  Stand- 
ing Com- 
mittee. 


Report. 


Third  Read- 
ing. 


posed  of  in  their  order.     Then  new  clauses  may  be  proposed, 
and  finally  the  bill  is  reported  back  to  the  House. 

Normally  a  bill  goes  either  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole 
or  to  a  standing  committee,  but  after  it  has  been  read  a  sec- 
ond time  a  motion  may  be  made  to  refer  it  to  a  select  com- 
mittee. Such  a  reference  simply  adds  a  step  to  the  journey 
of  the  bill,  for  when  reported  it  goes  to  a  standing  committee 
or  to  the  Committee  of  the  Whole.  A  standing  committee, 
on  the  other  hand,  is,  as  already  explained,  a  substitute  for 
the  Committee  of  the  Whole.  It  deals  with  the  bill  in  pre- 
cisely the  same  way,  reporting  it  back  to  the  House  amended 
or  unchanged. 

When  a  bill  has  been  reported  from  the  Committee  of  the 
Whole  with  amendments,1  and  when  it  has  been  reported 
from  a  standing  committee  whether  amended  or  not,2  it 
is  considered  by  the  House  in  detail,  upon  what  is  known 
as  the  report  stage.  The  object  is  to  give  the  House  an 
opportunity  to  review  the  work  done  in  committee,  and 
see  whether  it  wishes  to  maintain  the  amendments  there 
adopted.  But  the  House  is  not  restricted  to  confirming 
or  reversing  the  changes  made  in  the  bill,  and  although  the 
process  of  going  through  the  measure  clause  by  clause  is  not 
repeated,  fresh  amendments  may  be  proposed  and  new 
clauses  added.3 

If  the  bill  is  reported  from  a  Committee  of  the  Whole  with- 
out amendments,  it  is  assumed  that  the  details  are  satisfac- 
tory to  the  House,  and  there  is  no  report  stage. 

The  next,  and  now  the  last,  stage  of  a  bill  in  the  House  of 
Commons  is  the  third  reading.  Like  the  second  reading,  this 
raises  only  the  question  whether  or  not  the  House  approves 
of  the  measure  as  a  whole,  and  the  moves  for  compassing  its 
defeat  are  the  same.  Verbal  amendments  alone  are  in 
order,  and  any  substantial  alteration  can  be  brought  about 
only  by  moving  to  recommit. 


1  S.O.  39.  »  S.  O.  50. 

3  Cf.   S.O.  38-41.     Unless   a    motion  is  made  to    recommit,  the  bill  is 
considered  on  report,  when  reached,  without  question  put.     S.O.  40. 


COMMITTEES  AND  PUBLIC  BILLS  277 

Usually  the  several  steps  in  the  enactment  of  a  bill  are 
taken  on  different  days,1  but  there  is  nothing  in  the  rules 
of  the  House  of  Commons  to  require  this,  and  urgent  measures 
have  at  times  passed  through  all  their  stages  in  both  Houses 
in  one  day.  The  last  case  was  that  of  the  Explosive  Sub- 
stances Bill  passed  in  1883  under  the  pressure  of  the  dynamite 
scare.2 

When  a  bill  passed  by  one  House  is  amended  by  the  other,  Lords' 
it  is  sent  back  for  the  consideration  of  those  amendments.  Ainend_ 

merits. 

If  they  are  agreed  to,  the  bill  is  ready  for  the  royal  assent. 
If  not,  the  bill  is  returned,  and  a  committee  is  appointed 
to  frame  a  message  to  the  other  House,  stating  the  reasons 
for  disagreement.3  The  other  House  may,  of  course,  waive 
its  amendments,  insist  upon  them  or  modify  them,  and  the 
bill  might  thus,  with  new  changes,  go  back  and  forth  be- 
tween the  Houses  indefinitely.  Formerly  it  was  the  habit, 
when  the  Houses  failed  to  agree,  to  appoint  managers  to 
hold  a  conference,  but  this  practice  has  fallen  into  disuse,4 
and  in  the  case  of  government  bills  —  almost  all  important 
bills  to-day  are  government  bills  —  negotiations  are  carried 
on  between  the  ministers  and  the  leading  peers  who  oppose 
them. 

Leaving  out  of  account  the  first  reading,  which  rarely  sui 
involves  a  real  debate,  the  ordinary  course  of  a  public  bill 
through  the  House  of  Commons  gives,  therefore,  an  oppor- 
tunity for  two  debates  upon  its  general  merits,  and  between 
them  two  discussions  of  its  details,  or  one  debate  upon  the 
details  if  that  one  results  in  no  changes,  or  if  the  bill  has  been 
referred  to  a  standing  committee.     When  the  House  desires 

1  Except  that  the  third  reading  often  follows  immediately  upon  the 
report  stage.     May,  472. 

7  May,  487.  In  the  Lords  this  requires  a  suspension  of  the  rules.  Some 
kinds  of  bills  are  subject  to  special  forms  of  procedure  which  it  seems  hardly 
necessary  to  mention.  A  bill  for  the  restitution  of  honours  begins  in  the 
Lords,  and  in  the  Commons  is  referred  to  a  select  committee  which  takes 
the  place  of  a  Committee  of  the  Whole.  A  bill  for  a  general  pardon  originates 
with  the  Crown,  and  is  read  only  once  in  each  House.     May,  435-3(5. 

3  May,  479;    Ilbert,  ".Manual,"  §  209. 

4  May,  412-16;    Ilbert,  §  250  note. 


of  the 
Procedure 


278         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  collect  evidence  it  does  so  after  approving  of  the  general 
principle,  and  before  taking  up  the  details.  Stated  in  this 
way  the  whole  matter  is  plain  and  rational  enough.  It  is, 
in  fact,  one  of  the  many  striking  examples  of  adapta- 
tion in  the  English  political  system.  A  collection  of  rules 
that  appear  cumbrous  and  antiquated,  and  that  even  now 
are  well-nigh  incomprehensible  when  described  in  all  their 
involved  technicality,  have  been  pruned  away  until  they 
furnish  a  procedure  almost  as  simple,  direct  and  appropriate 
as  any  one  could  devise.  Many  old  forms  remain,  but  they 
have  been  shorn  of  their  meaning,  and  often  amount  to 
nothing  but  entries  in  the  journal.  Even  the  first  reading, 
which  seems  anomalous,  has  its  use.  A  real  debate  at 
that  stage  occurs  only  in  the  case  of  great  party  measures, 
where  both  sides  of  the  House  want  to  be  familiar  with  the 
scope  of  the  bill,  the  objections  that  may  be  made  to  it, 
and  the  way  it  strikes  the  public,  before  the  first  effective 
debate  upon  its  merits  opens.  The  procedure  upon  money 
bills,  which  appears  at  first  sight  still  more  arbitrary  and 
complex,  is  perfectly  rational  also,  and  the  differences  from 
the  method  of  passing  ordinary  measures  arise  from  the 
nature  of  the  case.  There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the 
general  principle  of  the  annual  appropriation  bill.  Supplies 
must  be  voted  to  carry  on  the  government,  and  the  only 
questions  arise  over  particular  grants.  Hence  there  is  no 
object  in  opening  with  a  first  or  second  reading,  and  the 
procedure  begins  in  committee.  But  in  order  to  understand 
how  this  works  out  one  must  again  go  back  to  the  technical 
rules. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

PROCEDURE   IN   THE   HOUSE   OF   COMMONS 

Money  Bills  and  Accounts 

The  procedure  in  the  case  of  financial  measures  differs  in 
important  respects  from  that  followed  in  passing  other  bills. 
It  will  be  remembered  that,  with  some  exceptions  already 
described,  all  the  national  revenues  are  first  paid  into  the 
Consolidated  Fund,  and  then  drawn  out  of  it  to  meet  the 
expenditures  of  the  government.  The  financial  work  of 
Parliament,  like  that  of  the  administration,  turns,  therefore, 
upon  the  processes  of  getting  money  into  and  out  of  that 
fund.  The  second  process  comes  first  in  the  order  of  par- 
liamentary business,  and  its  nature  is  fixed  by  two  standing 
orders,  which  date  from  the  early  years  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  One  of  them,  adopted  in  1707,  provides  that  the 
House  will  not  proceed  upon  any  petition  or  motion  for 
granting  money  but  in  Committee  of  the  Whole  House;1 
the  other,  that  it  will  not  receive  any  petition,  or  proceed 
upon  any  motion,  for  a  grant  or  charge  upon  the  public 
revenue  unless  recommended  from  the  Crown.2 

This  last  rule,  first  adopted  by  a  resolution  in  1700,  and  The  Rule 
made  a  standing  order  in  1713, 3  was  designed  to  prevent  im-  that  A,'T 

°  °  l  ]  imprint  ions 

provident  expenditure  on  private  initiative.     It  has  proved   Require 
not  only  an  invaluable  protection  to  the  Treasury,  but  a  bul-  the  crown. 

1  SO.  67. 

»S.O.  66.  May  (527)  points  out  that  these  two  rules,  together  with 
SO.  68,  adopted  in  1715,  that  the  House  will  receive  no  petition  for  com- 
pounding :i  revenue  debt  due  to  the  Crown  without  a  certificate  from  the 
proper  officer  stating  the  facts,  were  for  more  than  a  century  the  only  stand- 
ing orders  of  the  House. 

3  Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  2  Ed.,  I  ,  691. 

279 


280         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

wark  for  the  authority  of  the  ministry.1  Its  importance  has 
been  so  well  recognised  that  it  has  been  embodied  in  the  fun- 
damental laws  of  the  self-governing  colonies ; 2  while  some 
foreign  countries,  like  France  and  Italy,  that  have  copied  the 
forms  of  parliamentary  government,  without  always  per- 
ceiving the  foundation  on  which  they  rest,  have  suffered  not 
a  little  from  its  absence.3 

Even  in  England  the  rule  has  been  at  times  evaded.  About 
the  middle  of  the  last  century,  it  was  the  habit  to  bring  in 
bills  involving  the  expenditure  of  public  funds,  and  avoid  a 
violation  of  the  rule  by  inserting  a  clause  that  the  expenses 
incurred  should  be  "  defrayed  out  of  moneys  to  be  hereafter 
voted  by  Parliament."  But  a  vote  in  favour  of  such  a  bill 
was  clearly  an  expression  of  opinion  that  well-nigh  com- 
pelled the  ministers  to  include  the  expense  in  their  next 
estimates.  This  practice  was  stopped  in  1866  by  changing 
the  standing  order  so  as  to  provide  that  the  House  will  not 
"  proceed  upon  any  motion  for  a  grant  or  charge  upon  the 
public  revenue,  whether  payable  out  of  the  consolidated 
fund,  or  out  of  moneys  to  be  provided  by  Parliament,  unless 
recommended  from  the  Crown."  4      The   change,  however, 

1  As  an  illustration  of  the  fact  that  the  rise  of  the  authority  exerted  by 
ministers  over  Parliament  was  contemporary  with  the  loss  by  the  King 
of  personal  legislative  power,  Todd  (II.,  390)  remarks  that  this  rule  was  first 
adopted  in  1706,  and  the  last  royal  veto  was  given  in  1707. 

2  British  North  Amer.  Act,  §  54.  Commonwealth  of  Australia  Consti- 
tution Act,  §  56. 

After  the  government  of  India  was  transferred  from  the  East  India 
Company  to  the  Crown,  in  1856,  the  rule  was  extended  to  motions  for  a 
charge  upon  the  Indian  revenue.     S.O.  70. 

3  For  France,  cf.  Dupriez,  Les  Ministres,  II.,  416-17,  421-30;  Lowell, 
"Govts,  and  Parties,"  I.,  116-17;  for  Italy,  Dupriez,  I.,  316-19;  Lowell, 
207-9.  Owing  to  the  greater  cohesion  of  parties,  and  to  the  fact  that  the 
expenditures  are  contained  in  a  series  of  separate  acts  which  can  hardly  be 
changed  without  disturbing  the  financial  equilibrium,  Belgium  has  suffered 
little  from  this  cause.     Dupriez,  I.,  249-52. 

4  Todd,  I.,  692-96.  When  the  main  object  of  a  bill  is  the  creation  of  a 
public  charge,  a  resolution  for  that  charge  must  be  passed  in  Committee  of 
the  Whole  upon  ;i  recommendation  from  the  Crown  before  the  bill  is  intro- 
duced. Hut  when  the  charge  is  merely  subsidiary  or  incidental,  the  bill  can 
be  brought  in  previously,  the  clauses  or  provisions  creating  the  charge  being 
printed  in  italics.  The  words  so  printed  are  regarded  as  mere  blanks  with 
an  indication  of  the  way  they  are  eventually  intended  to  be  filled,  and  they 


MONEY  BILLS  AND  ACCOUNTS  281 

does  not  absolutely  prevent  the  House  from  forcing  the 
hands  of  the  government.  A  resolution  can  be  passed  in 
abstract  and  general  terms  in  favour  of  a  certain  kind  of 
expenditure,  the  construction  of  harbours  of  refuge,  for 
example ;  or  an  address  to  the  Crown  can  be  adopted  asking 
for  an  expenditure,  and  promising  "that  this  House  will 
make  good  the  same,"  a  procedure  followed  in  erecting 
statues  on  the  death  of  great  leaders  of  the  House.1 

As  late  as  1877  Mr.  Gladstone  lamented  the  loss  of  finan- 
cial control  by  the  Crown,  complaining  that,  by  addresses, 
resolutions,  and  even  bills,  the  House  pledged  itself  to  ex- 
penditure for  local  claims  or  the  interests  of  classes  and 
individuals,  and  that  the  government  was  morally  bound  to 
redeem  the  pledges.  This  he  thought  was  carried  so  far  as 
to  be  a  great  public  mischief.2  Whether  such  a  statement 
was  an  exaggeration  at  that  time  or  not,  it  would  hardly  be 
repeated  now ;  for  on  the  one  hand  the  control  of  the  cabinet 
over  the  House,  and  on  the  other  the  obstacles  encountered 
by  private  members  in  passing  measures,  have  increased  so 
much  that  it  is  very  difficult,  without  the  help  of  the  Treas- 
ury Bench,  to  get  the  House  to  adopt  anything  to  which  there 
is  serious  opposition. 

Although  in  terms  the  rule   applies  only  to  a  motion  for  The  Rule 
making  a  grant,  it  has  been  construed  to  cover  any  amend-  Please  of 
ment  for  increasing  a  grant  bevond  the  amount  recommended  the  Esti- 

-  ,  r.  -1  ".  -Ill  L         ma^C8- 

from  the  Crown,  — an  extension  certainly  needed  to  protect 
both  the  Treasury  and  the  authority  of  the  ministers.  When, 
therefore,  the  minister  moves  that  a  sum  of  money  be 
granted  for  a  definite  purpose,  no  amendment  is  in  order 
either  to  increase  that  sum  or  to  alter  its  destination.4  But 
the  rule  does  not  forbid  a  reduction.  It  follows  that  if  any 
member  deems  the  sum  named  too  small,  his  only  course  is 

cannot  bo  considered  by  the  House  until  ;i  Committee  of  the  Whole  has 
passer!  the  necessary  resolutions  on  a  recommendation  from  the  Crown. 
May,  528-29,  539. 

1  May,  538-40;  Todd,  I,  099-701 .  Hy  SO.  69  an  address  of  this  kind 
must  be  adopted  in  Committee  of  the  Whole. 

'"Gleanings  of  Past  Years,"   I.,  81. 

'  May,  532,  580.  *  Ibid.,  580-81.     Todd,  I  ,  753. 


282         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  move  to  reduce  it  in  order  to  draw  attention  to  its  in- 
sufficiency. Reductions  of  one  hundred  pounds  are,  in  fact, 
constantly  moved  to  make  an  occasion  for  discussing  some 
grievance  connected  with  the  service  in  question,  and  they 
afford  a  ready  means  of  protest,  free  from  peril  to  the 
Treasury.1 
The  Rule  is  A  still  greater  extension  of  the  rule  is  made  in  its  applica- 
Apphed  to  ^.•on  .J.Q  taxes  •  kut  this  depends  not  upon  the  standing  order, 
but  upon  a  general  constitutional  principle  which  has 
gradually  been  evolved  therefrom.  The  principle  has,  in  fact, 
been  expanded  until  it  may  be  stated  in  the  general  form  that 
no  motion  can  be  made  to  raise  or  expend  national  revenue 
without  a  recommendation  from  the  Crown,  or  to  increase 
the  sum  asked  for  by  the  Crown.  The  government  has 
accordingly  the  exclusive  right  to  propose  fresh  national 
taxation,  whether  in  the  form  of  new  taxes  or  of  higher  rates 
for  existing  ones,2  and  no  private  member  can  move  to  aug- 
ment the  taxes  so  proposed.3     He  can,  however,  move  to 

1  Such  reductions  are  sometimes  carried.  There  was  the  famous  case  in 
1895  when  a  motion  was  made  to  reduce  the  salary  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  War  to  draw  attention  to  the  alleged  lack  of  supply  of  cordite.  The 
defeat  of  the  government  in  this  case  furnished  the  occasion  for  the  resigna- 
tion of  Lord  Rosebery's  cabinet.   (Hans.  4  Ser.  XXXIV.,  1685-1711,  1742.) 

In  1904  Mr.  Redmond,  the  leader  of  the  Irish  Nationalists,  moved  to 
reduce  by  £100  the  appropriation  for  education  in  Ireland,  and  obtained  a 
majority  of  141  to  130.  Mr.  Balfour,  declining  to  treat  the  matter  seriously, 
remarked  that  the  Irish  leader  had  succeeded  in  reducing  the  grant  to  Ire- 
land by  £100;  to  which  the  latter  replied  that  defeating  the  government 
atacost  of  £100  was  money  well  spent.     (Hans.  4  Ser.  CXXXL,  1141-47.) 

Again  in  1905  a  motion  to  reduce  by  £100  the  appropriation  for  the  Irish 
Land  Commission  was  carried  by  a  vote  of  199  to  196.  (Hans.  4  Ser. 
CXLIX.,  1459-86.)  After  some  reflection  the  government  decided  that 
it  was  not  a  sufficient  cause  either  for  resignation  or  dissolution,  although 
the  ministry  was  undoubtedly  losing  its  hold  upon  the  country.  In  each 
of  these  three  cases  the  defeat  of  the  government  was  an  accident,  the 
result  of  a  "snap  vote." 

2  May,  532-33,  589.  Todd,  I.,  709-12.  But  this  does  not  apply  to 
local  taxation  for  local  purposes.     May,  565-67;   Todd,  I.,  710. 

3  May,  533,  589;  Todd  (I.,  711)  says  that  a  motion  can  be  made  to  in- 
crease a  tax  proposed  by  the  government,  but  of  the  two  precedents  he 
cites,  one  (Hans.  3  Ser.  LXXV.,  1020)  was  a  motion  by  the  minister  to 
restore  in  a  sugar  duties  bill  the  rate  of  duty  which  had  been  proposed,  but 
reduced  in  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means;  the  other  (Hans.  3  Ser.CCXYI  II., 
1041)  was  a  motion  to  renew  the  existing  rate  of  3d.  for  the  income  tax,  the 
government  having  proposed  to  reduce  it  to  2d. 


MONEY  BILLS  AND  ACCOUNTS  283 

reduce  them,  and  he  is  even  free  to  bring  in  a  bill  to  repeal 
or  reduce  taxes  which  the  government  has  not  proposed  to 
touch.1  Moreover,  as  the  principle  merely  forbids  him  to 
urge  an  increase  of  the  burdens  upon  the  people  beyond  the 
point  at  which  they  stand,  or  the  point  at  which  the  minis- 
ters propose  to  place  them,  he  can,  when  the  government 
suggests  a  reduction  of  a  tax,  move  an  amendment  to  reduce 
it  less,2  and  when  the  government  brings  in  a  plan  for  a 
revision  of  taxation,  he  can  move  to  substitute  a  somewhat 
different  tax  for  the  one  proposed,  provided  the  amount  of 
revenue  yielded  will  not  be  greater.3  But  these  rights  are 
seldom  used,  and  almost  never  with  success ;  otherwise  they 
would,  no  doubt,  be  found  objectionable  and  swept  away. 

The  House  of  Commons,  at  the  present  day,  certainly 
stimulates  extravagance,  rather  than  economy ;  but  this  is 
done  by  opinions  expressed  in  debate,  not  by  specific  pro- 
posals made  by  the  members.  It  is  done  by  criticising  the 
administration,  by  complaints,  for  example,  that  the  Army 
and  Navy  are  insufficient  for  the  defence  of  the  empire. 
The  result  is  a  growth  in  the  budgets  prepared  by  the  min- 
istry; but  this  is  a  very  different  thing  from  expenditure 
directly  caused  by  the  irresponsible  action  of  private  mem- 
bers. The  former  is  deliberate  and  reflects  public  opinion, 
the  latter  may  originate  in  personal  or  local  feelings,  and 
then  be  adopted  through  heedless  good  nature  or  skilful  log- 
rolling. 

As  grants  of  money  can  be  taken  up  only  in  Committee  of  Committee 
the  Whole,  and  only  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Crown,  of  SufP1>'- 
—  that  is,  of  a  minister  —  the  House  resolves  itself,  early  in 
the  session,  into  Committee  of  the  Whole  on    Supply,  to 
consider  the  estimates  submitted  by  the  government.4 

1  May,  540,  5G7;  Todd,  I.,  713  et  seq.  Provided  the  bill  does  not  inciden- 
tally increase  some  other  tax.     May,  533. 

2  May,  533-35. 

5  Ibid.,  589;    Todd,  I,  711. 

4  SO.  14  provides  that  the  Committees  of  Supply  and  Ways  and  Means 
shall  he  set  up  as  soon  as  the  address  in  reply  to  the  King's  speech  has  been 
agreed  to. 


284 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Consoli- 
dated Fund 
Charges. 


Estimates 
for  the 
Supply  Ser- 
vices. 


Votes  on 
Account. 


Now  it  will  be  remembered  that  certain  charges,  such  as 
the  interest  on  the  national  debt,  the  royal  civil  list,  and  the 
salaries  of  the  judges,  are  payable  by  statute  out  of  the  Con- 
solidated Fund,  and  hence  do  not  require  an  annual  vote  of 
Parliament,  or  come  before  the  Committee  of  Supply.  The 
estimates  for  the  rest  of  the  expenditures  for  the  coming  year, 
known  as  the  supply  services,  are  divided  into  three  parts, 
relating  to  the  Army,  the  Navy,  and  the  civil  services.  The 
last  of  the  three  is  divided  into  classes,  and  all  of  them  are 
divided  into  grants  or  votes,  which  are  in  turn  subdivided 
into  subheads  and  items.  Each  grant  is  the  subject  of  a 
separate  vote  in  Committee  of  Supply,  and  amendments  may 
be  moved  to  omit  or  reduce  any  item  therein. 

The  English  financial  system  aims  at  precision.  It  is 
deemed  of  great  importance  that  the  estimates  should  be  as 
accurate  as  they  can  be  made,  and  hence  they  must  be  pre- 
pared as  short  a  time  as  possible  before  going  into  effect. 
They  are  made  up  in  the  several  departments  late  in  the 
autumn,  then  submitted  for  revision  to  the  Treasury,  and  laid 
before  Parliament  shortly  after  it  meets  about  the  middle 
of  February.  But  as  the  financial  year  begins  on  April  1, 
it  is  manifest  that  the  Committee  of  Supply  cannot  finish 
its  discussion  of  them  by  that  time.  With  the  work  it  must 
do  in  passing  upon  supplementary  estimates  for  the  current 
year,  it  can,  in  fact,  make  little  progress  with  those  of  the 
coming  year  during  March,  and  yet  money  must  be  spent, 
and  there  must  be  legal  authority  to  spend  it,  especially  as 
the  unspent  balances  of  appropriations  lapse  at  the  close  of 
the  financial  year  in  which  they  are  voted.  The  committee, 
therefore,  passes  votes  on  account  to  cover  the  time  until 
the  regular  appropriations  are  made.  The  reader  will,  per- 
haps, recall  the  fact  that  in  the  military  and  naval  services 
an  excess  on  one  grant  may,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Treasury,  be  used  to  cover  deficiencies  on  other  grants, 
and  hence  it  is  the  habit  in  the  case  of  those  services  to 
vote  in  March  the  grant  for  the  pay  and  wages  of  the 
men  for  the  whole  year,  and  use  the  money  so  obtained  for 


MONEY  BILLS  AND  ACCOUNTS  285 

all  purposes  until  the  appropriations  have  been  completed. 
In  the  civil  services,  where  this  is  not  allowed,  votes  on  ac- 
count are  passed  for  all  the  grants,  large  enough  to  carry 
on  the  government  for  four  or  five  months. 

With  the  utmost  effort  at  accuracy  in  the  estimates  they  Suppie- 
will  always  prove  to  be  insufficient  in  some  branch  of  the  c^nts7 
service,  or  an  unexpected  need  for  expenditure  will  arise ; 
and  to  provide  funds  in  such  cases  supplementary  estimates 
must  be  presented  and  voted  before  the  close  of  the  financial 
year. 

There  may  also  be  other  expenses  outside  the  estimates,  Excess 
which  have,  by  the  authority  vested  in  the  Treasury,  been  Grants- 
temporarily  met  by  advances  from  the  Civil  Contingencies 
Fund  or  the  Treasury  Chest  Fund,  or  from  extra  receipts 
of  the  department.  These  do  not  require  an  immediate 
appropriation ;  but  they  are  reported  to  the  Committee 
on  Public  Accounts  at  the  next  regular  session  after  the 
close  of  the  financial  year,  and  then  presented  to  the  Com- 
mittee of  Supply  to  be  covered  at  once  by  an  excess  grant. 

Before  the  end  of  March,  therefore,  the  Committee  of 
Supply  must  pass  the  supplementary  grants  for  the  year  then 
coming  to  a  close,  the  excess  grants  for  the  preceding  year, 
the  votes  on  account  for  the  coming  year,  and  make  such 
progress  as  it  can  with  the  regular  estimates  for  that  year. 

But  the  committee  merely  passes  and  reports  to  the  House  consoii- 
resolutions  in  favour  of  those  grants,  and  the  money  cannot  ^^d  Fund 
be  paid  out  of  the  Consolidated  Fund  without  the  authority 
of  a  statute.  The  next  step  is  taken  in  the  Committee  of 
the  Whole  on  Ways  and  Means,  where  on  the  motion  of  a 
minister  another  resolution  is  passed,  that  to  make  good  the 
supply  already  voted,  the  sum  required  be  granted  out  of  the 
Consolidated  Fund.  This  in  turn  must  be  reported  to  and 
confirmed  by  the  House.1  A  bill  called  a  Consolidated  Fund 
Bill  is  then  brought  in  to  give  effect  to  the  resolution.  The 
bill,  with  the  separate   grants   annexed  in  a  schedule,  goes 

1  On  the  procedure  in  the  Committee  of  Wuys  and  Means,  and  on  Report 
from  Committee  of  Supply  and  of  Ways  and  Means,  see  May,  588  et  sc<j. 


286 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


The  Appro- 
priation 
Act. 


The 
Budget. 


through  the  ordinary  stages ;  but  the  time  spent  upon  it  is 
short.,  because  its  only  object  being  to  authorise  the  issue  of 
money  to  cover  the  supply  already  voted,  no  amendment 
can  be  moved  to  reduce  the  amount,  or  change  the  destina- 
tion, of  the  grants.1 

The  first  Consolidated  Fund  Act  must  be  passed  in  time 
to  receive  the  royal  assent  before  April  1.  One  or  two  more 
follow  from  time  to  time  as  the  Committee  of  Supply  makes 
its  way  slowly  through  the  estimates.2  Finally,  after  the 
whole  supply  for  the  year  has  been  voted,  the  Appropriation 
Bill  is  brought  in,  which  sums  up  and  embodies  all  the  grants 
for  the  services  of  the  year,  prescribes  their  application 
by  means  of  the  schedules  annexed,  and  authorises  their 
payment  out  of  the  Consolidated  Fund.  This  is  usually 
passed  on  the  last  day  of  the  session. 

So  much  for  the  process  of  getting  money  out  of  the  Con- 
solidated Fund.  That  of  getting  money  into  the  fund  goes 
on  at  the  same  time,  but  independently.  It  is  usually  early 
in  April  that  the  Chancellor  introduces  his  budget  in  the 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means.  In  an  elaborate  speech  he 
reviews  the  finances  of  the  past  year,  comparing  the  results 
with  the  estimates,  and  dealing  with  the  state  of  trade  and 
the  national  debt.  He  then  refers  to  the  estimates  already 
submitted,  and  coming  to  the  gist  of  his  speech,  and  the  part 
of  it  that  is  awaited  with  curiosity,  he  explains  how  he  pro- 
poses to  raise  the  revenue  required  to  meet  the  expenditures. 
As  he  could  have  no  right  to  take  the  floor  without  a  motion 
before  the  House,  he  concludes  by  moving  one  or  more  of  a 
series  of  resolutions  containing  the  changes  in  taxation,  or 
the  continuation  of  temporary  taxes,  that  he  desires. 

About  three  quarters  of  the  revenue  is  derived  from  per- 
manent taxes,  which  are  rarely  changed,  and  require  no 
action  by  Parliament  from  year  to  year.     But  in  order  to 

1  May,  526;    Ilbert,  "Manual,"  §  245,  note. 

2  In  order  to  provide  money  enough  in  the  Consolidated  Fund  in  anticipa- 
tion of  receipts  from  taxation,  each  of  these  bills  authorises  the  Bank  of 
England  to  advance  the  sums  required,  and  the  Treasury  to  borrow  on 
Treasury  bills.     May,  558,  n.  3;    Ubert,  §  244. 


MONEY  BILLS  AND  ACCOUNTS  287 

adjust  the  income  closely  to  expenses,  certain  taxes  are 
voted  for  a  year  at  a  time,  their  rates  being  raised  or  lowered 
as  may  be  required  to  balance  the  budget.  For  many  years 
the  only  imposts  so  treated  were  the  income  tax  and  the 
duty  on  tea;  one  of  them  being  regarded  as  a  direct  tax 
levied  upon  property,  and  the  other  as  an  indirect  tax  rest- 
ing upon  the  mass  of  the  people.  Recently,  however,  the 
duties  on  tobacco,  beer  and  spirits,  and  the  corresponding 
excises  on  beer  and  spirits,  have  been  increased,  and  the 
additions  so  made  have  been  voted  from  year  to  year. 

The  budget  speech  of  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  is 
followed  by  a  general  discussion  of  the  questions  he  has 
raised,  and  either  at  once,  or  on  subsequent  days,  by  de- 
bates and  votes  upon  the  resolutions  he  has  brought  in. 
The  resolutions  when  adopted  are  reported  to  the  House  for 
ratification,  but  as  in  the  case  of  supply,  they  have  no  legal 
effect  until  enacted  in  the  form  of  a  statute.  Perhaps  it 
would  be  more  correct  to  say  that  they  have  no  legal  va- 
lidity ;  because  in  order  to  prevent  large  importations  made 
to  avoid  a  projected  increase  in  a  duty,  it  is  customary  to 
prescribe  in  the  resolution  a  date  near  at  hand  when  the 
tax  shall  take  effect,  and  to  collect  it  from  that  date  if 
the  resolution  has  been  agreed  to  by  the  House  on  report. 
The  collection  is  quite  unauthorised  by  law  at  the  time,  but 
it  is  afterward  ratified  by  a  statute  which  fixes  the  same 
date  for  the  operation  of  the  tax ;  and  this  gives  the  transac- 
tion complete  legal  validity,  because  Parliament  has  power 
to  pass  a  retroactive  law.  If  for  any  reason  the  provision 
for  the  tax  fails  of  enactment,  the  duties  that  have  been 
collected  are,  of  course,  refunded. 

It  was  formerly  the  habit  to  include  in  the  fiscal  resolu-  The 
tions  based  upon  the  budget,  and  in  the  act  to  give  them 
effect,  the  annual  and  temporary  taxes  alone;  the  per- 
manent taxes,  and  especially  those  imposed  rather  for  eco- 
nomic reasons  than  for  the  purpose  of  revenue,  being  dealt 
with  by  special  acts.1     But  the  use  of  taxation  for  revenue 

1  May,  556-57;    Todd,  I.,  791. 


Finance 
Act. 


288         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

only,  and  still  more  a  quarrel  with  the  House  of  Lords, 
brought  about  a  change  of  system.  In  1860  the  government 
determined  to  repeal  the  paper  duties,  which  hindered  the 
publication  of  cheap  newspapers,  and  were  decried  as  a  tax  on 
knowledge.  The  loss  of  revenue  was  taken  into  account  in 
the  financial  plans  of  the  year ;  but  according  to  custom  the 
repeal  of  the  duties  was  contained  in  a  separate  bill  by  itself. 
The  Lords,  after  passing  the  act  to  give  effect  to  the  rest  of 
the  budget,  rejected  this  bill.  At  the  moment  the  Com- 
mons could  do  nothing  save  express  their  opinions;  but 
the  next  year  they  included  the  repeal  of  the  paper  duties 
in  the  annual  tax  bill,  and  the  Lords  were  constrained  to 
pass  it;  for  although  the  Peers  do  not  formally  admit  the 
claim  of  the  Commons  that  they  must  accept  or  reject  money 
bills  without  alteration,  they  never  venture  to  amend  them. 
The  policy  of  including  all  the  taxes  in  one  bill  has  developed 
into  a  permanent  practice,  and  under  the  name  of  the 
Finance  Bill  this  now  includes  all  fiscal  regulations  relating 
both  to  the  revenue  and  to  the  national  debt.1 
The  Public  The  whole  initiative,  as  regards  both  revenue  and  ex- 
Accounts,  penditure,  lies  with  the  government  alone.  The  House  has 
merely  power  to  reject  or  reduce  the  amounts  asked  for, 
and  it  uses  that  power  very  little.  Financially,  its  work  is 
rather  supervision  than  direction;  and  its  real  usefulness 
consists  in  securing  publicity  and  criticism  rather  than  in 
controlling  expenditure.  It  is  the  tribunal  where  at  the 
opening  of  the  financial  year  the  ministers  must  explain  and 
justify  every  detail  of  their  fiscal  policy,  and  where  at  its 
close  they  must  render  an  account  of  their  stewardship. 
This  last  duty  is  highly  important.  The  House  receives 
every  year  reports  of  the  administration  of  the  finances 
from  three  independent  bodies,  or  to  be  more  accurate,  it 
receives  two  distinct  sets  of  accounts  and  one  report. 

1  The  name  Customs  and  Inland  Revenue  Act  was  changed  to  Finance 
Act  in  1894  when  the  death  duties  were  included  in  it.  In  1899  the  provi- 
sions for  the  sinking-fund  were  also  included.  Courtney,  "The  Working 
Constitution  of  the  United  Kingdom,"  26-28;  and  see  the  recent  Finance 
Acts. 


MONEY  BILLS  AND  ACCOUNTS  289 

As  soon  as  possible  after  the  close  of  the  financial  year,  The  Finance 
the  Treasury  submits  the  Finance  Accounts,  which  cover  Accounta- 
all  receipts  paid  into,  and  all  issues  out  of,  the  Consolidated 
Fund,  giving  the  sources  from  which  the  revenue  was  de- 
rived and  the  purpose  for  which  the  issues  were  made.1  As 
these  accounts  are  based,  not  upon  the  sums  expended  by  the 
different  branches  of  the  government,  but  upon  the  amounts 
transferred  to  their  credit  at  the  Banks  of  England  and  Ire- 
land, they  can  be  compiled  quickly;  and,  in  fact,  they  are  laid 
before  Parliament  near  the  end  of  June,  about  three  months 
after  the  close  of  the  financial  year  to  which  they  relate. 

Meanwhile  the  Comptroller  and  Auditor  General  —  who  The  Ap- 
holds  his  office  during  good  behaviour,  with  a  salary  paid  ^^on 
by  statute  directly  out  of  the  Consolidated  Fund,  and  who 
considers  himself  in  no  sense  a  servant  of  the  Treasury,  but 
an  officer  responsible  to  the  House  of  Commons 2  —  ex- 
amines the  accounts  of  the  several  departments.  This  is 
a  matter  requiring  much  time,  and  it  is  not  until  the  open- 
ing of  the  next  regular  session  that  he  presents  what  are 
known  as  the  Appropriation  Accounts,3  covering  in  great 
detail  the  actual  expenditures  in  all  the  supply  services, 
with  his  reports  and  comments  thereon.4 

His  accounts  and  reports  are  referred  to  the  Committee  The  Com- 
of  Public  Accounts,  which  consists  of  eleven  members  of  the  p,1,^  Ac_ 
House  chosen  at  the  beginning  of  the  session,5  and  includes  counts. 

1  In  the  ca.se  of  the  consolidated  fund  services  the  separate  items,  e.g. 
the  individual  salaries,  are  given.  In  the  case  of  the  supply  services  only 
the  amounts  issued  on  account  of  each  grant  are  given  for  the  civil  service; 
and  for  the  Army  and  Navy  only  the  total  amounts. 

2  .See  his  evidence  before  the  Com.  on  Xat.  Expend.,  Com.  Papers,  1902, 
VII  ,  15,  Qs.  764-69,  831. 

'Thus  the  Parliamentary  Papers  for  1903  contain  the  Finance  Accounts 
for  the  financial  year  ending  March  31,  1903,  and  the  far  more  elaborate 
Appropriation  Accounts  for  the  year  ending  March  31,  1902. 

4  He  presents  also  separate  accounts  of  the  consolidated  fund  services, 
and  other  matters,  with  reports  upon  them. 

s  SO.  75.  For  a  brief  history  of  the  system  of  audit,  and  the  laying  of 
accounts  before  Parliament,  see  the;  memorandum  by  Ford  Welby.  Pep. 
Com  on  Nat  Expend.,  Com  Papers,  1902,  VI 1  ,  15,  App.  13.  See  also  the 
description  by  Hatschek,  in  his  Kriglisrhrs  Stnntsrrrht  (495-500),  of  the 
introduction  into  England  of  double  entry  and  the  French  system  of 
keeping  the  national  accounts, 
u 


290         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

the  Financial  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  some  one  who  has 
held  a  similar  office  under  the  opposite  party,  and  other  men 
interested  in  the  subject.  It  inspects  the  accounts  and  the 
Comptroller  and  Auditor  General's  notes  of  the  reason  why 
more  or  less  than  the  estimate  was  spent  on  each  item. 
It  inquires  into  the  items  that  need  further  explanation, 
examining  for  the  purpose  the  auditing  officers  of  the 
departments,  and  other  persons ;  and  it  makes  a  series  of 
reports  to  the  House,  which  refer  in  detail  to  the  cases  where 
an  excess  grant  must  be  made  by  Parliament,  or  a  transfer 
between  grants  in  the  military  departments  must  be  ap- 
proved.1 

The  Committee  of  Public  Accounts  has  undoubtedly  great 
influence  in  keeping  the  expenditures  very  strictly  within 
the  appropriations,  and  from  time  to  time  it  expresses  its 
opinions  strongly  about  any  laxity  in  that  respect  —  re- 
marks that  are  not  forgotten  by  the  officials.  But  there 
has  been  much  complaint  that  the  House  itself,  while  criticis- 
ing the  administrative  conduct  of  the  government  freely  in 
the  discussion  of  the  estimates,  takes  little  interest  in  their 
financial  aspect ;  and,  therefore,  the  recent  Committee  on 
National  Expenditure  has  suggested  that  one  day,  at  least, 
should  be  set  apart  for  the  discussion  of  the  report  of  the 
Committee  on  Public  Accounts.2 
Indian  There  are  a  couple  of  anomalous  cases  where,  by  statute, 

the  estimates  for  a  service  are  not  voted  by  Parliament, 
but  the  accounts  are  afterward  submitted  to  it  for  approval. 
This  is  true  of  India ;  and  the  provision  is  a  wise  one,  for  it 
allows  the  government  of  that  country  to  be  conducted  by 
the  authorities  on  the  spot,  who  are  alone  competent  to  do 
it,  and  yet  it  reserves  to  the  House  of  Commons  an  oppor- 

1  All  the  reports  of  the  Committees  on  Public  Accounts  from  1857  to  1900, 
with  the  minutes  made  in  consequence  by  the  Treasury,  have  been  collected 
and  printed  together  from  time  to  time  in  blue  books.  There  are  now  three 
of  these  published  in  1888,  1893,  and  1901,  the  last  containing  an  index  of 
all  three  (Com.  Papers,  1888,  LXXIX.,  331;  1893,  LXX.,  281;  1901, 
LVIII.,  161). 

2  Rep.  Com.  on  Nat.  Expend.,  Com.  Papers,  1903,  VII.,  483,  p.  v. 


Revenue 
Accounts 


MONEY  BILLS  AND  ACCOUNTS  291 

tunity  for  supervision  and  criticism.  On  one  of  the  last 
days  of  the  session  a  motion  is  made  to  go  into  Committee 
of  the  Whole  to  consider  these  accounts,  and  on  that  motion 
a  general  debate  on  Indian  affairs  is  in  order.  In  the  com- 
mittee itself  only  a  formal  motion  is  made  certifying  the 
total  revenue  and  expenditure,  and  debate  is  confined  to  the 
economic  and  financial  condition  of  the  dependency.1  In 
the  same  way  the  expenses  of  Greenwich  Hospital  are,  by 
statute,  defrayed  out  of  its  revenues,  but  the  accounts  are 
submitted  to  the  House  annually,  with  a  resolution  for  their 
approval.2 

1  May,  564.  On  July  20,  1906,  an  amendment  to  the  motion  that  the 
Speaker  leave  the  chair  was  proposed,  to  the  effect  that  the  salary  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  India  ought  to  be  placed  among  the  regular  Treas- 
ury estimates,  in  order  to  give  a  better  chance  to  discuss  the  government 
of  India.  One  of  the  chief  objections  made  to  this  was  that  it  would 
tend  to  bring  the  Indian  administration  into  party  politics,  and  the 
amendment  was  rejected  by  a  large  majority.  (Hans.  4  Ser.  CLXI.,  589— 
610.) 

1  May,  565. 


ure 


CHAPTER  XV 

PROCEDURE   IN  THE   HOUSE   OF  COMMONS 

Closure 

The  Need  Almost  all  great  legislative  bodies  at  the  present  day  have 

of ^cios-  been  forced  to  adopt  some  method  of  cutting  off  debate,  and 
bringing  matters  under  discussion  to  a  decisive  vote.  They 
have  been  driven  to  do  so  partly  as  a  defence  against  wilful 
obstruction  by  minorities,  and  partly  as  a  means  of  getting 
through  their  work.  Although  following  the  path  with  great 
reluctance,  the  House  of  Commons  has  been  no  exception  to 
the  rule.  With  the  evolution  of  popular  government  it  has 
become  more  representative  and  less  self-contained.  For- 
merly an  important  public  measure  gave  rise  to  one  great 
debate,  conducted  mainly  by  the  leading  men,  and  the  vote 
that  followed  was  deemed  to  settle  the  question.  The  case 
had  been  argued,  Parliament  had  rendered  its  verdict,  and 
that  ended  the  matter.  But  now  every  one  has  his  eye 
upon  the  country  outside.  The  ordinary  member  is  not 
satisfied  to  have  the  case  argued  well ;  he  wants  to  take  part 
in  the  argument  himself.  He  wants  the  public,  and  espe- 
cially his  own  constituents,  to  see  that  he  is  active,  capable, 
and  to  some  extent  prominent.1  He  watches,  therefore,  his 
chance  to  express  his  views  at  some  stage  in  the  proceedings. 

1  Lecky  attributed  what  he  called  "the  enormous  and  portentous  devel- 
opment of  parliamentary  speaking"  partly  to  the  scenes  of  violence  and 
obstruction,  which  have  weakened  both  the  respect  for  the  House  and  the 
timidity  that  imposed  a  restraint  on  idle  speech;  partly  to  the  growth 
of  the  provincial  press  which  reports  members  in  full  in  their  own  constit- 
uencies; and  partly  to  the  vast  increase  in  stump  oratory  which  has  given 
nearly  all  members  a  fatal  facility.  ("  Democracy  and  Liberty,"  I.,  146-47.) 
A  traveller  is  struck  both  by  the  universal  fluency,  and  by  the  ephemeral 
character,  of  public  speaking  in  England,  at  the  present  day. 

292 


CLOSURE  293 

Moreover,  the  strategy  of  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition  has 
changed.  They  are  not  trying  merely  to  persuade  the  House, 
or  to  register  their  protests  there.  They  are  speaking  to  the 
nation,  striving  to  convince  the  voters  of  the  righteousness 
of  their  cause,  and  of  the  earnestness,  devotion,  and  tenacity 
with  which  they  are  urging  it.  Hence  they  take  every  op- 
portunity for  resistance  offered  by  the  rules,  and  fight  dog- 
gedly at  every  step.  Just  as  in  war  the  great  battle  that 
settled  a  campaign  has  been  replaced  by  a  long  series  of 
stubborn  contests  behind  intrenchments ;  so  in  the  impor- 
tant issues  of  parliamentary  warfare,  the  single  conclusive 
debate  has  given  way  to  many  struggles  that  take  place 
whenever  the  rules  afford  a  means  of  resistance.  This  may 
not  be  done  for  the  sake  of  obstruction  or  delay,  but  it  con- 
sumes time,  and  it  has  made  some  process  of  cutting  off 
debate  and  reaching  a  vote  an  absolute  necessity. 

The  first  resort  to  such  a  process  was  brought  about  by  First  Used 
deliberate  obstruction.  This  had  been  felt  to  be  an  evil  for  m  1881- 
a  dozen  years,1  and  was  made  intolerable  by  the  tactics  of 
the  Irish  members  in  opposing  the  introduction  of  the  coer- 
cion bill  of  1881.  Several  nights  of  debate  were  followed  by 
a  continuous  session  of  forty-one  hours;  when  the  Speaker, 
on  his  return  to  the  chair,  of  which  he  had  been  for  a  time 
relieved  by  his  deputy,  interrupting  the  discussion,  said 
that  the  dignity,  the  credit  and  the  authority  of  the  House 
were  threatened,  and  that  he  was  satisfied  he  should  but 
carry  out  its  will  by  putting  the  question  forthwith.2  His 
action  was  not  authorised  by  standing  order  or  by  prece- 
dent, but  whether  justifiable  or  not,  it  marked  an  epoch  in 
parliamentary  history. 

Brand,  the  Speaker,  had  not  come  to  his  decision  without  The 
consulting  Gladstone,  then  Prime  Minister;    and  had  made  Krgc!H.y 

"  Resolution 

his  action  conditional  upon  the  introduction  of  some  regular  of  issi. 
process   for   coping   with   obstruction.3      Gladstone   at   once 
gave  notice  of  an   urgency   resolution,   which   was  speedily 

1  Hans.  3  Ser.  CCLVII  ,  1141-42.      2  Hans.  3  Ser.  UCLXVI  ,  20.'i2  .'5.1 
1  Morley,  "  Life  of  Gladstone,"  III  ,  .52  .Y.l 


Rules. 


294  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

adopted,  thanks  to  the  suspension  of  all  the  Irish  members 
for  interrupting  debate  contrary  to  the  orders  of  the  chair. 
The  resolution  enabled  a  minister  to  move  that  the  state  of 
public  business  with  regard  to  any  pending  measure  was 
urgent.  This  motion  was  to  be  put  forthwith  without  de- 
bate, and  if  carried  by  a  majority  of  three  to  one  in  a  House 
of  not  less  than  three  hundred  members,  was  to  vest  in  the 
Speaker,  for  the  purpose  of  proceeding  with  such  measure, 
all  the  powers  of  the  House  for  the  regulation  of  its 
business.1 
Urgency  The  language  was  vague,  but  the  intent  was  clear.     The 

urgency  resolution  sanctioned  for  the  future  the  authority 
recently  assumed  by  the  chair.  The  Speaker,  however,  not 
wishing  to  make  what  might  appear  to  be  an  arbitrary  use  of 
his  new  powers,  laid  before  the  House  a  number  of  rules 
by  which  he  should  be  guided ; 2  and  these  have  furnished 
the  suggestions  for  much  of  the  later  procedure  for  curtail- 
ing debate.3  The  one  dealing  with  the  primary  object  of  the 
resolution  provided  that  when  it  appeared  to  the  Speaker, 
or  to  the  Chairman  in  Committee  of  Supply  or  Ways  and 
Means,  to  be  the  general  sense  of  the  House  that  the  ques- 
tion should  be  put,  he  might  so  inform  the  House,  and  then 
a  motion  made  to  that  effect  should  be  voted  upon  without 
debate,  and  if  carried  by  a  majority  of  three  to  one,  the 
original  question  should  be  put  forthwith.  The  urgency 
motion  was  used  at  once  to  push  through  a  couple  of  bills 
relating  to  Ireland ;  but  the  resolution  expired  with  the  ses- 
sion, and  after  being  revived  for  a  short  time  the  next  year, 
it  was  replaced  in  the  autumn  of  1882  by  a  standing  order 

1  Hans.  3  Ser.  CCLVIII.,  155-56. 

2  Ibid.,  435-38,  1070-71,  1343-44;  CCLIX.,  888-90;  also  published  in 
Com.  Papers,  1881,  LXXIV.,  1-9. 

3  Such  as  that  debate  on  dilatory  motions  should  be  confined  to  the 
motion;  that  the  House  should  go  in  and  out  of  committee  without  ques- 
tion put;  that  divisions  frivolously  claimed,  and  dilatory  motions  made  for 
delay  might  be  refused  by  the  chair;  and  most  striking  of  all,  a  provision  for 
stopping  debate  altogether  upon  a  certain  stage  of  a  bill  by  putting  all  out- 
standing amendments  and  clauses  at  a  fixed  time —  a  shadow  of  the  future 
guillotine.  This  process  was,  indeed,  employed  by  Mr.  Gladstone  to  pass 
two  Irish  bills  in  that  very  session. 


CLOSURE  295 


based  upon  the  Speaker's  rules.1  The  new  order  made,  closure 
however,  two  changes  in  the  procedure.  Instead  of  being  x^  °f 
applicable  only  after  urgency  had  been  voted,  on  a  motion 
by  a  minister,  in  regard  to  some  particular  measure,  it 
could  be  used  at  any  time ;  and  instead  of  requiring  a  vote 
of  three  to  one,  it  required  either  a  bare  majority,  if  two 
hundred  affirmative  votes  were  cast,  or  one  hundred  affirm- 
ative votes,  if  there  were  less  than  forty  votes  against  it. 
Instead,  therefore,  of  being  a  weapon  that  could  be  used  only 
in  cases  of  exceptional  obstruction  by  a  small  group,  it 
became  a  process  applicable  at  any  time  to  limit  debate  by 
the  minority.  But  although  apparently  a  regular  part  of 
the  procedure  of  the  House,  the  motion  to  cut  off  further 
debate  could  be  made  only  on  the  suggestion  of  the  Speaker, 
and  this  vested  in  him  an  arbitrary  initiative  which  he  was 
loth  to  exercise.  The  standing  order  was,  in  fact,  put  into 
operation  on  two  occasions  only,  on  Feb.  24,  1885,  and  on 
Feb.  17,  1887. 

The  difficulty  that  had  been  felt  in  using  the  procedure  was  closure 
avoided  by  the  adoption  in  1887  of  a  new  standing  order  2  f^  of 
transferring  the  initiative  to  the  members  of  the  House, 
while  securing  fair  play  to  minorities  by  leaving  with  the 
Speaker  a  power  of  veto.  The  rule  provides  that  any  mem- 
ber may  claim  to  move  that  the  question  pending  be  now 
put,  "and  unless  it  shall  appear  to  the  chair  that  such  mo- 
tion is  an  abuse  of  the  rules  of  the  House,  or  an  infringement 
of  the  rights  of  the  minority,"  it  shall  be  put  forthwith.  If 
carried,  the  pending  question,  and  following  it  the  main 
question  before  the  House,  with  all  others  depending  upon 
it,  must  be  put  without  further  amendment  or  debate,3 
The  process,  now  entitled  for  the  first  time  "closure,"  was 

1  A  number  of  now  rules  were  added  at  this  time,  and  the  standing 
orders  were  rearranged  and  put  into  their  present  sequence.  Com.  Papers, 
1882,  LIT,  139,  213.     The  standing  order  on  this  subject  became  No.  14. 

2  The  Standing  Order  of  1SS2  was  not  repealed  until  1888. 

3  In  the  same  way  a  motion  may  be  made  to  put  forthwith  the  question 
that  certain  words  stand  part  of  a  clause,  or  that  a  clause  stand  part  of  the 
bill,  and  this  cuts  ofr  summarily  all  amendments  to  those  words  or  that 
clause.     These  standing  orders  are  now  Nos.  20  and  27. 


296         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

modified  in  1888,  so  that  the  only  requirement  about  the 
size  of  the  majority  was  that  one  hundred  votes  must  be  cast 
in  the  affirmative.  In  this  form  it  has  ever  since  remained, 
and  it  has  been  freely  used,  having  been  actually  applied 
from  one  score  to  four  score  times  each  year.1 
The  The  requirement  of  the  Speaker's  assent  has  proved  to 

Consent'*3  ^e  no  mere  formality.  This  is  especially  true  where  closure 
has  been  moved  by  private  members,  for  his  consent,  or 
that  of  the  Chairman  of  Committees,  has  been  refused  in 
one  third  of  such  cases.2  Largely  for  that  reason,  no  doubt, 
the  use  of  closure  by  private  members  has  become  far  less 
common  than  it  was  formerly.  During  the  first  ten  years 
after  1887  it  was  moved  by  private  members  on  the  average 
about  forty  times  a  year,  but  since  that  period  the  average 
has  been  only  twelve.  Even  in  the  case  of  motions  made  by 
a  minister,  consent  has  often  been  withheld.  It  happened 
very  frequently  during  the  earlier  years,  but  of  late  has  been 
much  less  common.3  Evidently  the  Treasury  Bench  and 
the  Speaker  have  come  to  adopt  very  nearly  the  same  stand- 
ard for  determining  when  a  matter  has  been  sufficiently 
debated.  To  a  spectator  in  the  gallery  the  discussion  seems 
to  proceed  until  the  House  must  be  thoroughly  weary  of 
it  before  closure  is  moved;  and,  indeed,  the  House  itself 
very  rarely  rejects  the  motion  when  it  gets  a  chance  to  vote 
upon  it  —  a  fact  which  shows  that  if  the  Speaker  had  not 
power  to  withhold  his  consent,  the  majority  would  cut  short 
debate  more  drastically  than  it  does  now.  But  although 
debate  may  have  gone  on  until  the  House  is  weary,  and  the 
benches  are  nearly  empty,  until  the  speeches  consist  mainly 

1  Owing  partly  to  the  extension  of  an  automatic  form  of  closure,  to  be 
explained  hereafter,  the  applications  in  1903  fell  to  thirteen. 

2  From  1887  to  1905,  inclusive,  the  closure  was  moved  by  private  mem- 
bers 517  times,  and  consent  was  refused  in  178  of  these  cases.  The  propor- 
tion of  refusals  is  almost  uniform  throughout  the  period,  rather  increasing 
during  the  last  few  years. 

Closure  has  failed  for  lack  of  100  affirmative  votes  only  once  in  the  last 
ten  years.     That  was  in  1905. 

3  From  1887  to  1896,  inclusive,  the  closure  was  moved  by  the  government 
313  times,  and  consent  was  withheld  in  52  of  these  cases.  From  1897  to 
1905  it  was  so  moved  338  times,  but  consent  was  withheld  only  23  times. 


CLOSURE  297 

of  the  reiteration  of  arguments  in  less  incisive  form,  yet 
there  are  almost  always  members  who  are  longing  in  vain 
for  a  chance  to  make  a  few  remarks.  In  great  debates  the 
order  of  the  chief  speakers  on  each  side  is  commonly 
arranged  between  the  whips,  and  given  to  the  presiding 
officer ;  who  usually  follows  it,  though  not  without  occasional 
exceptions.  For  the  rest  he  gives  the  preference,  among  the 
members  who  try  to  catch  his  eye,  to  those  who  have  the 
ear  of  the  House,  or  who  are  likely  to  say  something  worth 
hearing,  not  forgetting  to  call  on  a  new  man  who  rises  to 
make  his  maiden  speech.  By  seizing  on  the  dull  hours, 
when  the  House  is  not  full,  an  undistinguished  member  can 
often  get  his  chance.  Still,  there  are  many  men  who  sit 
impatiently  with  what  they  believe  to  be  effective  little 
speeches  ready  to  be  fired  off  upon  an  appreciative  public, 
and  see  their  chance  slipping  away.1  Perhaps  they  are  bores, 
but  on  them  the  closure  falls  as  a  blight,  and  they  raise  the 
bitter  cry  of  the  curtailment  of  the  rights  of  private  mem- 
bers. 

The  closure  can  be  moved  at  any  time,  even  when  a  mem-  closure 
ber  is  speaking,  but  perhaps  its  most  effective  use  is  at  the  of! sitting 
close  of  the  sitting.  A  standing  order  adopted  in  1S8S 
provides  2  that  when  the  hour  arrives  for  the  cessation  of 
debate  —  technically  known  as  the  interruption  of  business, 
—  the  closure  may  be  moved  upon  the  main  question  under 
consideration,  with  all  others  dependent  upon  it.  This 
gives  an  opportunity  of  finishing  a  bit  of  work  without  ap- 
pearing to  cut  off  discussion  arbitrarily,  and  it  was  especially 
valuable  during  the  time  when  the  rules  of  1902  provided 
on  four  days  of  the  week  3  two  regular  sittings  with  an  in- 
terruption at  the  end  of  each. 

1  Cf.  Palgrave,  "The  House  of  Commons,"  Ed.  of  1878,  41-42. 

2  Now   SO.    1    (4). 

•1  It  is  commonly  staled  that  closure  cannot  lie  used  in  a  standing  com- 
mittee, (Ilbert ,"  Manual,"  §§  80,  note,  lHo  not  el ;  bill  it  was  done  on  July  12, 
1901,  in  the  Standing  Committee  on  Law;  and  although  the  persons  ag- 
grieved stated  that  they  should  bring  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the 
House,  they  did  not  feel  confidence  enough  in  their  ease  to  do  so.    (See  The 


298         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

The  Guiiio-  While  the  closure  is  effective  in  bringing  to  an  end  debate 
on  a  single  question,  or  in  getting  past  some  one  particularly 
difficult  point  in  the  career  of  a  bill,  it  is  quite  inadequate 
for  passing  a  great,  complicated  government  measure  that 
provokes  relentless  opposition.  Here  it  is  as  useless  as  the 
sword  of  Hercules  against  the  Hydra.  Amendments  bristle 
by  the  score  at  every  clause,  and  spring  up  faster  than  they 
can  be  cut  off.  The  motion  that  certain  words  "stand  part 
of  a  clause,"  or  that  a  "  clause  stand  part  of  the  bill,"  was 
intended  to  work  like  the  hero's  hot  iron,  because  if  the 
motion  is  adopted  no  amendment  can  afterward  be  moved 
to  that  word  or  that  clause.  But  in  practice  such  motions 
cannot  be  used  ruthlessly.  The  government  discovered  the 
insufficiency  of  the  closure  under  the  Standing  Order  of  1887, 
during  the  debates  on  the  very  bill  whose  enactment  it  had 
been  adopted  to  secure,  and  resorted  to  a  procedure  which 
had  already  been  used  by  Mr.  Gladstone  on  a  couple  of  Irish 
coercion  bills  in  1881. *  Five  days  had  been  consumed  on  the 
first  reading  of  the  Irish  Crimes  Act  of  1887,  seven  on  the 
second  reading,  and  fifteen  days  more  had  been  spent  in 
Committee  of  the  Whole  on  four  out  of  the  twenty  clauses 
of  the  bill ;  when  the  government  moved  that  at  ten  o'clock 
on  June  17,  being  the  end  of  the  next  week,  the  Chairman 
should,  without  further  debate,  put  all  questions  necessary 
to  bring  the  committee  stage  to  an  end.2     The  motion  was 

Times,  July  17,  1901,  and  the  Political  Notes  in  the  number  for  July  13. 
Curiously  enough  the  incident  is  not  mentioned  in  the  report  of  the  meeting 
of  the  committee  in  that  number.)  For  other  statements  of  its  use  in  a 
standing  committee,  cf.  2d  Rep.  of  Sel.  Com.  on  House  of  Commons 
(Procedure),  May  25,  1906,  Qs.  418,  420. 

Since  this  was  written  closure  in  standing  committees  has  been  sanctioned 
by  a  change  in  the  standing  orders;  twenty  affirmative  votes  being 
required. 

1  After  giving  notice  of  his  intention  to  do  so,  he  moved,  on  Feb.  21, 
1881,  that  all  clauses  and  amendments  of  the  Protection  of  Life  and  Property 
(Ireland)  Bill  should  be  put  to  vote  in  Committee  of  the  Whole  at  twelve 
o'clock  that  night.  This  was  done,  and  repeated  upon  the  report  stage 
of  the  bill  (Hans.  3  Ser.  CCLVIII.,  1092,  1344,  1392,  1472,  1G08,  1665, 
1  f>72— 75; .  The  same  process  was  adopted  a  few  days  later  for  the  Peace 
Preservation  (Ireland)  Bill.  (Hans.  3  Ser.  CCLIX.,  657,  659,  691-95,697, 
740,  762-65.)  2  Hans.  3  Ser.  CCCXV.,  1594. 


CLOSURE  299 

adopted,  and  from  its  trenchant  operation  the  process  was 
known  as  the  "guillotine."  It  served  its  purpose,  but  from 
the  point  of  view  of  parliamentary  deliberation  it  was  a  very 
imperfect  instrument,  for  all  the  clauses  after  the  sixth  were 
put  to  vote  without  amendment  or  debate.1 

The  defect  of  the  guillotine,  that  it  resulted  in  needlessly  Closure  by 
long  discussions  on  a  few  early  clauses,  to  the  entire  neglect  menta"*" 
of  the  rest,  was  largely  remedied  in  the  case  of  the  Home 
Rule  Bill  of  1893.  After  twenty-eight  nights  had  been 
spent  in  committee  on  the  first  four  clauses,  the  House,  on 
June  30,  adopted  a  resolution  that  debate  on  clauses  five 
to  eight  should  close  on  July  G,  on  clauses  nine  to  twenty- 
six  on  July  13,  on  clauses  twenty-seven  to  forty  on  July  20, 
and  on  the  postponed  and  new  clauses  on  July  27. 2  This 
form  of  procedure,  sometimes  called  closure  by  compart- 
ments, has  the  merit  of  distributing  the  discussion  over 
different  parts  of  the  measure,  and  of  affording  at  least  a 
probability  that  any  provision  exciting  general  interest  will 
receive  some  measure  of  attention.  It  was  used  again  on 
the  Evicted  Tenants  Bill  in  1894,3  and  the  Education  Bill 
in  1902 ; 4  and  may  now  be  said  to  have  become  a  regular, 
because  a  necessary,  practice  in  the  case  of  difficult  and 
hotly  contested  measures.  But  save  in  the  case  of  supply, 
it  has  been  the  subject  of  a  special  resolution  passed  for  a 
particular  bill,  under  what  have  been  treated  as  exceptional 
conditions,  and  it  has  found  no  mention  in  the  standing 
orders.5 

The  guillotine  has  been  applied  more  systematically  to  Closure  of 
supply.     Formerly  the  estimates  were  taken  in  their  order, 
with  the  result  that  much  time  was  wasted  early  in  the  ses- 
sion over  trivial  matters,  like  the  repairs  of  royal  palaces  in 

1  Hans.  3  Ser.  CCCXVI.,  484-88.  2  Hans.  4  Ser.  XIV.,  590. 

3  Hans.  4  Ser.  XXVII.,  1410-46.  In  this  case,  fur  the  first  time,  the 
report  sta^e  was  included  in  the  original  motion. 

4  Hans.  4  Ser.  CXIV.,  735-38. 

'One  of  the  latest  and  most  elaborate  examples  of  its  use  was  on  the 
Territorial  and  Reserve  Forces  Hill  of  1907.  Hans.  1  Ser.  CLXXIII.,  1397- 
79,   14G3-GG. 


300         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Class  I. ;  while  great  appropriations  of  important  depart- 
ments were  rushed  through  at  the  fag  end  of  the  session.1 
But  at  the  instance  of  Mr.  Balfour  a  sessional  order  was 
passed  in  1896  allowing  in  that  session  twenty  days  for 
supply,  with  a  provision  for  taking  a  vote,  without  further 
debate,  on  every  grant  left  when  the  days  expired,  the  time 
allowed  being,  he  thought,  about  the  average  amount  here- 
tofore devoted  to  the  subject.2  As  the  grants  in  supply, 
unlike  the  clauses  of  a  bill,  can  be  brought  before  the  House 
in  any  order  that  the  minister  may  choose,  there  was  not  the 
same  need  of  a  closure  by  compartments ;  but  in  order  to 
remove  any  fear  that  the  government  might  hold  back 
certain  appropriations,  Mr.  Balfour  said  that  the  important 
grants,  and  those  which  any  group  of  members  wanted  to 
discuss,  would  be  taken  first.3  The  resolution  was  renewed 
from  year  to  year  4  until  by  the  new  rules  of  1902  it  was 
permanently  embodied  in  the  standing  orders.5 

As  the  rule  now  stands,  twenty  days,6  all  to  come  before 
Aug.  5,  are  allotted  for  the  consideration  of  the  estimates,7 
and  on  the  days  so  allotted  no  other  business  can  be  taken 
before  midnight.8  At  ten  o'clock  on  the  last  day  but  one  the 
Chairman  must  put  to  vote  every  question  needed  to  dis- 

1  Cf.  Hans.  4  Ser.  XXXVII.,  727.        2  Ibid.,  732.        3  Ibid.,  728-730. 

4  It  may  bo  assumed  that  the  House  will  never  reject  any  of  the  outstand- 
ing grants,  hut  a  useless  number  of  divisions  might  be  forced  in  voting 
upon  them.  As  the  number  of  such  grants  is  usually  little  short  of 
one  hundred,  the  time  wasted  in  walking  through  the  lobbies  on  the  last 
night  might  be  monstrous.  To  avoid  this  a  rule  was  adopted  in  1901  that 
when  the  allotted  time  expired,  all  the  remaining  grants  in  any  one  class 
should  be  put  to  vote  together.     Hans.  4  Ser.  XCVIII.,  1619-20. 

5  S.O.  15.  6  Three  more  days  may  be  added  by  special  order. 

7  These  include  the  votes  on  account,  but  only  one  day  can  be  given  to 
each  of  the  three  votes  on  account,  and  only  one  sitting,  or  half  a  day,  to 
the  report  of  such  a  vote.  Days  devoted  to  supplementary  estimates  or 
votes  of  credit  are  not  included;  nor  are  those  days  on  which  the  question 
must  be  put  that  the  Speaker  leave  the  chair,  because  those  days  are  really 
occupied  not  by  the  votes  of  supply,  but  by  general  criticism  of  the  govern- 
ment (Sec  Chap.  XVIII.,  infra.)  The  short  sitting  of  Friday  counts  as 
half  a  day. 

"This  floes  not  apply  to  private  bills,  questions,  and  the  other  matters 
that  are  taken  up  in  the  first  hour,  before  the  regular  orders  of  the  day  are 
reached 


CLOSURE  301 

pose  of  the  grant  under  consideration ;  and  then  put  in  suc- 
cession all  the  outstanding  grants  by  classes,  those  in  each 
class  being  taken  together  and  put  as  a  single  question.  At 
ten  o'clock  on  the  last  day  the  Speaker  follows  the  same  pro- 
cess for  closing  the  report  stage  of  the  estimates. 

The  real  object  of  the  debates  in  supply  at  the  present 
day  is  not  financial  discussion,  but  criticism  of  the  admin- 
istration of  the  departments,  their  work  being  brought  under 
review  as  their  estimates  are  considered.1  In  that  light  the 
new  procedure  has  worked  very  well.  Complaint  has  been 
made  that  the  government  no  longer  cares  what  grants  are 
brought  forward  for  debate  —  leaving  that  to  the  Opposi- 
tion, —  or  how  long  the  discussion  upon  them  may  take, 
or  whether  it  ends  with  a  vote  upon  them  or  not,  knowing 
very  well  that  all  these  grants  must  be  adopted  under 
closure  when  the  twenty  days  expire.2  This  is  perfectly 
true ;  but  on  the  other  hand  the  procedure  gives  the  fullest 
opportunity  for  criticising  the  administration,  and  forcing  a 
discussion  of  grievances,  the  matters  to  be  criticised  being 
selected  by  the  critics  themselves.  Although  the  Opposi- 
tion, as  in  duty  bound,  resisted  the  adoption  of  some 
portions  of  the  rule,  it  may  be  safely  said  that  the  rule 
itself  will  not  be  repealed  by  any  government  that  may 
come  to  power. 

1  Mr.  Balfour  said  this  frankly  in  the  debate  on  the  rule  in  1896. 
(Hans.  4  Ser.  XXXVII.,  724-26.) 

2  Hans.  4  Ser.  XCVIII.,  1548. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

PROCEDURE   IN  THE   HOUSE   OF  COMMONS 

Sittings  and  Order  of  Business 

sittings  of  After  describing  the  processes  of  legislation,  a  word 
must  be  said  about  the  order  of  business  for  each  day  and 
for  the  session  as  a  whole.  On  Monday,  Tuesday,  Wednes- 
day, and  Thursday  the  House  now  meets  at  a  quarter  before 
three,  and  sits  until  half-past  eleven,  when  it  is  automati- 
cally adjourned  unless  business  specially  exempted  is  under 
consideration.  But  the  sitting  is  divided  by  the  mystic 
hour  of  a  quarter  past  eight  into  two  parts  which  are  re- 
served on  certain  days  for  quite  different  kinds  of  business. 
On  Friday  the  House  sits  from  noon  till  half-past  five,  and 
on  Saturday  it  does  not  meet  at  all  unless  by  special  vote 
on  very  rare  occasions.1 

1  Until  1888  the  regular  hour  of  meeting  on  Monday,  Tuesday,  Thursday, 
and  Friday  was  a  quarter  before  four  o'clock;  but  as  there  was  no  provision 
for  adjournment  at  any  fixed  hour,  debate  on  a  subject  might  go  on  indefi- 
nitely; and,  in  fact,  all-night  sittings  were  common.  In  1879  a  standing 
order  had  been  adopted  that  no  opposed  business,  not  specially  exempted, 
should  be  taken  up  after  half-past  twelve;  but  this  did  not  put  a  stop  to  a 
business  in  hand  at  that  hour.  Owing  to  the  fatigue  caused  by  late  sittings 
(Temple,  "Life  in  Parliament,"  184-85),  a  standing  order  was  adopted  in 
1888  changing  the  hour  of  meeting  on  those  four  days  to  three  o'clock,  and 
providing  that  at  midnight  the  business  under  consideration  should,  unless 
specially  exempted,  be  interrupted;  that  no  other  opposed  business  should 
thereafter  be  taken  up;  and  that  the  House  should  adjourn  not  later  than 
one  o'clock.  The  hours  of  sitting  on  Wednesday  were  left  as  before  at  from 
noon  to  six  o'clock. 

For  some  time  it  had  been  the  habit,  especially  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
session,  to  break  the  day  occasionally  into  two  sittings,  the  earlier  one 
beginning  at  two  o'clock,  and  being  called  a  morning  sitting.  After  1888 
these  two  sittings  were  held  from  two  until  seven,  and  from  nine  until 
twelve  (SO.  of  March  7,  1888),  the  days  being  commonly  Tuesdays  and 
Fridays. 

302 


SITTINGS   AND  ORDER   OF  BUSINESS  303 

With  the  exception  to  be  noted  in  a  moment,  all  business  intemip- 
upon  which  the  House  may  be  engaged  is  interrupted  at  *'"". of 
five  o'clock  on  Friday  afternoon,  and  eleven  on  other  days ; 
but  unopposed  business  may  still  be  taken  up  until  the 
hour  arrives  for  adjournment.  During  that  interval  the 
orders  of  the  day  are  read,  and  each  of  them  may  in  turn 
be  debated  and  even  voted  upon,  unless  a  division  is  chal- 
lenged, or  some  member  objects.1  In  short,  work  can  be 
done  after  the  time  for  interruption  only  by  universal  con- 
sent, a  single  member  having  power  to  prevent  the  considera- 
tion of  any  measure  to  which  he  is  opposed.  Yet  a  certain 
amount  of  business  is  transacted  at  these  times ;  and,  in 
fact,  a  private  member's  bill  would  stand  little  chance,  even 
if  no  one  had  any  serious  objection  to  it,  unless  it  could 
pass  through  some  of  its  stages  in  this  way. 

To  the  rule  that  no  opposed  business  can  be  taken  after  Exceptions 
eleven  o'clock  there  is  an  important  exception.     A  minister  Thereto- 
may  move  at  the  beginning  of  the  afternoon  sitting  that  any 

Now  although  the  system  of  two  sittings  a  day,  with  a  considerable 
interval  for  dinner,  involved  beginning  at  an  hour  in  the  afternoon  incon- 
veniently early  for  men  in  the  active  work  of  a  business  or  profession,  it 
had  certain  manifest  advantages,  and  was  made  the  universal  practice  in 
1902.  At  that  time  the  standing  orders  were  extensively  revised,  and  in 
particular  the  subject  of  the  sittings,  with  the  order  of  business  thereat,  was 
remodelled.  For  the  sake  of  giving  members  a  chance1  to  pass  what  is  known 
as  the  week-end  in  the  country,  the  short  day  was  transferred  from  Wednes- 
day to  Friday,  the  House  meeting  on  that  day  at  twelve,  and  adjourning 
automatically  at  six  (S.O.  2) ;  while  each  of  the  other  four  working  days  was 
divided  into  afternoon  and  evening  sittings,  the  first  from  two  until  half- 
past  seven,  and  the  other  from  nine  until  one  (S.O.  1).  Finally  in  1906 
another  change  of  hours  was  made,  without,  however,  any  essential  altera- 
tion in  the  method  of  doing  business.  The  inconvenience  of  early  attend- 
ance at  the  House  was  avoided  by  changing  the  hour  of  meeting  on  Monday, 
Tuesday,  Wednesday,  and  Thursday  to  quarter  before  three,  while  tin; 
hour  for  the  adjournment  was  changed  to  half-past  eleven,  and  a  part  of 
the  time  then  lost  was  made  up  by  abolishing  the  formal  interval  of  an 
hour  and  a  half  for  dinner.  But  although  there  is  now  one  continuous 
sitting  on  each  of  these  days,  the  order  of  business  arranged  for  the  two 
sittings  lias  been  retained,  the  break  coming  at  a  quarter  past  eight.  The 
hour  of  adjournment  on  Friday  was  changed  at  the  same  time  to  half-past 
five. 

1  May,  209.  Business  which  is  merely  formal,  or  which  follows  as  of 
course  from  action  already  taken  by  the  House,  may  be  transacted  in  spite 
of  objection.      May,  210 


304         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

specified  business  shall  not  be  interrupted  at  that  hour,  and 
the  question  must  be  put  without  amendment  or  debate. 
This  is  often  done  toward  the  close  of  the  session,  and  results 
in  sittings  that  run  far  into  the  night.  Bills  originating  in 
Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  and  proceedings  taken  in 
pursuance  of  a  statute  *  or  standing  order,  are  also  exempted 
from  the  rules  about  interruption,  about  taking  up  no  opposed 
business  after  eleven  o'clock,  and  about  adjournment  at  half- 
past  eleven  o'clock.2  It  must  be  remembered  also  that  clos- 
ure may  be  moved  after  the  hour  for  interruption  has  struck.3 
Order  of  The  first  sitting  of  each  day  is  opened  with  prayer.     The 

tii^Day  f°r  Speaker  then  takes  the  chair,  and  certain  formal  or  routine 
business  that  occupies  little  time  is  taken  up  in  the  follow- 
ing order. 

1.  Private  business,  that  is,  bills  relating  to  private  or 
local  matters.  Private  business,  which  is  unopposed,  and 
therefore  takes  no  appreciable  time,  is  taken  up  first.  Op- 
posed private  business  is  not  taken  up  at  all  on  Friday,  and 
if  not  finished  by  three  o'clock  on  other  days  is  postponed 
to  a  quarter  past  eight  on  such  day  as  the  Chairman  of 
Ways  and  Means  may  determine.4 

2.  Presentation  of  public  petitions  (if  presented  orally 
instead  of  being  dropped  silently  into  a  bag  behind  the 
Speaker's  chair).  As  a  rule  no  debate  is  in  order,  and 
hence  this  process  is  also  short,5  and  must  be  finished  by 
three  o'clock.6 

1  Under  this  head  is  included  action  upon  statutory  orders,  where  the 
act  provides,  as  it  usually  does,  that  the  order  shall  be  laid  before  Parliament, 
and  shall  not  go  into  effect  if  either  House  adopts  an  address  with  that 
object.  Without  this  exception  to  the  rule  the  House  would  have  no  real 
opportunity  to  adopt  such  an  address,  unless  the  government  chose  to  give 
part  of  its  time  for  the  purpose.     Ilbert,  "Manual,"  §  36  note. 

2  S.O.  1  (2),  (3),  (5),  (7),  (8).  Ilbert,  §§  35-39.  The  Annual  Army  Bill 
has  always  been  treated  as  exempted  business.     Ibid.,  §  36  note. 

:!  S.O.  1  (4).     A  division  in  progress  is  not  interrupted.    Ilbert,  §  35  note. 

*  Such  postponed  private  business  must  be  distributed  as  equally  as  may 
be  between  the  days  allotted  to  the  government  and  to  private  members. 
S.O.  8;  Ilbert,  §  50.  The  procedure  on  private  bills  will  be  described  in 
Chap.  xx.  infra.  6  Ilbert,  §§  51-54,  47  n.     S.Os.  76-80. 

6  Except  in  the  rare  cases  where  debate  is  allowed  on  the  ground  that  an 
urgent  personal  grievance  is  involved.     Ilbert,  §  53  (6). 


SITTINGS   AND  ORDER  OF  BUSINESS  305 

3.  At  that  hour,  on  the  afternoon  sittings,  the  important 
business  of  putting  questions  to  ministers  begins.1  The 
character  and  political  effect  of  these  questions  will  be 
examined  in  Chapter  XVIII,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of 
parliamentary  time  it  may  be  noted  that  the  practice  has 
grown  so  much  during  the  last  thirty  years  as  to  require  some 
limitation.  In  1901  the  questions  asked  numbered  7180, 
and  consumed  119  hours,  or  the  equivalent  of  fifteen  parlia- 
mentary days  of  eight  hours  each.2  The  new  rules  of  1902 
sought  to  check  the  tendency  in  two  ways;  by  giving  the 
option  of  requiring  an  oral  or  a  written  answer,  the  question 
in  the  former  case  being  marked  in  the  notice  paper  with  an 
asterisk ;  and  by  fixing  a  strict  limit  to  the  time  consumed. 
Forty  minutes  are  allowed  for  putting  questions,  the  an- 
swers to  those  not  reached  by  a  quarter  before  four,  like  the 
answers  to  questions  not  starred, being  printed  with  the  votes 
of  the  day.3 

4.  If  there  is  a  vacant  moment  before  three  o'clock,  or 
between  the  time  questions  come  to  an  end  and  a  quarter 
before  four  o'clock,  it  may  be  used  by  motions  for  unopposed 
returns,  for  leave  of  absence,  or  for  similar  unopposed  mat- 
ters that  would  otherwise  have  to  be  taken  up  after  the 
interruption  of  business.4 

5.  Immediately  after  questions,  a  member  rising  in  his 
place  may  make  the  portentous  motion  "for  the  adjourn- 
ment of  the  House  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  a  definite 
matter  of  urgent  public  importance."  5  This  is  usually, 
but  not  necessarily,  made  in  consequence  of  a  highly  unsat- 
isfactory answer  that  has  just  been  given  to  a  question.  It 
may  seem  strange  to  move  to  adjourn  before  serious  business 
has  begun,  but  as  such  a  motion  has  not  been  carried  for 
nearly  a  score  of  years  that  feature  is  unimportant,  and  its 

1  SO.  9.  Ilbert,  £§  55-00.  Il  is  not  usual  to  ask  on  Friday  questions 
requiring  an   oral   answer.      Ilbert,  §   5fi  note.        2  Hans.  4  Ser.  CI.,  1353. 

3  (  nless  the  minister  was  not  present  to  answer,  or  the  question  (lid  not 
appear  on  the  notice  paper,  and  is  of  an  urgent  character.      SO.  '.(  (3). 

4  In  practice  a  motion  for  a  new  writ  of  election  is  usually  made  before 
questions,  and  the  introduction  of  a  new  member  follows  them.  Ilbert, 
5    17  not-.  »  S.O.   10. 


306         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

real  significance  in  giving  a  chance  to  discuss  at  short  notice 
some  action  of  the  government  will  be  explained  in  Chapter 
xviii.  Formerly  the  debate  upon  the  motion  took  place 
immediately ;  but  now  the  member  merely  obtains  —  by 
the  support  of  forty  members,  or  by  vote  of  the  House  — 
leave  to  make  his  motion,  while  the  debate  itself  is  post- 
poned to  a  quarter  past  eight  o'clock. 

6.  Then  come  what  are  called  "  matters  taken  at  the  com- 
mencement of  public  business."  These  are  the  presentation 
of  bills  without  an  order  of  the  House  or  under  the  ten- 
minute  rule,  and  motions  by  a  minister  relating  to  the  con- 
duct of  business  to  be  decided  without  amendment  or  debate. 

7.  Finally  comes  the  regular  business  of  the  sitting,  in  the 
form  of  notices  of  motions  or  orders  of  the  day.  The  dis- 
tinction between  these  two  classes  of  business  is  not  easy  to 
explain  with  precision ; !  but  for  our  purpose  it  is  unimpor- 
tant, except  so  far  as  one  class  has  precedence  over  the  other. 
Now  the  government  has  authority  to  arrange  the  order  of 
its  own  business  as  it  pleases;2  and  in  relation  to  private 
members,  orders  of  the  day  practically  mean  bills,  and 
notices  of  motion  mean  resolutions  and  other  matters 
that  are  not  bills.  The  application  of  the  distinction  comes, 
therefore,  to  this,  that  of  the  sittings  set  apart  for  private 
members,  Friday  is  reserved  for  their  bills,  and  Tuesdays 
and  Wednesdays  after  a  quarter  past  eight  o'clock  for  their 
other  motions.3 

Order  at  At  a  quarter  past  eight  o'clock  the  first  business  is  a  mo- 

Situngjf        **on  f°r  adjournment  on  an  urgent  matter  of  public  business, 

in  the  occasional  instances  where  leave  has  been  obtained 

at   the    afternoon   sitting   to    make   it.     Next   follows   any 

postponed  private  business  that  may  have  been  assigned 

1  Ilbert,  §  41  note.  Technically  an  order  of  the  day  is  a  matter  which  is 
set  down  for  a  particular  day  by  an  order  of  the  House;  a  notice  of  motion  is 
a  motion  set  down  for  the  day  by  notice  given  by  a  member  without  any 
order  of  the  House;  but  under  the  present  rules  an  order  of  the  House  is 
made  in  many  cases  without  any  actual  vote,  or  even  the  opportunity  for  a 
vote,  the  proceedings  being  in  fact  much  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  a  notice 
of  motion.  The  distinction  remains,  however,  as  a  means  of  classifying 
different  kinds  of  business.  2  S.O.  5.  3  S.O.  4. 


SITTINGS  AND  ORDER  OF  BUSINESS  307 

to  that  evening ;  and  then  come  the  notices  of  motions  and 
orders  of  the  day. 

By  the  new  arrangement  with  its  definite  time  for  certain 
business,  the  work  of  the  House  is  better  distributed.  There 
is  no  longer  the  same  danger  that  the  discussion  of  a  private 
bill  or  of  a  motion  to  adjourn,  or  an  interminable  series  of 
questions,  will  unexpectedly  cut  a  great  piece  out  of  the 
hours  when  the  House  is  most  crowded,  and  the  leading  men 
are  waiting  to  debate  a  great  public  measure.  At  the  after- 
noon sitting  the  regular  business  of  the  day  is  reached  at  a 
quarter  before  four,  or  very  little  later,  and  it  proceeds  with- 
out interruption  until  a  quarter  before  eight.  After  that 
hour  —  unless  there  is  an  opposed  private  bill,  which  does 
not  often  take  long,  or  by  chance  a  motion  to  adjourn — 
the  regular  business,  which  may  not  be  the  same  as  at  the 
afternoon  sitting,  begins  again,  and  goes  on  until  eleven. 
With  the  habits  of  slack  attendance  when  nothing  is  ex- 
pected, and  the  necessity  for  a  presence  in  force  when  a 
division  that  touches  the  Treasury  Bench  may  be  taken,  it 
is  a  matter  of  no  small  import  to  be  able  to  forecast  the 
business  of  a  sitting. 

The  severe  pressure  for  time  has  thus  brought  about  a 
minute  allotment  of  the  hours  at  each  sitting  for  definite 
kinds  of  business,  and  the  same  cause  hasproduced  a  similar, 
although  less  exact,  distribution  in  the  work  of  the  session 
as  a  whole. 

The  regular  session  of  Parliament  opens  about  the  begin-  Order  of 
ning  of  February,  and  the  first  business  is  the  address  in 
reply  to  the  King's  speech.  Formerly  it  was  an  elaborate 
affair,  which  referred  to  the  clauses  of  the  speech  in  succes- 
sion, but  since  1890  it  has  taken  the  form  of  a  single  resolu- 
tion expressing  simply  the  thanks  of  the  Commons  for  his 
Majesty's  most  gracious  speech.  Amendments  are  moved 
by  the  various  sections  of  the  Opposition  in  the  shape  of 
additions  thereto,  pointing  out  how  tin*  government  has 
done  things  it  ought  not  to  have  done,  and  left  undone 
things   it   ought  to  have  done,    and    even  members  of  the 


Business  fot 
the  Session. 


308         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

majority,  who  are  disgruntled  because  their  pet  hobbies 
have  been  left  unnoticed,  follow  the  same  course.  The  de- 
bates on  the  address  take  practically  the  whole  time  of  the 
House  for  two  or  three  weeks.1  As  soon  as  they  are  over, 
the  Committee  of  Supply  is  set  up,  and  sits  one  or  two  days 
each  week,  the  rest  of  the  sittings  being  taken  up  with  gov- 
ernment measures,  and  with  business  introduced  by  private 
members. 

Hope  springs  eternal  in  the  legislative  breast,  and  every 
assembly  undertakes  more  work  than  it  can  accomplish 
thoroughly.  In  some  legislatures  this  results  in  a  headlong 
rushing  through  of  measures  almost  without  discussion  at 
the  end  of  the  session.  But  while,  under  closure  by  com- 
partments and  the  supply  rule,  this  may  be  true  in  England 
of  certain  clauses  of  bills  and  of  large  parts  of  the  appropria- 
tions, it  is  not  true  of  bills  as  a  whole.  Parliament  is,  pri- 
marily, a  forum  for  debate,  rather  than  a  machine  for  legis- 
lation, and  bills  that  cannot  be  discussed  at  some  length 
are  dropped.  After  the  Whitsuntide  recess  every  year,  the 
leader  of  the  House  announces  that  owing  to  lack  of  time 
the  government  has  found  it  necessary  to  abandon  such 
and  such  measures,  a  proceeding  familiarly  known  as  the 
slaughter  of  the  innocents.  But  it  is  not  their  own  bills 
alone  that  the  ministers  are  obliged  to  slay.  In  order  to  get 
through  their  own  remaining  work  they  have  long  been  in 
the  habit  of  taking  by  special  order,  after  the  Easter  recess, 
a  part  of  the  sittings  reserved  for  private  members,  and  of 
seizing  all  the  rest  soon  after  Whitsuntide.  The  practice 
was  regulated  and  made  systematic  by  the  new  rules  of 
1902;  but  this  brings  us  to  the  relation  of  the  cabinet  and 
of  private  members  to  the  work  of  the  House,  which  forms 
the  subject  of  the  following  chapter. 

1  As  Redlich  remarks  (Recht  und  Technik,  315-16),  the  speech  having 
a  general  political  character,  debate  and  amendment  are  not  limited  by  any 
rule  of  relevancy,  but  stray  over  every  kind  of  political  grievance  or  aspira- 
tion and  the  whole  foreign  and  domestic  policy  of  the  government.  He 
points  out  that  until  1880  the  debate  rarely  took  more  than  a  couple  of 
days,  but  since  that  time  the  number  of  sittings  devoted  to  it  has  run 
from  six  to  sixteen. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE   CABINET'S   CONTROL  OF  THE   COMMONS 

For  the  purpose  of  collective  action  every  body  of  men  is  a  Body  of 
in  the  plight  of  M.  Noirtier  de  Villefort  in  "Monte  Cristo  "  M™lsay 

1      °  '        only  Yes  or 

who  was  completely  paralysed  except  for  his  eyes.  Like  No." 
him  it  has  only  a  single  faculty,  that  of  saying  Yes  or  No. 
Individually  the  members  may  express  the  most  involved 
opinions,  the  most  complex  and  divergent  sentiments,  but 
when  it  comes  to  voting,  the  body  can  vote  only  Yes  or  No. 
Some  one  makes  a  motion,  some  one  else  moves  an  amend- 
ment, perhaps  other  amendments  are  superimposed,  but  on 
each  amendment  in  turn,  and  finally  on  the  main  question, 
the  body  simply  votes  for  or  against.  Where  a  body  acts 
by  plurality  it  can,  of  course,  choose  which  of  several  propo- 
sitions it  will  adopt,  which  of  several  persons,  for  example, 
it  will  elect.1  But  this  depends  upon  the  same  general 
principle,  that  the  body  can  act  collectively  only  on  propo- 
sitions laid  before  it  by  an  individual,  or  a  group  of  men 
acting  together  as  an  individual.  Ordinarily  it  can  only 
answer  Yes  or  No  to  questions  laid  before  it  one  at  a  time 
in  that  way. 

Obviously,  therefore,  it  is  of  vital  importance  to  know   Framing  the 
who  has  power  to  ask  the  question ;   and,  in  fact,  one  of  the  ^uestlon- 
great  arts  in  managing  bodies  of  men  consists  in  so  framing 
questions  as  to  get  the  best  possible  chance  of  a  favourable 

1  Curiously  enough,  such  a  procedure  is  unknown  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  the  term  it sdf  is  unfamiliar.  It  means  in  the.  case  of  an  election, 
for  example,  that  a  candidate  to  be  successful  need  only  have  more  votes 
than  any  one  else,  whereas  election  by  majority  means  that  he  n.nst  have 
more  than  half  of  the  votes  cast.  The  propositi  for  a  second  ballot  in  elec- 
tions to  Parliament  involves  requiring  a  majority  instead  of  a  plurality  on 
the  first  ballot. 

309 


310         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

reply.  In  small  bodies  that  have  limited  functions  and  an 
abundance  of  time,  the  members  are  free  to  propose  any 
questions  they  please ;  but  in  large  assemblies,  all  of  whose 
proceedings  are  of  necessity  slower,  this  freedom  is  curtailed 
by  lack  of  time,  especially  if  the  range  of  activities  is  wide. 
Hence  the  legislatures  of  all  great  states  have  been  con- 
strained to  adopt  some  process  for  restricting  or  sifting  the 
proposals  or  bills  of  their  members.  The  most  common 
device  is  that  of  referring  the  bills  to  committees,  which  can 
practically  eliminate  those  that  have  no  serious  chance  of 
success,  and  can  amend  others,  putting  them  into  a  more 
acceptable  form.  In  such  cases  the  committees  enjoy,  if 
not  the  exclusive  privilege  of  proposing  questions  to  the 
legislature,  at  least  the  primary  right  of  framing  the  ques- 
tions that  are  to  be  submitted,  and  this  gives  them  a  momen- 
tous power.  An  organisation  by  committees  is  the  most 
natural  evolution  of  a  legislative  body,  if  there  is  nothing 
to  obstruct  it.  Now  in  Parliament  there  has  been  some- 
thing to  obstruct  it,  and  that  is  the  system  of  a  responsible 
ministry. 

TheCabi-  The  cabinet  has  been  said  to  be  a  committee,  and  the 

most  important  committee  of  the  House ;  but  it  is  really 
far  more.  Unlike  an  ordinary  committee,  it  does  not  have 
the  bills  of  members  referred  to  it.  On  the  contrary  it  has 
the  sole  right  to  initiate,  as  well  as  to  frame,  the  measures 
it  submits  to  the  House  ;  and  these  comprise,  in  fact,  almost 
all  the  important  bills  that  are  enacted.  By  far  the  greater 
part  of  legislation  originates,  therefore,  exclusively  with  the 
ministers.  The  system  of  a  responsible  ministry  has  ob- 
structed the  growth  of  committees;  because,  in  the  case  of 
government  measures,  the  chief  function  of  such  committees, 
that  of  sifting  bills  and  putting  them  into  proper  shape,  is 
performed  by  the  cabinet  itself;  and  also  because,  as  will 
be  shown  hereafter,  the  authority  of  the  cabinet  would  be 
weakened  if  other  bodies,  not  necessarily  in  accord  with  it, 
had  power  to  modify  its  proposals.  In  this  connection  it 
may  be  observed  that  in  the  domain  of  private  and  local 


net. 


THE   CABINET'S  CONTROL  OF  THE   COMMONS  311 

bills,  where  the  responsibility  of  the  cabinet  does  not  extend, 
there  has  developed  a  most  elaborate  and  complete  set  of 
committees,  to  which  all  such  bills  are  referred. 

The  relation  of  the  cabinet  to  the  House  of  Commons  Subjects 
may  be  conveniently  treated  under  three  heads:   the  initi-  aug^t"! 
ative  left  to  private  members;    the  direct  control  of  the  ter. 
cabinet   over  legislation   with  its  effects ;    and  the  control 
of  the  House  over  the  administration  and  the  general  policy 
of  the  government. 

It  may  appear  strange  that  the  existence  of  a  responsible  private 
ministry  should  obstruct  the  growth  of  committees  on  public  M(jmbers' 
bills  brought  in  by  private  members.  Nevertheless  it  has 
done  so ;  partly  by  reducing  those  bills  to  a  position  of  sec- 
ondary importance ;  and  partly  because  if  the  committees 
were  under  the  control  of  the  government  the  private 
member  would  be  even  more  helpless  than  he  is  now,  and 
if  they  were  not  they  might  be  at  times  inconvenient  rivals 
to  the  ministry.  As  the  House  of  Commons  is  organised, 
therefore,  the  committees  play  a  minor  part.  The  most 
important  legislation  of  a  public  nature  originates  with  the 
ministers,  and  is  entirely  in  their  charge,  save  for  an  occa- 
sional reference  to  a  committee  under  exceptional  circum- 
stances ;  while  private  members  are  free  to  bring  their  public 
lulls  before  the  House,  unfettered  by  any  committee,  pro- 
vided they  can  find  a  chance  to  do  so  in  the  extremely 
meagre  allowance  of  time  at  their  disposal.  In  short  the 
Commons  have  solved  the  question  of  time  by  giving  most 
of  it  to  the  government  to  use  as  it  pleases,  and  leaving 
the  private  members  to  scramble  for  the  rest. 

Under  the  new  rules  of  1002  and  1000  government  business  Time  Aiiot- 
has  precedence,  from  the  opening  of  the  session  until  Easter,   per;Vf|" 
at  every  sitting,  except  after  a  quarter  past  eight  o'clock  on   Members. 
Tuesday    and    Wednesday    and    at    the    sitting   on    Friday. 
Until  Easter,  therefore,  these  three  periods  in  the  week  are 
reserved    for   the    private    members.      Between    Easter   and 
Whitsuntide  the  government  is  given  the  whole  of  Tuesday 
for  its  own  use,  and  after  Whitsuntide  it   has  all  the  time 


312         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

except  the  third  and  fourth  Fridays  next  following.1  As 
the  private  members  have  no  time  reserved  for  them  until 
the  close  of  the  debate  on  the  address,  the  arrangement  gives 
them  in  a  normal  year  about  thirty  parts  of  the  session  out 
of  a  couple  of  hundred.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that  the 
part  of  a  sitting  after  quarter  past  eight  is  shorter  than  that 
which  goes  before  ;  is  never,  on  private  members'  nights,  pro- 
longed beyond  the  hour  of  interruption ;  and  is  liable  to  be 
broken  into  by  opposed  private  bills,  and  motions  to  adj  ourn  on 
a  matter  of  urgent  public  importance.2  It  is  clear,  therefore, 
that  the  share  of  time  reserved  for  private  members  is  small. 
But  although  their  lamentations  over  confiscation  of  their 
sittings  by  the  government  have  been  constant,  the  actual 
time  at  their  disposal  has  not,  in  fact,  been  seriously  dimin- 
ished of  late  years.  An  examination  of  the  parliamentary 
papers  shows  that  in  the  ten  years  from  1878  to  1887  gov- 
ernment business  actually  had  precedence  on  the  average 
in  eighty-three  per  cent,  of  the  sittings,  and  during  the  fol- 
lowing decade  in  about  eighty-four  and  a  half  per  cent.3 
This  is  very  little  less  than  the  proportion  that  now  prevails. 
The  recent  rules  have  merely  sanctioned  by  permanent 
standing  order  a  practice  that  had  long  been  followed  in 
an  irregular  way  by  special  resolutions  adopted  during  the 
course  of  the  session. 


1  S.O.  4.  In  his  account  of  the  evolution  of  procedure  in  the  House  of 
Commons  (Rerht  und  Technik  dcs  Englischen  Parlamenturismus,  Buch  I., 
Abs.  2),  Redlich  traces  the  history  of  the  practice  of  reserving  particular 
days  for  the  government,  which  began  in  1811. 

2  It  is  a  mistake  to  lay  too  much  stress  upon  the  exact  proportion  of 
time  allotted  to  private  members  and  to  the  government;  because  much  of 
the  time  of  each  is  devoted  to  the  same  purpose.  One  of  the  uses  to  which 
private  members'  evenings  are  put  is  criticism  of  the  conduct  of  the  min- 
istry, but  this  is  also  the  principal  object  of  the  debates  upon  the  address, 
upon  the  estimates  in  Committee  of  Supply,  upon  motions  to  adjourn  and 
on  other  occasions. 

3  These  figures  are  taken  from  the  return  made  for  ten  years  in  1888,  and 
the  subsequent  annual  returns,  making  due  allowance  for  the  cases  of  two 
short  sittings  instead  of  a  long  one  in  a  day.  An  exact  computation  by 
hours  would  be  difficult.  The  evening  sittings  are  shorter  than  the  aver- 
age sittings,  but  so  were  the  old  Wednesday  sittings  reserved  for  private 
members. 


THE  CABINET'S  CONTROL  OF  THE   COMMONS  313 

When,  as  Hobbes  remarked,  there  is  not  enough  of  any  Ballot  for 
article  to  satisfy  everybody,  and  no  one  has  authority  to  D&y3, 
apportion  it,  the  most  obvious  means  of  distribution  is  the 
lot.  This  primitive  method  is  still  employed  for  dividing 
among  the  private  members  the  time  reserved  for  their  use. 
Their  sittings  are  devoted  to  two  different  objects.  On 
Tuesday  and  Wednesday  evenings  notices  of  motions  have 
precedence,  while  Friday  is  the  day  for  bills.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  a  session  members  who  want  to  introduce  bills  send 
in  their  names,  and  in  the  order  in  which  the  lots  are  drawn 
they  set  down  their  bills  for  second  reading  on  a  Friday, 
selecting,  of  course,  the  earliest  unoccupied  day.  In  this 
way  every  Friday  before  Whitsuntide  is  taken,  and  although 
there  will  probably  not  be  time  to  deal  with  more  than  one 
bill  in  a  day,  less  successful  competitors  place  their  meas- 
ures second  or  third  on  the  lists,  hoping  that  they  may  be 
reached. 

The  first  bill  on  the  list  usually  comes  to  a  vote  on  the 
second  reading,  but  when  that  point  has  been  passed  it  is 
difficult  to  find  an  opportunity  for  any  of  its  subsequent 
steps.  A  reference  to  a  standing  committee  affords  the  best 
chance,  because  it  avoids  the  committee  stage  in  the  House. 
If  a  bill  is  not  so  referred,  it  is  almost  certainly  doomed,  un- 
less it  can  pass  some  of  its  stages,  unopposed,  after  the  hour 
for  the  interruption  of  business;  and,  in  fact,  any  bill  is 
well-nigh  hopeless  that  docs  not  take  at  least  one  step  in 
this  way.1  On  the  two  Fridays  remaining  after  Whitsuntide 
private  members'  bills  are  given  precedence  in  the  order  of 
their  progress,2  the  most  advanced  obtaining  the  right  of  way. 
The  loader  of  the  House  may,  however,  star  any  bill,  that 
is,  give  to  it  a  fraction  of  the  government  time,  but  this  is 
very  rarely  done,  and  never  till  near  the  close  of  a  session. 

As  there  are  only  about  a  dozen  Fridays  before  \\  hitsun- 

1  As  Redlich  observes  (Rccht  und  Trchnik,  206)  the  introduction  of  the 
twelve-o'clock  rule  for  the  interruption  of  business  brought  in  the  habit  of 
talking  out  a  bill  before  midnight,  and  blocking  bills  after  midnight,  two  of 
the  great  obstacles  to  legislation  by  private  members. 

2  S.O.  6. 


314         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

insignifi-       tide,  a  private  member  must  be  very  fortunate  in  the  ballot, 
canceofPn-  or  j^  must  have  a  number  of  friends  interested  in  the  same 

vate  Mem- 
bers' Legis-    bill,  to  get  it  started  with  any  prospect  of  success;   and  even 

then  there  is  scarcely  a  hope  of  carrying  it  through  if  a 
single  member  opposes  it  persistently  at  every  point.  Ten  or 
fifteen  such  bills  are  enacted  a  year,  and  of  these  only  a  couple 
provoke  enough  difference  of  opinion  to  lead  to  a  division 
during  their  course  in  the  House.1  But  while  many  private 
members  loudly  bewail  their  wrongs,  they  make  no  organised 
effort  for  mutual  protection.  These  men  are,  in  fact,  sepa- 
rate units  without  a  basis  for  combination.  They  have  not 
even  that  spirit  of  the  golden  rule,  which  does  much  harm 
in  legislation.  They  show  neither  the  good  nature,  nor  the 
instinct  for  log-rolling,  which  prompts  men  to  vote  for  one 
another's  bills,  hoping  for  like  favours  in  return.  Hence 
their  labours  produce  little  fruit,  either  sweet  or  bitter.  In 
short,  the  public  legislation  initiated  by  private  members  is 
neither  large  in  amount,  nor  important  in  character,  and  it 
cannot  be  passed  against  serious  opposition,  —  a  condition 
that  tends  to  become  more  marked  as  time  goes  on. 
Private  The  privilege  on  the  part  of  private  members  of  bring- 

Members'         •         r  j  j.-  t  i  itt     it  •  • 

Motions.  inS  forward  motions  on  luesday  or  Wednesday  evenings  is, 
like  that  of  having  bills  considered  on  Friday,  determined 
by  lot ;  with  this  difference,  that  a  notice  of  motion  cannot 
be  given  more  than  four  motion  days  ahead,  and  hence  the 
first  ballot  covers  only  two  weeks,  and  is  followed  by  fresh 
balloting  every  week  until  Easter.2  In  order  to  improve 
the  chance  of  getting  a  hearing,  a  number  of  members 
interested  in  the  same  question  will  often  send  in  their 
names,  with  the  understanding  that  any  one  of  them  who 
is  lucky  enough  to  be  drawn  shall  set  down  the  motion. 
This  practice  was  introduced  by  the  Irishmen;  but  it  has 

1  Although  the  time  at  the  disposal  of  private  members  has  not  changed 
much  of  late  years,  the  number  of  these  bills  enacted,  and  especially  of 
those  enacted  against  opposition,  has  diminished  sensibly.  In  the  decade 
from  1S7S  to  INN?  about  twenty-three  such  bills  were  passed  a  year,  and  on 
four  or  five  of  these  divisions  took  place. 

2S.O.  7.     Jlbert,  "Manual,"  §§  45,  119. 


THE   CABINET'S  CONTROL  OF  THE   COMMONS  315 

now  become  common  among  members  of  all  kinds  who  take, 
or  wish  to  appear  to  take,  an  interest  in  a  subject.  It  is 
called  "syndicating,"  and  has  resulted  in  making  the 
motions  not  infrequently  reflect  the  views  of  a  considerable 
section  of  the  House. 

The  motions  on  these  nights  take  the  form  of  resolutions,  Their 
and  are  of  every  kind.  Some  of  them  express  aspirations  Etfecteand 
of  an  abstract  nature,  such  as  that  the  government  ought 
to  encourage  cotton-growing  in  the  British  colonies,  or  that 
the  greater  part  of  the  cost  of  training  teachers  ought  to  be 
borne  by  the  national  exchequer.1  Others  demand  more 
definite  legislation  about  matters  on  which  the  parties  are 
not  prepared  to  take  sides.  A  motion,  for  example,  was 
carried  in  1904  that  the  franchise  for  members  of  Parlia- 
ment ought  to  be  extended  to  women.  But  a  resolution 
adopted  in  that  way,  without  opposition  from  the  govern- 
ment, is  commonly  regarded  as  a  mere  aspiration,  and  has 
hardly  a  perceptible  effect.  Others  again  deal  with  the  hob- 
bies of  individuals,  and  in  that  case  the  members  are  apt 
to  go  home,  so  that  after  an  hour  or  two. of  desultory  talk 
the  House  is  counted  out  for  lack  of  a  quorum ;  the  fre- 
quency with  which  that  occurs  depending,  of  course,  upon 
the  amount  of  general  interest  attaching  to  the  motions 
that  happen  to  appear  on  the  list.2  Finally  there  are  mo- 
tions which  attack  the  cabinet  or  its  policy,  motions,  for 
example,  condemning  preferential  tariffs  on  food,  or  the 
control  by  the  central  government  of  the  police  in  Ireland. 
Motions  of  that  sort  are,  of  course,  strenuously  resisted  by 
the  Treasury  Bench,  and  they  will  be  discussed  hereafter 
when  we  come  to  the  methods  of  criticising  the  action  of  the 
ministry.3     Apart  from  cases  of  this  last  class,  the  motions 

1  The  following  examples  arc  all  taken  from  the  session  of  1901 

2  In  190.'5,  for  example,  the  House  was  counted  out  for  want  of  a  quorum 
on  seven  out  of  the  seventeen  private  members'  nights;  while  in  l'.iOl  this 
happened  only  onee,  and  then  after  the  first  motion  had  been  voted  down. 

3  On  March  22  and  28,  MM),"),  the  ministers,  with  their  followers,  took  no 
part  in  the  debate-  or  divisions  on  tin-  motion,  of  private  members  con- 
demning their  attitude  on  the  fiscal  question,  and  they  paid  no  attention 
to  the  vote.-.      This  event,  which  was  unprecedented,  will  be  discussed  later. 


316         THE  GOVERNMENT  OP  ENGLAND 

of  private  members  have  even  less  practical  importance 
than  their  bills.  Occasionally  a  real  popular  demand  may- 
find  expression  in  that  way,  but  it  is  uncommon,  and  the 
chief  value  of  the  Tuesday  and  Wednesday  evening  sittings 
would  seem  to  lie  in  helping  to  keep  alive  the  salutary  fic- 
tion that  members  of  Parliament  still  possess  a  substantial 
power  of  independent  action. 
Control  of  All  the  sittings  not  reserved  for  private  members  are  at 
the  Cabinet    ^e  disposal  of  the  government,  and  it  can  arrange  the  order 

over  Legisla-  L  m  °  '  ... 

tion.  of  its  business  as  it  thinks  best.      The  responsibility  of  the 

ministers  for  legislation  is  a  comparatively  recent  matter.2 
Before  the  Reform  Act  of  1832  their  functions  were  chiefly 
executive ;  but  the  rapid  demand  for  great  remedial  meas- 
ures, and  later  the  complexity  of  legislation  due  to  the  ex- 
tended control  and  supervision  by  the  administrative  de- 
partments, and  not  least  the  concentration  of  power  in  the 
cabinet  by  the  growth  of  the  parliamentary  system,  brought 
about  a  change.  By  the  middle  of  the  century  that  change 
was  recognised,  and  at  the  present  day  the  ministers  would 
treat  the  rejection  of  any  of  their  important  measures  as 
equivalent  to  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence.3 

Moreover,  the  government  is  responsible  not  only  for  in- 
troducing a  bill,  but  also  for  failing  to  do  so.  At  a  meeting 
in  the  autumn  the  cabinet  decides  upon  the  measures  it 
intends  to  bring  forward,  and  announces  them  in  the  King's 
speech  at  the  opening  of  the  session.  Amendments  to  the 
address  in  reply  are  moved  expressing  regret  that  His 
Majesty  has  not  referred  to  some  measure  that  is  desired, 
and  if  such  an  amendment  were  carried  it  would  almost  cer- 
tainly cause  the  downfall  of  the  ministry.  This  happened, 
indeed,  in  188G,  when  the  resignation  of  Lord  Salisbury's 

1  S.O.  5. 

2Cf.  Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  II.,  368.  Ilbcrt,  "Legislative 
Methods  and  Forms,"  82,  216. 

3  The  only  cases  where  a  government  bill  has  been  rejected  by  the  House 
of  Commons  for  more  than  a  score  of  years  are  those  of  the  Home  Rule  Bill 
in  1886,  on  which  the  cabinet  dissolved  Parliament,  and  an  insignificant  bill 
on  church  buildings  in  the  Isle  of  Man,  which  was  defeated  in  a  thin  House 
in  1897. 


THE   CABINET'S  CONTROL  OF  THE   COMMONS 


317 


cabinet  was  brought  about  by  the  adoption  of  an  amend- 
ment regretting  that  the  speech  announced  no  measure  for 
providing  agricultural  labourers  with  land. 

Following  upon  the  responsibility  for  the  introduction  Amend- 
and  passage  of  all  important  measures  has  come  an  increas-  Qovern-° 
ing  control  by  the  ministers  over  the  details  of  their  meas-  ment  Billfl- 
ures.  It  was  formerly  maintained  that  the  House  could 
exercise  a  great  deal  of  freedom  in  amending  bills,  without 
implying  a  loss  of  general  confidence  in  the  cabinet.1  But 
of  late  amendments  carried  against  the  opposition  of  the 
Treasury  Bench  have  been  extremely  rare.2  In  fact  only 
four  such  cases  have  occurred  in  the  last  ten  years.  This 
does  not  mean  that  the  debates  on  the  details  of  bills  are  fruit- 
less. On  the  contrary,  it  often  happens  that  the  discussion 
exposes  defects  of  which  the  government  was  not  aware, 
or  reveals  an  unsuspected  but  widespread  hostility  to  some 
provision ;  and  when  this  happens  the  minister  in  charge 
of  the  bill  often  declares  that  he  will  accept  an  amendment, 
or  undertakes  to  prepare  a  clause  to  meet  the  objection 
which  has  been  pointed  out.3     But  it  does  mean  that  the 


1  Cf.  Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  IT.,  370-72. 

:  The  number  of  amendments  to  government  bills   (not   including  the 

estimates)  carried  against  the  government  whips  acting  as  tellers  in  each 
year  since  1850,  has  been  as  follows:  — 

1851  .     .     9            1865      .     .     4           1879      .     .  1  1893  .  .  1 

1852  .     .     2            1866       .     .     2           1880       .     .  0  1894  .  .  0 

1853  .     .     6            1867      .     .     8           1881       .     .  0  1895  .  .  0 

1854  .     .     7            1868      .     .     7           1882      .     .  1  1896  .  .  1 

1855  .     .     5            1869      .     .     2           1883      .     .  3  1897  .  .  0 

1856  .     .     7            1870      .     .     2           1884      .     .  3  1898  .  .  0 

1857  .     .     4            1871       .     .     4           1885       .     .  4  1899  .  .  0 

1858  .     .     2            1872       .     .     8           1S86       .     .  2  1900  .  .  0 

1859  .     .     1            1873      .     .     4           1887       .     .  1  1901  .  .  1 

1860  .     .     4            1874       .     .     0           1888       .     .  1  1902  .  .  0 

1861  .     .     6            1875      .     .     0           1889      .     .  0  1903  .  .  0 

1862  .      .     6            1876       .     .     0           1890       .     .  0  1901  .  .  2 

1863  .     .     4            1877       .     .     0           1891       .     .  1  1905  .  .  1 

1864  .      .     2            1878       .     .     0           1892       .     .  0  1906  .  .  0 


3  The  minister  often  says  thai  he  will  consider  whether  he  can  meet  the 
views  that  have  been  expressed;  and  then  on  the  report  stage  lie  brings  up 
a  compromise  clause.  An  interesting  example  of  this  occurred  on  July  23, 
1906,  when   the  Opposition  complained  that  sufficient   time  had  not  been 


318         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

changes  in  their  bills  are  made  by  the  ministers  them- 
selves after  hearing  the  debate,  and  that  an  amendment, 
even  of  small  consequence,  can  seldom  be  carried  without 
their  consent.  This  is  the  natural  outcome  of  the  principle 
that  the  cabinet  is  completely  responsible  for  the  principal 
public  measures,  and  hence  must  be  able  to  control  all  their 
provisions  so  long  as  it  remains  in  office. 
Relation  of  From  the  same  point  of  view  the  relation  of  the  govern- 
the  Cabinet  ment  to  ^e  various  committees  of  the  House  is  a  matter 

to  the  Com- 
mittees,        of  great  importance.     If  the  cabinet  is  to  be  responsible  for 

the  policy  of  the  state,  and  must  resign  when  defeated,  it  is 
manifestly  entitled  to  frame  the  policy  on  which  it  stands. 
But  if,  as  in  some  countries  that  have  copied  the  parlia- 
mentary form  of  government,  and  notably  in  France,  the 
bills  of  the  cabinet  are  referred  for  consideration  and  amend- 
ment to  committees  not  under  its  control,  then  it  may  have 
to  face  the  alternative  of  opposing  its  own  bill  on  account 
of  the  amendments  made  therein,  or  of  standing  upon  a 
measure  of  which  it  can  no  longer  wholly  approve.  It  may 
be  put  in  the  awkward  position  of  defending  a  policy  that 
has  been  forced  upon  it,  instead  of  one  of  its  own  selection. 
Such  a  condition  of  things  has  sapped  the  authority  of 
the  ministry,  and  weakened  the  government  in  more  than 
one  nation  of  continental  Europe.1  This  danger  has  been 
avoided  in  England  by  the  very  limited  use  of  committees 
on  public  bills,  and  by  the  influence  of  the  Treasury  Bench 
over  those  that  exist. 


given  for  debating  the  educational  council  for  Wales,  the  provisions  pro- 
posed having  been  profoundly  changed  since  it  had  been  last  before  the 
House.  The  government  replied  that  the  changes  had  been  made  to  meet 
objections  raised  by  the  Opposition  itself.  Hans.  4  Ser.  CLXI  ,  741  et  seq. 
1  For  France,  see  Dupriez,  Les  Ministres,  II.,  406-8,  410-13.  Lowell, 
"Governments  and  Parties,"  I.,  111-17.  For  Italy,  Dupriez,  I.,  309,  312. 
Lowell,  I.,  207-10.  For  Belgium,  where  the  evil  is  diminished  by  greater 
party  discipline,  and  by  the  fact  that  the  changes  proposed  by  the  committee 
must  be  moved  as  amendments  to  the  government  bill,  see  Dupriez,  I., 
243-45.  In  France  permanent  standing  committees  have  been  very  ex- 
tensively substituted  during  the  last  few  years  for  temporary  ones  appointed 
to  consider  particular  bills;  but  while  this  may  do  good  in  other  ways,  it 
cannot  entirely  remove  the  evil  described  in  the  text. 


THE  CABINET'S  CONTROL  OF  THE   COMMONS  319 

The    most   important   government   bills,    and   especially  controver- 
those  of  a  highly  controversial  nature,  are  not  referred  to  sialBillsnot 

Referred  to 

committees  at  all.  They  are  debated  only  in  the  House  Commit- 
itself ;  and  in  Committee  of  the  Whole,  which  is  merely  the  tees' 
House  sitting  with  slightly  different  rules,  and  not  a  com- 
mittee in  the  sense  in  which  the  word  is  used  in  this  chapter. 
To  select  committees  few  public  bills  are  referred,  and  those 
as  a  rule  are  certainly  not  of  a  controversial  character.1  The 
only  difficulty  arises  in  the  case  of  the  standing  committees. 
When  he  first  proposed  these  in  1882,  Mr.  Gladstone  said 
that  they  were  not  intended  to  consider  measures  of  a  par- 
tisan character ; 2  and  it  has  been  generally  recognised  ever 
since  that  very  contentious  bills  ought  not  to  be  referred 
to  them.3  A  long  debate  on  the  subject  took  place  recently, 
on  the  occasion  when  the  bill  to  restrict  alien  immigration 
was  sent  to  the  Standing  Committee  on  Law  in  1904. 4  All 
the  members  who  took  part  in  the  discussions,  except  Mr. 
Chamberlain,5  agreed  on  the  general  principle ;  but  they 
did  not  agree  upon  any  test  of  contentiousness,  and  were 
sharply  divided  on  the  question  whether  the  Aliens  Bill  was 
contentious  or  not.  Mr.  Balfour  himself  took  the  ground 
that  the  controversial  character  of  a  bill  is  a  matter  of 
degree,  and  that  this  bill  was  near  the  border  line.  The 
obstacles  in  its  path  proved  in  the  end  so  serious  that  it  had 
to  be  dropped  for  the  session. 

That  a  bill  is  non-contentious  clearly  does  not  mean  that 
it  is  unopposed,  or  even  that  the  opposition  has  no  con- 
nection with  party.  Every  one  of  the  six  government  bills 
referred  to  standing  committees  in  1S99,  for  example,  had  a 

'In  each  of  the  years  1894  and  1899,  for  example, — years  for  which  I 
have  analysed  the  divisions  in  Parliament,  only  one  government  hill,  that 
was  enacted,  was  referred  to  a  select  committee,  and  neither  of  these  hills 
had  a  division  on  party  lines  in  the  course  of  its  progress  through  the  House. 

2  Hans.  3  Ser.  CCLXXV.,  1  10. 

1  See,  for  example,  Hans.   1  Ser.  IV.,  1461,  XXII.,  1  151,  XXIII.,  713-14, 

1012,  XXXIII..  S51-54,  en.,  345. 

*  Hans.  4  Ser.  CX  X  X  V.,  10KG  et  scq.  Another  dehnte  ha-  since  occurred 
on  March  20  -'21,   1907. 

6  Mr.  Chamlx ■rlain's  views  seem  to  have  undergone  some  modification. 
Cf.  Hans.  4  Ser.  XXIII.,  1012,  and  CXXXY.,   1113-14. 


320         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

party  vote  at  some  stage  in  its  passage  through  the  House.1 
These  committees  are  expected  to  deal,  not  with  questions 
of  political  principle,  but  with  details  that  require  techni- 
cal skill  or  careful  consideration,  in  bills  where  the  general 
principle  is  either  non-contentious,  or  may  be  regarded  as 
settled  by  the  House  itself.  They  were  intended  to  be  used 
for  measures  on  which  the  committee  stage  is  not  likely  to 
raise  any  important  questions  of  policy.  The  original  in- 
tention, however,  has  not  been  wholly  carried  out.  Highly 
contentious  bills  have  not  infrequently  been  u  sent  upstairs," 2 
as  the  expression  goes,  although  this  has  never  been  done 
in  the  case  of  the  most  important  government  measures. 
Many  people  feel  that  the  departure  is  unfortunate,  and 
hence  there  was  no  little  opposition  in  1907  to  raising  the 
number  of  standing  committees  to  four,  and  providing  that 
all  bills  should  be  referred  to  them  unless  the  House  ordered 
otherwise.  An  amendment,  to  the  report  of  the  committee, 
that  the  provision  should  not  apply  to  bills  containing  gen- 
eral controversial  matter  was  rejected  by  a  strict  party  vote,3 
and  the  change  in  procedure  was  put  through  the  House 
itself  by  the  use  of  closure.4  If  the  standing  committees 
were  confined  to  non-contentious  measures,  they  could  create 
no  serious  embarrassment  for  the  ministry,  even  if  quite  free 
from  its  control. 
Party  Com-  But  in  fact  the  committees  are  a  good  deal  under  the 
Comma-  influence  of  the  government.  In  the  first  place  the  govern- 
tees.  ment  party  is  always  given  a  majority  of  the  members. 

Formerly  it  had  on  select  committees  a  majority  of  one  only,5 
but  now  it  has  become  a  general  rule  that  both  select  and 
standing  committees  shall  reflect  as  nearly  as  may  be  the 
party  complexion  of  the  House  itself.     Thus  in  1894,  when 

1  T  define  a  party  vote  arbitrarily  as  one  where  more  than  nine  tenths  of 
the  members  of  the  party  in  power,  who  take  part  in  the  division,  vote  to- 
gether on  one  side,  and  nine  tenths  of  the  Opposition  who  take  part  vote 
together  on  the  other  side. 

2  Second  Rep.  of  Com.  on  House  of  Commons  (Procedure),  May  25, 
1906,  Qs.  96,  113,  142,  381  (p.  41).  The  rooms  of  the  standing  committees 
are  on  the  tipper  floor.  3  Ibid.,  p.  viii. 

4  Hans.  4  Ser.  CLXXIL,  873-919.  i  Hans.  3  Ser.  CCLXXV.,  306-7. 


tees. 


THE   CABINET'S  CONTROL  OF  THE   COMMONS  321 

the  parties  were  nearly  evenly  balanced  in  the  House,  the 
government  majority  on  the  committees  was  usually  very 
small,  but  after  the  Conservatives  came  into  power  with  a 
much  larger  majority,  their  share  of  members  in  the  com- 
mittees was  correspondingly  great.1  The  standing  com- 
mittees, and  often  the  select  committees  also,  are  appointed 
by  the  Committee  of  Selection,  which  contains  usually  six 
adherents  of  the  party  in  power,  and  five  from  the  other 
side  of  the  House.  But  they  are  members  of  great  experi- 
ence. They  know  the  principles  they  are  expected  to  apply, 
and  with  their  discretion  in  the  choice  of  individuals  the 
ministers  make  no  attempt  to  interfere.2 

The  mere  possession  of  a  majority  upon  a  committee  is  influence 
not  alwavs  enough,  unless  the  government  can  bring  pres-  of  the  ?°Y~ 

\  °  °    l  eminent     in 

sure  to  bear  upon  its  followers.  In  select  committees  on  Commit- 
bills  this  is  not  a  matter  of  much  consequence,  because,  as 
we  have  seen,  they  rarely  have  charge  of  important,  or  at 
least  of  contentious,  measures.  In  select  committees  of  in- 
quiry one  hears  nothing  of  pressure — to  the  credit  of  states- 
men be  it  said  —  and  although  the  report  of  an  English 
committee  or  commission  of  inquiry  is  often  a  variation  on 
the  theme  that  "no  one  did  anything  wrong,  but  they  had 

1  This  does  not,  of  course,  apply  to  the  ordinary  committees  on  private 
and  local  bills,  and  it  cannot  always  be  strictly  applied  to  all  select  com- 
mittees. But  in  the  case  of  standing  committees  the  apportionment  is 
decidedly  accurate.  In  fact  one  of  the  chief  objections  to  a  standing 
committee  for  Scotland,  composed  mainly  of  Scotch  members,  was  that  it 
would  not  reflect  the  proportion  of  parties  in  the  House.  In  the  debate  Mr. 
Balfour  remarked  that  this  "is  not  merely  the  traditional  practice,  but  a 
practice  absolutely  necessary  if  we  are  to  maintain  dovernmental  respon- 
sibility in  matters  of  legislation."  He  asked  what  would  be  the  position  of 
the  government  with  standing  committees  of  which  they  did  not  happen  to 
possess  the  confidence.  The  committee  would  send  back  a  bill  changed, 
and  then  the  minister  must  either  drop  the  bill,  or  accept  it  as  it  is,  or 
reverse  the  changes  on  the  report  stage.  Such  a  position  would,  as  he  said, 
be  intolerable,  and  would  make  legislation  by  a  responsible  ministry  an 
absurdity.  (Hans.  1  Ser.  XXII.,  1132,  1  1  3">-:i6. )  Cf.  Second  Hep.  Com. 
on  House  of  Commons  (Procedure),  May  2f>,   1906,  Q.  100. 

2  Hans.  'A  Ser.  CCCXXXIX.,  126.  The  chairmen  of  the  standing  com- 
mittees are  intended,  like  the  Speaker,  to  he  strictly  impartial.  They  are 
selected  by  and  from  the  Chairman's  Panel,  which  contains  three  members 
from  each  side  of  the  House;  and  a  member  of  the  Opposition  often  presides 
when  a  government  bill  is  discussed. 


322  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

better  not  do  it  again,"  still  there  are  reports  that  con- 
tain severe  criticism  on  the  public  administration.1  In  the 
standing  committees  the  influence  of  the  government  is 
palpable.  In  fact  these  committees,  when  dealing  with 
government  bills,  are  miniatures  of  the  House  in  arrange- 
ment as  well  as  in  composition.  There  are  the  same  rows 
of  benches  facing  each  other ;  and  the  minister  in  charge  of 
the  bill  sits  in  the  corner  seat  at  the  chairman's  right  hand, 
accepting,  or  refusing  to  accept,  amendments  on  behalf  of 
the  government.2  Absent  members  are  fetched  in  the  same 
way  to  take  part  in  divisions ; 3  and  when  the  Conserva- 
tives were  in  power,  whips  were  sometimes  issued  imploring 
them  to  be  present  on  the  morrow,  because  an  important 
vote  was  expected.  The  Liberals  do  not  do  this,  and  often 
have  trouble  in  getting  their  partisans  to  attend.  More- 
over, a  difficulty  sometimes  arises  from  the  fact  that  the 
members  who  are  most  strongly  interested  in  a  bill  and 
hence  least  under  the  control  of  the  minister  —  the 
Labour  men  or  the  Irish  Nationalists,  for  example,  in  the 
case  of  bills  affecting  their  constituents  —  attend  far  more 
regularly  than  the  rest.  But  although  the  influence  of 
the  government  over  a  standing  committee  is  distinctly 
less  than  over  the  House  itself,4  it  is  certainly  very 
considerable. 
Few  Party  Nevertheless  the  voting  in  both  select  and  standing  com- 
Commit-  mittees  runs  little  on  party  lines,  decidedly  less  than  it 
does  in  the  House  itself.  Taking  two  recent  years,  1894  and 
1899,  for  which  the  writer  has  had  statistics  prepared,  it 
appears  that  in  1894  there  were  in  the  select  committees 
twenty-three  party  votes  out  of  eighty-four  divisions ;   and 

1  Notably  in  recent  years  that  of  1903  on  the  War  in  South  Africa,  Com. 
Papers,  1904,  XL.,  1  et  seq.;  and  that  of  1904  on  the  Beck  case,  Com.  Papers, 
1905,   LXII.,  465  et  seq. 

2  "  The  very  structure  and  furniture  ...  of  the  Chamber  in  which  the 
Grand  Committee  would  sit,  were  designed  to  carry  out  the  idea  of  govern- 
ment by  Party."      Hans.  4  Ser.  XXII.,  1162. 

3  Hans.  4  Ser.   XCIL,  570. 
*  Second    Rep.  of   Com.  on   House  of  Commons    (Procedure),  1906,  Qs. 

100,  280,  341. 


tf'-s. 


THE   CABINET'S  CONTROL  OF  THE  COMMONS  323 

in  the  Standing  Committees  on  Law  and  Trade '  there  were 
only  seven  divisions  in  all,  of  which  only  two  were  on  party 
lines;  whereas  in  the  House  itself  there  were  one  hundred 
and  eighty-four  party  votes  out  of  a  total  of  two  hundred 
and  forty-six  divisions.  Moreover,  the  party  votes  in  com- 
mittees were  mainly  confined  to  a  very  few  subjects.  Thus 
seventeen  of  the  twenty-three  party  votes  in  the  select 
committees  were  given  in  the  committee  on  the  work  of  the 
Charity  Commission,  and  four  of  the  remainder  were  in  that 
on  Scotch  Feus  and  Building  Leases.2  For  1899  the  com- 
parison is  even  more  striking.  In  the  select  committees 
there  was  one  party  vote  out  of  sixty-three  divisions;  in 
the  standing  committees  six  out  of  fifty-three  —  and  those 
six  were  all  on  one  bill3  —  while  in  the  House  there  were  two 
hundred  and  forty-two  party  votes  out  of  three  hundred 
and  fifty-seven  divisions.4 

The  reasons  why  the  votes  run  on  party  lines  less  in  the 
committees  than  in  the  House  itself  are  self-evident.  First 
there  is  the  fact  that  the  most  contentious  measures,  those 
where  party  feeling  runs  highest,  are  not  referred  to  com- 

1  In  the  anomalous  standing  committee  for  Scotch  business  the  condi- 
tion of  things  was  very  different.  It  reported  upon  only  one  bill,  that  on 
Local  Government  for  Scotland,  and  on  this  there  were  no  less  than  sixty- 
three  divisions,  of  which  twenty-one  were  party  votes. 

:  Both  of  the  party  votes  in  the  standing  committees  of  Law  and  Trade 
in  1894  were  on  the  Church  Patronage  Bill,  which  was  not  a  government  bill. 

3  The  Agriculture  and  Technical  Education  (Ireland)  Bill. 

4  The  method  of  making  these  computations  is  the  same  as  that  described 
in  the  chapter  on  "The  Strength  of  Party  Tics."  and  the  divisions  in  the 
committees  are  taken  from  their  reports  in  the  blue  books  for  the  year. 

The  figures  may  be  presented  in  other  ways  which  give  much  the  same 
result.  It  we  take  only  the  party  in  power,  to  see  in  what  proportion  of 
divisions  it  cast  a  party  vote  —  paying  no  attention  to  the  votes  of  the 
members  of  the  Opposition  —  we  find  it  as  follows:  — 

1891:  House  81%;  Select  Corns.  49%;  Stand.  Coins.  Law  &  Trade  43% 
IvU:  House  91%;  Select  Corns.  34%;  Stand.  Coins.  Law  &  Trade  ">9% 
1900:     House  Select  Coins.  18%;    Stand.   Coins.    Law   &   Trade  43% 

The  proportion  of  divisions  where  neither  party  cast  a  party  vote  were 
as  follows:  — 

1891:  House  4.13%:  Select  Corns.  2f>%:  Stand.  Coins.  Law  &  Trade  14% 
1X99:  House  2. 2H'/„;  Select  Corns.  43 7,,;  Stand.  Coins.  Law  &  Trade  2(5% 
1900:     House  Select  Coins.  4.}%;    Stand.    Coins.    Law   A:   Trade   41";, 

The  number  of  party  votes  in  19U0  was  in  Select  Coins.  1  out  of  51,  and 
in  Stand.  Coins.  0  out  of  74. 


324 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Suggestion 
of    a 

Committee 
on  the 
Estimates. 


mittees.  Another  reason,  not  less  important,  is  that  a  de- 
feat of  the  government,  even  in  a  standing  committee,  cannot 
directly  imperil  the  life  of  the  ministry,  and  hence  the  final 
means  of  pressure  is  lacking.  In  fact  an  amendment  is 
occasionally  carried  against  the  government  in  a  standing 
committee,  and  in  that  case  the  minister  either  makes  up 
his  mind  to  accept  the  change  or  tries  to  get  it  reversed  in 
the  House  on  report.  But  this  very  condition,  which  is 
embarrassing  for  the  minister,  shows  that  there  is  a  limit 
to  the  work  standing  committees  can  be  set  to  do,  without 
imperilling  the  authority  of  the  cabinet. 

A  similar  danger  would  attend  the  use  of  committees  on 
the  estimates.  The  creation  of  such  committees  has  often 
been  suggested,1  and  for  a  very  good  reason.  The  debates 
on  the  estimates  in  the  House  of  Commons  have  become  an 
opportunity  for  criticising  the  conduct  of  the  administration, 
while  the  financial  aspect  of  the  matter,  the  question  whether 
the  grants  are  excessive  and  ought  to  be  reduced  or  not,  has 
largely  fallen  out  of  sight.  It  has  not  unnaturally  been  felt 
that  this  function,  which  the  House  itself  is  disinclined  to 
discharge,  might  be  effectively  performed  by  a  select  or 
standing  committee.  But  if  the  committee  were  really  to 
revise  the  estimates,  it  would,  like  the  committees  on  the 
budget  in  continental  parliaments,  encroach  upon  the  power 
of  the  government  to  frame  its  own  budget.  It  would  im- 
peril the  exclusive  initiative  in  money  matters,  which  is  the 
corner-stone  both  of  sound  finance,  and  of  the  authority  of 
a  responsible  ministry.  That  the  Committee  on  Accounts 
should  scrutinise  the  disbursements  with  care,  to  see  that 
they  correspond  with  the  votes,  is  most  salutary ;  and  that 
special  committees  should  be  appointed  from  time  to  time, 
to  review  the  expenditures,  and  suggest  possible  lines  of 
saving,  is  also  excellent.  These  are  in  the  nature  of  criti- 
cism of  past  actions,  with  suggestions  of  a  general  character 


'Todd,  "Pari.  Govt,  in  England,"  I.,  744-46.  May,  564.  Rep.  of 
Com.  on  Estimates  Procedure,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XII.,  27,  p.  iv.  Report 
Com.  on  Nat.  Exp.,  Com.  Papers,  1903,  VII.,  483. 


THE   CABINET'S  CONTROL  OF  THE  COMMONS  325 

for  the  future,  and  they  do  not  affect  the  freedom  of  the 
cabinet  to  lay  down  its  own  policy  and  prepare  its  own 
budget. 

The  last  committee  on  national  expenditure  reported  in 
1903  in  favour  of  having  a  select  committee  examine  each 
year  one  class  or  portion  of  the  estimates ;  but  there  was  a 
sharp  difference  of  opinion  on  the  question  whether  such  a 
committee  would  or  would  not  interfere  with  the  respon- 
sibility of  ministers,  and  the  recommendation  was  adopted 
only  by  a  vote  of  seven  to  five.1  In  view  of  the  experience 
in  other  countries,  one  cannot  help  feeling  that  the  minority 
was  right ;  that  while  the  proposed  committee  would  be  far 
less  of  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  Treasury  Bench  than  one  on 
the  estimates  as  a  whole,  yet  that  if  it  really  exerted  any 
authority,  and  ventured  to  report  reductions,  it  would  stand 
to  just  that  extent  in  a  position  of  antagonism  and  rivalry 
with  the  ministers. 

One  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  objects  in  proposing  the  standing  Legislative 
committees  was  to  increase  the  legislative  capacity  of  the  p*1^1^  °tf 
House,  by  enabling  it  to  do  a  part  of  its  work  by  sections  has  been 
sitting  at  the  same  time.2  Such  a  process  of  making  one 
worm  into  two  by  cutting  it  in  halves  is  well  enough  with 
an  organism  whose  nervous  system  is  not  too  highly  cen- 
tralised; and  in  England  it  seems  to  have  been  carried 
about  as  far  as  is  consistent  with  a  responsible  ministry. 
The  standing  committees  have  to  some  extent  fulfilled  this 
purpose,  but  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether  they  can 
wisely  be  charged  with  bills  of  a  more  contentious  nature 
than  are  sent  to  them  now.  In  order  to  increase  the  legisla- 
tive output  the  number  of  standing  committees  was  raised 
to  four,  on  April  Hi,  1907,  with  a  provision  that  bills  should 
be  regularly  referred  to  them  unless  the  House  directed 
the  contrary.  How  far  this  change  will  result  in  placing  in 
their  hands  more  controversial  lulls,  and  how  far  it  will 
increase  the  power  of  the  House  to  pass  laws,  remains  to  be 

1  Rep.  Com.  on  Nat.  Exp.,  Com.  Papers.  1903,  VII.,  483. 
J  Hans.  .'5  Sir.  CCLNNV.,  1  I5-4G. 


326         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

seen.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  the  legislative 
capacity  of  Parliament  is  limited ;  and  the  limit  would  ap- 
pear to  be  well-nigh  reached,  unless  private  members  are 
to  lose  their  remnant  of  time,  or  debate  is  to  be  still  further 
restricted,  so  that  the  members  will  no  longer  be  free,  until 
closure  is  moved,  to  speak  at  such  length  as  they  please,  and 
to  discuss  every  conceivable  detail,  great  or  small,  often 
several  times  over.  But  upon  the  preservation  of  these 
things  the  position  of  the  House  of  Commons  largely 
depends. 

To  say  that  at  present  the  cabinet  legislates  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  Parliament  would  hardly  be  an  exag- 
geration ;  and  it  is  only  the  right  of  private  members  to 
bring  in  a  few  motions  and  bills  of  their  own,  and  to  criti- 
cise government  measures,  or  propose  amendments  to 
them,  freely,  that  prevents  legislation  from  being  the  work 
of  a  mere  automatic  majority.  It  does  not  follow  that 
the  action  of  the  cabinet  is  arbitrary ;  that  it  springs  from 
personal  judgment  divorced  from  all  dependence  on  popu- 
lar or  parliamentary  opinion.  The  cabinet  has  its  finger 
always  on  the  pulse  of  the  House  of  Commons,  and  espe- 
cially of  its  own  majority  there;  and  it  is  ever  on  the 
watch  for  expressions  of  public  feeling  outside.  Its  func- 
tion is  in  large  part  to  sum  up  and  formulate  the  desires 
of  its  supporters,  but  the  majority  must  accept  its  conclu- 
sions, and  in  carrying  them  out  becomes  well-nigh  auto- 
matic. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE   COMMONS'    CONTROL   OF   THE   CABINET 

If  the  relations  between  the  cabinet  and  the  House  of  control  of 
Commons   in   legislative  matters  have  changed,  their  rela-  thc  H°"se 

_  °       ;  over  Admin- 

tions  in  executive  matters  have  been  modified  also.  If  istration. 
the  cabinet  to-day  legislates  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  House,  it  administers  subject  to  its  constant  super- 
vision and  criticism.  In  both  cases  the  relation  is  funda- 
mentally the  same.  In  both  the  English  system  seems  to 
be  approximating  more  and  more  to  a  condition  where  the 
cabinet  initiates  everything,  frames  its  own  policy,  submits 
that  policy  to  a  searching  criticism  in  the  House,  and  adopts 
such  suggestions  as  it  deems  best;  but  where  the  House, 
after  all  this  has  been  done,  must  accept  the  acts  and  pro- 
posals of  the  government  as  they  stand,  or  pass  a  vote  of 
censure,  and  take  the  chances  of  a  change  of  ministry  or  a 
dissolution. 

There  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  House  of  Commons  from  it  Rarely 
adopting  an  address  or  resolution  calling  upon  the  govern-  ^j^f/tive 
ment  for  specific    administrative    action;    and   it  has  been  Action, 
occasionally,  though  not  often,  done.1     Under  the  present 
rules  of  procedure  there  are  few  opportunities  for  a  direct 
vote  of  this  kind,  the  chief  occasions    when  it    is  in  order 
being  the  evening  sittings  reserved  for  private  members'  mo- 
tions.    On  these  and  other  occasions  resolutions  asking  for 
executive  action  are  sometimes  brought  forward,-'  but  they 

1  For  a  collection  of  instances  from  1807  to  1874  sec  Todd,  "  Pari.  Govt, 
in  England,"  I..  422-28,   ll'.»-.">(). 

2  In  the  year  1901,  for  example,  there  were  three  motions  clearly  of  this 
character.  The  first  two  fin  favour  of  paying  unskilled  government  work- 
men the  standard  rate  of  wages,  and  against  granting  permits  for  the 
vivisection  of  dogs)  did  not  come  to  a  vote;  while  the  third  (calling  upon 
the  government  to  encourage  cotton  growing  in  Africa)  was  agreed  to  w  itli- 
out  a  division. 


328         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

are  rarely  carried  against  the  opposition  of  the  cabinet. 
In  fact  it  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  at  all  in  the  last 
ten  years,  while  in  the  preceding  ten  years  it  occurred  only 
four  times;  and  it  so  happened  that  in  the  last  three  of 
those  cases,  at  least,  the  government  did  not  carry  out  the 
wishes  of  the  House.1  Such  votes  are  not  likely  to  be 
common  in  the  future,  because  the  modern  principle  of 
responsibility  requires  that  the  ministers  should  be  free  to 
act  and  be  held  to  account  for  what  they  do,  rather  than 
that  they  should  be  given  explicit  directions  in  regard  to 
their  duties, 
ft  Criticises  If  the  House  of  Commons  does  not  often  pass  votes  ask- 
Conduct  of  m%  f°r  executive  action  in  the  future,  its  members  criticise 
the  Govern-  the  conduct  of  the  government  in  the  past  freely  and  con- 
stantly. The  opportunities  for  doing  so  are,  indeed,  mani- 
fold. There  is  first  the  address  in  answer  to  the  King's 
speech  at  the  opening  of  the  session ;  then  the  questions 
day  by  day  give  a  chance,  if  not  for  direct  criticism,  at 
least  for  calling  the  ministers  to  account ;  then  there  are 
the  motions  to  adjourn;  the  private  members'  motions; 
the  debates  on  going  into  the  Committees  of  Supply  and 
Ways  and  Means  ;  the   discussions  in  the  Committee   of 

1  It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  distinguish  between  censure  of  past  action, 
and  a  direction  for  the  future;  but,  if  we  exclude  votes  indirectly  implying 
censure,  by  a  reduction  of  an  appropriation,  or  an  adjournment  of  the 
House,  the  only  instances  since  1886  where  a  vote  relating  ;n  express  terms 
to  either  of  these  things  has  been  carried  against  the  opposition  of  the  gov- 
ernment, have  been  as  follows:  On  June  12,  1888,  a  resolution  was  adopted 
that  redundant  officials  ought  to  be  transferred  to  other  departments, 
although  a  Royal  Commission  was  already  considering  the  subject.  On 
April  30,  1889,  a  vote  was  passed  condemning  the  Indian  fiscal  system  for 
encouraging  the  opium  trade;  and  another  vote  to  the  same  effect  was 
carried,  on  going  into  the  Committee  of  Supply  on  April  10,  1891.  A  com- 
mission appointed  by  the  government  reported  in  favour  of  the  existing 
system  which  was  thereupon  maintained.  (Com.  Papers,  1891,  LX.,  583; 
LXL;  LXII.;  1895,  XLII.,  31  et  seq. ;  rf.  1892,  LVIII.;  and  1893,  LXVI.) 
Finally,  on  June  3,  1893,  it  was  voted  that  the  examinations  for  the  Indian 
Civil  Service  ought  to  be  held  in  India  as  well  as  in  England;  but,  after 
collecting  the  opinions  of  Indian  officials,  which  were  almost  wholly  adverse 
to  the  change,  the  government  decided  not  to  make  it  (Com.  Papers,  1893, 
LXIV.,  869;  1894,  LX.,  1),  and  so  informed  the  House,  Hans.  4  Scr. 
XXIV.,  1537. 


THE   COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  329 

Supply  itself  ;  the  debates  on  the  Consolidated  Fund  Reso- 
lutions, on  the  Appropriation  Bill,  on  the  Budget,  and  on 
the  motions  to  adjourn  for  the  holidays;  and,  finally,  the 
formal  motions  of  want  of  confidence.  The  way  in  which 
these  various  occasions  are  used  to  bring  the  acts  of 
the  ministers  to  the  attention  of  Parliament  needs  expla- 
nation. 

But  first  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  individual  individual 
criticism  by  members,  and  collective  censure  by  vote  of  the  andCoiiec- 
House.  The  former,  whether  coming  from  the  seats  behind  tiveCen- 
the  Treasury  Bench,  or  from  the  opposite  side  of  the  floor, 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  caution  to  the  ministers,  an  expression 
of  personal  opinion  that  is  likely  to  find  more  or  less  of  an 
echo  outside  of  Parliament.  It  does  not  in  itself  imperil 
the  position  of  the  government  at  the  moment,  although  the 
errors  of  the  ministers  pointed  out  in  this  way  go  into  the 
great  balance  of  account  on  which  the  nation  renders  its 
verdict  at  the  next  general  election.  But  a  collective  cen- 
sure by  vote  of  the  House  may  mean  immediate  resignation. 
Now  the  system  of  a  responsible  ministry  implies  the  alterna- 
tion in  power  of  two  parties  holding  different  views  upon  the 
questions  of  the  day.  If  it  does  not  imply  this;  if  the  fall 
of  one  cabinet  is  followed  by  the  appointment  of  another 
with  a  similar  policy;  then  public  life  will  revolve  about 
the  personal  ambitions  and  intrigues  of  leading  politicians, 
—  a  condition  that  has  caused  much  of  the  discredit  now 
attached  to  the  parliamentary  system  in  some  continental 
states.  But  if  a  change  of  ministry  involves  the  transfer  of 
power  to  an  Opposition  with  quite  a  different  programme,  it 
is  clear  that  the  change  ought  not  to  take  place  until  the 
nation  has  declared,  either  at  the  polls,  or  through  its  repre- 
sentatives in  the  House  of  Commons,  thai  it  wishes  that 
result.  The  ministers  ought,  therefore,  to  stand  or  fall 
upon  their  general  policy,  upon  their  whole  record,  or  upon 
some  one  question  that  in  permanent  consequence  out- 
weighs everything  else,  not  upon  a  particular  act  of  sec- 
ondary importance;.     Moreover  the  judgment   ought   to  be 


330  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

given  after  mature  deliberation,  not  in  the  heat  of  a  debate 
upon  some  political  blunder  brought  suddenly  to  the  notice 
of  the  House.  Exactly  the  reverse  of  this  occurs  under  the 
French  system  of  interpellations.  By  that  procedure  a 
single  act  of  the  government  can  be  made  the  subject  of  a 
debate  ending  with  motions  condemning  or  justifying  the 
occurrence ;  and  great  ingenuity  is  sometimes  displayed  in 
so  framing  the  motions  as  to  catch  the  votes  of  members, 
who,  although  supporters  of  the  cabinet,  cannot  approve 
of  the  act  in  question.1  How  a  resort  to  similar  tactics  in 
the  House  of  Commons  has  been  more  and  more  barred  out, 
will  be  seen  in  the  following  pages,  which  describe  the  dif- 
ferent methods  of  bringing  the  conduct  of  the  ministers 
before  the  House. 
Address  in  The  first  two  or  three  weeks  of  an  ordinary  session  are 
thePKing's  taken  up  with  a  debate  on  the  address  in  reply  to  the  King's 
Speech.  speech.  The  address  provides  a  field  for  a  series  of  political 
battles,  fought  over  the  amendments  that  are  brought  for- 
ward. There  are  a  dozen  or  more  of  these  every  year ;  many 
of  them  urging  the  need  of  legislation  that  is  not  foreshad- 
owed in  the  speech  ;  others  relating  to  purely  administrative 
matters  arising  in  foreign  or  domestic  affairs.  Sometimes 
they  deal  with  large  questions  of  public  policy,  like  the  ex- 
tension of  the  frontier  of  India,  or  the  maintenance  of  the 
integrity  of  China.  But  this  is  by  no  means  always  true ; 
and  amendments  are  moved,  for  example,  drawing  attention 
to  the  grievances  of  the  postal  and  telegraph  clerks,  or  com- 
plaining of  the  government  for  failure  to  prosecute  the  direc- 
tors of  a  blasted  financial  scheme  or  for  the  releasing  or 
refusing  to  release  persons  convicted  of  crimes  connected 
with  political  agitation  in  Ireland.  In  some  of  these 
cases  particular  acts  are  brought  before  the  bar  of  the 
House ;  and  it  is  usually  impossible  to  avoid  a  direct  vote 
upon  them.  But  they  are  not  recent  events,  or  unexpect- 
edly  sprung  upon  Parliament.     They   have  almost  always 

1  Cf.  Dupriez,  Lea  Ministres,  II.,  440-45.     Lowell,   "Governments  and 
Parties,"  I.,  117-26. 


THE  COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  331 

aroused  a  good  deal  of  public  attention,  and  formed 
the  subject  of  no  little  discussion.  The  government  has, 
therefore,  plenty  of  time  to  prepare  its  defence,  to  sound 
and  marshal  its  followers;  and  it  does  not,  in  fact,  suffer 
defeats  on  administrative  questions  brought  forward  in  this 
way.  Twice  in  more  than  twenty  years  the  government 
tellers  have  found  themselves  in  a  minority  on  an  amend- 
ment to  the  address,  but  neither  case  involved  an  execu- 
tive act.  The  first,  in  1886,  was  an  amendment  expressing 
regret  that  the  speech  had  announced  no  measure  for  the 
relief  of  agricultural  labourers.  Under  the  peculiar  state  of 
parties  Lord  Salisbury's  cabinet  took  the  defeat  as  a  vote 
of  want  of  confidence  and  resigned.  The  other  case  oc- 
curred in  1S94,  when  an  amendment  aimed  at  the  power 
of  the  Lords  to  reject  bills  passed  by  the  Commons  was 
carried  against  the  government  on  the  motion  of  some  of  its 
own  followers ;  but  it  was  clearly  not  the  kind  of  vote  that 
involves  the  downfall  of  a  ministry. 

While,  therefore,  the  address  is  essentially  a  time  for  the 
discussion  of  questions  of  general  policy,  it  is,  no  doubt,  an 
occasion  when  particular  acts  may  be  brought  up  for  judg- 
ment, and  a  direct  vote  forced  upon  them,  although  not  in 
the  way  that  is  most  embarrassing  for  a  cabinet. 

Isolated  examples  of  questions  addressed  to  ministers  can  Questions 
be  found  far  back  in  the  eighteenth  century,  but  the  habit  Ministers 
did  not  become  common  until  about  sixty  years  ago.  At 
that  period  one  hundred  or  more  questions  were  asked  in 
the  course  of  a  session,  and  the  first  regulations  were  made 
regarding  the  time  and  method  of  putting  them.1  There- 
after the  practice  grew  so  fast  that  in  the  seventies  over  one 
thousand  were  asked  in  a  session,  and  by  the  end  of  the 
century  it  had  increased  to  about  five  thousand,  hi  form 
questions  are  simply  requests  for  information.  They  must 
contain  no  argument,  no  statement  of  fact  not  needed  to 
make  their  purport  clear,  and  they  must  be  addressed  to 
that  minister  in  the  House  in  whose  province  the  subject- 

1  May,  20G,  note  1,  236,  note  1.     Todd,  II.,  421-22. 


332 


THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Motives  for 

Asking 

Them. 


Not  fol- 
lowed by 
Debate    or 
Vote. 


matter  of  the  inquiry  falls.1  They  cover  almost  every  con- 
ceivable field ;  the  intentions  of  ministers  in  the  conduct  of 
the  business  of  the  House  ;  acts  done  by  officials  of  all  grades 
in  every  department  of  the  public  service ;  and  even  events 
that  might  be  expected  to  give  rise  to  action  by  the  govern- 
ment. The  process  of  answering  questions  gives  to  the 
Treasury  Bench  an  air  of  omniscience  not  wholly  deserved, 
for  notice  of  the  question  to  be  asked  is  sent  in  a  day  or 
two  in  advance  so  as  to  give  time  for  the  permanent  sub- 
ordinates to  hunt  up  the  matter,  and  supply  their  chief 
with  the  facts  required. 

Questions  are  asked  from  various  motives ;  sometimes 
simply  to  obtain  information ;  sometimes  to  show  to  con- 
stituents the  assiduity  of  their  member,  or  to  exhibit  his 
opinions ;  sometimes  to  draw  public  attention  to  a  griev- 
ance ;  sometimes  to  embarrass  the  government,  or  make  a 
telling  point ;  and  at  times  a  question  is  asked  by  a  sup- 
porter of  the  minister  in  order  to  give  him  a  chance  to  bring 
out  a  fact  effectively.  But  whatever  the  personal  motive 
may  be,  the  system  provides  a  method  of  dragging  before 
the  House  any  act  or  omission  by  the  departments  of  state, 
and  of  turning  a  searchlight  upon  every  corner  of  the  public 
service.  The  privilege  is  easily  abused,  but  it  helps  very 
much  to  keep  the  administration  of  the  country  up  to  the 
mark,  and  it  is  a  great  safeguard  against  negligent  or  arbi- 
trary conduct,  or  the  growth  of  that  bureaucratic  arro- 
gance which  is  quite  unknown  in  England.  The  minister 
is  not,  of  course,  obliged  to  answer,  but  unless  he  can  plead 
an  obvious  reason  of  public  policy  why  he  should  not  do 
so,  as  is  often  the  case  in  foreign  affairs,  a  refusal  would 
look  like  an  attempt  to  conceal,  and  would  have  a  bad 
effect. 

Now  while  questions  furnish  a  most  effective  means  of 
bringing  administrative  errors  to  the  notice  of  the  House 

1  May,  2.37-38.  Questions  may  also  be  addressed  to  the  Speaker,  or  to 
private  members  in  regard  to  bills  or  motions  in  their  charge,  but  questions 
of  this  kind  are  few,  and  do  not  concern  us  here. 


THE   COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  333 

they  afford  no  opportunity  for  passing  judgment  upon 
them ;  and  thereby  they  avoid  the  dangers  of  the  French 
custom  of  interpellations.  A  question  in  England  is  not 
even  followed  by  a  debate.  Often,  indeed,  the  member  says 
that  his  inquiry  has  not  been  fully  answered,  or  interjects 
a  remark,  objection  or  further  question ;  but  this  is  never 
allowed  to  grow  into  a  discussion,  and  when  the  habit  of 
asking  supplementary  questions  becomes  too  common  the 
ministers  refuse  to  answer  them  altogether,  to  the  tem- 
porary exasperation  of  the  Opposition,  or  the  Speaker 
himself  checks  them,  enforcing  the  rule  against  introducing 
matter  of  argument.  If  no  debate  is  in  order,  neither  is 
a  vote ;  and  hence  questions  furnish  a  means  of  drawing 
public  attention  to  an  act,  but  not  for  collective  censure 
of  it  by  the  House. 

Although  a  question  cannot  give  rise  directly  to  a  discus-  Motions  to 
sion  or  a  vote,  yet  a  motion,  followed  both  by  a  debate  and  AdJ°urn- 
a  division,  may  result  from  a  question.  This  is  the  "  motion 
to  adjourn  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  a  definite  matter 
of  urgent  public  importance/'  which  is  commonly,  but  by 
no  means  always,  provoked  by  an  answer  to  a  question.  It 
has  had  a  curious  history.  There  is  in  the  House  of  Com-  Their  His- 
mons  no  principle  of  universal  application  requiring  debate  tory' 
to  be  confined  to  the  subject  of  the  motion  before  the 
House,  and  great  latitude  was  formerly  permitted  in  the 
discussion  of  motions  to  adjourn.1  Taking  advantage  of 
this  fact  it  became  the  habit  to  create  an  opportunity 
for  debating  some  matter  that  could  not  be  brought 
forward  in  the  ordinary  course  of  procedure,  by  moving 
the  adjournment  before  the  orders  of  the  day  had  been 
taken  up;  and  the  object  being  merely  debate,  the  mo- 
tion was  almost  always  withdrawn  after  it  had  served  its 
purpose.  In  1877  motions  of  this  kind  began  to  be  used, 
much  against  the  inclination  of  the  Speaker,  to  bring  on  a 
debate  where  the  answer  to  a  question  had  been  unsatis- 
factory ;  and  about  the  same  time  they  ceased  to  be  regularly 

1  May,  301. 


334         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

withdrawn.1  A  few  years  later,  indeed,  it  became  common 
to  push  these  motions  to  a  division.  Before  1881  this  seems 
to  have  been  done  in  only  two  instances,2  but  in  that  year 
it  was  done  seven  times,  and  the  motions  themselves  rose 
to  the  unprecedented  number  of  nineteen.  Members  were 
beginning  to  regard  the  motion  to  adjourn  as  a  privilege, 
while  the  freedom  with  which  it  could  be  used  opened  a 
door  for  abuse.  The  government,  however,  speedily  re- 
stricted the  practice  by  regulations  that  dealt  with  different 
kinds  of  motions  to  adjourn  in  different  ways.  The  motion 
to  adjourn  for  the  Easter  or  Whitsuntide  recess  was  left  un- 
touched, and  still  gives  rise,  as  we  shall  see,  to  a  miscella- 
neous discussion  of  many  things.  Upon  a  motion  to  ad- 
journ, made,  on  the  other  hand,  while  the  House  is  engaged 
upon  the  business  of  the  day,  debate  was,  by  a  standing 
order  of  1882,  confined  strictly  to  the  question  of  adjourn- 
ment;3 and,  finally,  the  motion  to  adjourn,  made  before 
the  orders  of  the  day  have  been  taken  up,  was  hedged  about 
by  limitations  peculiar  to  itself. 
Motion  to  Mr.  Gladstone's  Urgency  Resolution  of  1881  gave  to  the 

Adjourn  to    gpeaker  control  over  the  business  of  the  House  so  long  as 

Discuss  an  l  " 

Urgent  Pub-  the  matter  declared  urgent  was  under  consideration;  and 
in  framing  rules  for  the  exercise  of  his  power  the  Speaker 
laid  down  a  principle  that  was  embodied  in  a  standing 
order  in  the  autumn  of  1882. 4     The  order,  which  is  still  in 

1  In  the  five  years  from  1873  to  1877  thirty-one  such  motions  were  made, 
of  which  all  but  three  were  withdrawn.  Those  three  were  negatived  by 
an  oral  vote,  and  were  not  pushed  to  an  actual  division.  In  the  next  five 
years,  up  to  the  adoption  of  the  Standing  Order  of  1882,  the  motions  num- 
bered sixty-four,  and  only  eighteen  of  them  were  withdrawn,  while  twelve 
(one  in  1878,  seven  in  1881,  and  four  in  1S82)  were  pushed  to  a  division. 
For  these  and  many  other  facts  relating  to  these  motions  to  adjourn  I 
am  indebted  to  my  students  at  Harvard,  Messrs.  O.  M.  Dickerson  and 
E.  Takasugi. 

2  In  1871  and  1878.  3  Now  S.O.  22. 

*  The  rules  framed  by  the  Speaker  on  Feb.  9,  1881,  provided,  in  regard  to 
motions  to  adjourn,  that  no  adjournment  should  be  moved  before  the 
business  of  the  day  was  taken  up,  except  by  leave  of  the  House;  and  that 
debate  on  a  motion  to  adjourn  made  after  business  had  been  taken  up, 
should  be  confined  to  the  question  of  adjournment.  Com.  Papers,  1881, 
LXXIV.,  1. 


the  Motion. 


THE  COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE   CABINET  335 

force  to-day,  provides  that  a  motion  to  adjourn  shall  not  be 
made  before  taking  up  the  business  of  the  day,  except  by 
leave  of  the  House,  unless  forty  members  rise  in  their  places 
to  support  it,  or  ten  members  rise,  and  the  House,  on  a  divi- 
sion, decides  that  the  motion  shall  be  made.  It  provides, 
also,  that  the  motion  can  be  made  only  "for  the  purpose  of 
discussing  a  definite  matter  of  urgent  public  importance."  ! 
The  standing  order  of  1882  prevented  waste  of  time  by  a 
frivolous  or  eccentric  use  of  the  motion  to  adjourn,  but  did 
not  prevent  any  considerable  body  of  opponents  from  using 
it  to  bring  the  ministers  to  account.  This  may  be  seen  from 
the  fact  that  in  the  twenty  years  following  the  adoption  of 
the  order  the  motion  was  made  one  hundred  and  forty-six 
times,  and  in  just  one  half  of  those  cases  it  was  pushed  to  a 
division. 

Although  the  motion  is  almost  invariably  made  by  an  Object  of 
opponent  of  the  ministry,  the  object  is  not  always  censure. 
Sometimes  it  is  made  in  order  to  obtain  fuller  information 
than  can  be  given  by  an  answer  to  a  question ;  sometimes  in 
order  to  rivet  attention  on  a  subject;  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
it  is  often  withdrawn  or  negatived  without  a  division.  Yet 
it  does  furnish  a  method  by  which,  without  notice,  a  debate 
can  be  precipitated  and  a  vote  taken  upon  a  specific  act  or 
omission  of  the  government ;  and  this  is  after  all  its  chief 
importance.  The  motion  bears,  therefore,  a  certain  resem- 
blance to  the  French  interpellation,  but  the  difference  in 
form  is  of  the  utmost  consequence.  There  is  in  England  no 
chance  to  frame  the  motion,  as  in  France,  to  express  subtle 
shades  of  meaning.  It  cannot  be  so  drafted  that  conscien- 
tious members  of  the  dominant  party  may  feel  obliged  to 
vote  for  it,  although  it  implies  a  condemnation  of  the  gov- 
ernment. The  motion  to  adjourn  does  not,  indeed,  express 
in  terms  any  judgment  upon  the  subject-matter  of  the 
debate,  and  a  supporter  of  the  cabinet  can,  without  incon- 
sistency, state  his  opinion  that  the  ministers  have  blundered, 

1  Now  SO.  10.      The  changes  made  in  1902  did  not  affect  these  provisions, 
l,ut  merely  the  time  when  the  debute  on  the  motion  should  take  place. 


336 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Its  Danger. 


Under  the 
Rules  of 
1902  and 
1906. 


Blocking 
Orders. 


and  then  vote  against  the  adjournment.  The  motion  has, 
in  fact,  been  carried  only  twice;  once  on  May  10,  1881, 
before  the  Standing  Order  of  1882,  in  a  very  thin  House, 
when  the  government  did  not  oppose  it ; l  and  a  second  time 
on  July  5,  1887,  after  the  debate  over  the  arrest  of  Miss 
Cass.     In  neither  case  did  any  minister  resign. 

Still  the  motion  to  adjourn  is  a  source  of  danger  to  the 
cabinet.  Cool  as  English  public  men  are,  and  strong  as  the 
bonds  of  party  have  become,  it  wrould  be  rash  to  predict 
that  the  House  of  Commons  will  not  be  carried  away  again 
as  it  was  in  the  case  of  Miss  Cass,  and  that  the  cabinet  would 
not  regard  a  vote  to  adjourn  as  a  censure  implying  lack  of 
confidence.  The  danger  has  been  slightly  reduced  by  the 
rules  of  1902.  By  a  change  in  the  standing  orders  adopted 
in  that  year,  and  slightly  modified  in  190G,  the  motion  can 
be  made  only  when  the  putting  of  questions  is  finished  at 
a  quarter  before  four,  and  then  stands  over  for  debate  until  a 
quarter  past  eight  of  the  same  day.  By  this  arrangement 
the  government  escapes  the  risk  of  surprise.  It  has  five 
hours,  after  notice  of  the  debate,  in  which  to  prepare  its 
case,  ascertain  the  opinion  of  its  followers,  persuade  the 
doubtful,  and  rally  the  faithful.  Then  the  debate  comes  on 
at  an  hour  when  the  attendance  is  habitually  small,  instead 
of  a  time  when  the  House  is  always  full.2 

Moreover  a  motion  to  adjourn  for  the  purpose  of  discuss- 
ing a  matter  of  urgent  public  importance  can,  in  the  case 
of  any  particular  subject,  be  prevented  altogether,  if  neces- 


1  The  debate  was  over  the  arrest  of  Mr.  Dillon,  M.P.  Mr.  Gladstone,  not 
thinking  it  a  proper  way  to  bring  the  question  before  the  House,  declined  to 
resist  the  motion,  which  was  carried  without  a  division.  Hans.  3  Ser. 
CCLXL,  183-216. 

2  In  the  twenty  years  that  the  Standing  Order  of  1882  remained  un- 
changed, the  number  of  motions  to  adjourn,  before  public  business  began 
averaged  seven  a  year.  In  1903  there  were  only  three  of  them,  and  in  1904 
seven;  but  in  1905,  when  Mr.  Balfour's  cabinet  was  manifestly  losing  its 
hold  upon  the  country,  the  number  rose  to  nine.  Incidentally  the  change 
of  rule  has  tended  to  shift  the  debates  on  those  motions  into  the  time  re- 
served for  private  members,  for  the  debate  must  occur  at  the  evening  sitting, 
and  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  session  two  of  the  four  evening  sittings  belong 
to  the  private  members. 


THE   COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  337 

sary,  by  a  very  simple  device.  There  is  a  general  principle 
of  parliamentary  law  in  England  that  no  question  on  which 
the  House  has  rendered  a  decision  shall  be  brought  before 
it  a  second  time  in  the  same  session ;  and  in  the  Commons  — 
although  not  in  the  Lords  —  the  principle  has  been  extended 
by  rulings  of  the  Speakers  to  forbid  the  anticipation  of 
questions  of  which  notice  has  already  been  given.  Nor  is  it 
necessary  that  a  definite  time  for  taking  the  matter  up  should 
have  been  fixed.1  It  is  enough  that  the  notice  of  a  motion 
should  have  been  given,  no  matter  how  remote  may  be  the 
chance  that  the  member  who  gave  the  notice  will  ever  be 
able  to  bring  his  motion  before  the  House.  By  merely  giv- 
ing notice  of  a  motion,  which  he  has  no  intention  of  calling 
up,  any  member  can,  therefore,  prevent  a  subject  from 
being  brought  forward  either  by  a  motion  to  adjourn,  or  by 
a  subsequent  private  member's  motion,  or  in  the  course  of 
the  debate  on  adjournment  for  the  Easter  or  Whitsuntide 
recess.  A  "blocking  motion"  of  this  kind  is  thus  an 
effectual  barrier  against  a  motion  to  adjourn  which  might 
place  the  government  in  an  awkward  position. 

Complaints  of  the  use  of  blocking  motions  have  been  often 
made,  and  in  1904  there  was  no  little  discussion  of  the  sub- 
ject.2 There  were  said  to  be  on  the  notice  paper,  without 
any  day  assigned  for  their  consideration,  thirty-four  notices 
of  motion,  relating  among  other  things  to  fiscal  reform, 
Macedonia,  the  Congo  State,  Thibet,  the  reorganisation  of 
the  War  Office,  Chinese  labour  in  South  Africa,  public 
health,  military  training,  local  and  other  taxation,  and  the 
system  of  blocking  motions  itself.3  It  was  asserted  that 
motions  of  this  kind  were  set  down  by  supporters  of  the 
Treasury   Bench    after   consultation   with   the    government 

1  Mav,  264-6.5,  286. 

2  E.g.  Huns.  A  SerX'XXV.,  379-80,  382-83,  386-87,  397-98,  415,  629-30, 
1229-31';  Ibid.,  CXXXVI.,  836-40.  Cf.  remarks  by  Mr.  Swift  MacNeill  in 
1906.     Ibid.,  CLII.,  1178-79. 

3  Hans.  4  Ser.  ('XXXV.,  1229.  Since  this  was  written  a  report  lias  been 
made  by  a  Keleet  committee  on  the  subject;  and  appended  thereto  is  a 
memorandum  by  Sir  Courtenay  Ilbert  on  the  history  of  the  rule  against 
anticipation. 

z 


338  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

whip.  Mr.  Balfour  did  not  deny  the  charge,  but  said  that  he 
never  inquired  into  consultations  of  that  kind.1  He  thought 
that  "there  ought  to  be  no  limitation  of  the  powers  of  the 
House  to  discuss  anything  upon  a  motion  for  adjournment 
for  the  holidays";  but  he  was  more  cautious  in  giving  an 
opinion  about  motions  to  adjourn  to  discuss  a  matter  of 
urgent  public  importance.  The  government  dislikes  these 
motions,  because  they  consume  precious  time,  and  because 
they  can  be  used  on  all  occasions  to  raise  awkward  ques- 
tions on  which  the  cabinet  may  be  unwilling  to  show  its 
hand  or  supply  facts.  There  is,  however,  another  serious 
objection  to  them.  The  House  ought  to  be  at  liberty  to 
criticise  the  ministry  freely  at  all  times,  but  that  the  dis- 
cussion should  be  followed  by  a  vote,  expressing,  however 
indirectly,  a  judgment  on  the  matter,  involves  a  possible 
danger  to  the  parliamentary  form  of  government. 
Private  The  most  direct  method  by  which  the  acts  of  the  min- 

isters can  be  brought  before  Parliament,  and  a  vote  taken 
upon  them,  is  that  of  private  members'  motions.  These 
may,  and  often  do,  contain  an  explicit  condemnation  of 
some  part  of  the  policy  or  administrative  conduct  of  the 
government.  But  the  effectiveness  of  such  motions  as  a 
means  of  passing  judgment  upon  the  Treasury  Bench  is  not  in 
reality  great,  and  that  for  several  reasons.  There  are  in  all 
only  about  seventeen  evenings  reserved  for  the  purpose, 
and  it  is  rare  that  more  than  one  motion  reaches  a  vote  in  an 
evening.  Nor  are  those  few  occasions  all  used  to  take  the 
government  to  task.  The  right  to  make  a  motion  is  deter- 
mined by  the  ballot,  and  the  fortunate  member  is  free  to 
raise  any  question  he  pleases.  Being  one  of  the  rare  chances 
for  private  initiative,  he  often  uses  it  to  bring  forward  some 
favourite  project  of  his  own.  Several  of  these  evenings  are 
thus  devoted  every  year  to  discussing  aspirations  that  lie 
outside  the  field  of  party  politics,  and  do  not  affect  the  po- 
sition of  the  cabinet.  The  number  of  motions  aimed  at  the 
government  is,  therefore,  not  large,  and  unless  many  mem- 

1  Ibid.,  1232.     Cf.  CXXXVL,  840. 


Members' 
Motions. 


THE   COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  339 

bers  are  interested  in  criticising  the  same  thing,  it  is  a  mere 
chance  what  is  brought  forward  for  discussion.  Then  all 
the  private  members'  evenings  come  in  the  early  part  of 
the  year,  and  notices  of  the  motions  must  be  given  four 
evenings  in  advance.  It  follows  that  they  can  hardly  deal 
with  current  questions  that  arise  after  the  session  is  well 
under  way,  and  this  is  in  itself  a  very  serious  limitation 
upon  their  importance  as  a  means  of  bringing  the  ministers 
to  account. 

In  case  of  necessity  a  hostile  vote  on  a  private  member's  Means  of 
motion  can  usuallv  be  avoided.     The  member  has  but  one  r^voldin8 

1  hem. 

evening,  and  the  ministers  could  no  doubt  prolong  the  de- 
bate until  the  moment  of  interruption,  and  then  defeat  an 
attempt  at  closure.  But  this  does  not  appear  to  be  done, 
and  might  be  regarded  as  showing  too  much  fear  of 
the  result.  Sometimes,  also,  a  motion  can  be  blocked, 
although  that  is  not  so  easy  as  in  the  case  of  a  motion  to 
adjourn,  because  the  private  member  has  as  early  an  oppor- 
tunity as  the  blocker  to  give  notice  of  his  motion. 

There  are,  however,  other  means  of  defence ;  and,  in  fact, 
the  possibility  of  escaping  a  disastrous  vote  on  a  private 
member's  motion  has  been  recently  illustrated  in  the  case 
of  the  fiscal  question  in  a  very  striking  way,  for  during  the 
sessions  of  1904  and  1905  such  motions  were  used  persist- 
ently in  a  vain  attempt  to  get  a  decisive  expression  of  opin- 
ion on  that  question.  On  May  18,  1904,  a  motion  was  made 
against  any  protective  tax  on  food,  which  the  government 
met  by  an  amendment  that  it  was  not  necessary  to  discuss 
the  question.  As  there  were  a  number  of  Unionists  who 
objected  to  a  tax  on  food,  but  did  not  want  to  upset  the  gov- 
ernment, the  amendment  was  carried.  Early  in  the  next 
session  another  inconvenient  motion  of  a  similar  kind  was 
-helved  by  the  previous  question;  and,  finally,  Mr.  Balfour 
decided  that  he  could  avoid  the  consequences  of  a  wager  of 
battle  by  simply  refusing  to  fight.  On  .March  '22  and  2S, 
1905,  followed  by  most  of  his  supporters,  he  absented  him- 
self from  the  debates  and  divisions  on    private    members' 


340         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

motions  touching  this  subject,  although  on  the  second  occa- 
sion the  motion  condemned  in  direct  terms  the  policy  of  the 
government.  He  explained  that  he  took  this  course  be- 
cause the  subject  ought  not  to  be  discussed  on  party  lines, 
and  could  not  be  dealt  with  by  the  existing  Parliament, 
which  had  no  mandate  from  the  nation  for  the  purpose.  He 
added  that  if  the  House  was  allowed  on  private  members' 
nights  to  act  without  the  ordinary  machinery  of  party  man- 
agement, the  conclusions  at  which  it  might  arrive  would  be 
treated  as  expressions  of  opinion  which  do  not  govern 
policy.1  In  other  words,  he  claimed  that  the  ministers 
might  decline  to  take  part  in  the  proceedings  on  private 
members'  motions,  and  disregard  the  votes  passed.  His 
attitude  was  severely  criticised,  and  may  have  damaged 
the  ministry  in  the  eyes  of  the  public,  but  that  he  should 
have  been  able  to  assume  it  shows  the  impotence  of  mo- 
tions of  that  kind. 
Rarely  Car-  As  lately  as  twenty  years  ago  motions  made  by  private 
the*  MfmV  *  members  were  not  infrequently  carried  against  the  oppo- 
ters.  sition  of  the  government  —  on  the  average  nearly  once  a 

year.  Like  all  other  votes  hostile  to  the  ministers,  however, 
they  have  become  more  rare,  and  in  fact  the  last  case  of  the 
kind  occurred  in  1893.  But  if  private  members'  motions 
have  not  of  late  proved  effectual,  as  a  means  of  bringing  some 
special  part  of  the  conduct  of  the  government  before  the 
judgment  of  the  House,  and  obtaining  a  test  vote  upon  it, 
this  may  not  hereafter  be  true  in  every  case.  They  certainly 
furnish  possible  exception  to  the  principle  that  in  its  rela- 
tions with  the  government  the  House  of  Commons  passes 
judgment  only  upon  the  measures  which  the  ministers  choose 
to  bring  forward,  or  upon  their  policy  and  administrative 
record  as  a  whole. 
Debate  on  Amendments  to  the  address,  motions  to  adjourn  and  pri- 
s'uppfy!  va*e  members'  motions,  are  almost  the  only  occasions  at 
the  present  time  when  criticism  of  the  government's  action 
can  be  followed  by  a  vote  upon  the  act  criticised.     Formerly 

1  Hans.  4  Ser.  CXLTIL,  886-95. 


THE   COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE   CABINET  341 

there  was  another  opportunity  as  constant  and  prolific  as 
any  of  them.  This  came  when  the  House  resolved  itself 
into  Committee  of  the  Whole  on  Supply.  Before  taking 
up  supply  on  any  day  a  motion  had  to  be  made  that  the 
Speaker  do  leave  the  chair ;  and  in  accordance,  it  was  said, 
with  the  ancient  doctrine  that  redress  of  grievances  should 
be  considered  before  supply,  any  subject  not  requiring  a 
substantive  motion,  or  not  a  matter  of  detail  properly  dis- 
cussed in  the  committee  itself,  could  be  debated  either  on 
the  principal  motion,  or  on  an  amendment  framed  for  the 
purpose.1  This  gave  frequent  opportunities,  throughout  the 
greater  part  of  the  session,  not  only  for  finding  fault  with 
the  conduct  of  the  government,  but  also  for  taking  the 
sense  of  the  House  thereon  by  means  of  amendments  to  the 
motion  that  the  Speaker  do  leave  the  chair. 

The  practice  opened  the  door  to  a  vexatious  waste  of  How  Lim- 
time,  and  in  1882  it  was  limited  by  a  standing  order,  which  ltedm1882- 
provided  that  on  Monday  or  Thursday  the  Speaker  should 
leave  the  chair  without  question  put  (and  therefore  without 
amendment  or  debate)  unless  on  first  going  into  supply 
on  the  estimates  for  the  Army,  Navy,  or  civil  service,  or 
on  a  vote  of  credit,  an  amendment  should  be  moved,  or 
question  raised,  relating  to  the  estimates  proposed  to  be 
taken  in  supply.2  Tuesdays  and  Wednesdays  were  at  that 
time  private  members'  days,  and  whenever  they  were  seized 
by  the  government,  and  used  for  supply,  it  was  the  habit  to 
extend  the  order  to  them  by  special  vote.3  This  left  Friday 
as  the  only  day  on  which  the  motion  that  the  Speaker 
do  leave  the  chair  was  open  to  amendment  and  debate* 
Finally,  in  1896,  when  a  fixed  number  of  days  were  allotted  in  1896  and 
to  supply,  the  standing  order  was  extended  to  Friday  also. 

1  Anson,  "Law  and  Custom  of  tho  Const."  I.,  270;  May,  ,r>71-72.  Red- 
lich  (lierht  und  Tcrhnik,  1 1 0—1 7 )  points  out  that  these  amendments  be- 
gan in  1S11  at  the  very  moment  when  special  days  were  first  reserved  for 
the  government . 

2  Old  SO    56.  3  May,  573  7  1. 

*  Friday  was  especially  reserved  for  this  purpose  l>v  old  S.O.  11,  <j.  Old 
S.O.  51. 


Present 
Practice. 


342         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

It  was  done  at  first  by  a  sessional  order;  but  this  was 
renewed  from  year  to  year,  until  it  was  made  permanent  by 
the  rules  of  1902.1 
Effect  of  the  At  present  the  Speaker  leaves  the  chair  without  putting 
any  question,  except  on  going  into  supply  for  the  first  time 
on  the  Army,  Navy  and  civil  service  estimates ;  and  on  these 
three  occasions  the  rule  that  discussion  and  amendment  must 
relate  to  the  estimates  in  that  branch  of  supply  about  to 
be  taken  up  is  very  strictly  applied.2  Moreover,  only  a 
single  amendment  to  the  motion  that  the  Speaker  do  leave 
the  chair  can  be  moved,  because  the  amendment  takes  the 
form  that  certain  words  in  the  motion  be  left  out  in  order  to 
substitute  others,  and  the  question  is  put  to  the  House 
whether  the  words  proposed  to  be  left  out  shall  stand.  If, 
therefore,  the  amendment  is  negatived,  the  House  has 
decided  that  those  words  shall  stand  part  of  the  question, 
and  no  other  amendment  to  omit  them  can  afterward  be 
proposed.3  Debate,  however,  may  and  usually  does  con- 
tinue upon  the  main  question.  But  the  House  can  hardly 
reject  the  motion  that  the  Speaker  do  leave  the  chair;  and, 
in  fact,  such  a  vote,  although  perhaps  a  general  reflection 
upon  the  ministry,  could  not,  after  a  miscellaneous  debate 
upon  many  topics,  be  regarded  as  expressing  an  opinion 
upon  any  particular  subject. 

It  follows  that  (besides  the  extraordinary  case  of  a  vote 
of  credit)  there  are  every  year  three  occasions  set  apart 
for  general  discussion  of  all  matters  germane  to  the  three 
great  branches  of  supply,  on  each  of  which  a  single  vote  can 
be  taken  upon  some  special  grievance  or  question  of  policy. 
Formerly  the  amendment  that  obtained  the  right  of  way 
depended  largely  upon  the  accident  of  catching  the  Speaker's 
eye,4  but  now,  like  the  motions  on  private  members'  nights, 
it  is  determined  by  the  blinder  justice  of  the  lot.5  The 
amendments  relate  to  all  manner  of  things,  such  as  the 

1  S.O.  17.  *  May,  574. 

2  May,  573.  » Ilbert,  "  Manual,"  §  45. 
'May,  574;  Ilbert,  "Manual,"  §  231. 


THE  COMMONS'   CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  343 

system  of  enlistment  for  the  Army,  the  number  of  artillery 
horses,  the  insufficient  manning  of  the  fleet,  the  desirability 
of  an  international  agreement  for  a  reduction  in  ship-build- 
ing, the  refusal  of  the  Post  Office  to  grant  telephone  licenses 
to  municipalities,  the  inequitable  fiscal  treatment  of  Scot- 
land, and  the  defective  state  of  primary  education  in  Ireland. 

The  three  general  debates  upon  the  motions  to  go  into 
Committee  of  Supply  upon  the  estimates  still  afford  an 
excellent  chance  for  criticising  the  government,  but  the 
limitations  upon  amendments,  and  the  conditions  under 
which  they  are  proposed,  have  reduced  the  opportunity  for  a 
decisive  condemnation  of  any  part  of  its  conduct  almost  to 
nothing.  Until  a  score  of  years  ago  the  ministers  were,  in- 
deed, beaten  nearly  every  session  upon  some  amendment 
on  going  into  supply,  but  since  1891  this  has  not  happened 
once. 

After  the  general  rule  forbidding  debate  and  amendment   Amend- 
on  going  into  Committee  of  Supply  had  been  extended  to  mentson, 

D  °  i  i     «.  tiding  into 

Friday,  it  occurred  to  Mr.  Gibson  Bowles,  an  enterprising  Ways  and 
mentor  of  the  government,  that  a  similar  use  might  be  made 
of  the  motion  to  go  into  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means. 
Accordingly  in  the  regular  session  of  1900,  and  in  the  special 
session  in  December  of  that  year,  he  moved  amendments  to 
the  motion,  but  the  practice  grieved  the  Treasury  Bench 
and  was  stopped  by  a  change  in  the  standing  orders  made 
in  1901. ' 

In  proposing  his  new  procedure  for  supply  in  1896,  Mr.   Debate  in 
Balfour  spoke  of  the  belief  that  the  object  of  debating  the  ^."'"/f 
appropriations  is  to   secure  economical  administration,   as  Supply  as 
an  ancient  superstition  no  longer  at  all  true.     Members,  he  critidsm° 
said,  now  move  reductions  in  order  to  get  from  ministers 

1  The  change  consisted  in  leaving  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means  out 
of  the  exceptions,  in  S.O.  51,  to  the  general  rule  that  the  House  goes  into 
committee  without  question   put. 

Debate  on  the  motion  to  go  into  committee  on  the  East  Indian  Accounts    The  Coin- 
is  still  allowed,  in  order  to  provide  an  opportunity  for  general  debate  on    mitteeon 
the  questions  that  may  arise  on  these  accounts.      (S.O.  51,  cf.  Ilbert,  "  Man-    Indian   V 
ual,"   J   64.)      An   amendment    can  also    be    moved   (Ibid.,   §    117),  but   in    counts. 
practice  this  has  no  serious  effect. 


344         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

a  promise  of  future  increase ;  and  the  danger  is  that  the 
House  will  urge  too  much  extravagance.  He  insisted  that 
the  real  object  of  the  Committee  of  Supply  is  the  chance  it 
affords  to  private  members  of  criticising  the  executive  and 
administrative  action  of  the  government ;  that  it  is  an  open 
platform  for  members,  where  the  ministers,  for  the  sake  of 
getting  their  appropriations  passed,  are  bound  to  keep  a 
quorum.1  This  is,  indeed,  manifest  to  any  one  familiar  with 
the  debates  upon  the  estimates.  They  are  not  to  any  great 
extent  discussions  of  financial  questions,  of  what  the  nation 
can,  or  cannot,  afford  to  do.  They  are  a  long  series  of  criti- 
cisms upon  the  policy  of  the  ministers,  and  the  conduct  of 
the  departments  under  their  control.  From  this  point  of 
view  Mr.  Balfour  suggested  a  method  of  making  the  debates 
more  valuable.  He  described  the  futility  of  the  old  system 
of  taking  up  the  estimates  in  their  numerical  order,  pointing 
out  how  much  time  was  wasted  every  year  in  discussing  the 
earlier  votes  in  Class  I.,  —  repairs  of  royal  palaces,  etc.,  — 
while  some  of  the  largest  appropriations  were  always  hur- 
ried through  with  little  comment  at  the  fag  end  of  the  session. 
He  promised  in  future  to  bring  forward  the  important  votes 
in  the  earlier  part  of  the  year,  and  in  fact  to  give  prece- 
dence to  estimates  that  any  group  of  members  might  wish 
to  discuss.2 

Adding  together  the  days  regularly  allotted  to  supply 
under  the  standing  order,  the  additional  sittings  used  for 
the  purpose,  and  those  devoted  to  supplementary  estimates,3 
the  better  part  of  more  than  thirty  days  are  spent  every 

1  Hans.  4  Ser.  XXXVII.,  724-26.  With  this  may  be  contrasted  the 
Report  of  the  Select  Committee  on  Procedure  in  Supply  in  1888  (Com.  Papers, 
1888.  XII.,  27),  which  said  that  the  debates  on  the  estimates  were  an  effec- 
tive means,  both  of  criticising  the  administration  and  of  controlling  expen- 
diture. It  expressed  the  opinion  that  although  the  estimates  were  not 
often  actually  reduced,  the  discussion  prevented  future  extravagance.  For 
the  condition  at  the  present  day  see  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on 
National  Expenditure,  and  the  evidence  thereto  annexed  (Com.  Papers, 
1902,  VII.,  15;  1903.  VII..  483). 

2  Hans.    4  Ser.  XXXVII.,  727-30. 

3  Debate  on  supplementary  and  excess  grants  is  limited  to  those  par- 
ticular grants.     May,  585-86. 


THE  COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  345 

year  in  Committee  of  Supply.  This  would  appear  to  give 
time  enough  for  a  thorough  overhauling  of  many  branches 
of  the  administration;  and  under  Mr.  Balfour's  practice, 
which  will,  no  doubt,  be  followed  by  future  cabinets,  the 
question  what  departments  shall  be  examined  is  determined 
by  the  critics  themselves. 

The  debates  in  the  Committee  of  Supply  must  be  relevant 
to  the  estimates  under  consideration,  that  is,  they  must  be 
confined  to  the  particular  vote  then  before  the  House,  and 
the  conduct  of  the  government  connected  therewith.  The 
greater  part  of  the  time  is  therefore  taken  up  with  a  discus- 
sion of  small  details  of  administration.  But  there  are  certain 
votes  that  give  a  chance  to  review  the  broader  questions  of 
policy.  As  the  grants  made  to  the  Army  and  Navy  for  one 
purpose  can,  with  the  consent  of  the  Treasury,  be  used  for 
another,  the  debate  on  the  great  votes  for  the  pay  of  the 
men  is  allowed  to  range  over  the  general  policy  and  man- 
agement of  the  service  concerned.1  The  items  for  the 
salaries  of  the  ministers  give  a  similar,  though  less  compre- 
hensive, chance  to  examine  the  policy  pursued  in  their  sev- 
eral departments  ;  and  in  order  to  raise  a  debate  of  that  kind 
it  is  common  to  move  to  reduce  the  salary  of  a  minister  by 
one  hundred  pounds.  If  an  excessive  proportion  of  the 
time  devoted  to  supply  is  consumed  in  the  ventilation  of 
small  grievances,  that  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  criticism 
is  conducted,  in  the  main,  by  individual  members  of  the 
House,  and  not  by  an  organised  opposition;  but  at  least  it 
has  the  merit  of  keeping  the  administration  in  all  its  details 
highly  sensitive  to  public  opinion. 

The  debates  in  supply  afford  an  excellent  opportunity  for  Amend- 
criticising  the  acts  of  the  government,  but  the  divisions  in   suppU-as 
supply  are  not  an  effective  means  of  expressing  the  judg-  an  Kxpres- 

"  it  rn        •  r  sionofOpin 

merit  of  the  House  upon  those  acts.      1  he  items  ol  appro-   ;on 
priation  are  grouped  into  votes,  each  of  which,  as  its  name 
implies,  is  passed  as  a  single  vote;    and  every  vote  contains 
so    many    items   that    the    House    cannot    reject    it    entirely. 

1  May,  r>x,-8f>. 


346 


THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Reductions 
used  as  a 
Protest. 


Moreover,  the  only  amendment  in  order  is  a  motion  to  re- 
duce the  vote,  by  omitting  a  particular  item  or  otherwise. 
Now  a  reduction  may  be  moved  either  because  the  House 
really  objects  to  the  appropriation,  or  as  a  means  of  express- 
ing condemnation  of  some  act  of  the  government  connected 
with  the  item  in  question.  Even  in  these  days  of  extrava- 
gance the  House  occasionally  objects  to  an  appropriation 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  unnecessary  or  excessive,  or  because 
it  disapproves  of  the  purpose  altogether.  In  such  cases  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  is  apt  to  withdraw  the  estimate 
or  consent  to  the  reduction.  In  fact,  there  have  been  only 
two  instances  in  the  last  twenty  years  where  a  reduction 
was  made  for  this  reason  without  the  consent  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  only  one  where  it  was  carried  against  their  oppo- 
sition.1 

A  reduction  is  often  moved,  on  the  other  hand,  to  empha- 
sise some  grievance,  some  act  of  the  administration  that  is 
the  subject  of  complaint.  But  such  a  motion  is  not  an  effec- 
tive means  of  testing  the  opinion  of  the  House  upon  the 
matter  in  debate.     When,  for  example,   a  reduction  of  a 


1  Since  the  reduction  of  the  vote  for  royal  parks  on  March  11,  1886,  the 
only  two  instances  have  been  a  reduction  of  the  salaries  of  the  officers  of 
the  House  of  Lords,  carried  against  the  government  in  1893  on  the  ground 
that  they  were  excessive,  and  in  1895  a  rejection  of  the  appropriation  for  a 
statue  of  Cromwell. 

A  list  of  all  the  reductions  in  the  estimates  from  1868  to  1887  may  be 
found  in  Appendix  5  to  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Estimates  Proced- 
ure (Com.  Papers,  1888,  XII.,  27).  A  list  of  those  from  1887  through 
1901  in  Appendix  1,  of  the  first  report  of  the  Committee  on  National  Ex- 
penditure (Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  15.  Cf.  Return  of  Divisions  in  Supply, 
1891-1901.  Com.  Papers,  1902,  LXXXIL,  139).  There  were  eighteen 
reductions  in  the  twenty  years  covered  by  the  earlier  report,  eleven  in  the 
fourteen  years  next  following.  Of  those  eleven,  four  were  cases  where 
estimates  were  withdrawn  by  the  government  (two  of  them  supplementary 
estimates,  afterward  voted  as  regular  estimates  for  the  next  year),  three 
were  reductions  moved  by  the  government  because  the  expenditure  had 
become  unnecessary,  another  was  a  reduction  accepted  by  the  govern- 
ment, two  more  were  the  two  cases  mentioned  in  the  text,  and  the  remain- 
ing one  was  moved  to  call  attention  to  a  grievance,  i.e.  the  number  of  rooms 
in  the  Parliament  buildings  occupied  by  officers  of  the  House.  This  last 
case,  together  with  the  reduction  of  the  salary  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
War  (which  occurred  in  1895,  but  is  not  mentioned  in  the  list),  is  described 
hereafter  in  the  text. 


THE   COMMONS'   CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  347 

minister's  salary  is  proposed  in  order  to  draw  attention  to 
a  shortcoming  in  his  department,  the  supporters  of  the 
cabinet  almost  invariably  vote  against  the  reduction  with- 
out regard  to  their  opinion  upon  the  shortcoming  in  question ; 
and  they  are  perfectly  right  in  so  doing.  They  would  be 
quite  justified,  and  quite  logical,  in  refusing  to  vote  the 
reduction  in  salary,  while  saying  that  the  act  complained 
of  had  been  a  mistake  and  ought  not  to  occur  again.  An 
amendment  of  that  kind  is,  therefore,  seldom  carried ;  and 
then  usually  by  accident.  It  has  happened  only  four  times 
in  a  score  of  years.  On  June  14,  1895,  when  Lord  Roscbery's 
cabinet  was  struggling  for  its  life,  with  only  a  majority  of 
a  dozen  in  the  Commons,  it  was  beaten  on  an  amendment 
reducing  the  appropriation  for  the  Parliament  buildings  by 
five  hundred  pounds  to  call  attention  to  the  quantity  of 
rooms  occupied  by  officials  of  the  House.  The  number  of 
members  who  took  part  in  the  division  was  so  small  — ■  the 
vote  being  sixty-three  to  forty-three  —  that  the  result  must  be 
regarded  as  a  fluke,  rather  than  as  an  expression  of  opinion 
by  the  House.  A  week  later  the  government  was  defeated 
again  on  an  amendment  to  reduce  the  salary  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  War  by  one  hundred  pounds  to  draw 
attention  to  an  alleged  lack  of  supply  of  cordite.  This  was 
done  by  a  trick.  Enough  Conservatives  to  turn  the  scale 
were  brought  into  the  House,  by  way  of  the  terrace,  without 
the  knowledge  of  the  whips  on  either  .side.  Under  ordinary 
circumstances  the  ministers  would  not  have  paid  much  at- 
tention to  such  a  division,  but  their  position  in  this  case 
was  so  precarious  and  so  uncomfortable,  that  they  took 
advantage  of  the  occurrence  to  resign.  The  third  instance 
happened  in  1004  when  the  grant  for  the  Commissioners  of 
National  Education  in  Ireland  was  reduced  by  one  hundred 
pounds  as  a  protest  against  a  circular  they  had  issued  which 
limited  the  teaching  of  the  Irish  language  in  the  schools.  It 
was  a  "snap"  vote,  coming  suddenly  after  a  very  short 
debate.  Had  the  ministers  foreseen  the  division  they  could 
easily  have  called  in  enough  of  their  followers  to  change  the 


348  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF   ENGLAND 

majority ; 1  and,  in  fact,  they  seem  to  have  disregarded  the 
vote  altogether,  save  that  they  expended  for  Irish  education 
one  hundred  pounds  less  than  they  had  intended.  The  last 
case  was  in  1905,  when  the  appropriation  for  the  Irish  Land 
Commission  was  reduced  by  one  hundred  pounds  as  a  pro- 
test against  the  administration  of  the  Land  Act  of  1903. 
This  was  serious,  and  the  government  considered  its  position 
for  a  couple  of  days,  but  decided  for  the  moment  neither  to 
resign  nor  dissolve.2 

Manifestly  the  debates  in  Committee  of  Supply  offer  a 
very   wide   field  for  individual   criticism,   while  they   give 
little   chance   for   collective   condemnation   of  the   matters 
criticised.     This  is  even  more  obvious  in  certain  other  forms 
of  procedure  that  are  yet  to  be  considered. 
Debates  on        The  debates  upon  the  resolutions  embodying  the  propo- 
se Finance  gajg  Q£  ^e  budget,  and  upon  the  Finance  Bill  that  carries 
them  into  effect,  are  governed  by  the  ordinary  rules  of  de- 
bate upon  bills,  and  are  confined  to  the  questions  immedi- 
ately before  the  House.3 
on  the  But   in   introducing   his   budget   the   Chancellor   of   the 

Exchequer  makes  a  statement  covering  the  income  and  ex- 
penditure of  the  current  and  coming  years,  and  incidentally 
reviewing  the  economic  condition  of  the  country  and  the 
state  of  trade.  The  debate  that  ensues  may  wander  as  far 
as  the  statement  itself,  regardless  of  the  particular  resolution 
on  which  it  is  nominally  based.  This  gives  a  chance  to 
examine  fully  the  financial  policy  —  but  only  the  financial 
policy  —  of  the  government ;  without,  however,  any  cor- 
responding means  of  expressing  the  judgment  of  the  House 
thereon, 
on  the  Con-  In  his  treatise  on  parliamentary  practice,  Sir  Thomas 
Fund  Biib.  Erskine  May  states  that  debate  and  amendment  on  the 
stages  of  Consolidated  Fund  Bills  "must  be  relevant  to  the 

1  The  vote  was  141  to  130.      (Hans.  4  Ser.  CXXXI.,  1141-50.) 

2  The  vote  was  199  to  196.  (Hans.  4  Ser.  CIL.,  1486  et  seq.)  Mr.  Bal- 
four's cabinet  resigned  three  months  later  when  Parliament  was  not  in 
session. 

3  Cf.  May,  588. 


THE   COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  349 

bill,  and  must  be  confined  to  the  conduct  or  action  of  those 
who  receive  or  administer  the  grants  specified  in  the  bill."  * 
The  first  part  of  this  statement  is  true  of  the  committee 
stage.  Debate  and  amendment  must  then  be  strictly  rele- 
vant ;  and  as  the  object  of  the  bills  is  simply  to  authorise 
the  issue  out  of  the  Consolidated  Fund  of  the  sums  required 
to  meet  the  grants  already  voted,  and  to  provide  that  those 
grants  must  be  used  for  the  purposes  for  which  they  are  made, 
no  criticism  of  administrative  conduct  is  in  order.2  The 
proceedings  in  committee  are,  therefore,  brief.  The  latter 
part  of  May's  statement  applies  to  the  second  and  third 
readings,  but  as  the  bills  cover  the  grants  that  support 
practically  every  branch  of  the  government,  except  the  India 
Office,3  the  acts  of  almost  any  department  can  be  discussed 
at  those  stages.  The  occasions  are,  as  a  rule,  freely  used  for 
the  purpose.  Sometimes  the  debate  is  of  a  miscellaneous 
character,  and  runs  off  into  small  details,  but  more  commonly 
it  turns  upon  a  few  large  questions  of  domestic,  colonial  or 
foreign  policy  that  have  aroused  general  interest.4  Amend- 
ments can,  indeed,  be  moved,  and  they  may  range  as  far  as 
the  debate  itself.  The  procedure  would  appear,  therefore, 
to  resemble  that  of  going  into  Committee  of  Supply.  But 
the  House  is  aware  that  it  must  pass  the  bills,  and  although 
a  division  on  the  reading  is  often  taken,  the  negative  votes 
are  usually  confined  to  the  Irish  members,  who  are  more 
anxious  to  impede  than  to  make  use  of  the  parliamentary 
system.     In  the  rare  cases  where  amendments  have  been 

1  May,  561.  Ho  speaks  hero  only  of  the  Appropriation  Rill,  but  what 
ho  says  is  equally  true  of  all  the  Consolidated  Fund  Bills,  of  which  the  Ap- 
propriation Hill  is  merely  the  last,  completing  the  process  for  the  year. 

2  Ibid.,  562. 

3  The  India  Office  is  maintained  out  of  the  revenues  of  India,  but,  as 
already  explained,  an  opportunity  to  criticise  the  administration  of  that 
country  is  provided  every  year  when  the  Indian  accounts  are  laid  before 
Parliament. 

4  The  debate  must  relate  to  the  administrative  conducl  of  those  who 
receiver  the  grants  (May,  561-62),  and  therefore  the  Speaker,  in  HM)."i,  ruled 
out  of  order  a  discussion  of  the  fiscal  question  on  which  the  cabinet  had 
taken  no  action,  and  had  refused  to  announce  a  policy.  (Hans.  1  Ser. 
CXXVII.,  867-70.) 


350 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Debates    on 
Adjourn- 
ment for 
Easter  and 
Whitsun- 
tide. 


Motion    of 
Want  of 
Confidence. 


Freedom   of 
Criticism. 


moved  the  object  is  simply  to  concentrate  discussion  upon 
some  particular  question/  and  they  have  seldom,  if  ever, 
been  carried. 

Perhaps  the  most  striking  case  of  an  opportunity  for 
criticising  the  government,  without  any  means  of  condemn- 
ing its  action,  is  furnished  by  the  motion  to  adjourn  over 
Easter  or  Whitsuntide.  According  to  the  old  practice 
about  adjournment,  the  rule  of  relevancy  does  not  apply 
in  these  cases,  and  hence  the  discussion  may,  and  in  fact 
does,  wander  wherever  the  members  please.  It  is  of  a 
heterogeneous  nature,  touching  upon  many  subjects.  But 
as  the  Speakers  have  ruled  that  no  amendment  is  in  order, 
except  on  the  time  of  adjournment,2  the  motion  which  pro- 
vides the  excuse  for  a  debate  is  always  adopted  as  it  stands. 

The  foregoing  comprise  all  the  ordinary  means  of  criti- 
cising the  conduct  of  the  government.  The  leader  of  the 
Opposition  has  one  more.  He  can  at  any  time  claim  to 
move  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence,  and  within  reasonable 
limits  the  leader  of  the  House  will  always  assign  a  day  for 
the  purpose.  But  this  is  quite  a  different  matter  from  the 
criticism  of  particular  acts  of  which  we  have  been  speaking. 
Whatever  the  precise  form  of  the  motion  may  be,  the  object 
is  to  turn  the  ministry  out,  and  every  member  goes  into  one 
or  the  other  lobby,  according  to  his  desire  that  the  cabinet 
shall  stand  or  fall.  The  judgment  of  the  House  is  passed 
not  upon  any  one  act  or  question  of  policy,  but  distinctly 
upon  the  record  of  the  ministry  as  a  whole ;  and  a  defeat 
must  be  immediately  followed  by  resignation  or  dissolution. 

From  this  survey  of  the  various  methods  by  which  the 
ministers  can  be  called  to  account  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
it  is  clear  that  the  opportunities  to  air  grievances,  to 
suggest  reforms,  and  to  criticise  the  government  for  both 
large  matters  and  small,  for  their  general  policy  and  their 

1  This  was  true  of  the  latest  example,  that  of  an  amendment  relating  to 
native  labour  in  South  Africa,  moved  on  the  second  reading  of  the  Con- 
solidated Fund  (No.  1)  Bill  of  1903.  It  was  withdrawn  when  it  had  served 
the  purpose.      (Hans.  4  Ser.  CXX.,  72.) 

'May,  581. 


THE  COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  351 

least  administrative  acts,  are  many  and  constant.  If  less 
numerous  than  formerly,  they  are  in  practice  quite  as  useful. 
For  the  object  they  serve,  that  of  turning  a  searchlight  upon 
the  government,  and  keeping  the  public  informed  of  its 
conduct,  they  are  abundant.  On  the  other  hand,  the  op- 
portunities to  pass  judgment  upon  particular  acts  of  the  Difficulty 
ministers  have  diminished  very  much,  and  there  is  a  marked  V1  fasslns 

^  \  Judgment. 

tendency  to  make  a  definite  expression  of  opinion  on  such 
matters  by  vote  of  the  House  more  and  more  difficult. 
Such  a  tendency  is  entirely  in  accord  with  the  true  principle 
of  parliamentary  government.  There  ought  to  be  the  fullest 
opportunity  for  criticism ;  but  the  cabinet  must  be  free  not 
only  to  frame  its  own  policy,  but  also  to  carry  that  policy 
out,  and  it  ought  not  to  be  shackled,  or  thrust  out,  so  long 
as  its  conduct  of  affairs  is  on  the  whole  satisfactory  to  the 
nation. 

So  far  we  have  considered  primarily  the  functions  of  the  illustrated 
House  in  relation  to  administrative  matters,  but,  except  for  Abates  on 
the  bills  brought  in  by  the  government,  what  has  been  said  Fiseai 

Policy . 

applies  equally  to  its  control  over  the  general  policy  of  the 
cabinet,  for  its  means  of  criticising  and  passing  judgment  are 
the  same.  How  far  the  ministers  are  free  to-day  to  frame 
the  programme  on  which  they  will  take  their  stand,  and  how 
hard  it  is  to  force  an  issue  on  a  question  that  they  do  not 
choose  to  bring  forward,  may  be  seen  from  the  recent  his- 
tory of  the  debates  on  the  fiscal  question.  A  considerable 
number  of  Unionists  were  strongly  opposed  to  a  return  to 
protective  duties  in  any  form,  and  especially  to  a  taxation  of 
food.  There  were  enough  of  them  to  turn  the  scale,  so  that 
if  a  division  could  have  been  taken  at  any  time  on  the  fiscal 
question  alone,  the  House;  would  in  all  probability  have 
voted  in  favour  of  maintaining  the  existing  system.  On  the 
other  hand,  most  of  the  free-food  Unionists,  being  heartily 
in  accord  with  the  cabinet  on  other  matters,  desired  to  keep 
it  in  power  so  long  as  it  adopted  no  fiscal  policy  hostile  to 
their  principles;  and  therefore  they  were  anxious  not  to 
vote  against  the  government   if  they  could  conscientiously 


352         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

abstain  from  doing  so.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
Liberals  sought  by  every  means  to  force  a  direct  vote  upon 
the  fiscal  question,  while  Mr.  Balfour  cautiously  avoided  any 
definite  statement  of  policy  himself,  and  strove  to  prevent 
the  House  from  expressing  a  distinct  opinion  on  the  subject. 
He  took  the  ground  that  until  the  cabinet  announced  a  fiscal 
programme  the  only  form  in  which  the  attitude  of  the  minis- 
ters on  the  question  could  properly  come  before  Parliament 
was  that  of  a  general  motion  of  want  of  confidence  in  them, 
in  1903.  Mr.  Chamberlain  broached  his  plan  of  preferential  tariffs 

in  a  speech  at  Birmingham  on  May  15,  1903.  By  that  time 
it  was  just  too  late  in  the  year  to  bring  forward  a  private 
member's  motion  on  the  subject;  so  that  the  first  debate 
upon  it  took  place  on  the  motion  to  adjourn  over  Whit- 
suntide,1 when  no  amendment  or  vote  expressing  the  opin- 
ion of  the  House  was  in  order.  This  was  May  28.  The 
next  opportunity  for  extensive  discussion  came  on  June  9 
over  the  Finance  Bill ;  but  the  Speaker  ruled,  that  as  the 
government  had  made  no  proposals  for  a  change  of  fiscal 
policy,  such  changes  could  not  be  brought  into  the  debate 
on  that  bill.2  The  Opposition  then  resorted  to  a  motion  to 
adjourn.  But  it  was  not  easy  to  treat  as  an  urgent  mat- 
ter the  question  of  adopting  a  policy,  which  the  ministers 
declared  the  existing  Parliament  incompetent  to  adopt, 
and  the  Opposition  insisted  ought  never  to  be  adopted  at  all. 
The  Liberals  solved  the  difficulty  by  taking  advantage  of  a 
recent  occurrence,  and  on  June  17  moved  to  adjourn  to 
discuss  a  misunderstanding  of  the  tariff  speeches  of  Mr. 
Balfour  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  by  the  premier  of  New  South 
Wales.  The  Speaker,  however,  ruled  that  a  general  debate 
of  the  fiscal  question  did  not  come  within  the  terms  of  the 
motion,  although  a  motion  of  wider  scope  might  have  been 
made.  The  adjournment  was,  of  course,  rejected,  and  by  a 
vote  of  252  to  132.3  Both  on  this  and  on  later  occasions, 
Mr.  Balfour,  while  refusing  to  give  any  of  the  government's 

1  Hans  4  Ser.  CXXIII.,  142.  J  Ibid.,  327. 

3  Ibid.,   1241,  1245,  1274. 


THE   COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  353 

time  for  the  discussion  of  fiscal  policy  as  such,  expressed 
his  entire  readiness  to  assign  a  day  for  a  formal  motion  of 
lack  of  confidence ;  l  but  the  Liberals  did  not  accept  the 
offer.  They  said,  and  with  truth,  that  a  vote  of  censure 
would  not  test  the  opinion  of  the  House  on  the  fiscal  ques- 
tion ;  and  they  knew  that  it  would  result  in  an  over- 
whelming defeat  for  them.  Finally,  on  Aug.  11,  the  Speaker 
ruled  that,  as  no  official  act  of  any  minister  was  involved, 
the  question  could  not  be  debated  on  the  second  reading 
of  the  Appropriation  Bill.2  And  thus,  although  there  were 
many  questions  put  on  the  subject,  and  some  incidental 
discussion  during  the  debates  on  other  matters,  the  session 
of  1903  came  to  an  end  without  any  vote  on  fiscal  policy. 

When  the  House  met  again  great  changes  had  taken  place  in  1904. 
in  the  ministry.  Both  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  his  strongest 
opponents  had  resigned,  and  it  was  certain  that  the  cabinet 
would  take  no  positive  attitude  on  the  fiscal  question  during 
the  life  of  the  Parliament.  Yet  the  Liberals  had  several 
means  of  extracting  a  vote  on  the  subject,  which  they  had 
lacked  in  the  second  half  of  the  preceding  session.  They 
began  at  once  with  the  debate  on  the  address,  by  moving 
that  the  removal  of  protective  duties  has  conduced  to  the 
welfare  of  the  population,  and  that  any  return  to  them  would 
be  injurious.  The  wording  was  not  well  adapted  to  drive  a 
wedge  into  the  government  majority,  for  the  ministers 
repudiated  the  charge  that  they  contemplated  protection. 
Only  twenty-one  Unionists  voted  for  the  amendment, 
which  was  rejected  by  327  to  276. -!  Then  came,  on  March  9, 
a  private  member's  motion  to  the  effect  that  the  House 
expresses  its  condemnation  of  the  continual  agitation  in 
favour  of  a  protective  tariff  encouraged  by  the  ministers. 
This  also  was  not  well  conceived,  and  was  rejected  by  289 

1  Hans.   1  Ser.  CXXIII.,  1250,  132.3;    (WW,  571-74. 

2  Ibid.  (WWII  ,  Mi? 

'  Hans.  4  .Ser.  CXXIX..  023,  lilt).  Then- was  on  March  7  n  motion  to 
adjourn  to  rail  attention  to  tin-  failure  of  Mr.  Balfour  to  explain  the  resig- 
nations of  ministers  in  the  autumn.  This  involved  ihc  fiscal  question  only 
indirectly,  and  was  rejected  _'.'>7  to   17J 


354         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  243,  nineteen  Unionists  voting  against  the  government. 
On  May  18  another  private  member's  motion  came  on  ; 
which  stated  that  the  House,  believing  a  protective  tariff 
on  food  burdensome  to  the  people,  welcomes  the  declara- 
tion that  the  government  is  opposed  to  it.  It  was  a  more 
dangerous  attack,  which  the  ministers  met  by  moving  an 
amendment  that  it  was  unnecessary  to  discuss  the  question. 
They  succeeded  by  about  the  same  majority  as  on  the  other 
occasions,  for  the  amendment  was  carried  by  a  vote  of  306 
to  251,  seventeen  Unionists  in  the  minority.1 

At  last  the  Liberals  asked  for  a  day  to  move  a  vote  of 
censure,  and  Aug.  1  was  set  apart  for  the  purpose.  The 
motion  expressed  regret  that  certain  ministers  had  accepted 
official  positions  in  the  Liberal  Unionist  Association,  which 
had  recently  declared  its  adhesion  to  the  policy  of  preferen- 
tial duties,  involving  the  taxation  of  food.  But  the  form 
of  the  motion  was  unimportant,  and  the  result  illustrates  the 
nature  of  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence,  and  the  futility  of 
using  it  to  test  the  opinion  of  the  House  on  any  particular 
question  of  policy.  No  one  voted  against  the  ministers  who 
was  not  prepared  to  turn  them  out,  and  the  motion  was 
rejected  by  a  vote  of  288  to  210. 2  Only  one  member  classed 
as  a  Unionist  voted  for  it,  while  of  those  who  had  gone  into 
the  Opposition  lobby  on  previous  occasions  one  voted  with 
the  government,  and  the  rest  absented  themselves.  Al- 
though the  fiscal  question  had  been  debated  several  times,3 
the  Opposition  had  again  been  baffled  throughout  the  ses- 
sion in  their  efforts  to  get  a  vote  upon  its  merits, 
in  1905.  The  result  in  the  following  year  was  the  same,  but  the 

tactics  were  different.  The  first  private  member's  motion  on 
the  subject  was  shelved  by  the  previous  question,  and  the 
government  dealt  with  the  subsequent  ones  by  the  novel 
device,  already  described,  of  staying  away  from  the  division 
altogether.  Mr.  Balfour  virtually  took  the  ground  that  a 
vote  on  which  the  government  exerted  no  pressure  could  not 

1  Hans.  4  Ser.  CXXXV.,  253  et  seq.  2  Ibid.,  CXXXIX.,  284  et  teq. 

3  It  had  also  been  discussed  on  the  adjournment  for  Easter. 


THE  COMMONS'  CONTROL  OF  THE  CABINET  355 

be  regarded  as  a  true  expression  of  the  opinion  of  the  House, 
and  might  therefore  be  ignored  —  an  extension,  although 
by  no  means  an  illogical  extension,  of  the  accepted  doctrines 
of  the  constitution. 

The  system  of  a  responsible  ministry  can  develop  in  a  Parliament 
normal  and  healthy  way  only  in  case  the  legislative  body  incSStf 
is  divided  into  two  parties,  and  under  those  conditions  it  is  the  Nation, 
the  inevitable  consequence  of  the  system  that  Parliament 
cannot  support  the  cabinet  on  one  question  and  oppose  it 
on  another.  The  programme  of  the  ministers  must  be  ac- 
cepted or  rejected  as  a  whole,  and  hence  the  power  of  initia- 
tive, both  legislative  and  executive,  must  rest  entirely  with 
them.  This  is  clearly  the  tendency  in  Parliament  at  the 
present  day.1  The  House  of  Commons  is  finding  more  and 
more  difficulty  in  passing  any  effective  vote,  except  a  vote 
of  censure.  It  tends  to  lose  all  powers  except  the  power  to 
criticise  and  the  power  to  sentence  to  death.  Parliament 
has  been  called  the  great  inquest  of  the  nation,  and  for  that 
purpose  its  functions  have  of  late  been  rather  enlarged  than 
impaired.  Xor  are  the  inquisitors  confined  to  any  one  sec- 
tion of  the  House,  for  while  that  part  is  played  chiefly  by 
the  Opposition,  the  government  often  receives  a  caution  from 
its  own  supporters  also.  If  the  parliamentary  system  has 
made  the  cabinet  of  the  day  autocratic,  it  is  an  autocracy 
exerted  with  the  utmost  publicity,  under  a  constant  fire  of 
criticism ;  and  tempered  by  the  force  of  public  opinion,  the 
risk  of  a  vote  of  want  of  confidence,  and  the  prospects  of  the 
next  election. 

1  Redlich  ends  his  book  on  the  procedure  of  the  House  of  Commons  with 
the  remark  (p.  800),  that  the  rules  of  a  legislative  body  are  the  political 
manometer,  which  measures  the  strain  of  forces  in  the  parliamentary 
machine,  and  thereby  in  the  whole  organism  of  the  state. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  FORM   AND   CONTENTS  OF  STATUTES 

Difficulty  of  We  have  seen  that  the  legislative  capacity  of  the  House 
LawsDg  °f  Commons  has  nearly  reached  its  limit-  What  is  more,  it 
is  small,  and  markedly  smaller  than  in  the  past.  In  the 
decade  beginning  with  1868,  ninety-four  government  bills 
on  the  average  became  law  each  year,  but  of  late  the  number 
has  not  been  half  so  large,  and  private  members'  bills  have 
fallen  off  in  about  the  same  proportion.  The  fact  is  that  a 
growth  in  the  number  of  members  who  want  to  take  part 
in  debate,  a  more  minute  criticism,  and  a  more  systematic 
opposition,  have  made  the  process  of  passing  a  bill  through 
the  House  increasingly  difficult.  This  is  particularly  true 
of  measures  that  are  long  or  complicated,  for  the  greater 
the  length  the  more  the  pegs  on  which  to  hang  amendments.1 
Now  the  difficulty  of  passing  laws  has  had  an  effect  both  on 
the  form  of  the  statutes  and  on  the  content  of  legislation. 
Drafting  of  A  public  bill  introduced  by  a  private  member  may  be 
drafted  by  him,  or  by  counsel  he  has  employed  for  the  pur- 
pose. There  is  no  systematic  supervision  over  such  bills,2 
no  stage  at  which  their  drafting  is  reviewed,  and  whether 
well  or  ill  drawn,  they  are  not  likely  to  be  much  improved 
in  their  passage  through  Parliament.  Government  bills, 
on  the  other  hand,  which  relate  to  England,  and  are  not  of  a 
purely  formal  and  routine  character,3  are  now  all  drafted  by 

1  Cf.  Ilbert,  "Legislative  Methods  and  Forms,"  217. 

2  Ilbert,  Ibid.,  90-91.  Private  bills  are,  of  course,  drafted  by  the  counsel 
for  the  petitioners,  and  provisional  order  bills  by  the  department  that 
grants  the  provisional  order. 

3  Ilbert,  "Leg.  Methods  and  Forms,"  86  note.  The  Scotch  and  Irish 
bills,  and  almost  all  the  most  important  Indian  bills,  are  drawn  by  drafts- 
men attached  to  the  offices  for  those  countries. 

356 


Bills. 


THE   FORM  AND  CONTENTS  OF  STATUTES  357 

the  Parliamentary  Counsel  to  the  Treasury,  or  by  his  as- 
sistants under  his  direction.1  They  are  prepared  under 
instructions  from,  and  after  consultations  with,  the  depart- 
ments concerned,  and  are  sometimes  recast  several  times 
before  they  are  introduced  into  Parliament.  They  are  then 
assailed  by  a  host  of  critics,  both  in  and  out  of  the  Houses; 
some  of  them  trying  to  pick  flaws  in  a  measure  which  they 
want  to  destroy;  while  others,  who  are  not  opposed  to  the 
general  principle  involved,  discover  provisions  that  affect 
their  interests,  based,  perhaps,  on  local  custom  or  privilege. 
The  objections  raised  may  not  have  been  entirely  foreseen, 
or  may  prove  of  greater  political  importance  than  was  sup- 
posed, and  hence  amendments  and  new  clauses  are  adopted 
during  the  debates  in  committee.  These  changes  are  usu- 
ally made  with  the  consent  of  the  minister  in  charge  of  the 
bill,  and  the  Parliamentary  Counsel,  as  well  as  the  perma- 
nent head  of  the  department  concerned,  is  often  present 
under  the  gallery  to  give  his  advice ;  but  still  the  amend- 
ments mar  the  fair  handicraft  of  the  draftsman,  and  an 
effort  has  to  be  made  to  improve  the  text  either  on  the 
report  stage  or  in  the  House  of  Lords. 

Sir  Courtenay  Ilbert  attributes  the  defects  of  form  in  the  Defects  of 
English  statutes  of  the  present  day  chiefly  to  the  battering  m" 
that  a  bill  must  almost  necessarily  encounter  in  passing 
through  the  House  of  Commons,  and  to  the  fact  that  an 
Act  of  Parliament  is  essentially  a  creature  of  compromise.2 
Yet  there  would  seem  to  be  other  difficulties  arising  from  the 
conditions  under  which  legislation  is  conducted. 

The  Parliamentary  Counsel's  office  has  certainly  improved 
the  statutes  very  much  by  making  them  more  concise, 
uniform  and  orderly;  but  their  form  is  far  from  perfect. 
Two  objects  must  be  aimed  at  in  drafting  an  act ;  one  that 
it  shall  be  intelligible  to  the  persons  who  are  compelled  to 

'Sir  Courtenay  Ilbert,  himself  Parliamentary  Counsel  at  the  time  he 
wrote  his  work  on  "Legislative  Methods  and  Forms,"  has  Riven  therein 
an  exeellent  description  of  the  history  (07  (i'.l,  80-85)  and  the  work  (N.r>-<)7, 
218-19,  227-31  )  of  the  office. 

1  "Leg.  Methods  and  Forms,"  229-31. 


358         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

obey  it;  and  the  other  that  the  courts  which  interpret  it, 
or  the  counsel  who  are  called  upon  to  advise  upon  it,  shall 
be  able  to  ascertain  its  precise  meaning  with  certainty. 
Now  to  a  layman,  and  even  to  a  foreign  lawyer,  an  English 
act  is  often  difficult  to  understand,  and  sometimes  mislead- 
ing. To  penetrate  its  intent  one  must  frequently  be  familiar 
with  all  previous  legislation  on  the  subject.  It  is  no  doubt 
true  that  "No  statute  is  completely  intelligible  as  an  isolated 
enactment.  Every  statute  is  a  chapter,  or  a  fragment  of 
a  chapter,  of  a  body  of  law."  *  Still  it  does  not  seem  neces- 
sary that  English  acts  should  be  quite  so  obscure  as  they 
often  are.  Nor,  judging  from  the  amount  of  litigation  that 
sometimes  occurs  over  their  interpretation,  does  this  defect 
appear  to  be  always  counterbalanced  by  remarkable  legal 
certainty.  The  most  celebrated  case  is  that  of  the  Educa- 
tion Act  of  1902.  After  the  provision  for  the  payment  of 
religious  instruction  in  the  church  schools  out  of  local  rates 
had  provoked  dogged  resistance,  and  the  magistrates  had 
enforced  it  against  recalcitrant  rate-payers  for  a  couple  of 
years,  the  matter  was  brought  before  the  higher  courts  by 
the  refusal  of  the  County  Council  for  the  West  Riding  of 
Yorkshire  to  make  the  payment;  and  the  majority  of  the 
Court  of  Appeal  was  of  opinion  that  the  statute  did  not 
oblige  it  to  do  so.2  The  House  of  Lords  reversed  the 
decision  ; 3  but  for  Parliament  to  pass  the  Act  in  such  a  form 
that  the  Court  of  Appeal  could  regard  it  as  failing  to  effect 
what  everybody  knew  to  be  one  of  its  main  objects  is 
surely  an  amazing  example  of  bad  drafting.  Nor  was  this 
the  result  of  amendments  in  the  House  of  Commons,  for 
the  provision  in  question  went  through  unchanged  ;  and 
although  in  this  case  the  fault  is  said  not  to  lie  at  the  door 
of  the  Parliamentary  Counsel,  it  shows  none  the  less  the 
defects  of  the  system. 
The  Defects       It  has  already  been  remarked  that  the  limited  capacity 

Arise ; 

1  "  Leg.  Methods  and  Forms,"  254. 

2  Rex  vs.  West  Riding  of  Yorkshire,  (1906)  2  K.B.,  676. 

3  Atty.  Gen.  vs.  West  Riding  of  Yorkshire,  (1907)  App.  Cas.,  29. 


THE   FORM  AND  CONTENTS  OF  STATUTES  359 

of  Parliament  for  law-making  affects  both  the  form  and  the 
content  of  its  acts;  and  this  is  one  of  many  elements  in  a 
complex  problem.  The  lack  of  time  for  comprehensive 
legislation,  the  political  temperament  of  the  nation,  and  the 
exigencies  of  a  responsible  ministry  have  each  a  marked  in- 
fluence on  the  form  and  the  substance  of  the  statutes ;  and, 
indeed,  all  these  factors  act  and  react  upon  one  another. 

The   difficulty  of  passing  long  or  complicated  measures  from 
makes  the  minister  insist  that  his  bill  shall  be  as  short  as  difficulty  of 

Legislating ; 

possible,  and  hence  it  must  include  no  clauses  not  abso- 
lutely necessary  for  the  object  he  has  in  view.  The  drafts- 
man, therefore,  disturbs  existing  statutes  as  little  as  he  can, 
either  in  the  way  of  revising  or  incorporating  their  provi- 
sions. If  he  must  embody  earlier  enactments  in  his  draft, 
he  does  so  by  referring  to  them,  rather  than  by  repeating 
them.2  The  practice  of  legislation  by  reference,  which  is  a 
source  of  no  small  inconvenience  in  using  the  statutes,  has 
been  carried  very  far.  In  fact  there  is  a  long  series  of 
"Clauses  Acts"  on  various  subjects,  not  enacted  with  an 
independent  legislative  force  of  their  own,  but  placed  on 
the  statute  book  as  standard  provisions  to  be  embodied 
in  subsequent  acts  by  reference  express  or  implied.3  The 
desire  to  have  the  bill  short  has  also  given  a  strong  impulse 
to  the  practice  of  removing  details  from  the  body  of  the 
act,  and  massing  them  in  schedules  at  its  close.4  This  is  an 
advantage  to  the  minister  who  has  charge  of  the  bill,  because 
while  it  does  not  withdraw  the  matters  in  the  schedules 
from  the  control  of  the  House,  it  does  make  them  less  con- 
spicuous and  concentrates  the  attention  of  the  members  on 
the  principal  questions  of  policy. 

A  similar  result,  although  one  that  concerns  more  directly  from  Poiit- 
the  substance  than  the  form  of  the  statutes,  may  be  traced  lca  Iem~ 

J  penuwnt  ; 

1  Ilbrrt,  "  Leg.  Methods  and  Forms,"  217,  241. 

2  Ibid. ,  2 1 7- 1 S.     Cf.  2 54-66. 

3  This  is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  local  and  private  bills,  whore  the 
provisions  of  "Clauses  Acts"  must  often  he  incorporated,  either  by  the 
term-  of  those  acts,  or  in  consequence  of  the  standing  orders  on  private 
business.     Ibid.,  261.  *  Cf.  Ibid.,  266-68. 


360         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  a  conservative  tradition  in  legislation.  It  is  commonly 
said  that  in  industrial  matters  Englishmen  do  not  appreci- 
ate the  value  of  the  scrap-heap,  that  they  tend  to  use  old- 
fashioned  machinery  when  it  would  be  better  to  discard  it 
altogether.  If  they  dislike  to  abandon  a  machine,  they  have 
a  still  greater  aversion  to  repealing  an  Act  of  Parliament. 
Every  Briton  happily  believes  that  it  is  better  to  readjust 
the  institutions  of  a  country  slowly,  than  to  pull  them  down 
and  build  anew ;  and  there  being  no  line  between  the  insti- 
tutions that  are  fundamental,  and  those  that  are  not,  a 
fragment  of  the  veneration  for  the  British  Constitution 
attaches  to  every  statute ;  and,  indeed,  to  custom  also. 
This  helps  to  make  the  legislator  cautious,  and  his  work 
tentative.  Moreover,  there  is  a  great  respect  for  vested 
rights,  and  for  that  matter  for  vested  habits,  and  sometimes 
vested  abuses.  Sir  Courtenay  Ilbert  tells  us  how  much 
solicitude  is  aroused  by  the  probable  effect  of  a  bill  on  the 
peculiar  circumstances  of  the  parish  of  Ockley-cum- Withy- 
pool,  or  the  emoluments  of  the  beadle  of  Little  Peddling- 
ton.1  Too  much  attention  seems  to  be  paid  at  times  to  such 
interests  when  they  conflict  with  those  of  the  public ;  and 
this  brings  up  the  third  factor  in  the  problem,  that  of  cabinet 
responsibility,  which  has  a  marked  influence  on  both  the 
form  and  the  content  of  legislation, 
from  Re-  If  the  parliamentary  system,  as  it  has  developed  in  Eng- 

ofMinistets  land,  intrusts  the  active  conduct  of  legislation  and  admin- 
istration to  the  ministry  of  the  day,  and  thereby  concen- 
trates enormous  political  power  in  the  hands  of  a  few  men, 
it  does  so  among  a  highly  individualistic  people.  The  min- 
isters wield  their  great  authority  on  two  conditions.  One 
is  that  they  must  retain  an  absolute  hold  upon  their  own 
majority,  and  the  other  is  that  their  rule  must  be  tempered 
by  liberty  of  criticism.  They  must  explain  everything 
they  do,  they  must  defend  it  against  the  attacks  of  the  whole 
House,  and  justify  it  to  the  satisfaction  of  almost  all  their 
followers.  The  result  is  that  they  try  to  bring  into  their 
1  Ilbert,  "Leg.  Methods  and  Forms,"  230. 


THE  FORM  AND  CONTENTS  OF  STATUTES  361 

measures  nothing  that  might  furnish  a  needless  target  for 
critics,  or  prove  a  cause  of  offence  to  any  of  their  supporters. 

Restraint,  in  some  form,  is  the  price  paid  for  power ;  and 
great  strength  in  one  direction  is  apt  to  conceal  weakness 
in  another.  An  English  ministry  with  a  good  majority 
at  its  back  appears  omnipotent.  It  announces  its  policy, 
forces  through  its  bills  against  the  protests  of  the  Opposi- 
tion, and  even  against  appeals  from  members  on  its  own 
side  not  to  put  pressure  upon  them.  But  the  power  it  exerts 
is  in  large  part  the  resultant  of  other  forces  less  openly  dis- 
played. If,  on  pain  of  disloyalty,  and  for  fear  of  handing 
the  government  over  to  the  adversary,  the  private  adherent 
of  the  party  in  power  must  follow  the  whips  in  critical  divi- 
sions, the  ministers,  on  their  part,  are  sometimes  compelled 
by  an  insistent  group  of  their  supporters  to  adopt  one  meas- 
ure, or  to  mutilate  or  abandon  another.  They  cannot  dis- 
regard the  serious  objections  of  any  considerable  section  of 
their  own  followers,  and  this  has  become  more  and  more 
true  with  the  evolution  of  the  parliamentary  system.  Half 
a  century  ago  they  might  win  as  many  votes  from  the  other 
side  of  the  House  as  they  lost  on  their  own,  but  that  is  rarely 
possible  to-day.  They  must  now  carry  with  them  on  every 
question  sut>st  ant  i  ally  the  whole  of  their  party.1  Their 
omnipotence  is  therefore  a  very  limited  and  cautious  om- 
nipotence, and  this  has  shown  itself,  especially  under  the 
late  Conservative  government,  in  the  meagre  annual  pro- 
duction of  statutes. 

If  the  legislation  of  a  country  is  to  consist,  not  in  passing  Revision 
comprehensive  laws  dealing  with  a  whole  subject,  but  in  a'\(!  CodlfL' 

1  o  j  cation  of 

making  progressive  changes  by  tinkering  and  patching  the  statutes, 
existing  acts,  it  would  seem  an  obvious  convenience  to  issue 
from  time  to  time  new  editions  of  those  acts  compiled  in  a 
more  compact  and  intelligible  form.      It    would  be  a  great 

1  The  extent  to  which  this  is  done,  and  the  amount  it  lias  increased,  is 
shown  by  statistics  in  the  chapter  on  "The  Strength  of  Party  Ties."  The 
difficulty  to-day  comes,  not  from  the  opinion--  or  interests  of  individual 
members,  but  from  groups  of  members  acting  on  public  grounds,  or  at  least, 
on  grounds  which  affect  a  great  part  of  their  constituents. 


362         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

advantage  to  have  frequent  revisions  or  codification  of  the 
statutes  on  a  subject,  not  involving  a  change  of  substance, 
but  merely  a  simplification  of  form.  But  such  a  process  of 
consolidation  has  not  been  common  in  England.  A  great 
deal  of  labour  was  expended  on  this  object  by  several  com- 
missions during  the  nineteenth  century ;  but  the  only  posi- 
tive results  have  been  the  production  of  two  editions  of 
revised  statutes  —  being  simply  the  statutes  at  large  rear- 
ranged with  the  parts  no  longer  in  force  omitted  —  and  the 
passage  of  a  limited  number  of  acts  consolidating  the  stat- 
utes on  certain  subjects.1  Such  acts  are  not  easy  to  pass, 
because,  as  Sir  Courtenay  Ilbert  remarks,  "It  is  difficult  to 
disabuse  the  average  member  of  Parliament  of  the  notion 
that  the  introduction  of  a  consolidation  bill  affords  a  suitable 
opportunity  for  proposing  amendments,  to  satisfy  him  that 
reenactment  does  not  mean  approval  or  perpetuation  of  the 
existing  law,  or  to  convince  him  that  attempts  to  combine 
substantial  amendment  with  consolidation  almost  inevitably 
spell  failure  in  both."  2  The  process  has  neither  been  ex- 
tended to  so  many  subjects,  nor  repeated  at  such  short 
intervals,  as  might  be  wished. 
Temporary  Another  curious  result  of  the  difficulty  of  enacting  laws 
may  be  seen  in  the  long  list  of  temporary  statutes,  con- 
tinued in  force  from  time  to  time,  sometimes  for  many  years. 
Some  of  these  are  acts  of  a  transitory  nature,  designed  to 
cover  an  emergency,  or  to  deal  with  an  ephemeral  state  of 
things.  Laws  of  that  kind  expire  with  the  conditions  that 
called  them  forth.  But  the  English  temporary  acts  often 
relate  to  permanent  matters.  That  a  statute  of  an  experi- 
mental character  should  be  enacted  at  the  outset  for  a 
limited  period  is  natural  enough,  but  when  the  period  has 
come  to  an  end,  and  the  experiment  has  proved  a  success, 
one  would  expect  to  see  the  law  reenacted  in  an  enduring 
form.  In  England,  however,  there  is  passed  every  year  an 
Expiring  Laws  Continuance  Act,  giving  another  twelve- 
month's lease  of  life  to  a  list  of  acts  appended  in  a  schedule, 
1  Ubert,  "Leg.  Methods  and  Forms,"  Chs.  iv.,  vii,  2  Ibid.,  113, 


Laws. 


THE   FORM  AND  CONTENTS  OF  STATUTES  363 

many  of  which  are  already  old.  One  or  two  have  already 
reached  the  age  of  threescore  years  and  ten  ;  and  among  the 
list  are  still  found  the  Ballot  Act  of  1872,  with  most  of  the 
statutes  of  the  last  half  century  that  regulate  the  conduct  of 
elections.  The  reason  for  the  existence  of  perpetual  tem- 
porary laws  is  to  be  found,  no  doubt,  in  the  fact  that  in  this 
form  they  can  be  continued  almost  without  opposition,  while 
an  attempt  to  enact  them  as  permanent  statutes  would  give 
rise  to  great  debates  with  a  host  of  amendments,  and  con- 
sume a  vast  deal  of  the  one  thing  whereof  the  ministry  has 
never  enough  —  that  is  time. 

The  limited  capacity  of  Parliament  to  pass  statutes  is  not  Delegation 
felt  as  a  crying  evil,  because  the  pressure  for  great  remedial  °f  Leglsla- 

^  r  e>  tive   Power. 

legislation  has  lessened.  The  transition  from  the  political 
and  industrial  conditions  of  the  eighteenth  century  has  been 
accomplished,  and  the  consequent  change  in  laws  and  in- 
stitutions has  been,  in  the  main,  effected.  The  demand  for 
radical  legislation  is,  therefore,  comparatively  small,  and 
for  the  time  at  least  the  process  of  making  law  can  afford  to 
run  slow.  Yet  it  may  be  doubted  whether,  with  the  great 
extension  in  the  sphere  of  government,  Parliament  could  be 
suffered  to  move  at  its  present  pace  were  it  not  for  the  grow- 
ing practice  of  delegating  legislative  power.  We  hear  much 
talk  about  the  need  for  a  devolution  of  the  power  of  Par- 
liament on  subordinate  representative  bodies,  but  the  ten- 
dency is  not  mainly  in  that  direction.  The  authority  of 
this  kind  vested  in  the  county  councils  by  recent  statutes 
is  small,  too  small  to  affect  the  question.  The  real  delega- 
tion has  been  in  favour  of  the  administrative  departments 
of  the  central  government,  and  this  involves  a  striking  de- 
parture from  Anglo-Saxon  traditions,  with  a  distinct  ap- 
proach to  the  practice  of  continental  countries.1 

Formerly  an  English  statute  went  into  great  detail,  at-  statutory 
tempting  to  provide  expressly  for  every  question  that  could 
possibly  arise.     Its  interpretation,  or  its  applicability  to  a 

1  Cf.    Ilbert,   "Leg.    Methods  and    Forms,"    Chap,    iii.,   and   pp.   220-21, 
224. 


(  > 


nlei> 


364 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Control    of 
Parliament 
over  Pro- 
visional 
Orders. 


special  case,  could  be  determined  only  by  the  courts,  while 
its  defects  could  be  remedied,  or  its  omissions  filled  up,  only 
by  another  statute.  It  contained  in  itself  the  complete 
expression  of  the  legislative  will.  But  of  late  it  has  become 
more  and  more  common  for  Parliament  to  embody  in  a 
statute  only  general  provisions,  and  give  to  some  public 
department  a  power  to  make  regulations  for  completing  the 
details,  and  applying  the  act  to  particular  cases.  These 
regulations  —  known  as  statutory  orders  —  cover  a  great 
variety  of  subjects,  and  govern  not  only  the  duties  of  offi- 
cials, and  the  administration  of  public  affairs,  both  national 
and  local,  but  also  the  conduct  of  individuals  in  the  manage- 
ment of  their  own  concerns.  They  prescribe,  for  example, 
how  many  persons  can  live  on  canal-boats,  the  number  of 
cubic  feet  of  air  in  factories,  the  precautions  that  must  be 
taken  for  cleanliness  in  dairies,  what  per  cent  of  water  may 
be  contained  in  genuine  butter,  and  under  an  authority  of 
this  kind  a  general  order  was  issued  in  1900  for  muzzling 
all  the  dogs  in  the  country. 

Parliament  usually  attempts  to  retain  a  control,  or  at 
least  an  oversight,  of  the  orders  made  by  the  public  depart- 
ments under  the  authority  delegated  to  them  in  this  way. 
Sometimes  the  order  is  issued  under  a  power  that  is  pro- 
visional only,  and  does  not  become  operative  until  con- 
firmed by  a  statute.  This  is  usually,  though  not  invariably,1 
true  of  rights  granted  to  private  companies  or  local  authori- 
ties to  construct  works  of  public  utility,  such  as  waterworks, 
gas-works,  tramways,  and  the  like.2  Provisional  orders  of 
that  kind  do  not  involve  any  true  delegation  of  legislative 
power,  because  they  derive  their  validity,  not  from  the  act 
of  the  department,  but  from  the  statutes  by  which  they  are 


1  Authority,  for  example,  to  construct  a  light  railway,  which  is  legally 
distinct,  but  physically  indistinguishable,  from  a  tramway,  does  not  require 
confirmation  by  Parliament,  59-60  Vic,  c.  48,  §  9. 

2  A  change  in  the  boundaries  of  a  county  or  borough  requires  in  the 
same  way  confirmation  by  Parliament;  but  an  order  altering  an  urban  or 
rural  district  or  parish,  requires  only  to  be  laid  upon  the  table  of  each 
House,  51-52  Vic,  c.  41  (part  3). 


THE   FORM  AND  CONTENTS  OF  STATUTES  365 

confirmed ;  and  they  are  included  among  the  Acts  of  Par- 
liament, and  not  the  statutory  orders  of  the  year.  Prac- 
tically, however,  they  are  almost  always  confirmed  without 
amendment. 

Parliamentary  control  over  statutory  orders  strictly  so  Over  statu- 
called,  which  involve  a  real  delegation  of  legislative  power,  tory°rders 
is  commonly  maintained  by  requiring  them  to  be  reported 
to  the  two  Houses ;  and  in  order  to  give  an  opportunity  for 
preliminary  criticism,  the  regulation,  or  a  draft  thereof,  must 
sometimes  be  laid  on  the  table  for  a  certain  time  before  it 
becomes  operative.1  Moreover,  control  by  Parliament  is 
often  expressly  reserved  by  providing  that  if,  within  forty 
days,  either  House  presents  an  address  to  the  Crown  against 
a  draft  or  order,  then  the  order  shall  not  be  made,  or  in  case 
it  has  already  gone  into  effect  it  shall  thenceforth  be  void.2 
An  address  under  such  a  provision  is  exempted  from  the 
rule  about  the  interruption  of  business  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  hence  can  be  moved  by  a  private  member  at  the 
close  of  the  sitting  on  any  evening,  without  taking  his 
chance  in  drawing  lots,  or  appealing  to  the  government 
for  a  part  of  its  time.3  As  a  matter  of  fact,  motions  of 
this  kind  are  uncommon,  and  are  rarely,  if  ever,  successful ; 
although  the  frequency  with  which  the  statutory  orders  are 
revised  by  the  departments  would  seem  to  show  that  the 
officials  who  make  them  are  highly  sensitive  to  outside 
opinion. 

Since  1893  the  statutory  orders  of  each  year  have  been 
regularly  published  like  the  Acts  of  Parliament;4  and  an 
idea  of  their  number  may  be  derived  from  the  fact  that 
they  always  fill  one,  and  often  two,  large  volumes,  each 
much  thicker  than  the  present  emaciated  book  of  the  Public 

1  Drafts  tif  orders  that  arc  not  required  to  be  laid  before  Parliament 
before  they  come  into  operation,  must,  by  56-57  Vic.,  c  60,  §  1,  be  open  to 
criticism,  by  any  public  body  interested,  for  forty  days  before  they  are 
finally  settled  and  made.  But  this  does  not  apply  to  rules  made  by  the 
Local  Government  Hoard,  the  Hoard  of  Trade  and  some  others  (§  1   (4)). 

2Cf.  Ilbert,  "Leg.  Methods  and  Forms,"   11,  rf.  310-14. 

'  Ilbert,  "  Manual,"  §  36.  4  56-57  Vic,  c.  00,  §  3. 


366         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

General  Acts.1  In  spite  of  the  potential  control  retained  by 
the  Houses  over  statutory  orders,  the  growing  habit  of  dele- 
gating authority  to  make  them  involves  a  substantial  trans- 
fer of  power  from  Parliament  to  the  executive  branch  of  the 
government,  a  transfer  due  in  part  to  the  increasing  diffi- 
culty in  legislation. 

The  existing  relation  between  the  cabinet  and  the  House 
of  Commons  has  thus  had  a  number  of  distinct,  and  at 
first  sight  contradictory,  effects.  While  placing  the  initia- 
tive for  almost  all  important  legislation  in  the  hands  of 
the  ministers,  it  has  tended  to  reduce  the  number  and 
completeness  of  the  laws  they  can  carry  through ;  and  on 
the  other  hand  it  has  helped  to  invest  them  with  a  power 
of  subordinate  or  secondary  legislation  quite  foreign  to 
English  traditions.  This  is  true  of  public  matters,  but  in 
regard  to  private  and  local  acts  the  relation  of  the  cabinet 
to  Parliament,  and  hence  the  effects  of  that  relation,  are 
wholly  different. 

1  This  last,  however,  does  not  contain  the  text,  but  only  a  list  of  titles, 
of  local  and  private  acts,  although  many  of  them  are  legally  public  general 
acts.  On  the  other  hand  the  published  statutory  orders  for  the  year  do 
not  include  by  any  means  all  the  orders  of  a  temporary  nature. 


CHAPTER  XX 

PRIVATE   BILL   LEGISLATION 

If  the  direction  of  important  legislation  of  a  public 
character  lies  almost  altogether  in  the  hands  of  the  ministers, 
special  laws  affecting  private  or  local  interests  are  not  less 
completely  outside  of  their  province. 

Private  Acts  of  Parliament  are  of  immemorial  antiquity,  The  Nature 
but  thev  seem  to  have  first  become  numerous  in  connection  °f.„Pnvate 

Bills. 

with  the  building  of  turnpike  roads  and  the  enclosure  of 
commons  in  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century.1 
They  were  also  the  means  used  to  authorise  the  construction 
of  canals,  and  later  of  railways;  and,  in  fact,  it  was  the 
great  number  of  railway  bills,  presented  in  1844  and  1845 
that  gave  rise  to  the  modern  private  bill  procedure  in  the 
House  of  Commons. 

Apart  from  railway  bills  they  have  been  used  of  late 
years  chiefly  to  regulate  local  police  and  sanitary  matters, 
or  to  grant  powers  to  private  companies  or  municipal  cor- 
porations for  the  supply  of  public  conveniences,  such  as 
water,  gas,  electric  light,  or  tramways;  for  private  bill  pro- 
cedure applies  not  only  to  bills  that  affect  private  persons 
or  companies,  but  also  to  those  that  deal  with  the  rights  and 
duties  of  organs  of  local  government  in  any  particular  place.2 

1  For  the  History  of  this  subject  see  Clifford's  "History  of  Private  Bill 
Legislation." 

2  The  distinction  between  public  and  private  bills,  and  public  and  private 
acts  is  not  the  same.  The  former  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  procedure 
in  Parliament;  while  acts  are  classified  as  (1)  Public  General  Acts,  (2)  Lo- 
cal Acts,  which  have  the  same  legal  effect  as  public  acts,  hut  apply  only  to 
a  particular  locality,  and  may  relate  to  an  organ  of  local  government  or  a 
company;  (3)  Private  Acts  —  now  few  in  number  —  which  are  of  a  per- 
sonal nature,  and  arc  not  taken  notice  of  by  courts  unless  specially  pleaded. 
With  some  exceptions  that  will  appear  sufficiently  in  the  text,  the  acts  in 
classes  (2j  and  ('.',)  do,  and  those  in  class  (1)  do  not,  go  through  the  procedure 
for  private  bills. 

367 


368 


THE   GOVERNMENT    OF    ENGLAND 


Procedure 
on  Private 
Bills. 


The  line,  however,  between  public  and  private  bills  is  not 
altogether  logical.  Measures,  for  example,  touching  mat- 
ters of  general  interest  affecting  the  whole  metropolis  have 
been  passed  as  public  bills;  and  this  has  been  true  to  a 
smaller  extent  of  other  places ;  while  bills  regulating  affairs 
of  less  importance  for  those  very  areas  have  been  treated  as 
private.  In  fact  the  same  subject  has  at  different  times  been 
dealt  with  by  public  and  private  bills;  the  question  which 
procedure  should  be  followed  depending  upon  the  uncer- 
tain standard  of  the  degree  in  which  the  public  interest  was 
involved.1  With  these  exceptions  it  may  be  said  that  every 
bill  introduced  for  the  benefit  of  any  person,  company  or 
locality,  is,  for  the  purposes  of  procedure,  a  private  bill. 

The  standing  orders  that  govern  procedure  upon  private 
bills  are  much  more  elaborate  and  comprehensive  than  those 
relating  to  public  bills.  They  fill  in  print  five  times  as  many 
pages ;  and  although  custom  and  precedent  play  an  impor- 
tant part,  still  the  printed  rules  approach  very  nearly  to  a 
code  of  private  bill  procedure.2 

Before  a  private  bill  is  introduced,  a  petition  therefor  is 


Hybrid  •  Cf.  May,  634-43.     Ilbert,  "  Leg.  Methods  and  Forms,"  29-32.     More- 

Bills,  over,  as  measures  intended  primarily  to  affect  particular  places,  may,  on 

account  of  their  far-reaching  importance,  be  treated  as  public  bills,  so  others 
designed  for  public  objects  may  interfere  in  a  peculiar  way  with  private  in- 
terests. Measures  of  either  kind  are  sometimes,  under  the  name  of  "  Hy- 
brid Bills,"  put  through  a  mixed  procedure.  They  are  introduced  as  public 
bills,  and  then  referred  to  a  private  bill  committee,  which  is,  however,  larger 
than  an  ordinary  committee  of  that  kind,  the  members  being  appointed 
partly  by  the  House  and  partly  by  the  Committee  of  Selection.  A  pro- 
cedure of  this  sort  is  required  in  the  case  of  bills  of  the  London  County 
Council  for  raising  loans  (S.O.P.B.  194). 

2  To  distinguish  between  the  two  classes  of  standing  orders  the  numbers 
of  those  relating  to  public  business  are  printed  in  the  parliamentary  papers 
in  bold-faced  type.  But  in  the  footnotes  to  this  book  those  relating  to  private 
business  are  referred  to  as  S.O.P.B.  The  references  are  to  the  standing 
orders  as  revised  in  1903,  because  a  number  of  changes  were  made  in  that 
year  in  pursuance  of  the  recommendations  of  the  Select  Committee  of 
1902.  The  statements  in  this  chapter  relate  to  the  procedure  in  the  House 
of  Commons ;  for  the  practice  in  the  House  of  Lords  is  so  nearly  the  same 
in  almost  all  essential  points,  that  it  is  enough  to  indicate  the  more  im- 
portant differences  in  the  text  or  in  the  notes.  A  memorandum  on  the 
differences  in  detail  may  be  found  in  the  Report  of  the  Committee  on  Pri- 
vate Business  (Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  App.  15). 


PRIVATE  BILL   LEGISLATION  369 

drawn  up,  and  in  order  to  give  any  one  interested  an  oppor-  Petition  and 
tunity  to  prepare  his  objections,  notice  of  the  petition  must  Notlce- 
be  given,  in  October  or  November,  in  The  Gazette,  in 
appropriate  local  newspapers,  and  in  some  cases  by  posters 
upon  the  roadside.  Personal  notice  must  also  be  served  in 
December  upon  the  owners  of  land  directly  affected,  and  if 
the  petition  is  for  leave  to  build  a  tramway,  the  consent  of 
the  local  authority  must  be  obtained.1  Plans  of  the  work 
proposed  must  also  be  deposited  for  inspection  both  at  West- 
minster and  with  some  local  officer.2  The  petition,  with  the 
bill  itself,  must  be  filed  on  or  before  Dec.  17  in  the  Private 
Bill  Office  of  the  House,  and  a  copy  must  be  delivered  to  the 
Treasury,  the  Local  Government  Board,  the  Post  Office,  and 
to  any  other  department  whose  duties  relate  to  the  subject 
involved.3  The  petitioner  is  also  required  to  file  estimates 
of  cost,  and  to  deposit  a  sum  equal  to  four  or  five  per  cent, 
of  the  proposed  expenditures  as  a  guarantee  fund  for  the 
benefit  of  persons  who  may  be  injured  by  a  commencement, 
and  failure  to  complete,  the  work.4 

The  next  step  is  to  make  sure  that  these  preliminary  Examiners 
regulations  have  been  obeyed.  It  is  done  by  paid  officers  jf^f1" 
of  the  House  called  Examiners  of  Petitions  for  Private 
Bills,5  and  since  1855  the  two  Houses  have  appointed  the 
same  persons  to  that  post,  so  that  the  process  is  gone 
through  only  once.8  The  petitioner  must  prove  before  the 
examiner  that  he  has  complied  with  the  standing  orders; 
and  any  person  affected  has  a  right  to  be  heard  on  the  ques- 
tion, if  he  has  filed  a  memorial  of  his  intention  to  appear. 
The  examiner  certifies  that  the  standing  orders  have  been 
followed,  or  reports  in  what  respect  they  have  been  dis- 
regarded.7 

1  The  rules  about  notice  are  contained  in  S.O.P.B.  3-22.  See  also  May, 
680-81.  2  S.O.P.B.  23-31.  3  Ibid.,  32-34. 

4  Ibid.,  35-37,  55-59.  By  the  so-called  Wharncliffe  Order  a  special 
meeting  of  the  members  of  any  company  must  be  held  to  authorise  or 
ratify  an   application  for  a  private  bill.      Ibid.,  62-08. 

'  S.O.P.B.  (19-78.  •  May,  6S2;    cf.  Clifford,  7SS-95. 

7  S.O.P.B.  (39-78,  230-32.      May,  6S3-91. 
'A  li 


370 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Legislative 
and  Judi- 
cial Aspects 
of  the  Pro- 
cedure. 


Introduc- 
tion of  the 
Bill. 


Private  bill  procedure  has  both  a  legislative  and  a  judi- 
cial aspect.  The  final  aim  being  the  passage  of  an  act,  a 
private  bill  goes  through  all  the  stages  of  a  public  bill,  and 
the  records  of  its  progress  appear  in  the  journals  of  the  House. 
But  the  procedure  is  also  regarded  as  a  controversy  between 
the  promoters  and  opponents  of  the  measure,  and  this  in- 
volves an  additional  process  of  a  judicial  character.  For 
that  purpose  the  full  records  of  the  case  are  preserved  in  the 
Private  Bill  Office,  where  they  are  open  to  public  inspection. 
The  preliminary  steps  already  described  are  intended  chiefly 
to  prepare  the  case  for  the  judicial  trial,  and  to  give  oppo- 
nents a  chance  to  make  ready  their  defence.  They  corre- 
spond to  the  pleadings  in  the  clerk's  office  of  a  court ;  and 
they  are  conducted  by  a  parliamentary  agent  who  performs 
the  duties  of  a  solicitor  in  a  law  suit.1 

The  preliminaries  over,  the  bill  is  ready  to  be  introduced, 
and  the  first  thing  is  to  arrange  in  which  House  it  shall  begin 
its  career.  This  is  decided  at  a  conference  between  the 
Chairmen  of  Committees  of  the  two  Houses,  or  in  practice 
by  the  gentlemen  who  act  as  their  legal  advisers,  the  Counsel 
to  Mr.  Speaker  and  the  Counsel  to  the  Lord  Chairman  of 
Committees.2  All  these  proceedings  take  place  before  the 
usual  date  for  the  meeting  of  Parliament,  so  that  when  it 
assembles  the  bills  can  be  brought  in  at  once.3 

If  the  examiner  reports  that  the  standing  orders  have  been 
complied  with,  the  bill  is  presented  forthwith  by  being  laid 

1  The  legislative  procedure  in  the  House  is  regulated  by  Part  IV.  (193- 
226)  of  the  Standing  Orders  Relating  to  Private  Business;  the  conduct  of 
the  Private  Bill  Office  by  Part  V.  (227-49) ;  the  judicial  procedure  before 
private  bill  committees,  with  the  supervision  thereof  by  the  officers  of  the 
House,  and  the  prescription  of  provisions  that  must,  or  must  not,  be  inserted, 
by  Part  III.  (69-162). 

2  Rep.  of  Sel.  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XVI.,  1,  Q. 
340;  Hep.  of  a  similar  Com.,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  Qs.  193,  1957-5. 
Formerly  many  more  private  bills  began  in  the  Commons  than  in  the  Lords, 
but  now  the  numbers  are  not  very  far  from  the  same.  Ibid.,  Q.  337,  and 
App.  8. 

3  Until  1903  the  division  of  bills  between  the  two  Houses  was  not  made 
until  after  Parliament  met.  Ibid.,  Qs.  166-68,  197.  But  the  committee 
of  1902  recommended  a  change  which  was  made  (Ibid.,  Report  Sect.  18, 
S.O.P.B.  79). 


PRIVATE  BILL   LEGISLATION  371 

upon  the  table  of  the  House.  If  not,  his  report  is  referred  to 
the  Committee  on  Standing  Orders,  composed  of  eleven  mem- 
bers chosen  by  the  House  itself  at  the  opening  of  the  session.1 
This  committee  reports  whether  the  omission  is  of  such  a 
nature  that  under  the  circumstances  it  ought  to  be  excused 
or  not ;  and  the  report  is  almost  always  adopted  by  the 
House.  In  case  the  omission  is  excused  the  bill  is  presented 
by  being  laid  upon  the  table  ;  and  every  bill  is  deemed  when 
presented  to  have  been  read  a  first  time.2 

On  the  next  stage,  the  second  reading,  a  debate  may  take  Second 
place  upon  the  general  principle  involved,  and  a  bill  is  Readmg- 
sometimes  rejected  at  this  point,  either  because  it  is  incon- 
sistent with  public  policy,  or  because  opponents  whose 
interests  are  involved  have  been  able  to  persuade  a  major- 
ity of  the  members  to  vote  against  it.  Instructions  to  the 
committee  about  the  provisions  to  be  inserted  in  the  bill 
can  also  be  adopted  at  that  time. 

The  committee  stage  of  the  bill,  for  the  consideration  of  its  Private  Bill 
provisions  in  detail,  is  devolved  upon  a  private  bill  committee.  tc™"mit~ 
Here  takes  place  the  judicial  process,  or  trial  of  the  con- 
troversy between  conflicting  interests,  which  presents  the 
peculiar  feature  of  the  English  procedure.  Until  near  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  committees  for  private 
bills  were  made  up  on  the  same  principle  as  select  committees 
on  other  matters.  They  consisted  in  large  part  of  supporters 
and  opponents  of  the  measure.  But  in  1837  the  Lords  be- 
gan to  form  their  private  bill  committee  of  a  small  number 
of  wholly  impartial  members,  —  a  practice  which  was 
adopted  by  the  Commons  for  railway  bills  in  1844,  and  for 
all  other  private  bills  in  1855. 3     The  system  of  committees 


1  S.O.P.B.  91-97.  There  is  a  committee  with  similar  powers  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  composed  of  forty  peers,  besides  the  Chairman  of  Commit- 
tees who  with  any  two  other  members  forms  a  quorum.      May,  79G. 

J  S.O.P.B.  197.  This  is  a  change  made  in  accordance  with  the  report  of 
the  Select  Committee  of  1902.  Before  that  time  a  vote,  though  a  formal 
one,  took  place  on  the  first  reading. 

'Clifford,  I.,  70-71,  256;  II.,  821-43.  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Bill 
Leg.,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XVI.,  1,  p.  xix. 


372 


THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Railway 
and   Canal 
Bills. 


Police  and 

Sanitary 

Bills. 


in  the  two  Houses  is  now  very  much  the  same,1  the  order  of 
proceeding  in  the  Commons  being  as  follows :  All  opposed 
private  bills,  except  those  relating  to  railways  and  canals, 
divorce,  and  police  and  sanitary  matters,  are  referred  under 
the  rules  to  the  Committee  of  Selection,  which  divides  them 
into  groups  and  refers  each  group  to  a  separate  committee, 
consisting  of  a  chairman  and  three  members  not  locally 
or  otherwise  interested,  all  of  whom  it  appoints  for  the 
purpose.2 

In  order  to  secure  greater  uniformity  in  the  private  acts 
relating  to  railways,  a  general  committee  on  railway  and 
canal  bills  was  created  in  1854. 3  It  is  appointed  every  year 
by  the  Committee  of  Selection,  and  to  it  are  referred  all 
bills  of  that  kind.  But  it  does  not  take  charge  of  them 
itself.  It  merely  divides  them  into  groups,  and  then  acts 
as  a  chairman's  panel ;  that  is,  it  refers  the  bills  to  separate 
committees,  the  chairman  of  which  it  selects  from  its  own 
ranks,  the  other  three  members  being  appointed  by  the  Com- 
mittee of  Selection.4 

With  the  same  object  of  obtaining  uniformity,  all  bills 
promoted  by  local  authorities  for  police  and  sanitary  pur- 
poses were  referred  after  1881  to  a  single  committee.  In  this 
case,  however,  the  bills  were  not  too  numerous  to  be  con- 
sidered by  the  committee  itself,  although  to  relieve  pressure 
it  was,  in  1892,  enlarged  to  eleven  members,  and  authorised 
to  bisect  itself  for  the  more  rapid  despatch  of  business. 
Curiously  enough  the  committee  was  discontinued  for  some 
years,  but,  after  loud  complaints  about  exceptional  powers 
granted  by  private  acts,  it  was  revived  by  sessional  order  in 
1903,  and  intrusted  with  all  police  and  sanitary  bills  which 


1  In  the  Lords  the  committees  on  opposed  bills  consist  of  five  members, 
and  the  chairman  has  no  casting  vote.  In  the  Commons  he  has  both  an 
ordinary  and  a  casting  vote,  S.O.P.B.  124.  In  the  Lords  there  is  no  Com- 
mittee on  Railway  and  Canal  Bills. 

2  S.O.P.B.  98,  103,  105-6,  108,  110-13,  116-17,  208.  Until  a  few  years 
ago  there  was  a  paid  referee  who  could  sit  on  the  committee  with  an  ad- 
visory voice  but  no  vote.  May,  728.  There  were  formerly  two  paid 
referees,  and  later  only  one. 

3  Clifford,  I.,  117.  4  S.O.P.B.  98-106,  115,  208. 


PRIVATE  BILL  LEGISLATION  373 

contain  powers  "in  conflict  with,  deviation  from,  or  excess  of, 
the  general  law."  ' 

A  committee  on  divorce  bills  is  still  provided  for  in  the 
rules,  but  since  the  power  of  granting  divorces  in  England 
and  Scotland  has  been  entirely  transferred  to  the  courts, 
bills  of  this  kind  have  become  rare.  While  the  various 
private  bill  committees  are  thus  formed  in  slightly  different 
ways,  their  mode  of  dealing  with  the  measures  that  come 
before  them  is  the  same. 

The  bills  referred  to  these  committees  have  been  described  Locus 
as  "opposed,"  but  that  implies  an  opponent,  and  means,  not  Standl- 
an  objector  in  the  House,  but  an  outside  contestant  on  the 
basis  of  interest,  for  the  chief  object  of  these  committees  is 
a  judicial  hearing  of  opposing  parties.  If  there  is  no  oppo- 
nent, so  that  the  question  is  solely  whether  the  privileges 
sought  are  consistent  with  the  public  welfare,  the  bill  is  said 
to  be  unopposed,  and  goes  through  quite  a  different  pro- 
cedure to  be  described  hereafter.  Plainly,  therefore,  the 
question  who  may  oppose  a  bill,  and  on  what  grounds,  is 
of  vital  importance.  A  person  who  enjoys  the  right  is  said 
to  have  a  locus  standi;  and  the  first  question  to  be  decided 
is  whether  an  opponent  does  or  does  not  have  it. 

Now,  any  one  who  wishes  to  oppose  a  bill  must,  on  or 
before  Feb.  12,  file  a  petition  in  the  Private  Bill  Office,  stating 
the  ground  of  his  objection,2  and  if  the  promoters  contest 
his  right  to  appear,3  the  question  of  locus  standi  is  decided  by 
the  Court  of  Referees,  consisting  of  the  Chairman  of  Ways 
and  Means,  the  Deputy  Chairman,  and  not  less  than  seven 
members  of  the  House  appointed  by  the  Speaker.  The 
Counsel  to  Mr.  Speaker  assists  the  court,  but  sits  now  only 
as  an  assessor.4     The  principal  divergence  in  the  procedure 

1  May,  707.  Ilbert,  "Manual,"  §  92,  and  p.  294.  It  is  appointed  by  the 
Committee  of  Selection. 

2  S.O.P.B.  127-28.  If  the  bill  is  brought  from  the  House  of  Lords,  or 
delayed  in  any  other  way,  the  petition  must  he  filed  within  ten  days  of  the 
first   reading.  :i  May.  733. 

4  S.O.P.B.  S7-S9.  1'ntil  1902  the  Speaker's  Counsel  and  the  paid  referee 
were  members,  and  the  important   members,  of  t lit-  court. 


374 


THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Grounds 
of  hocus 
Standi. 


of  the  two  Houses  arises  at  this  point,  for  questions  of  locus 
standi  are  determined  in  the  House  of  Lords  by  the  committee 
that  considers  the  bill ;  and  there  is  some  difference  of  opin- 
ion about  the  relative  merits  of  the  two  systems.1  In  both 
Houses  the  decisions  are  governed  partly  by  express  pro- 
visions in  the  standing  orders,2  and  partly  by  precedents  that 
have  hardened  into  rules. 

In  order  to  have  a  locus  standi,  an  opponent  must,  as  a 
rule,  show  that  the  bill  may  affect  his  property  or  business. 
He  must  prove  a  personal  interest  distinct  from  that  of  the 
rest  of  the  community.  Moreover,  it  is  a  general  principle 
that,  except  on  the  ground  of  some  special  injury  to  them- 
selves, both  individuals  and  public  boards  are  precluded  from 
opposing  before  a  private  bill  committee  a  public  body  on 
which  they  are  represented.  If,  for  example,  a  borough 
proposes  to  construct  and  work  a  tramway,  an  omnibus 
company  has  a  right  to  be  heard  in  opposition,  but  a  rate- 
payer who  believes  that  the  plan  will  be  financially  disas- 
trous has  not.3 

It  is,  of  course,  unnecessary  to  describe  here  all  the  kinds 
of  private  interest  that  will  furnish  a  locus  standi.4  But 
in  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  right  is  enjoyed  by  all 
persons  whose  land  is  to  be  compulsorily  taken;  by  the 
owners  and  occupiers  of  buildings  along  the  line  of  a  pro- 
posed tramway;  by  traders  affected  by  the  tolls,  fares,  or 
rates  proposed ; 5   by  public  authorities ;   and  sometimes  by 

1  Rep.  Com.  on  Priv.  Bill  Log.,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XVI.,  1,  p.  iv.,  and 
see  the  evidence  before  the  Committee  on  Private  Business,  Com.  Papers, 
1902,  VII.,  321. 

2  S.O.P.B.  129-35.  These  precedents  are  collected  in  the  reports  of 
cases  in  the  Court  of  Referees,  by  Rickards  and  Saunders,  and  Saunders  and 
Austin. 

s  By  the  Borough  Funds  Act  of  1872  the  expense  of  promoting  a  private 
bill  cannot  be  incurred  by  a  local  authority  unless  sanctioned  by  a  meeting 
of  the  rate-payers.  Glen,  "Law  of  Public  Health,"  12  Ed.,  483,  967-68. 
But  this  does  not  apply  to  matters  for  which  provisional  orders  can  be 
obtained.     Ibid.,  970;    cf.  Rep.  of   Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers, 

1902,  VII.,  321,  Qs.  2242,  2290-92,  2329-31.     By  the  Borough  Funds  Act, 

1903,  no  such  sanction  is  required  for  opposing  a  private  bill. 
1  Cf.  May,  734-52. 

6  But  usually  only  in  case  they  appear  as  a  class.  S.O.P.B.  133;  Mav, 
735. 


PRIVATE  BILL  LEGISLATION  375 

inhabitants  acting  on  behalf  of  a  county,  town,  or  district, 
that  is  or  may  be  affected.  Competition,  also,  is  a  ground 
for  locus  standi,  although  the  right  to  appear  is  usually  con- 
fined to  monopolies,  to  organisations  that  represent  the  trade 
as  a  whole,  or  to  individuals  whose  business  is  important 
enough  to  represent  that  trade ; *  moreover  the  privilege  is 
extended  by  the  standing  orders  to  chambers  of  agricul- 
ture, commerce  or  shipping.2  While,  therefore,  the  rules  of 
locus  standi  are  not  perfectly  logical,  they  are  distinctly 
based  upon  private  interest,  individual  or  collective,  and  not 
upon  the  general  welfare. 

The  hearing  of  the  parties  before  the  committee  follows  Hearing 
the  pattern  of  a  trial  in  a  court  of  law,  even  to  the  standing  committee 
of  the  counsel  employed.  Up  to  this  point  the  parties  have 
been  represented  by  parliamentary  agents,  who,  although 
not  necessarily  attorneys  or  solicitors,  hold  a  similar  position, 
and  must  be  registered  in  the  Private  Bill  Office.3  The  ac- 
tual hearings,  however,  like  trials  in  court,  are  conducted 
by  barristers.  The  fees,  which  are  large,  attract  a  high 
order  of  talent,  and  in  fact  the  practice  before  private  bill 
committees  has  become  almost  a  distinct  branch  of  the  pro- 
fession, the  counsel  who  pursue  it  being  known  as  the  parlia- 
mentary bar.4  The  proceedings  are  strictly  judicial  in  form, 
the  barristers  examining  and  cross-examining  the  witnesses 
and  making  the  arguments  in  the  ordinary  way.  Moreover, 
if  either  party  has  vexatiously  subjected  the  other  to 
expense,  the  committee  can  award  costs  like  a  court  of  law, 
and  this  is  occasionally  done.5 

The  first  thing  taken  up  is  the  preamble,  the  hearing  upon 
this  involving  the  general  merits  of  the  bill,  so  that  if  the 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Municipal  Trading,  Com.  Papers,  1900,  VII.,  183, 
Qs.  576,  5K2,  2377. 

2  If  the  Court  of  Referees  thinks  fit.  S.O.P.B.  133a.  This  provision  is 
not  restricted  to  eases  of  competition. 

5  May,  691-93. 

*  By  custom,  parliamentary  counsel  are  never  appointed  to  the  bench, 
and  as  they  cannot  enter  Parliament  without  giving  up  their  practice, 
they  are  u.-ually  shut  out  from  a  political  career. 

4  May,  781-82. 


376         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

committee  is  of  opinion  that  promoters  have  failed  to  prove 
that  part  of  their  case,  it  reports  at  once  against  the  bill. 
Otherwise  the  clauses  are  taken  up  in  order,  and  the  com- 
mittee reports  the  bill  with  or  without  amendments. 
The  Com-         Although  the  peculiar  function  of  the  committee  consists 
Public an      m  passing  upon  the  conflicting  claims  of  the  parties  that 
Policy.  appear  before  it,  the  question  whether  the  public  welfare 

will  be  promoted  by  the  enactment  of  the  bill  must  be  con- 
sidered also.  This  is,  of  course,  one  of  the  chief  things  that 
the  promoters  must  prove ;  but  the  committee  seeks  no 
evidence  on  its  own  account,  nor  can  it  permit  a  private 
person  who  has  no  locus  standi  to  address  it  on  the  subject. 
In  the  interest  of  public  policy,  however,  some  safeguards 
have  been  devised.  In  the  first  place  the  standing  orders 
direct  that  in  various  classes  of  measures  certain  provisions 
must  be  inserted.  These  relate  to  such  matters  as  the  level 
of  roads,  grade  crossings,  the  amount  of  mortgages,  the  time 
for  completing  works,  deposits  to  secure  completion,  mini- 
mum rates  of  fare,  the  application  of  general  railway  acts, 
leaving  open  spaces  for  recreation  in  enclosure  bills,  and  the 
erection  in  London  of  new  workmen's  dwellings  to  replace 
others  that  are  torn  down.  In  some  cases  also  the  com- 
mittee must  report  specially  any  unusual  provisions  con- 
tained in  the  bill,  notably  in  relation  to  the  borrowing  powers 
of  local  authorities. 

Moreover,  on  some  questions  the  committee  has  the  bene- 
fit of  advice  from  public  officials.  That  private  bills  must 
be  filed  with  one  or  more  of  the  public  departments  has 
already  been  pointed  out.  In  a  few  cases  the  departments 
are  directed  to  submit  to  Parliament  a  report  upon  the  bill,1 
and  they  are  always  at  liberty  to  do  so.  Under  the  rules 
these  communications  are  referred  to  the  committees,2 
which  are  required  to  notice  in  their  reports  the  recommen- 
dations of  the  departments,  and  state  the  reasons  for  dissent 
where  they  have  not  been  followed.3     Occasionally,  repre- 

lCf.  S.O.P.B.  154,  155,  157a,  158b,  173,  194c. 

2S.O.P.B.  212.  3  Ibid.,   150,  157,  157a,  173a,  194c,  194d. 


Bills. 


PRIVATE  BILL   LEGISLATION  377 

sentatives  of  the  departments  appear  before  the  commit- 
tees ; 1  and,  what  is  more  important,  a  general  oversight  of 
private  bill  legislation,  with  the  right  to  make  suggestions, 
is  maintained  by  the  officers  of  the  Houses.2  This  is  es- 
pecially true  of  the  Counsel  to  Mr.  Speaker,  and  of  the 
Chairman  of  Committees  and  his  counsel  in  the  House  of 
Lords ;  but  the  question  how  effective  their  supervision 
is  must  be  deferred  until  the  results  of  the  system  are 
discussed. 

Unopposed  bills,  that  is  bills  where  no  adverse  petition  Unopposed 
has  been  filed,  or  where  the  petitioner  has  not  proved  a  locus 
standi,  do  not  involve  a  judicial  trial  between  contestants, 
but  only  an  examination  with  a  view  to  the  public  interest.3 
They  are,  therefore,  referred  to  quite  a  different  committee. 
Until  1903  it  consisted  of  the  Chairman,  or  Deputy  Chair- 
man, of  the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  and  the  Counsel 
to  Mr.  Speaker,  assisted  usually,  but  not  always,  by  one 
other  member  of  the  House.4  The  Select  Committee  of 
1902  on  Private  Business  was  of  opinion  that  a  body  with 
so  much  authority  ought  to  be  strengthened  by  the  addition 
of  more  members  directly  responsible  to  the  House,5  and  in 
partial  fulfilment  of  its  recommendations  the  standing  or- 

1  Rep.  Com.  on  Municipal  Trading,  Com.  Papers,  1900,  VII.,  1,  Qs.  569, 
985. 

2  Cf.  S.O.P.B.  79-86. 

3  The  total  number  of  private  bills  that  come  before  the  House  of  Com- 
mons runs  from  150  to  250  a  year,  and  of  these  about  one  half  are  unop- 
posed in  that  House.     There  are  also  about  50  unopposed  provisional  orders. 

*Cf.  S.O.P.B.  (1902)  109,  137.  For  bills  originating  in  the  House  the 
third  man  was  the  member  indorsing  the  bill.  But  this  member,  if  inter- 
ested, locally  or  otherwise,  although  taking  part  in  other  ways,  could  not 
vote.  S.O.P.B.  (1902)  139,  now  S.O.P.B.  138.  For  bills  coming  from  the 
House  of  Lords  he  was  Mr.  Parker  Smith,  M.P.  Hep  Com.  on  Priv. 
Business,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  Qs.  23,  68-69,  368;  and  see  the 
Return  printed  yearly  in  the  Commons  Papers  of  the  persons  who  served 
on  the  committee  for  each  unopposed  bill. 

In  the  Lords  the  Committee  on  unopposed  bills  consists  of  the  Chairman 
of  Committees  and  such  lords  as  think  (it  to  attend,  but  the  work  is  prac- 
tically done  by  the  Chairman  and  his  counsel.  May,  SOI.  Hep.  Com. 
on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  Qs.  1961,  1981-85,  2096, 
2099-2101. 

'Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  pp.  viii-ix. 


378  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

ders  provided  in  the  following  year  that  the  Committee  on 
Unopposed  Bills  should  consist  of  the  Chairman  and  Deputy 
Chairman  of  Ways  and  Means,  of  two  other  members  of  the 
House,  appointed  by  the  Committee  of  Selection,  and  of  the 
Counsel  to  Mr.  Speaker.1 

The  bills  having  already  been  read  through  by  the  Speak- 
er's Counsel,  and  in  part  by  the  Chairman  of  Ways  and 
Means,  the  committee  goes  over  them  rapidly  with  the  pro- 
moters, discussing  chiefly  such  points  as  have  been  raised  by 
the  Speaker's  Counsel,  and  by  any  reports  from  government 
departments.2  If  any  other  question  should  come  up  in- 
volving a  new  and  important  matter  of  public  policy,  the 
Chairman,  who  was  already  overworked,  would  formerly 
have  avoided  the  responsibility  of  deciding  it  himself  by 
reporting  to  the  House,  as  he  has  power  to  do,3  that  the  bill 
ought  to  be  treated  as  opposed ; 4  and  this  although  there 
was  no  one  to  conduct  the  opposition.5  One  of  the  objects 
of  strengthening  the  committee  was  to  put  it  in  a  position 
to  decide  all  such  questions  itself.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the 
committee  often  makes  amendments  in  a  bill,  but  seldom 
reports  that  it  ought  not  to  pass. 
Report  and  After  a  bill,  whether  opposed  or  not,  has  been  reported, 
the  House,  if  dissatisfied,  may  recommit  it  either  as  a  whole 
or  with  reference  to  particular  clauses,  and  with  or  without 
instructions.  When  this  does  not  happen,  and  it  is  unusual, 
the  bill,  if  reported  without  amendment,  and  not  a  railway 
or  tramway  bill,  stands  ready  for  its  third  reading.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  has  been  amended  by  the  committee,  or 
is  a  railway  or  tramway  bill,  it  is  ordered  to  lie  upon  the 
table  for  consideration  on  report.6  At  that  stage  amend- 
ments may  be  proposed,  or  a  motion  may  be  made  to  recom- 
mit, but  in  order  to  insure  that  the  standing  orders  are  com- 
plied with,  both  by  the  private  bill  committee  and  by  the 

1  S.O.P.B.  109. 

2  Rep.  Com.   on  Priv.  Business,  Com.   Papers,   1902,  VII.,  321,  Qs.  25, 
27,  72-73,  1393,  1405-8.  3  S.O.P.B.  S3,  209. 

4  Rep.  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  Qs.  75-76, 
1410-12.  *  Ibid.,  Q.  1391.  ■  S.O.P.B.  213. 


Considera- 


Bills 

the  Lords. 


PRIVATE  BILL  LEGISLATION  379 

House  itself,  the  consideration  cannot  take  place  until  the 
Chairman  of  Ways  and  Means  has  informed  the  House  that 
this  is  the  case ;  nor  can  any  amendments  be  offered  until  the 
Committee  on  Standing  Orders  has  reported  upon  them, 
if  the  Chairman  thinks  it  proper  that  they  should  do  so.1 

The  last  stage  is  that  of  third  reading  where  only  verbal 
amendments  are  in  order.2 

After  passing  through  one  House  a  private  bill  goes  to  the  Private 
other,  and  there  is  the  usual  process  for  reaching  an  agree- 
ment upon  amendments.  It  is  needless  to  trace  here  the 
course  of  a  private  bill  in  the  Lords.3  The  procedure  is 
essentially  the  same  as  in  the  Commons,  and  the  only  differ- 
ences of  any  consequence  have  already  been  mentioned  in 
the  text  or  in  the  notes.  A  great  deal  of  discussion  has 
taken  place  upon  the  wisdom  of  having  two  separate  hear- 
ings before  the  private  committees  of  the  two  Houses.4  It 
has  been  suggested  that  a  second  hearing  is  needless,  and 
that  time  and  expense  would  be  saved  by  having  a  single 
trial  before  a  joint  committee.  On  the  other  hand  it  is 
urged  that  where  a  bill  is  objectionable  or  defective  the 
second  hearing  gives  a  better  chance  to  reject  or  improve 
it ;  and  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  parties  often  accept  the 
decision  of  the  first  committee,  or  compromise  their  differ- 
ences, only  about  one  third  of  the  bills  opposed  in  one  house 
being  opposed  again  in  the  other.5 

The  inconvenience  and  expense  of  a  trial  before  a  com-  Special  Pro- 
mittee  in  London  led  to  a  strong  demand  for  hearings  in  ^odurc  for 

...  .  .        Scotland. 

Scotland  upon  private  bills  relating  to  that  kingdom,  and  in 

1  S.O.P.B.  81,  84,  85,  215-16,  218.  Amendments  made  by  the  Lords 
must  also  be  laid  before  the  Chairman  of  Ways  and  Means.  Ibid.,  8G.  Before 
consideration  bills  must  also  be  sent  again  to  the  government  departments 
where  they  have  to  b"  deposited  before  they  are  introduced.      Ibid.,  84. 

2  S.O.P.B.  210.  In  l  lie  House  of  Lords  there  is  no  consideration  or  report 
stage, and  substantial  amendments  may  be  made  on  third  reading.  Rep. 
of  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  App.  15. 

3  Cf.  May,  Ch.  xxix. 

4  Cf.  Reps,  of  the  Sel.  Coins,  of  1888  and  1002,  Com.  Papers,  1888, 
XVI.,   1;   1002,  VII.,  321. 

'  Cf.  Rep. of  Coin,  on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers,  1002,  VII.,  321,  Apps. 
8,   12. 


380         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

1899  a  statute  was  enacted  for  that  purpose.1  The  Act 
and  the  general  orders  made  in  pursuance  thereof,  provide 
that,  instead  of  following  the  ordinary  procedure,  pro- 
moters of  Scotch  private  bills  shall,  in  April  or  December, 
file  a  petition  with  the  Secretary  for  Scotland  for  a  draft 
provisional  order  deposited  therewith.  They  must  also 
comply  with  rules  similar  to  those  in  force  for  private  bills 
about  giving  notice,  and  filing  copies  and  plans  with  the 
government  departments.  The  draft  order  is  submitted 
to  the  Chairmen  of  Committees  of  the  two  Houses.  If 
either  of  them  is  of  opinion  that  it  affects  interests  outside 
of  Scotland,  or  is  of  such  a  character,  or  raises  such  a  ques- 
tion of  policy,  that  it  ought  not  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  new 
way,  then  it  takes  the  regular  course  of  an  English  private 
bill.  If  not,  the  order  follows  the  new  Scotch  procedure. 
The  two  Chairmen  assign  an  examiner  to  see  that  the  general 
orders  about  notice,  and  other  matters,  have  been  observed, 
the  final  power  of  dispensation  in  case  of  non-compliance 
resting  also  in  their  hands.  After  these  preliminary  steps 
have  been  taken,  the  petition  is  ready  to  begin  its  active 
career. 
Scotch  If  the  petition  is  not  opposed,  the  Secretary  for  Scotland 

Committees.  may>  ftfter  considering  the  reports  of  the  public  depart- 
ments, make  the  provisional  order,  as  prayed  for  or  with 
amendments.  In  short,  he  takes  the  place  of  a  committee 
on  unopposed  private  bills.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  thinks 
an  inquiry  ought  to  be  held,  or  if  the  petition  is  opposed,  he 
sends  it  to  a  commission  selected  on  a  curious  plan  designed 
to  retain  the  work  as  far  as  possible  in  parliamentary  hands. 
The  difficulty,  on  one  side,  of  getting  members  of  Parlia- 
ment to  undertake  such  a  service,  and  the  desire,  on  the 

1  62-63  Vic,  c.  47.  Section  15  of  the  act  empowers  the  Lord  Chairman 
of  Committees  and  the  Chairman  of  Ways  and  Means,  acting  jointly  with 
the  .Secretary  for  Scotland,  to  make,  subject  to  objection  by  either  House, 
general  orders  for  regulating  proceedings  under  the  Act.  These  orders, 
which  are  voluminous,  may  be  found  in  Com.  Papers,  1900,  LXVIL,  649. 
A  few  standing  orders  for  Scotch  bills  are  published  as  Part  VI.  of  the 
Standing  Orders  relating  to  Private  Business. 


PRIVATE  BILL  LEGISLATION  381 

other,  to  retain  a  close  connection  with  the  Houses,  resulted 
in  a  compromise  between  a  parliamentary  committee  and  a 
permanent  commission.1  Each  House  provides  a  panel  of 
its  own  members,  that  of  the  Commons  consisting  of  not 
more  than  fifteen  members  appointed  by  the  Committee 
of  Selection.2  There  is  also  an  extra  parliamentary  panel 
of  twenty  men  appointed  for  a  term  of  five  years  by  the  two 
Chairmen  and  the  Secretary  for  Scotland.  The  commis- 
sion upon  every  petition  consists  of  four  persons  taken  from 
these  panels,  the  Chairmen  of  Committees  selecting  two 
from  the  panel  of  each  House,  if  possible ;  if  not,  they  ap- 
point as  many  of  the  four  as  they  can  from  the  two  House 
panels  indiscriminately,  the  remainder  in  any  case  being 
taken  by  the  Secretary  from  the  extra  parliamentary 
panel.3  The  commission  so  formed  holds  its  sessions,  of 
course,  in  Scotland,  proceeds  like  a  committee  upon  an 
opposed  private  bill,  and  has  power  to  decide  all  questions 
of  locas  standi.  It  reports  to  the  Secretary  whether  the 
provisional  order  should  be  issued  and  in  what  form ;  and 
he  acts  accordingly.4 

The  order  of  the  Secretary,  whether  opposed  or  unopposed,  confirma- 
is  not  final,  but  provisional  only,  and  requires  confirmation  ii1am^ut?ar" 
by  Parliament.  He  brings  in  a  bill  to  confirm  it,  and  if  the 
order  was  not  opposed  in  Scotland,  or  is  not  opposed  in 
Parliament,  it  is  treated  as  if  it  had  already  gone  through 
all  the  stages  up  to  and  including  committee,  and  is  ordered 
to  be  considered  as  if  reported  from  a  committee  of  the  House. 
But  the  right  of  the  parties  to  a  hearing  in  Parliament  as  the 
final  court  of  appeal  has  been  to  some  extent  preserved,  for 
a  petition  may  be  presented  against  any  order  that  has  been 
opposed,  or  has  been  the  subject  of  a  local  inquiry,  in  Scot- 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Bill  Proc.  (Scotland),  Com.  Papers,  1898,  XL, 
62.5.  2  S.O.P.B.  25:}. 

3  The  parliamentary  returns  show  that  of  the  do/en  persons  required 
each  year  to  make  three  commissions  on  groups  of  petitions,  it  has  been 
necessary  to  take  only  a  couple  of  names  from  the  extra  parliamentary 
panel. 

4  By  $  8  if  the  commission  report  that  the  order  be  issued,  he  may 
amend  their  draft. 


382  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

land,  and  in  that  case  a  motion  may  be  made  to  refer  the 
bill  to  a  joint  committee,  which  hears  the  parties  as  in  the 
case  of  an  ordinary  private  bill,  but  reports  to  both  Houses. 
The  question  of  permitting  an  appeal  to  a  parliamentary 
committee  in  London  was  much  discussed  at  the  time,  and 
the  bill  as  finally  passed  reserved  the  right,  limiting  it  to  a 
single  hearing  before  a  joint  committee,  instead  of  two 
hearings  before  separate  committees  of  each  House  as  in 
the  case  of  an  ordinary  private  bill.  The  promoter,  more- 
over, as  well  as  the  opponent,  has  a  right  to  appeal  to  Par- 
liament. If  his  draft  order  is  refused,  he  may,  without  going 
through  the  other  preliminary  steps,  file  it  in  the  form  of 
a  substitute  bill  in  the  proper  public  office,  and  proceed 
with  it  like  a  private  bill.1 

The  Scotch  procedure  has  thus  the  effect  of  a  compulsory 
arbitration  in  Scotland,  preceding  a  possible  trial  at  West- 
minster.    It  appears,  however,  that  a  Scotch  confirmation 
bill  is  in  fact  seldom  opposed  in  London. 
Ireland  Two  years  after  the  Scotch  statute  was  passed,  similar 

acts  were  proposed  for  Ireland  and  for  Wales,  but  neither 
of  them  was  passed.  A  select  committee  on  a  Welsh  bill  of 
this  kind  reported  in  1904  that  the  Scotch  procedure  as  it 
stood  was  not  adapted  to  Wales,  and  that  any  desire  in 
England  for  a  less  costly  procedure  than  now  existed  would 
best  be  met  by  an  extension  of  the  system  of  provisional 
orders.  The  committee  remarked  that  while  most  of  the 
witnesses  examined  thought  the  Scotch  Act  had  worked 
well  on  the  whole,  some  of  them  believed  there  had  been 
no  saving  of  expense  in  the  case  of  large  schemes.  This  was 
attributed  by  the  witnesses  mainly  to  the  cost  of  bringing 
counsel  and  experts  from  London,  and  in  fact,  the  evidence 
showed  no  little  difference  of  opinion  about  the  advantages 
of  the  new  procedure  in  several  respects.2  In  Ireland  there 
is  another  obstacle  to  the  adoption  of  the  Scotch  Act ;  for 
while  local  hearings  on  private  bills  would  have  especial 
value  beyond  St.  George's  Channel,  the  Nationalists  do  not 

1  S.O.P.B.  255-58.  J  Com.  Papers,  1904,  VI.,  409. 


PRIVATE  BILL   LEGISLATION  383 

want  any  form  of  devolution  that  leaves  the  final  manage- 
ment of  Irish  affairs  in  the  hands  of  the  British  Parliament. 

The  vast  amount  of  private  legislation  enacted  in  England  Provisional 
every  year  is  due  in  large  measure  to  the  absence  of  general  r  ers 
statutes  upon  subjects  that  would  seem  to  be  ripe  for  them. 
Year  after  year  private  bills  are  passed  on  the  same  subject, 
until  a  policy  is  established  which  might  well  be  crystallised 
into  a  general  law,  leaving  the  controversies  that  arise  in  its 
application  to  be  settled  by  a  body  of  purely  judicial  char- 
acter; or,  as  in  continental  countries,  a  final  power  of  deal- 
ing with  these  matters  might,  subject  to  rules  fixed  by  law, 
be  vested  in  the  administrative  departments.  That  many 
costly  bills  in  Parliament  would  be  saved  by  passing  ap- 
propriate statutes  has  been  suggested,1  yet  the  process  goes 
on  slowly,  and  so  far  as  it  has  been  carried  it  is  for  the  most 
part  incomplete.  During  the  last  fifty  years  central  adminis- 
trative authority  in  local  and  other  matters  has  increased 
enormously,  but  in  conferring  powers  upon  public  depart- 
ments Parliament  has  been  reluctant  to  give  up  its  own  ulti- 
mate control  over  particular  cases.  This  is  especially  true 
of  the  compulsory  sale  of  land  for  public  purposes ;  for 
property  in  land  still  retains  a  peculiar  sanctity  in  England.2 

Parliament  has,  no  doubt,  in  many  cases,  delegated  to  the 
administrative  organs  of  the  state  a  final  authority  to  grant 
special  powers  to  local  bodies  or  private  companies,  or  at 
least  to  sanction  their  use;3  but  in  other  cases  the  grant 
must  be  laid  before  the  Houses,  and  does  not  go  into  effect 
if  either  of  them  passes  a  resolution  of  disapproval.4     Some- 

1  E.g.  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Police  and  Sanitary  Bills,  Com.  Papers,  1S98,  XL, 
555;    Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  p.  vii. 

2  The  eases  where  land  can  be  taken  eompulsorily  without  confirmation 
by  Parliament,  are  few,  and  are  in  the  main  confined  to  widening  highways, 
enlarging  public  buildings,  providing  for  national  defence,  furnishing  allot- 
ments to  labourers,  and  acquiring  land  for  parish  purposes.  The  most 
striking  departure  from  the  rule  is  in  the  Act  of  189G  for  the  construction 
of  light  railways.      Cf.  Jlbert,  "  Leg.  Methods  and  forms."  320. 

3  This  applies  to  many  matters  connected  with  local  government.  It  is 
true  also  of  the  construction  of  light  railways      59-  (>0  Vie.,  c.  -IS,  J  9. 

4  This  is  true,  for  example,  of  certificate.-  granted  by  the  Hoard  of  Trade 
to  railways,  for  raising  capital,  working  agreements,  and  other  matters. 


384 


THE   GOVERNMENT  OF   ENGLAND 


Procedure 
upon  Pro- 
visional 
Orders. 


times  if  opposed,1  and  more  often  whether  opposed  or  not, 
the  orders  conferring  the  powers  must  be  submitted  to  Par- 
liament for  a  formal  ratification.  This  is  the  origin  of  pro- 
visional orders.  They  are  issued  by  a  government  office 
under  the  authority  of  statutes,  but  they  are  merely  pro- 
visional until  confirmed  by  Parliament.  Except  the  Treas- 
ury, the  Admiralty,  and  the  Indian  and  Colonial  Offices, 
which  can  hardly  come  into  direct  touch  with  local  affairs, 
almost  all  the  important  departments,  and  even  the  county 
councils,  have  been  given  some  powers  of  this  kind ;  and 
they  cover  all  manner  of  subjects  that  would  otherwise  be 
dealt  with  by  private  bills.2 

Provisional  orders  are  begun  by  an  application  to  the 
department  that  has  power  to  issue  them,  and  although  the 
standing  orders  do  not  as  a  rule  apply  to  these  applications,3 
yet,  by  the  enabling  acts,  or  by  the  instructions  issued 
by  the  departments  themselves,  similar  regulations  about 
notices,  deposit  of  plans,  consent  of  local  authorities,  and 
so  forth,  are  enforced.  The  department  usually  holds,  by 
means  of  an  inspector,  an  inquiry  on  the  spot ;  and  either 
in  this  or  in  some  other  way  objectors  who  are  interested 
are  given  a  chance  to  present  their  case.  Upon  the  report 
of  the  inspector,  and  such  other  information  as  it  obtains, 
the  department  decides  whether  it  will  make  the  order  or 
not. 

The  orders  made  are  then  arranged  in  groups  according  to 
their  subjects,  and  each  group  is  scheduled  to  a  confirming 
bill,  which  is  introduced  into  Parliament  like  a  public  bill 
by  a  minister  on  behalf  of  the  department.  But  it  is 
not  treated  as  a  public  bill,  still  less  as  a  government  bill. 


1  To  this  class  belong  the  orders  for  providing  dwellings  for  the  working 
classes,  granting  charters  to  municipal  boroughs,  changing  the  boundaries 
of  divided  parishes,  constructing  tramways  in  Ireland,  etc. 

2  For  a  description  of  the  various  statutes  giving  authority  to  issue  pro- 
visional orders  see  Clifford,  Oh.  xviii.,  and  May,  Ch.  xxvi.,  and  for  a  more 
exhaustive  list  of  those  relating  to  the  Local  Government  Board  see  Rep. 
of  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  Couk  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  App.  10. 

3  The  only  ones  that  apply  are  S.O.P.B.  38  and  39  about  replacing  work- 
men's dwellings  and  the  deposit  of  plans. 


PRIVATE   BILL   LEGISLATION  385 

The  minister  does  not  try  to  force  it  through ;  he  does  not 
put  pressure  upon  his  followers  by  having  the  government 
whips  act  as  tellers  in  a  division.  The  measure  is  treated 
as  a  group  of  private  bills,  except  that  if  an  order  is  unop- 
posed an  officer  of  the  department  appears  in  support  of  it 
before  the  committee.  The  bill  is  read  a  first  time,  sent  to 
the  examiner,  read  a  second  time  and  referred  to  the  Com- 
mittee of  Selection  or  the  Committee  on  Railway  and  Canal 
Bills.  Then  if  no  petition  has  been  filed  against  any  of  the 
orders  in  the  bill  it  goes  to  the  Committee  on  Unopposed 
Private  Bills  ;  otherwise  it  goes,  with  all  the  orders  it  contains, 
to  an  ordinary  private  bill  committee  which  gives  a  hearing 
in  the  usual  form  to  the  promoters  and  opponents  of  the 
orders  that  are  opposed.1  Finally,  the  bill  goes  through 
the  regular  stages  in  the  House.2  In  fact  the  standing 
orders  direct  3  that  provisional  order  bills,  after  being  re- 
ported, shall  be  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  private  bills, 
except  so  far  as  the  payment  of  fees  by  the  promoters  is 
concerned. 

The  question  of  fees  is  a  very  important  matter.     It  is  Advantages 
one  of  the  chief  reasons  for  resorting  to  a  provisional  order;  giona°vl~ 
because  the  fees  charged  by  the  Houses  to  the  promoters  Orders. 
of  private  bills  are  heavy,  and  in  the  case  of  unopposed  bills 
they  form  a  large  part  of  the  cost  of  obtaining  the  act.     An 
unopposed  provisional  order  is,  therefore,  very  much  less 
expensive  than  an  unopposed  private  bill ;    and  although, 
with  the  large  fees  of  counsel  and  expert  witnesses,  an  op- 
posed order   may  cost   as   much  or  even   more  than  an  op- 
posed bill,  it  has  the  benefit  of  the  presumption  arising  from 
the  action  of  the  department.     Moreover,  provisional  orders, 
even  if  contested  before  the  department,  are  not  commonly 
opposed  in  the  House.     In  the  four  years  from  1898  to  1901 
less  than  one  tenth  of  the  provisional  orders  were  opposed 

1  S.O.P.B.  208a. 

2  In  the  House  of  Lords  an  unopposed  hill,  like  a  public  bill,  is  referred 
after  second  reading  to  a  Committee  of  the  Whole.  An  opposed  order  goes 
to  a  private  bill  committee,  and  then,  with  the  rest  of  the  bill  to  a  Com- 
mittee of  the  Whole.  3S  O.P.B.  151. 


386         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

in  Parliament,  and  only  one  of  them  failed  to  pass.1  It  is, 
indeed,  noteworthy  that  of  the  2520  provisional  orders 
issued  by  the  Local  Government  Board  from  1872  to  1902 
only  23  were  rejected  by  Parliament.2 
Defects  of  The  system  of  private  bill  legislation,  like  the  rest  of  man's 
Private  Bui  iiandiwork,  is  not  altogether  without  defects.     One  of  these 

Legislation.  ° 

is  the  costliness  of  the  procedure.  A  local  governing  body 
Expense.  that  wants  to  do  some  obvious  and  necessary  public  duty, 
such  as  to  take  land  for  the  purpose  of  a  new  street  or 
schoolhouse,  must  go  to  the  expense  of  getting  a  provisional 
order ;  or  if  the  object  happens  to  be  one  not  covered  by  any 
statute  for  provisional  orders,  it  must  incur  the  greater  cost 
of  promoting  a  private  bill ;  and  in  either  case  the  owner,  if 
determined  to  fight  to  the  bitter  end,  can  force  the  ex- 
pense up  to  a  considerable  sum.  In  the  House  of  Commons 
there  is  a  fee  for  almost  every  step  that  is  taken  by  the  pro- 
moters of  a  private  bill ;  the  minimum  fees  for  the  various 
stages  in  the  House  itself  taken  together  are  never  less  than 
thirty-five  pounds,  and  they  increase  according  to  the 
amount  involved,  up  to  four  times  as  much.  There  is, 
moreover,  a  fee  of  ten  pounds  for  each  day  that  the  com- 
mittee sits,  if  the  promoters  appear  by  counsel,  and  of  five 
pounds  if  they  do  not.  Fees  on  a  smaller  scale  are  also 
charged  to  opponents.  Altogether  the  annual  receipts  of 
the  House  of  Commons  from  private  bill  legislation  average 
over  forty  thousand  pounds,  while  its  expenses  on  that 
account  are  less  than  twelve  thousand.3  In  the  House  of 
Lords  the  fees  are  arranged  somewhat  differently,  but  they 
are,  on  the  whole,  about  as  large  ; 4  so  that  the  parliamentary 
charges  on  the  smallest  unopposed  private  bill  amount  to 
over  one  hundred  and  ninety  pounds.  Then  there  are  the 
expenses  of  parliamentary  and  local  agents,  of  printing, 
advertising,  and,  in  the  case  of  opposed  bills,  of  counsel, 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII.,  321,  App.  11. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  185. 

3  Ibid.,  App.  6. 

4  Ibid.,  App.  15,  and  see  the  tables  appended  to  the  standing  orders. 


the  Public 
Interest. 


PRIVATE  BILL   LEGISLATION  387 

witnesses,  and  experts.  Sometimes,  all  this  makes  a  very- 
large  sum.  Birmingham,  for  example,  spent  £44,750  in 
1892  in  promoting  a  single  bill.1 

The  total  amount  spent  by  local  authorities  in  the  United 
Kingdom  during  the  seven  years  from  1892  to  1898  in  pro- 
moting and  opposing  private  bills  was  £1,390,407,  while 
private  companies  expended  for  the  same  purpose  £2,806,813. 
Adding  the  smaller  sums  spent  on  provisional  orders,  and 
those  paid  out  by  harbour  and  dock  boards,  the  grand  total 
consumed  in  private  legislation  was  £4, 496, 834. 2  The  cost 
of  opposed  bills  cannot  be  materially  reduced  by  Parliament 
if  the  present  system  is  to  be  maintained ;  and  while  this  is 
not  true  of  unopposed  bills,  it  has  been  argued  that  high 
fees  are  an  earnest  of  good  faith  and  tend  to  check  private 
speculation  in  concessions. 

A  second  defect  in  the  system  is  a  lack  of  sufficient  atten-  Neglect  of 
tion  to  the  interests  of  the  public.     As  early  as  1865  it 
struck  observers  that,  apart  from  certain  partial  safeguards, 
the  public  had  no  friend  in  this  class  of  legislation.3 

The  fact  is  that  private  bill  committees  are  chiefly  occu- 
pied by  a  hearing  between  conflicting  interests,  in  which  a 
citizen  whose  only  motive  for  appearing  is  the  general  welfare 
has  no  locus  standi.*  Moreover,  they  are  shifting  tribunals, 
whose  decisions  are  uncertain,  and  whose  very  nature  ren- 
ders a  consistent  policy  extremely  difficult.  In  fact  it  is 
this  uncertainty  that  often  causes  promoters  to  try  the 
chance  of  a  private  bill,  rather  than  apply  for  a  provisional 
order  on  the  same  subject  to  a  public  department  that  is 
trying  to  enforce  a  well-known  policy  at  variance  in  some 
respects  with  the  powers  the  promoter  is  socking  to  obtain. 

1  Return  of  Expense  of  Private  Bill  Legislation,  1892-98,  Com.  Papers, 
1900,  LXVIL,  111,  p.  7. 

2  Ibid.,  187,  p.  06.  See  also  the  returns  for  the  preceding  seven  years  in 
Com.  Papers,  1S92,  LXIIL,  51. 

3  Clifford,  II..  800. 

4  At  the  local  inquiries  held  by  the  departments  for  the  purpose  of  issuing 
provisional  orders,  any  resident  of  the  district  has,  in  some  cases,  at  least, 
a  right  to  be  heard.  Macassey,  "  Private  Bills  and  Provisional  Orders," 
388,  418. 


388  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

The  committees  are  sometimes  willing  to  grant  new  and 
unusual  powers,  without  enough  regard  for  the  ultimate 
effect  of  the  precedent  they  create.  This  has  been  specially 
true  in  the  case  of  borough  councils,  and  was  a  cause  of  no 
small  complaint  before  the  Committee  on  Municipal  Trading 
in  1900. 
Effect  of  the  There  are,  indeed,  certain  means  of  preserving  uniformity 
Orders^  °^  action  that  are  more  or  less  effective.  The  first  of  these 
are  the  standing  orders,  which  lay  down  some  rules  for  the 
guidance  of  the  committees,  and  prescribe  a  few  provisions 
that  must  be  inserted  in  certain  classes  of  bills.  They  do 
not,  however,  go  very  far. 
clauses  Acts  Then  there  are  the  clauses  acts,  of  various  kinds,  which 
BinsModel  are  practically  always  incorporated  —  though  not  without 
additions  or  exceptions  —  in  private  bills  on  the  subjects 
with  which  they  deal.  There  are,  also,  the  model  bills, 
which  have  been  carefully  drawn  up  as  standards  for  the 
committees  to  follow,  although  they  are  by  no  means  obliged 
to  do  so.  But  all  these  things  tend  merely  to  maintain 
uniformity  in  legislation  of  a  well-recognised  type,  along 
familiar  lines.  They  have  little  effect  in  cases  where  a 
request  is  made  for  new  and  unusual  powers.  Cases  of  that 
kind  are  not,  indeed,  wholly  without  supervision.  If  a  bill 
deals  with  local  police  or  health,  it  goes  before  the  Police  and 
Sanitary  Committee  created  by  the  House  of  Commons  for 
the  very  purpose  of  preserving  a  consistent  policy  in  such 
matters,  and  of  no  small  use  in  that  way.1  But  this  is  true 
only  for  a  very  limited  class  of  measures. 
The  The  only  general  oversight  comes  from  the  government 

Depart-         departments,  and  the  officers  of  Parliament.     It  has  already 
ments.  been  pointed  out  that  all  private  bills  must  be  referred  to  one 

or  more  of  the  departments,  and  that  these  are  sometimes 
obliged,  and  always  at  liberty,  to  make  reports  upon  them. 
The  reports  go  to  the  private  bill  committees,  which  are 
required  to  notice  the  recommendations  therein  in  their  own 

1  Rep.  of   Com.    on    Municipal  Trading,  Com.    Papers,  1900,  VII.,  18.3, 
(>.-■.  421,  423. 


PRIVATE  BILL  LEGISLATION  389 

reports  to  the  House.  The  suggestions  cannot,  therefore, 
be  entirely  ignored,  but  the  departments  have  no  means  of 
enforcing  them.  The  Home  Office  is,  indeed,  always  repre- 
sented before  the  Committee  on  Police  and  Sanitary  Bills,1 
but  it  is  rarely  asked  to  attend  before  others ; 2  and,  in  gen- 
eral, it  may  be  said  that  for  a  department  to  communicate 
with  the  committees  save  by  its  written  reports  is  somewhat 
exceptional.3  On  novel  questions  of  policy,  moreover,  the 
departments  seem  to  follow  rather  than  lead  the  private  bill 
committees.4 

The  officers  of  the  Houses  of  Parliament  have  a  more  effec-  chairman  of 
tive  influence.     Under  the  standing  orders  of  the  Commons  }Yays  and 

°  t  Means. 

all  private  bills  must  be  shown  to  the  Chairman  of  Ways 
and  Means,  both  before  they  are  considered  by  a  committee 
and  after  any  amendments  have  been  made.5  When  sitting 
in  the  Committee  on  Unopposed  Bills,  he  frequently  requires 
the  agent  of  the  promoters  to  omit  or  insert  clauses,6  and 
occasionally  he  draws  the  attention  of  the  chairman  of  a 
private  bill  committee  to  an  extraordinary  provision ;  but 
he  does  not  feel  it  his  duty  to  try  to  secure  a  general  uniform- 
ity in  private  bills.7  In  fact,  he  is  so  busy  that  he  can  exam- 
ine personally  only  a  small  part  of  them.8  The  appointment 
of  a  Deputy  Chairman  has  been  an  assistance  in  this  way.9 
But  the  work  is  mainly  done  by  the  Counsel  to  Mr.  Speaker, 
who  reads  all  the  bills ;  makes  a  careful  analysis  of  them, 
noting  the  reports  from  the  government  departments;  sees 
the  agents  about  any  amendments  he  has  to  suggest ;  and 
calls  the  attention  of  the  Chairman  of  Ways  and  Means  to 
any  matters  that  may  require  it.10    Sometimes  he  is  consulted 

1  Rep.  of  the  Com.  on  Municipal  Trading,  Coin.  Papers,  1900,  VII., 
183,  Q.  987;  Rep.  of  the  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  Com.  Papers,  1902,  VII., 
321.  Qs.  2368-09,  2403-4. 

2  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  1902,  VII.,  321.  Qs.  2378,  2401-2. 

5  Pep.  of  Com.  on  Municipal  Trading,  1900,  VII..  183,  Qs.  233-34. 

4  Cf.  Ibid.,  Qs.  3,  103,  145,  and  1063.  5  S.O.P.B.  80. 

6  Rep.  of  Committee  on  Priv.  Business,  1902,  VII.,  321,  Qs.  403-5. 

7  Ibid.,  Qs.  391-94.  8  Ibid.,  Q.  2327.  •  Ibid.,  Qs.  85-87. 
10  Rep.  of  Com.  on   Priv.   Bill  Legislation,  Com.   Papers,   1888,  XVI.,   1, 

Qs.  310-42. 


Chairman. 


390  THE   GOVERNMENT    OF   ENGLAND 

by  the  chairman  of  a  private  bill  committee ; 1    while  the 
paid  referee,  on  account  of  his  large  experience,  had  for- 
merly some  influence  with  the  committees.2 
The  Lord  But  by  far  the  most  important  officer  of  Parliament  in 

this  respect  is  the  Chairman  of  Committees  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  the  Lord  Chairman,  as  he  is  called.  Being  less  busy 
with  public  affairs  than  the  House  Chairman,  he  is  able 
to  devote  much  more  time  to  private  bill  legislation.  He 
examines  all  the  bills,  even  reading  those  introduced  into 
the  House  of  Commons  before  the  Speaker's  Counsel  sees 
them ; 3  and  he  is  in  constant  communication  with  the  Chair- 
man of  Ways  and  Means,  and  with  the  government  depart- 
ments.4 He  does  not,  as  a  rule,  act  directly  upon  the  private 
bill  committees,5  but  he  confers  with  the  promoters  of  the 
bills  or  their  agents,  and  explains  to  them  what  changes  he 
requires  them  to  make.  In  such  cases  the  promoters  usu- 
ally comply  with  his  wishes.  In  fact  they  are  practically 
obliged  to  do  so  or  withdraw  their  bill,  because  the  second 
and  third  readings  of  private  bills  in  the  House  of  Lords 
are  always  moved  by  the  Lord  Chairman,  who  would  simply 
refuse  to  act  if  his  advice  were  not  accepted.  Of  course, 
some  other  peer  might  make  the  motion  and  carry  it,  but 
this  is  said  to  have  happened  only  once  within  living  mem- 
ory.6 The  Lord  Chairman  examines  provisional  orders  less 
thoroughly,  and  if  they  contain  objectionable  provisions  he 
confers  with  the  department  that  is  responsible  for  them 
rather  than  with  the  promoters.7 

The  greatest  obstacles  which  the  Lord  Chairman  meets 
with  come  from  what  are  known  as  "  agreed  clauses,"  that  is. 
clauses  agreed  upon  between  opponents  and  promoters  of 

1  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Bill  Legislation,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XVI.,  I.,  Qs. 
348.    Rep.  of  Com.  on  Municipal  Trading,  1900,  VII.,  183,  Q.  545. 

2  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Municipal  Trading,  1900,  VII.,  183,  Qs.  2372,  2393, 
and  2399.         3  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  1902,  VII.,  321,  Q.  248. 

'  Rep.  on  Municipal  Trading,  1900,  VII.,  183,  Q.  3915. 

5  Ibid.,  Qs.  290-91  and  3923-24. 

6  Ibid.,  Qs.  284-85,  390,  3912,  3920,  3922;  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Busi- 
ness,  1902,  VII.,  321,  Qs.   77-80,  214-15. 

7  Rep.  on  Municipal  Trading,  1900,  VII.,  183,  Qs.  454-55  and  3917-18. 


PRIVATE  BILL  LEGISLATION  391 

the  bill.  These  in  most  cases  are  accepted  without  much 
examination  by  the  private  bill  committees.  The  Lord 
Chairman  tries  to  strike  them  out  when  he  deems  them 
against  public  policy ;  but  this  is  not  always  easy,  because 
it  may  be  an  injustice  to  one  of  the  parties  who  has  con- 
sented not  to  urge  or  oppose  other  provisions  on  the  faith  of 
those  clauses.  Moreover,  even  if  the  clauses  are  struck  out 
of  the  bill,  they  may  still  be  operative  in  fact,  as  the  persons 
interested  often  feel  bound  in  honour  to  carry  them  out. 
The  matter  has  a  very  important  bearing  on  the  subject 
of  municipal  trading,1  that  is,  the  supply  of  public  utilities 
by  companies  and  public  bodies,  and  it  will  be  noticed  here- 
after in  that  connection.  It  is  curious  that  the  protection 
of  the  public  interest  in  private  bill  legislation  should  depend 
very  largely  on  the  action  of  one  man,  and  that  man  not  the 
holder  of  a  representative  office  or  responsible  to  the  public, 
but  a  member  of  an  hereditary  chamber  who  practically 
holds  his  post  as  long  as  he  pleases. 

If  the  English  system  of  private  bill  legislation  has  its  Merits  of 
defects,  they  are  far  more  than  outweighed  by  its  merits.  tie  ystem- 
The  curse  of  most  representative  bodies  at  the  present  day 
is  the  tendency  of  the  members  to  urge  the  interests  of  their 
localities  or  their  constituents.  It  is  this  more  than  any- 
thing else  that  has  brought  legislatures  into  discredit,  and 
has  made  them  appear  to  be  concerned  with  a  tangled  skein 
of  private  interests  rather  than  with  the  public  welfare.2  It 
is  this  that  makes  possible  the  American  boss,  who  draws 
his  resources  from  his  profession  of  private  bill  broker. 
Now  the  very  essence  of  the  English  system  lies  in  the  fact 
that  it  tends  to  remove  private  and  local  bills  from  the 
general  field  of  political  discussion,  and  thus  helps  to  rivet 
the  attention  of  Parliament  upon  public  matters.  A  min- 
istry  stands  or  falls  upon  its  general  legislative  and  admin- 

1  Cf.  Rep.  on  Municipal  Trading,  1900,  VII.,  183,  Qs.  298,  341-14,  347, 
3939- t 1 . 

2  For  :i  careful  study  from  this  point  of  view  of  a  fairly  good  legislative 
foody,  foy  one  of  its  members  well  fitted  to  ofoserve,  see  an  article  foy  Francis 
('.  Lowell,  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  LXX1X.,  300-77,  -March,  1897. 


392         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

istrative  record,  and  not  because  it  has  offended  one  mem- 
ber by  opposing  the  demands  of  a  powerful  company,  and 
another  by  ignoring  the  desires  of  a  borough  council, 
it  Depends  Such  a  condition  would  not  be  possible  unless  Parliament 
porfof  fiuf"  was  wiUmg  to  leave  private  legislation  in  the  main  to  small 
Committees  impartial  committees,  and  abide  by  their  judgment.  If  this 
House.  were  not  true  —  and  it  would  not  be  true  in  most  other 

legislatures  —  the  promoters  and  opponents  of  the  bill 
would  attempt  to  forestall  or  reverse  the  decisions  of  the 
committees  on  the  floor  of  the  House,  and  would  try  to  enlist 
the  support  of  the  members  in  their  favour.  That  is,  indeed, 
occasionally  done,  and  has  called  forth  no  small  complaint. 
Perhaps  the  most  notable  instance  of  late  years  was  that 
of  the  bills  for  the  organisation  of  companies  to  supply 
electric  power  in  Durham  and  South  Wales.  The  bills 
were  opposed  on  the  ground  both  of  public  policy  and  of 
local  interest,  and  were  rejected  by  the  House  of  Commons 
in  1899  under  the  powerful  influence  of  the  Association 
of  Municipal  Corporations.  Public  feeling  was,  however, 
aroused,  and  the  bills  were  passed  in  1901. 

In  the  very  nature  of  things  Parliament  must  have  power 
to  overrule  the  private  bill  committees,  and  sometimes 
does  so,  but  the  permanence  of  the  system  depends  upon  the 
fact  that  it  is  not  done  often.  The  question,  therefore, 
whether  there  is  a  growing  tendency  to  override  the  com- 
mittees is  a  very  interesting  one.  Such  meagre  statistics 
as  have  been  collected  would  appear  to  show  that  there  has 
been  a  slight  increase  in  the  number  of  bills  opposed  on 
second  and  third  reading,  and  in  the  number  of  instruc- 
tions to  committees  that  have  been  moved,1  as  well  as  in 
the  amount  of  time  spent  in  the  House  in  debating  these 
matters.2     It  seems,  also,  to  be  the  general  opinion  of  men 

1  In  the  five  years  1891-95  the  number  of  bills  opposed  on  second  reading 
averaged  17|,  while  from  1897-1901  they  averaged  32.  Rep.  of  Com.  on 
Priv.  Business,  1902,  VII.,  321,  Q.  218. 

2  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  1902,  VII.,  321,  App.  2.  But  these 
periods  are  too  short  to  warrant  any  accurate  conclusion.  In  not  more  than 
eight  or  nine  per  cent,  of  the  cases  does  the  opposition  seem  to  have  suc- 
ceeded.    Ibid.,  Q.  219-20. 


PRIVATE  BILL  LEGISLATION  393 

in  close  touch  with  private  bill  practice,  that  the  habit  of 
overruling  the  committees  has  gained  ground  of  late  years, 
but  fortunately  not  to  any  dangerous  extent.1 

1  Cf.  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Bill  Leg.,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XVI.,  1, 
Qs.  346-47,  487-88,  553.  1244.  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Municipal  Trading, 
1900,  VII.,  183,  Qs.  519,  523-26,  529.  Com.  on  Priv.  Business,  1902,  VII., 
321.  Qs.  42-43.  In  conversation  the  writer  found  the  opinion  that  the 
habit  was  increasing  substantially  universal. 

When  the  Speaker's  Counsel  hears  that  opposition  in  the  House  is  likely 
to  be  made,  he  sometimes  tries  to  prevent  it  by  arranging  for  a  conference 
between  the  promoters  and  opponents  in  the  presence  of  the  Chairman  of 
Ways  and  Means.  Rep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Bill  Legislation,  1888,  XVI.,  1, 
Q.  346. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

THE   HOUSE   OF   LORDS 

Tracing  its  origin  to  the  ancient  council  of  the  magnates 
of  the  realm,  the  House  of  Lords  has,  in  the  fulness  of  time, 
undergone  several  changes  of  character.1  From  a  meeting  of 
the  Great  Council  of  the  King,  it  became  an  assembly  of 
his  principal  vassals,  the  chief  landholders  of  the  Kingdom, 
ecclesiastical  and  lay ;  and  finally  it  was  gradually  trans- 
formed into  a  chamber  of  hereditary  peers,  enjoying  their 
honours  by  virtue  of  a  grant  from  the  Crown.  Each  phase 
has  left  a  trace  upon  its  organisation  or  functions,  or  upon 
the  privileges  of  its  members. 
Composition  Before  the  Reformation  the  ecclesiastics  in  the  House  of 
House  Lords,2  including  the  abbots  and  priors,  usually  outnumbered 

the  laymen ;  but  upon  the  dissolution  of  the  monasteries, 
and  the  disappearance  therewith  of  the  abbots  and  priors, 
the  proportions  were  reversed,  and  the  hereditary  element 
became  predominant.  At  present  the  House  contains  sev- 
eral kinds  of  members,  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  every 
peer  has  not  a  right  to  sit,  and  all  members  of  the  House 
are  not  in  every  respect  peers. 
The  iieredi-  First  there  are  the  peers  with  hereditary  seats.  They 
tary  Peers.  are  ^c  peerg  0f  England,  created  before  the  union  with 
Scotland  in  1707 ;  the  peers  of  Great  Britain  created  between 
that  time  and  the  union  with  Ireland  in  1801 ;  and  the  peers 
of  the  United  Kingdom  created  thereafter.  They  rank  as 
dukes,  marquises,  earls,  viscounts,  and  barons,  whose  pre- 

1  The  best  history  of  the  House  is  Pike's  "  Constitutional  History  of  the 
House  of  Lords." 

2  The  question  whether  they  sat  by  virtue  of  their  tenure  of  land,  or  of 
their  offices  in  the  Church,  has  been  a  subject  of  some  discussion.  Cf. 
Pike,  151  et  seq.     Anson,  I.,  220-22. 

.394 


THE  HOUSE  OF  LORDS  395 

cedence,  with  that  of  their  wives  and  children,  furnishes 
abundant  interest  to  those  who  care  for  such  things.  The 
Crown,  that  is,  the  ministry  of  the  day,  has  unlimited  power 
to  create  hereditary  peerages  with  any  rules  of  descent  known 
to  the  law  in  the  case  of  estates  in  land,1  and  since  the  ac- 
cession of  George  III.  the  power  has  been  freely  used.  All 
but  seventy-four  out  of  nearly  six  hundred  seats  belong  to 
this  class,  which  is  now  the  only  channel  for  an  increase  in 
the  membership  of  the  House. 

When  the  union  with  Scotland  was  made  in   1707,  the  The  Repre- 
Scotch  peers  were  more  numerous  in  proportion  to  popula-  5^tatl^e 
tion  than  the  English;    and  therefore,  instead  of  admitting  Scotland. 
them  all  to  the  House  of  Lords,  it  was  provided  that  they 
should  elect  sixteen  representatives  of  their  order  for  the 
duration  of  each  Parliament.     No  provision  was  made  for 
the  creation  of  new  Scotch  peers,  so  that  with  the  dying  out 
of  peerages,  and  the  giving  of  hereditary  seats  to  Scotch 
noblemen  by  creating  them  peers  of  the  United  Kingdom,2 
the  number  of  Scotch  peers  who  have  no  seats  in  their  own 
right  has  fallen  from  one  hundred  and  sixty-five  to  thirty- 
three.     Within  another  generation  they  may  not  be  more 
than  enough  to  furnish  the  sixteen  representatives. 

The  same  problem  arose  upon  the  union  with  Ireland  a  Of  Ireland, 
hundred  years  later;  but  the  Scotch  precedent  was  not  fol- 
lowed in  all  respects;  for  the  act  provided  that  the  Irish 
peers  should  elect  twenty-eight  of  their  number  representa- 
tives for  life,  and  an  arrangement  was  also  made  for  per- 
petuating the  nobility  of  Ireland  within  certain  limits. 
Not  more  than  one  new  Irish  peerage  was  to  be  created  for 
every  three  that  became  extinct,  until  the  number  —  ex- 
clusive of  those  having  hereditary  seats  in  the  House  of 

1  And  possibly  with  others.     Cf.  Anson,  I.,  197-200. 

2  At  one  time  the  House  of  Lords  held  that  a  Scotch  peer  could  not  be 
given  an  hereditary  seat  as  a  peer  of  Great  Britain;  but  this  decision  was 
afterwards  reversed.  Pike,  361-62.  A  peer  so  created  can  still  vote  for 
representatives  as  a  Scotch  peer.  Ibid.,  362-63.  And  there  has  been  some 
doubt  whether,  if  a  representative  peer,  he  vacates  his  seat  at  once.  Ibid., 
362,  May,  13. 


396  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

Lords  under  other  titles  —  had  fallen  to  one  hundred,  a 
limit  above  which  it  can  never  be  raised.1  There  is  another 
important  difference  between  the  Scotch  and  Irish  peers. 
The  former  are  wholly  excluded  from  the  House  of  Commons, 
but  the  latter  can  sit  for  any  constituency  in  Great  Britain, 
though  not  in  Ireland.  Under  this  provision  Irish  peers 
have,  in  fact,  often  sat  in  the  Commons,  the  most  famous 
case  being  that  of  Lord  Palmerston.  The  Irish  peerage  thus 
affords  an  opportunity  to  ennoble  a  statesman,  without 
putting  an  end  to  his  political  career  in  the  popular  chamber. 
The  The  dissolution  of  the  monasteries,  by  removing  the  abbots 

Bishops.  an(j  priors  from  the  House  of  Lords,  left  the  bishops  the  only 
spiritual  peers ;  and  as  such  they  have  held  their  seats  to  the 
present  day.  By  the  time  the  union  with  Scotland  was 
made,  the  established  church  of  that  kingdom  was  Presby- 
terian in  form,  and  no  Scotch  ecclesiastics  were  added  to 
the  House  of  Lords.  But  the  Irish  established  church  was 
Episcopal  and  Protestant,  and  hence  at  the  union  with 
Ireland  in  1801  four  places  were  given  to  her  bishops,  who 
filled  them  by  rotation  sitting  for  a  session  apiece.  With 
the  disestablishment  of  the  Irish  Church  in  1869  its  repre- 
sentatives vanished  from  Parliament,  leaving  the  English 
prelates  as  the  only  spiritual  peers  in  the  House  of  Lords.2 
Meanwhile  the  greater  attention  paid  to  the  needs  of  the 
Church  has  brought  about  the  creation  of  new  bishoprics  in 
England ;  but  in  order  not  to  increase  the  number  of  spiritual 
peers,  it  has  been  provided  that  while  the  Archbishops  of 
Canterbury  and  York,  with  the  Bishops  of  London,  Durham, 
and  Winchester,  shall  always  have  seats  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  of  the  rest  only  the  twenty-one  shall  sit  who  are 
seniors  in  the  order  of  appointment.3  The  spiritual  peers 
are  members  of  the  House  solely  by  virtue  of  their  office, 
and  so  long  as  they  retain  it.  Except,  in  fact,  for  the 
five  great  sees  they  are  members  only  by  virtue  of  seniority 

1  The  number  is  now  less  than  one  hundred. 

2  The  Bishop  of  Sodor  and  Man  has  a  seat,  but  no  vote. 

3  There  are  now  ten  English  bishops  who  do  not  sit  in  the  House  of  Lords. 


THE  HOUSE   OF   LORDS  397 

in  office.  At  times  the  Nonconformists  have  tried  to  ex- 
clude them  altogether;  but  with  the  growth  in  the  number 
of  lay  peers  their  relative  importance  has  diminished,  and 
it  is  not  probable  that  they  will  be  removed,  unless  as  part 
of  a  larger  movement  for  the  reform  of  the  House  of  Lords, 
or  the  disestablishment  of  the  Church. 

Since  the  House  of  Lords  is  not  only  a  legislative  chamber,  Life  Peers, 
but  also  the  highest  court  of  appeal  for  the  British  Isles,  it 
is  well  that  it  should  contain  at  all  times  the  legal  talent 
required  for  the  purpose.     An  obvious  method  of  accom- 
plishing   the    result,    without    permanently    enlarging    the 
House,  or  hampering  the  career  of  heirs  who  may  not  have 
the  wealth  to  support  the  dignity,  is  by  giving  seats  for  life 
to  eminent  judges.     With  this  object  Sir  James  Parke,  a 
distinguished  baron  of  the  Court  of  Exchequer,  received  in 
1856  a  patent  as  Baron  Wensleydale  for  life.     Much  learn-  The  Case 
ing  has  been  expended  upon  the  question  whether  the  Crown  °frBaron 
has  ever  exercised  the  power  to  create  a  life  peer  with  a  seat  dale, 
in  the  House  of  Lords,1  and  whether,  if  it  ever  existed,  the 
power  has  become  obsolete ;   but  the  Wensleydale  case  was 
settled  by  a  vote  of  the  House  that  the  Letters  Patent  did 
not  enable  the  grantee  to  sit  and  vote  in  Parliament.     Sir 
James  Parke  was  thereupon  created  Baron  Wensleydale  with 
an  hereditary  title,  and  the  appointment  of  Law  Lords  as 
life  peers  was  postponed  a  score  of  years. 

At  last  the  need  for  increasing  the  legal  members  of  the  The  Lords 
House  became  so  clear  that  in  1876  an  act  was  passed  to  of  APPeal- 
authorise  the  appointment  of  two,  and  ultimately  of  four, 
Lords  of  Appeal  in  Ordinary  for  life.2  They  hold  the  posi- 
tion, and  enjoy  a  salary  of  six  thousand  pounds,  on  the  same 
tenure  as  other  judges;  and  since  1887  they  have  also  had  a 
right  to  sit  in  the  House  as  long  as  they  live,  irrespective 
of  their  tenure  of  the  office.  The  motive  for  their  creation 
was  simply  to  strengthen  the  House  of  Lords  as  a  court  of 

1  Cf.  Pike,  369-76.      Stubbs,  "Const,  Hist.,"  ">  Ed.,  ITT.,  454. 
7  Before  appointment   they  must   have  held  high  judicial  office  for  two 
years,  or  have  practised  at  the  English,  Scotch,  or  Irish  bar  for  fifteen  years. 


398         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

appeal.     Proposals  for  life  peerages  on  a  more  extended 
scale  have  also  been  made  in  connection  with  plans  to  re- 
form the  House  of  Lords  as  a  branch  of  Parliament.     So 
far  these  have  come  to  nothing ;   and,  as  we  shall  see  here- 
after, it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  they  would  attain  the  end 
in  view,  or  that,  if  they  did,  they  would  be  wise. 
The  House        The  authority  of  the  House  of  Lords  to  determine  the 
th^Quaim-    validity  of  new  patents  has  already  been  referred  to  in  con- 
cation  of  its  nection  with  the  Wensleydale  case.     It  is  also  empowered 
by  statute  to  pass  upon  the  election  of  Scotch  and  Irish 
representative  peers.     Disputed  claims  to  the  succession  of 
hereditary  peerages,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  settled  by  the 
Crown  on  its  own  authority,  but  it  is  the  habit  at  the  present 
day  to  refer  these  likewise  for  decision  to  the  Lords.1 
Disquaii-  Infants,   aliens,  bankrupts,   and  persons  under  sentence 

fications.  for  grave  offences,  are  incapable  of  sitting  in  the  House  of 
Lords ; 2  and  instances  occurred  in  the  seventeenth  century 
of  special  sentence  of  exclusion  by  the  House  itself.  But 
more  important  from  a  political  point  of  view  than  the  dis- 
qualifications for  the  upper  chamber  is  the  fact  that  a  peer 
cannot  escape  from  the  peerage.  This  is  sometimes  a  mis- 
fortune when  a  man,  who  has  made  his  mark  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  has  an  obscure  greatness  thrust  upon  him  by 
the  untimely  death  of  his  father.  In  such  a  case  he  loses  at 
once  and  forever  his  seat  in  the  House  where  the  active 
warfare  of  politics  goes  on,  and  this  although  he  may  be 
a  Scotch  peer,  who  has  no  seat  in  the  House  of  Lords.  The 
question  was  debated  at  some  length  in  1895,  when  Lord 
Selborne  tried  to  retain  his  seat  in  the  Commons  by  omitting 
to  apply  for  a  writ  of  summons  as  a  peer ;  but  the  Commons 
decided  that  he  could  not  do  so.3 

Besides  the  liberty  of  speech   and  freedom  from  arrest 

1  Pike,  285-87 ;   Anson,  I.,  227-28.     These  cases  are  referred  to  the  Com- 
mittee of  Privileges. 

2  The  Act  of  1870  abolished  corruption  of  blood,  so  that  a  sentence  no 
longer  cuts  off  the  heirs. 

3  Hans.  4  Ser.  XXXIII.,  1058  et  seq.,  1174  et  seq.,  and  1728  et  seq.     Cf. 
Rep.  of  Com.  on  Vacating  of  Seats,  Com.  Papers,  1895,  X.,  561. 


THE  HOUSE  OF  LORDS  399 

which  they  possess  in  common  with  the  members  of  the  Personal 
other  House,  the  peers,  partly  in  memory  of  their  position  as  ofThe^Poer 
councillors  of  the  Crown,  partly  as  an  aftermath  of  feudal 
conditions,  retain  certain  personal  privileges,  of  small  politi- 
cal importance,  but  sometimes  of  interest  to  the  person  con- 
cerned. One  of  these  is  the  right  of  access  to  the  sovereign 
for  the  purpose  of  an  audience  on  public  affairs.  Another  is 
the  right  to  be  tried  by  their  peers  in  all  cases  of  treason  or 
felony.1  If  Parliament  is  in  session,  the  trial  is  conducted  by 
the  whole  House  of  Lords,  presided  over  by  the  Lord  High 
Steward  appointed  by  the  Crown.  If  not  it  takes  place  in 
the  court  of  the  Lord  High  Steward,  to  which,  however, 
all  the  peers  are  summoned.2  The  privilege  extends  to  the 
Scotch  and  Irish  peers,  whether  chosen  to  sit  in  the  House 
of  Lords  or  not;  to  the  life  peers;  to  peeresses  in  their 
own  right ;  and  to  the  wives  and  widows  of  peers,  unless 
they  have  " disparaged"  themselves  by  a  second  marriage 
with  a  commoner ;  but  it  does  not  extend  to  the  bishops,  or 
to  Irish  peers  while  members  of  the  House  of  Commons.3 

The  House  of  Lords  is  both  a  coordinate  branch  of  Par-  Functiona 
liament  and  a  court  of  law.  Its  duties  as  a  court  of  appeal  House 
will  be  described  in  another  chapter  with  the  rest  of  the 
national  judicial  system,  and  its  original  jurisdiction,  in  the 
trial  of  peers  and  of  impeachments  brought  by  the  House  of 
Commons,  is  no  longer  of  much  consequence.  The  evolu- 
tion of  the  political  responsibility  of  ministers  has  made 
impeachment  a  clumsy  and  useless  device  for  getting  rid  of 
an  official,  while  the  greater  efficiency  of  the  criminal  law 
has  made  it  needless  for  punishing  an  offender;  and  in  fact 
the  last  case  where  it  was  used  was  that  of  Lord  Melville, 
one  hundred  years  ago.  It  may  be  noted,  however,  in  this 
connection  that  the  House  still  retains  the  right  to  require 

1  For  misdemeanors,  peers,  like  other  persons,  are  tried  by  an  ordinary 
jury. 

2  Fpon   conviction   a  peer  is   now   liable  to  the   same  punishment  as 
other  offenders. 

5  For  the  history  of  the  subject  in  general  see  Pike,  Chs.  x.,  xi.,  and  for 
that  of  the  bishops,  Ibid.,  151-G&  179-94,  219-23. 


400         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

the  attendance  of  the  judges,  not  only  when  acting  in  a 
judicial  capacity,  but  on  all  occasions  when  it  may  need 
their  advice. 

Money  Bills.  Since  the  House  is  a  coordinate  branch  of  the  legislature, 
every  act  of  Parliament  requires  its  assent,  and  although  in 
practice  it  is  far  less  powerful  than  the  House  of  Commons, 
the  only  subject  on  which  the  limitations  of  its  authority 
can  be  stated  with  precision  is  that  of  finance.  As  far  back 
as  1671  the  Commons  resolved  "That,  in  all  aids  given  to 
the  King,  by  the  Commons,  the  Rate  or  Tax  ought  not  to 
be  altered  by  the  Lords  "  ; *  and  in  1678  they  adopted  another 
resolution  that  all  bills  granting  supplies  "ought  to  begin 
with  the  Commons.  And  that  it  is  the  undoubted  and  sole 
right  of  the  Commons,  to  direct,  limit,  and  appoint,  in  such 
Bills,  the  Ends,  Purposes,  Considerations,  Conditions,  Limi- 
tations, and  Qualifications  of  such  Grants;  which  ought 
not  to  be  changed,  or  altered  by  the  House  of  Lords."  2 
The  Commons  have  clung  to  this  principle  ever  since,  enforc- 
ing it  by  a  refusal  to  consider  bills  in  which  the  Lords  have 
inserted  or  amended  financial  provisions;  and  although  the 
Lords  have  never  expressly  admitted  the  claim,  they  have 
in  fact  submitted  to  it.3 

Paper  The   upper  House   can,   of   course,   reject   a  money  bill 

altogether,  but  the  history  of  the  last  case  where  they  did 
so  shows  the  futility  of  such  a  power  by  itself.  In  1860  the 
ministry  brought  in  a  bill  to  repeal  the  duties  on  paper, 
which  hindered  the  development  of  a  cheap  newspaper  press, 
and  the  Lords  rejected  it  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  budget 
already  passed  imposed  additional  taxation  to  make  up  for 
the  loss  of  revenue  from  paper.  The  next  year  the  repeal 
of  the  paper  duties  was  simply  included  in  the  annual  tax 
bill,  and  forced  through  in  that  way.  It  is  now  the  regular 
practice  to  include  all  the  taxation  in  one  bill,  and  as  the 
peers  never  venture  to  reject  as  a  whole  either  this,  or  any 
of  the  great  measures  granting  supplies,  it  is  truly  said  that 

1  9  Com.  Journals,  235.  2  9  Ibid.,  509. 

3Cf.  May,  "Const.  Hist.,"  I.,  Ch.  viii.,  444. 


Duties  Bill 
in  1860. 


THE   HOUSE   OF   LORDS  401 

the  House  of  Lords  cannot  initiate  or  amend,  and  practically 
cannot  reject,  any  money  bill.  The  principle  applies  not 
only  to  the  national  receipts  and  expenditures,  but  also  to 
local  rates,1  but  it  does  not  apply  to  revenues  of  the  Crown 
or  the  Church,  nor  at  the  present  day  to  penalties  or  fees  not 
payable  into  the  Exchequer.2 

It  might  be  supposed  that  the  Commons  could  carry  any  Tacking, 
piece  of  legislation  by  tacking  it  to  a  money  bill.  This  was 
formerly  done  ;  but  the  Lords  have  long  had  a  standing  order 
forbidding  such  a  practice,  and  no  attempt  has  been  made  of 
late  years  to  revive  it.3  Moreover  the  rule  about  money  bills 
is  not  strictly  enforced  where  the  financial  provision  is  merely 
incidental  to  general  legislation.  The  Lords  are  free  to 
omit  such  a  clause  altogether,4  or  if  it  is  so  interwoven  with 
the  rest  of  the  measure  that  it  cannot  be  treated  separately, 
the  Commons  have  often  waived  their  rights  and  taken  into 
consideration  amendments  made  by  the  Lords.5  For  the 
sake  of  convenience  they  have  gone  farther  still,  for  they 
suffer  expedients  to  be  used,  that  really  evade,  while  recog- 
nising, their  privilege.  Bills  are  sometimes  introduced  in 
the  House  of  Lords  with  financial  provisions  which  are  struck 
out  on  third  reading.  In  the  Commons  these  provisions  are 
printed  as  ghosts,  underlined  or  in  brackets,  to  indicate 
that  they  are  not  at  the  moment  a  part  of  the  bill,  but  that 
a  motion  will  be  made  in  committee  to  reinsert  them.6 
What  is  more,  the  Commons  have  adopted  a  standing  order 
that  it  will  not  insist  on  its  privileges  in  the  case  of  private, 
or  provisional  order,  bills  which  impose  tolls,  or  authorise 
rates  by  local  authorities  for  local  purposes.7 

The  rule  about  money  bills  applies  only  to  measures  ac- 
tually before  Parliament.     It  does  not  prevent  the  House  of 

1  May,  "  Pari.  Prac,"  542.  !  Ibid..  547,  549-50. 

5  Ibid.,  552-53.  *  Ibid.,  551-52.  5  Cf.  Ibid.,  544-46. 

•  For  the  same  purpose  the  Lords  sometimes  insert  a  clause,  in  a  bill  or 
amendment,  that  a  financial  provision  really  essential  to  their  plan  shall  not 
be  operative,  and  then  the  Commons  strike  the  clause  out.      May,  547-49. 

7  SO. PH.  220.  Sometime-,  also,  at  the  rcquesl  of  the  member  in  charge 
of  a  hill,  the  Commons  consent  to  waive  a  privilege  on  which  they  might 
have  insisted. 


the  House 
of  Lords. 


402         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Lords  from  expressing  an  opinion  upon  financial  matters 
either  in  debate  or  by  resolution,  or  from  inquiring  into 
them  by  means  of  select  committees.1  In  1903,  indeed,  was 
seen  the  curious  spectacle  of  the  House  of  Lords  debating 
freely  Mr.  Chamberlain's  fiscal  policy,  while  the  Opposition 
in  the  Commons  was  striving  almost  in  vain  for  an  oppor- 
tunity to  do  so. 

Officers  of  Except  when  a  peer  is  being  tried  the  Lord  Chancellor 
presides  over  the  House.  In  practice  he  is  always  made  a 
peer,  but  this  is  not  a  legal  necessity,  and,  in  fact,  the  wool- 
sack, on  which  he  sits,  is  commonly  said  not  to  be  within  the 
House  itself.  Perhaps  for  this  very  reason  he  has  not  the 
authority  of  the  Speaker  of  the  Commons  in  ruling  upon 
points  of  order.  He  does  not  even  decide  which  peer  shall 
speak,  but  if  more  than  one  rise  at  once,  and  refuse  to  give 
way,  the  question  who  shall  have  the  floor  is  decided  by 
the  House  itself,  if  necessary  by  division.2  Order  in  debate, 
also,  is  enforced  not  by  him  but  by  the  Lords  themselves. 
Moreover,  he  has  no  casting  vote,  and  it  is  characteristic  of 
his  position  that  the  peers  do  not  address  him,  but  speak 
to  "My  Lords."  In  short,  his  functions  are  limited  to 
formal  proceedings,  and  even  in  these  he  can  be  overruled 
by  the  House.3  If  a  peer  he  can,  of  course,  as  such,  take 
part  in  debate  ;  but  otherwise  not.  During  his  absence  one 
of  the  deputy  speakers,  appointed  by  the  Crown,  takes  his 
place,  or  if  none  of  these  be  present  the  House  appoints  a 
speaker  pro  tempore.* 

The  other  principal  officers  of  the  House  are  the  Lord 
Chairman  of  Committees,  chosen  by  the  House  itself,  who 
presides  in  Committee  of  the  Whole,  and  who,  as  we  have 
seen,  has  great  influence  over  private  bill  legislation ;  the 
Clerk  of  the  Parliaments,  who  acts  as  Clerk  of  the  House ; 
the  Gentleman  Usher  of  the  Black  Rod,  who  acts  as  messen- 

1  May,  541.  2  Ibid.,  296-97.  5  Ibid.,  186,  307. 

*  A  Lord  Keeper  of  the  Great  Seal  has  the  same  rights  to  preside  as  the 
Lord  Chancellor,  and  if  the  Seal  be  in  commission  the  Crown  appoints  a 
Lord  Speaker.     May,  184-86. 


THE  HOUSE  OF   LORDS  403 

ger  of  the  House  on  great  and  formal  occasions;  and  the 
Sergeant-at-Arms ;  all  these  last  three  being  appointed  by 
the  Crown. 

The  quorum  of  the  House  is  fixed  at  the  absurdly  small  Quorum, 
number  of  three,  but  this  is  to  some  extent  delusive,  for  the 
presence  of  thirty  Lords  is  necessary  for  an  effectual  division 
upon  any  stage  of  a  bill.  Formerly  the  House  occasionally 
imposed  fines  upon  its  absent  members,  a  practice  that  has 
fallen  into  disuse.  The  privilege  of  voting  by  proxy  has 
also  disappeared.  It  was  abolished  by  standing  order  in 
1868.1 

The  procedure  upon  bills  is  in  general  similar  to  that  in  Procedure, 
the  House  of  Commons.  There  are  two  readings,  and  then 
a  Committee  of  the  Whole,  followed  by  a  third  reading ;  and 
there  is  the  familiar  rule  that  no  member  can  speak  more 
than  once  to  the  same  question,  except  in  Committee  of  the 
Whole.  The  chief  difference  from  the  Commons  consists 
in  the  rule  adopted  in  recent  years  for  referring  bills  after 
the  committee  stage,  and  before  report,  to  a  standing  com- 
mittee appointed  by  the  Committee  of  Selection.2  This 
gives  an  opportunity  to  revise  the  drafting  of  a  bill  that  has 
been  battered  out  of  shape  in  its  passage  through  Parlia- 
ment. As  a  matter  of  practice,  however,  the  reference  to 
a  standing  committee  is  usually  omitted,  for  the  Lords  are 
quite  in  the  habit  of  shortening  the  process  of  legislation  by 
special  vote  of  the  House.  The  committee  stage  is  often 
left  out  altogether ;  and  in  money  bills  this  always  is  done. 
On  the  appropriation  bills,  indeed,  there  is  rarely  any  debate, 
and  all  the  stages  are  not  infrequently  taken  on  one  day. 

The  Lords  have  no  constituents  to  impress,   and  hence  The 
there  are  not  so  many  members  as  in  the  Commons  who  want   Abundance 
to  take  part  in  debate.     Moreover,  they  are  not  obliged  to   of  Time, 
devote  a  large  part  of  their  time  to  supply  and  to  the  budget ; 
and   as  their   chamber   is   not   the   place    where   the   great 

1  Two  days'  notice  must  be  given  of  a  motion  to  suspend  this  order.     May, 
350-51. 

2  May,  376,  377. 


404         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

political  battles  are  fought,  the  Opposition  does  not  oppose 
at  every  possible  step.  They  can,  therefore,  get  through 
their  work  at  leisure.  They  make  use,  indeed,  of  select 
and  sessional  committees  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  Com- 
mons; but,  having  time  enough  to  consider  every  bill  in 
Committee  of  the  Whole,  they  do  not  need  time-saving  ma- 
chinery like  the  Standing  Committees  on  Law  and  Trade. 
For  the  same  reason,  and  because  there  is  no  disposition  to 
wilful  obstruction,  they  do  not  require  and  do  not  have  a 
closure  to  cut  off  debate.  Their  sittings  also  are  short. 
On  Wednesday  and  Saturday  they  seldom  meet  at  all, 
while  on  other  days  their  usual  hour  of  meeting  is  half-past 
four,  and  they  rarely  sit  after  dinner-time. 
Their  Ac-  On  the  other  hand,  the  very  fact  that  the  fate  of  ministers 

Fettered"16  ^oes  n0^  ^anS  upon  their  votes  renders  possible  a  much 
Rules.  larger  freedom  of  action  than  in  the  Commons.     There  is 

not  the  same  need  of  precaution  against  hasty,  ill-consid- 
ered motions,  or  against  votes  that  might  embarrass  the 
government  without  implying  a  real  lack  of  confidence. 
Hence  there  is  no  restriction  upon  the  motions  that  can  be 
brought  forward,  save  that  notice  must  be  given  beforehand ; ! 
and  any  question  to  a  minister  may  be  followed  by  a  gen- 
eral debate,  provided  again  that  notice  of  the  question  has 
been  given  in  the  orders  of  the  day.2 

»  May,  204,  205.  l  Ibid.,  206. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

THE   CABINET   AND   THE   HOUSE   OF   LORDS 


By  sweeping   away   rotten  boroughs,  and  giving  repre-  Effect  of 

the  Refor 
Act  of  1832 


sentatives  to  new  centres  of  industry,  the  Reform  Act  of  * 


1832  made  a  great  change  in  the  position  of  the  House  of 
Lords ;  not  by  lessening  its  power  —  for  since  the  Great 
Rebellion  the  Lords  as  a  branch  of  the  legislature  has  never 
had  much  power  —  but  by  the  change  in  the  composition 
of  the  House  of  Commons  which  opened  a  door  to  conflicts 
between  the  two  bodies.  In  the  old  unreformed  days  the 
Lords  and  Commons  were  in  general  accord,  because  both 
were  controlled  by  a  territorial  aristocracy  whose  chief 
members  were  peers.  That  element  remained,  no  doubt, 
strong  in  the  Commons  after  the  Act  of  1832,  but  it  was 
no  longer  overmastering,  and  it  had  to  use  its  authority  in 
a  more  popular  spirit,  so  that  the  two  Houses  ceased  to  be 
controlled  by  the  same  force.  By  bringing  about  this  result 
the  Reform  Act  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  an  heredi- 
tary body,  however  great  the  personal  influence  of  its 
members,  could  not  in  nineteenth  century  England  be  the 
equal  in  corporate  authority  of  a  representative  chamber. 
It  became  apparent  that  the  House  of  Lords  might  on 
important  issues  differ  in  opinion  from  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  that  in  such  cases  an  enduring  desire  of  the 
nation,  as  expressed  in  the  representative  chamber,  must 
prevail. 

This  did  not  mean  that  the  House  of  Lords  must  submit  Power  of 
to  everything  that  the  Commons  chose  to  ordain  ;    that  it  was 
to  become  a  mere  fifth  wheel  of  the  coach  ;    on  the  contrary, 
in  matters  not  of  great    importance,  or  on  which  the  Com- 
mons were  not   thoroughly  in  earnest,  it   exercised  its  own 

■to.-, 


the  Lords 
Thereafter 


406 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


The  House 
of  Lords  is 
Conserva- 
tive. 


judgment,  sometimes  in  cases  that  caused  no  little  friction 
between  the  Houses.  In  1860,  for  example,  it  rejected  the 
bill  to  repeal  the  duties  on  paper;  in  1871  it  refused  to  con- 
cur in  the  abolition  of  the  purchase  of  commissions  in  the 
Army ;  and  in  1880  it  rejected  the  bill  to  compensate  evicted 
Irish  tenants.  In  all  these  cases  the  policy  of  the  House  of 
Commons  was  ultimately  carried  out ;  and  the  peers  recog- 
nised fully  that  their  action  on  great  measures  was  tentative  ; 
that  they  must  not  go  too  far ;  and  that  if  public  opinion  was 
persistent  they  must  in  the  end  give  way.  As  Mr.  Sidney 
Low  well  says :  "The  House  of  Lords,  ever  since  the  struggle 
over  the  great  Reform  Bill,  has  been  haunted  by  a  suspicion 
that  it  exists  on  sufferance."  1 

From  the  fact  that  it  represents,  in  the  main,  the  interests 
of  property,  and  especially  of  landed  property,  the  House  of 
Lords  tends  naturally  to  be  conservative,  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  adverse  to  popular  demands  which  appear  dangerous 
to  interests  of  that  kind,  or  indeed  to  the  established  order  of 
things ;  but  more  than  this,  the  peerage  as  a  mass  tends  from 
its  social  position  in  the  nation  to  gravitate  toward  the 
political  party  that  clings  to  the  nobility  and  the  Church 
as  pillars  of  the  state.  During  the  half  century  that  fol- 
lowed the  first  Reform  Act,  the  Liberals  were  in  power 
much  the  greater  part  of  the  time,  and  they  created  by  far 
the  larger  number  of  peers ; 2  yet  the  House  of  Lords  re- 
mained firmly  Conservative  throughout ;  for  even  Liberal 
peers  —  and  still  more  their  descendants  —  are  drawn  by  a 
steady  current  to  the  other  side ;  a  current  that  was  accel- 
erated, but  not  caused,  by  the  Home  Rule  Bill. 

The  House  is,  in  fact,  overwhelmingly  Conservative.  Of 
the  hereditary  peers  more  than  four  fifths  belong  to  the 


1  "The  Governance  of  England,"  218. 

2  In  1830  the  House  of  Lords  contained  326  hereditary  members.  From 
that  time  until  the  fall  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  cabinet,  in  1885,  the  Liberals 
made  198  additions  to  these  members;  and  during  the  same  period  the  Con- 
servatives made  70.  Since  1885  the  Conservatives  have  been  in  power  by 
far  the  greater  part  of  the  time,  and  their  creations  of  peers  have  been  cor- 
respondingly more  numerous. 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE   LORDS  407 

Unionist  party;  and  the  disproportion  is  increased  by  the 
representatives  from  Scotland  and  Ireland.  In  the  case  of 
Ireland  this  is  the  inevitable  result  of  the  method  of  choos- 
ing, because  elections  occur  only  one  at  a  time  on  the  death 
of  a  representative  peer,  and  his  successor  is  always  taken 
from  the  dominant  —  that  is,  the  Unionist  —  party.  In 
Scotland,  there  being  no  provision  for  minority  representa- 
tion, the  same  result  takes  place,  the  majority  electing  all 
the  sixteen  peers  for  the  Parliament  from  its  own  side ;  and 
thus  the  representative  peers  from  both  kingdoms,  forty- 
four  in  number,  are  Unionists  to  a  man. 

It  is  commonly  said  that  the  House  of  Lords  is  a  conserva-  Meaning  of 
tive  body  which  acts  as  a  drag  on  hasty  legislation,  and  «c0nser™- 
holds  back  until  the  nation  shows  clearly  that  it  has  made  up  tive-" 
its  mind.  This  is  undoubtedly  true,  and  if  it  were  the  whole 
truth  the  limited  authority  retained  by  the  House  would 
provoke  no  strong  resentment  in  any  quarter;  but  it  is  only 
a  part  of  the  truth.  The  word  "  conservative "  has  two 
distinct  meanings  in  England,  according  as  it  is  spelled  with 
a  small  or  a  capital  C.  The  first  signifies  an  aversion  to 
change ;  the  second,  one  of  the  two  great  political  parties  in 
the  state.  Now,  for  more  than  a  generation  after  the  Reform 
Act  of  1832  these  two  meanings  of  the  word  were  not  very  far 
apart.  The  Conservative  party  was  to  such  an  extent  the 
party  of  resistance  to  change  as  to  make  plausible,  if  not 
accurate,  Macaulay's  comparison  of  the  two  parties  that 
divided  the  nation  to  the  fore  and  hind  legs  of  a  stag,  the 
Liberals  being  always  in  advance,  and  the  Conservatives 
following  their  footsteps  at  a  distance.  The  simile  expressed 
one  aspect  of  a  not  uncommon  feeling,  that  the  direction  of 
the  national  policy  rested  normally  with  the  Liberals,  but 
that  when  they  went  too  fast  the  Conservatives  would  come 
to  power  for  a  short  time,  while  the  country  adjusted  itself 
to  its  new  conditions.  That  under  these  circumstances  the 
House  of  Lords  should  act  with  the  Conservative  party,  and 
should  help  them  to  play  the  part  of  a  brake  from  time  to 
time,  not  in  order  to  stop,  but  only  to  slow  down,  the  coach 


408         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

on  a  hill,  was  natural,  and  not  open  to  serious  objection. 
But  Disraeli's  constant  preaching  against  a  merely  negative 
policy,  coupled  with  the  need  of  seeking  for  working-class 
support  after  the  extension  of  the  franchise  by  the  Reform 
Act  of  1867,  led  to  the  abandonment  by  the  Tories  of  the 
attitude  of  resistance  to  change.  Even  if  it  be  true  that  the 
new  Tory  democracy  is,  on  the  whole,  less  progressive  than 
the  Liberal  party,  it  is  certainly  not  opposed  to  all  progress. 
In  more  than  one  direction,  indeed,  it  is  distinctly  more 
favourable  to  change.  If  the  stag  has  not  become  double- 
headed,  he  has,  at  least,  learned  to  walk  with  either  end  in 
front ;  and  this  change  in  the  Tory  party  has  had  a  marked 
effect  upon  the  position  of  the  House  of  Lords. 
The  House  Although  the  Conservatives  have  outgrown  their  negative 
has  Become  attitude  of  resistance  to  change,  and  have  become  an  ag- 

a  Tool  of  the  _  _  ...  . 

Conserva-  gressive  party  with  a  positive  policy,  they  have  retained  and 
tive  arty.  even  strengthened  their  control  of  the  House  of  Lords.  The 
House  has  not,  of  course,  lost  all  volition  so  completely  as 
merely  to  register  the  commands  of  the  Unionist  leaders. 
To  some  extent  it  has  its  own  opinions,  which  are  now  more 
conservative  than  theirs ;  and  even  when  they  are  in  power 
it  amends  the  lesser  details  of  their  bills  with  a  good  deal 
of  freedom,  sometimes  making  its  own  views  prevail.  In 
1899,  for  example,  it  struck  out  of  the  London  Local  Gov- 
ernment Bill  the  provision  allowing  women  to  sit  on  the 
borough  councils,  a  change  that  the  Commons  accepted  with 
reluctance  ;  and  in  1902  it  succeeded  in  making  amendments 
to  the  Elementary  Education  Bill,  which  threw  upon  the 
rates  the  burden  of  current  repairs  in  the  Church  schools, 
and  preserved  some  control  by  the  bishops  over  religious 
instruction  therein. 

But  while  the  House  of  Lords  has  a  will  of  its  own  in  smaller 
questions,  on  the  great  party  struggles  that  rend  the  country 
it  throws  its  weight  wholly  on  the  side  of  the  Tories,  and 
plays  into  their  hands.  Thus,  from  1892  to  1895,  and  again 
in  1900,  — the  only  two  occasions  on  which  the  Liberals  have 
been  in  office  for  a  score  of  years,  —  the  House  of  Lords  used 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   LORDS  409 

its  power  boldly  to  hobble  the  government.  That  it  did  so 
to  help  the  Unionist  party,  and  not  simply  from  conserva- 
tive objection  to  change,  is  curiously  brought  out  by  its 
treatment  of  the  principal  measures  of  1906.  Besides  the 
Education  Bill,  where  the  conflict  of  opinion  lay  very 
deep,  two  other  government  measures  that  aroused  some 
feeling  came  to  it  from  the  Commons.  One  of  them,  the 
Trades  Dispute  Bill,  which  provided  that  a  trade  union 
should  not  be  liable  to  suit  for  any  action  it  might  take  during 
a  strike,  was  certainly  a  radical  measure,  and  one  to  which  a 
chamber  of  conservative  temperament  might  well  object ; 
but  the  Lords  passed  it  without  amendment.  The  other,  the 
Plural  Voting  Bill,  designed  to  prevent  a  man  from  voting  in 
more  than  one  place,  involved  no  very  profound  question  of 
principle,  and  made  no  very  far-reaching  change  in  English 
institutions,  but  was  a  bone  of  contention  between  the 
parties  because  it  affected  the  chances  of  election  in  close 
districts.  This  bill  the  House  of  Lords  summarily  rejected. 
The  fact  is  that  since  the  Reform  Act  of  1832  government 
by  party  has  become  highly  developed ;  and  although  the 
differences  between  the  principles  of  the  two  parties  may  be 
less  fundamental  than  they  were  formerly,  the  voting  in 
Parliament  runs  very  much  more  strictly  on  party  lines.1 
Politics  have  become  more  completely  a  battle  between  par- 
ties, in  which  it  is  more  difficult  than  ever  to  avoid  taking 
sides,  while  the  combatants  try  to  make  use  of  every  weapon 
within  their  reach.  Now  the  very  accentuation  of  party  has 
made  it  easier  for  the  peers  to  resist  a  Liberal  ministry, 
because  in  doing  so  they  are  evidently  opposing,  not  the 
people  as  a  whole,  but  only  a  part  of  the  people,  and  a  part 
that  is  a  majority  by  a  very  small  fraction.  In  this  way  it 
has  happened  that  the  House  of  Lords,  without  ceasing  to 
have  an  opinion  of  its  own  on  other  matters,  has  become  for 
party  purposes  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  Tory 
leaders,  who  use  it  as  a  bishop  or  knight  of  their  own  colour 
on  the  chess-board  of  party  politics. 

1  See  the  chapter  on  "The  Strength  of  Parly  Ties,"  infra. 


410         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Position  of  A  cabinet  never  thinks  of  resigning  on  account  of  the  hos- 
fnF^iT  tility  of  the  Lords;  nor  is  its  position  directly  affected  by 
Referen-  their  action.  Indirectly,  however,  it  may  be  very  seriously 
impaired,  if  the  peers,  claiming  that  the  government  is  not 
really  in  accord  with  the  electorate,  reject  important  meas- 
ures, and  thereby  challenge  a  dissolution  of  Parliament.  By 
doing  so  they  may  reduce  a  ministry,  that  is  not  in  a  con- 
dition to  dissolve,  to  a  state  of  political  impotence,  both  in 
fact  and  in  the  eyes  of  the  nation.  This  was  true  of  the 
Liberal  administration  in  1893-94,  when  the  peers  rejected 
the  Home  Rule  Bill,  and  made  amendments  that  struck  at 
the  root  of  the  Parish  Councils  and  Employers'  Liability  Bills, 
changing  the  latter  in  a  manner  so  vital  that  the  govern- 
ment finally  withdrew  the  measure  altogether.  The  Lib- 
erals protested  that  the  House  of  Lords  thwarted  the  will  of 
the  people,  and  ought  to  be  ended  or  mended.  The  allitera- 
tion helped  to  make  the  phrase  a  catchword,  but  the  cry 
excited  popular  enthusiasm  so  little  that  at  the  dissolution 
in  1895  the  country  upheld  the  same  party  as  the  House  of 
Lords,  and  returned  a  large  Unionist  majority  to  Parliament. 
For  the  Lords  to  appeal  to  the  people  at  a  moment  when 
the  people  were  of  their  party  was  naturally  not  an  unpopular 
thing  to  do,  and  for  some  time  after  the  fall  of  Lord  Rose- 
bery's  government  they  rather  gained  than  lost  ground  in 
the  esteem  of  the  public.  The  Conservatives,  indeed,  de- 
clared that  the  House  had  renewed  its  youth,  and  had 
become  once  more  an  important  organ  of  the  state  by  as- 
serting its  right  to  appealing  from  the  cabinet  and  the 
majority  in  the  Commons  to  the  nation  itself.  The  Lords 
were  said  to  have  attained  the  function  of  demanding  a  sort 
of  referendum  on  measures  of  exceptional  gravity ;  but 
useful  as  such  a  function  might  be,  if  in  the  nature  of  things 
a  possible  one,  the  existing  House  of  Lords  cannot  really 
exercise  it,  because  their  object  in  doing  so  is  essentially 
partisan.  In  attempting  to  appeal  to  the  electorate,  they 
act  at  the  behest  of  one  party  alone.  Thus  in  1893  the  Lords 
were   quite   ready  to   force  the  issue  whether  the   cabinet 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE  LORDS  411 

retained  the  confidence  of  the  country;  but  in  1905  when  a 
series  of  adverse  by-elections  made  it  exceedingly  doubtful 
whether  the  Conservative  government  had  not  lost  its  popu- 
larity, nothing  was  further  from  their  intention  than  to 
cause  a  dissolution. 

Now,  a  power  to  provoke  a  referendum  or  appeal  to  the 
people,  which  is  always  used  in  favour  of  one  party  and 
against  the  other,  however  popular  it  may  be  at  a  given 
moment,  and  however  much  it  may  be  permanently  satis- 
factory to  the  party  that  it  helps,  cannot  fail  in  the  long 
run  to  be  exceedingly  annoying  to  its  rival ;  nor  is  it  likely 
to  commend  itself  to  the  great  mass  of  thinking  men  as  a 
just  and  statesmanlike  institution.  The  House  of  Lords 
is  a  permanent  handicap  in  favour  of  the  Tories,  which  is 
believed  to  have  helped  them  even  in  elections  for  the 
House  of  Commons.  The  workingmen  have  been  told  that 
although  the  Conservatives  promise  them  less,  they  are 
better  able  to  fulfil  their  promises  than  the  Liberals  who 
cannot  control  the  House  of  Lords.  These  things  must  be 
borne  in  mind  in  discussing  a  possible  "reform  of  the  upper 
House ;  but  before  coming  to  that  question  it  will  be  well  to 
look  at  the  Lords  under  some  other  aspects —  at  their  non- 
partisan activity,  their  treatment  of  private  members'  bills, 
and  of  private  bill  legislation,  and  at  the  personal  influence 
of  the  leading  peers. 

So  far  we  have  considered  only  government  bills,  backed  Non-poiiti- 
by  the  authority  of  a  responsible  ministry,  which  the  upper  \^tlo^gls" 
House  must  treat  with  circumspection.  The  Lords  do 
not  feel  the  same  restraint  in  regard  to  private  members' 
bills  sent  to  them  from  the  Commons.  These  lie  beyond  the 
immediate  range  of  party  conflicts,  and  although  they  may 
occasionally  deal  with  important  subjects,  neither  the  cabinet 
nor  the  parties  take  sides  officially  upon  them.  The  Lords 
can,  therefore,  amend  or  reject  them  without  fear;  but  it 
lias  become  so  difficult  for  a  private  member  to  get  through 
the  Commons  any  bill  to  which  there  is  serious  opposition, 
that  this  function  of  the  upper  House  is  not   of  great  use. 


412         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Still  less  vital  is  its  power  to  initiate  measures.  In  order 
the  better  to  employ  the  time  of  the  Commons  the  govern- 
ment introduces  some  of  its  secondary  bills  first  in  the 
Lords ; l  but  measures  proposed  by  individual  peers  have 
little  chance  of  success.  It  is  hard  enough  for  a  private 
member  of  the  Commons  to  put  his  bill  through  its  stages 
in  that  House,  with  all  the  sittings  reserved  for  the  purpose 
in  the  earlier  part  of  the  session ;  and  it  is  even  harder  to 
pass  a  bill  brought  from  the  Lords  at  a  later  date.  The 
result  is  that  of  the  few  private  members'  bills  enacted  each 
session  only  about  one  sixth  originate  with  the  peers. 
Private  Bill  The  relation  of  the  House  of  Lords  to  private  bill  legisla- 
egisation.  ^Qn  -g  veIy  different,  for  bills  of  that  kind  are  in  a  region 
quite  outside  of  politics.  In  their  case,  as  already  observed, 
the  action  of  the  Lords  is,  if  anything,  even  more  important 
than  that  of  the  Commons;  and,  in  fact,  the  private  bill 
committees  of  the  upper  House  inspire  in  general  a  greater 
confidence,  because  the  members  are  men  of  more  experi- 
ence.2 While,  therefore,  the  House  of  Lords  occupies  a 
subordinate  place  in  regard  to  public  measures  of  all  kinds, 
and  a  position  of  marked  inferiority  in  the  case  of  govern- 
ment bills,  in  private  and  local  legislation,  which  in  Eng- 
land is  of  great  importance,  its  activity  is  constant  and 
highly  useful. 
Personal  The  personal  influence  of  the  Lords  is  far  greater  than 

of thePeers  their  collective  authority.  With  the  waning  of  the  landed 
gentry  the  respect  for  the  old  territorial  aristocracy  has 
been  replaced  by  a  veneration  for  titles,  and  this  has  inured 
to  the  benefit  of  the  peerage.  One  sees  it  even  in  business 
affairs,  although  the  Lords  as  a  class  are  little  qualified  by 
experience  for  dealing  with  matters  of  that  kind,  the  nobility 
having  until  recently  been  debarred  by  tradition  from  com- 
mercial life.     One   of  the   devices  of  that   arch   promoter 

1  When  the  Liberals  arc  in  power  this  is  not  much  use  for  bills  which  the 
Lords  are  likely  to  amend  seriously,  because  the  amendments  would  have 
to  be  r<  versed  in  the  Commons  at  a  cost  of  much  time. 

2  Hep.  of  Com.  on  Priv.  Bill  Legislation,  Com.  Papers,  1888,  XVI.,  1. 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE   LORDS  413 

Hooley  for  inducing  the  public  to  embark  in  his  schemes  was 
to  include  a  number  of  peers  in  his  list  of  directors  — 
guinea-pig  directors,  as  they  were  called,  because  their  most 
visible  function  was  to  pocket  a  guinea  for  attendance  at 
each  meeting.  The  Hooley  revelations  some  years  ago 
checked  this  practice ;  but  the  fact  that  it  should  have 
existed  shows  the  confidence  that  titles  were  believed  to 
inspire  among  a  large  class  of  investors. 

The  glamour  of  rank  appears  to  be  if  anything  more  daz- 
zling as  one  descends  in  the  social  scale ;  and  a  scion  of  a 
noble  family,  even  when  he  has  no  landed  interest  at  his 
back,  is  usually  a  strong  Parliamentary  candidate  in  a 
working-class  constituency.  The  extension  of  the  franchise 
has  thus  rather  increased  than  diminished  the  influence  of  the 
nobility.  The  House  of  Commons,  no  doubt,  makes  a  show 
of  insisting  that  the  peers  shall  take  no  part  in  general  elec- 
tions; but  they  are,  nevertheless,  active  in  politics  and 
even  in  great  electioneering  organisations,  particularly  in 
those  that  stand,  like  the  Primrose  League,  a  little  outside 
of  the  regular  party  machinery.  When  a  general  election  is 
not  in  progress  the  leaders  of  the  House  of  Lords  speak  con- 
stantly in  public;  and  at  the  present  day  speeches  from 
the  platform  are  reported  in  the  daily  press  quite  as  fully, 
and  read  at  least  as  widely,  as  those  delivered  in  the  House 
of  Commons.  A  foreigner  is  impressed  by  the  popular  con- 
fidence in  those  peers  who  have  attained  a  position  in  the 
forefront  of  politics.  There  seems  to  be  a  feeling  that 
they  are  raised  above  the  scrimmage  of  public  life ;  that  in 
rank,  wealth,  and  reputation  they  possess  already  the  goal  of 
ambition,  and  are  beyond  the  reach  of  the  temptations  that 
beset  the  ordinary  man. 

The  adoption  by  the  Lords,  in  the  autumn  of  1906,  of  Reform  of 
amendments  to  the  Education  Bill,  so  contrary  to  its  spirit  *feLordgSe 
that  they  were  rejected  in  the  Commons  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing   majority    without    any    attempt    at    compromise,    has 
brought  the  question  of  a  reform  of  the  upper  House  again 
prominently  before  the  country.     No  one  would  now  think 


of  Reform. 


the  Power  of 
the  House 


414         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

of  creating  the  House  of  Lords  as  it  stands;  but,  as  Mr. 
(now  Lord)  Courtney  remarks,  "The  public  judgment  may 
long  tolerate  a  machine  which  works  without  unnecessary 
friction,  although  it  would  not  construct  it  in  the  same 
fashion  if  it  had  to  be  for  the  first  time  devised."  1  This  is 
particularly  true  if  it  is  difficult  to  propose  something  that 
would  work  better;  and  therefore  in  discussing  the  reform 
of  the  House  of  Lords  it  is  important  to  have  clearly  in 
mind  the  objects  to  be  attained.     Now,  there  are  four  pos- 

Objects  sible  objects  of  a  reform:  to  make  the  House  less  powerful; 
to  make  it  more  powerful ;  to  change  the  nature  of  its  power ; 
or  to  bring  it  into  greater  harmony  with  the  popular 
elements  in  the  state  ;  and  it  may  be  interesting  to  examine 
these  objects  in  turn. 

To  Redure  The  National  Liberal  Federation  has  repeatedly  passed 
resolutions  in  favour  of  restricting  what  is  called  the  veto  of 
the  House  of  Lords.  This  is  most  natural,  for  besides  the 
objection  in  principle  to  hereditary  legislators,  there  is  the 
galling  fact  that  the  House  is  always  hostile  to  the  Liberal 
party.  No  one  would  suggest  that  so  long  as  a  second 
chamber  is  suffered  to  exist  it  should  be  wholly  deprived 
of  the  right  to  reject  or  amend  bills  sent  to  it  from  the 
Commons.  It  is  proposed,  however,  that  the  veto  shall 
not  be  repeated  after  a  certain  interval,  and  the  vital  ques- 
tion is  what  that  interval  shall  be.  A  provision  that  the 
Lords  should  not  reject  a  bill  passed  by  the  Commons  in 
two  successive  Parliaments,  would  probably  be  a  mere 
legal  ratification  of  their  present  constitutional  position ; 
for  although,  after  a  fresh  general  election  has  proved  that 
the  cabinet  retains  the  confidence  of  the  nation,  the  Lords 
may  refuse  a  second  time  to  enact  one  of  its  measures, 
they  have  never  done  so,  and  are  not  very  likely  to 
venture  so  far.  A  provision,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the 
Lords  should  not  reject  or  amend  a  bill  passed  by  the  Com- 
mons in  two  successive  sessions  of  the  same  Parliament 
would  mean  that  except  in  the  last  session  of  an  expiring 

1  "The  Working  Constitution,"  120. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE   LORDS  415 

Parliament,  they  could  reject  or  amend  seriously  no  gov- 
ernment bill,  whether  convinced  that  the  nation  approved 
of  it  or  not.1  This  would  be  almost  equivalent  to  an 
entire  abolition  of  the  second  chamber  so  far  as  govern- 
ment measures  are  concerned,  because  the  shred  of  author- 
ity left  would  amount  to  little  more  than  that  of  requiring 
the  ministers  to  reconsider  their  position,  which  they  could 
hardly  do  without  stultifying  themselves.  The  President 
of  the  French  Republic  has  a  similar  right  in  relation  to 
the  chambers,  but  it  is  never  exercised.  A  change  of  this 
kind  could  certainly  be  made,  but  whether  it  would  be 
wise  or  not  is  another  question. 

Moreover,  if  a  rule  that  the  Lords  should  not  reject  or 
amend  a  government  bill  passed  by  the  Commons  in  two 
successive  sessions  did  not  virtually  destroy  the  power  of 
the  House  of  Lords  altogether,  it  would  not  accomplish  the 
object  of  the  Liberals.  It  would  not  put  them  upon  a  foot- 
ing of  equality  with  the  Conservatives,  for  it  would  mean 
that  it  would  take  them  two  sessions  to  pass  any  legislation 
of  a  far-reaching  character,  while  the  Conservatives  could 
do  it  in  one. 

We  are  not  concerned  now  with  the  question  of  reducing 
the  power  of  the  hereditary  members  of  the  House,  by 
introducing  other  members  in  their  stead;  but  of  reducing 
the  power  of  the  House  as  a  whole.  Those  persons  who  are 
seriously  interested  in  reforming  the  composition  of  the  body 
are  usually  more  anxious  to  increase  than  to  diminish  its 
authority,  and  it  would  be  somewhat  strange  to  make  the 
House  of  Lords  more  representative  or  more  popular,  while 
at  the  same  time  taking  away  the  last  remnants  of  its  power 
in  political  questions. 

In  considering  suggestions  to  reform  the  House  of- Lords  To  increase 
for  the  sake  of  increasing  its  efficiency  we  are  met  by  the  lts  Power- 
question  whether  with  a  parliamentary  system,  that  is  with 
government  by  party,  as  highly  developed  as  it  is  in  Eng- 

1  Probably  the  advocator  of  this  policy  would  not  want  to  apply  it  in  the 
ea.se  i  >f  private  hill  I<  fd.-hition. 


416         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

land,  a  more  powerful  upper  House  is  possible.  Fifty  yeara 
ago  second  chambers  were  defended  on  the  ground  that  they 
acted  as  a  drag  on  radical  legislation.  But,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  House  of  Lords  does  not  really  perform  that  function. 
It  does  not  try  to  check  legislation  by  one  of  the  parties, 
and  only  under  peculiar  circumstances  can  it  seriously 
restrain  the  other.  Nor  could  any  upper  House  render  that 
service  effectively  in  England  to-day.  The  fact  is  that 
although  historically  the  position  of  the  House  of  Lords 
may  have  been  the  consequence  of  its  hereditary,  non- 
representative  character,  it  is  now  doomed  to  its  present 
condition  by  the  inexorable  logic  of  a  political  system.  Its 
limitations  in  dealing  with  government  bills  are  imposed  by 
the  principle  of  a  ministry  responsible  to  the  popular  cham- 
ber, and  working  through  highly  developed  parties;  its 
inability  to  exert  a  substantial  influence  upon  other  public 
legislation  is  the  result,  not  of  its  own  inherent  weakness, 
but  of  the  condition  of  the  House  of  Commons;  while  in 
private  bill  legislation,  which  lies  outside  the  domain  of 
politics,  it  shares  in  full  measure  the  authority  of  a  coor- 
dinate branch  of  Parliament. 
To  change  The  same  reasoning  would  apply  to  any  proposal  to  alter 
of  its  Power  m  character  the  powers  exercised  by  the  Lords.  The  chan- 
nels of  possible  activity  of  any  second  chamber  are  fixed  in 
England  by  the  system  itself,  and  they  are  not  far  from  the 
ones  in  which  the  House  of  Lords  now  moves.  The  House 
could,  no  doubt,  be  shorn  of  the  remnant  of  political  author- 
ity that  it  still  wields,  and  it  could  be  deprived  of  its  right 
to  take  part  in  private  bill  legislation ;  but  it  would  seem 
that,  except  by  merely  reducing  their  extent,  the  nature  of  its 
powers  cannot  be  very  materially  changed. 
To  Bring  During  the  generation  following  the  Reform  Act  of  1832, 

mony\vith~  m<-'n  spoke  of  the  possibility^  of  making  new  peers  as  a  suffi- 
ce -Nati<j"-  cient  safeguard  against  obstinacy  on  the  part  of  the  upper 
House.     It  was  felt  that  a  ministry  with  the  nation  at  its 
back  could,  if  necessary,  force  the  Lords  to  yield  by  advising 
the  Crown  to  create  peers  enough  to  turn  the  scale.     Lord 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE   LORDS  417 

Grey's  government  proposed  to  do  this  as  a  last  resort  to  Creation 
pass  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832,  and  obtained  the  consent  of  °  eer*" 
William  IV. ;  but  the  threat  was  enough,  and  the  Lords 
gave  way.  Such  a  drastic  means  of  coercion  is  probably 
useless  to-day,  and  would  be  only  a  temporary  remedy.  It 
is  really  not  with  the  Commons  that  the  House  of  Lords 
now  comes  into  serious  conflict,  but  with  the  cabinet  which 
represents,  or  claims  to  represent,  the  nation,  or  to  be  more 
accurate  the  major  part  of  the  nation;  and  no  creation  of 
peers  would  be  made  to  force  a  bill  through  the  House  of 
Lords  unless  the  party  in  power  had  a  mandate  from  the 
people  to  pass  it.  This  is  the  real  meaning  of  the  saying  that 
the  House  of  Lords  can  force  a  referendum,  or  appeal  to  the 
nation,  on  a  measure  to  which  they  object.  A  creation  of 
peers  to  swamp  the  upper  House  would,  therefore,  not  be 
tried  until  a  general  election  had  proved  the  persistent  will 
of  the  electorate  upon  the  measure  in  question,  and  then 
the  Lords  would  in  any  case  submit.  Differences  of  opinion 
may,  of  course,  arise  on  the  question  whether  there  is  suffi- 
cient evidence  of  the  popular  will  or  not.  In  1893,  for 
example,  the  Liberals  contended  that  the  preceding  general 
election  had  been  carried  on  the  issue  of  Home  Rule,  while 
the  Conservatives  insisted  that  it  had  really  turned  on 
other  matters ;  and  the  same  thing  happened  in  the  case 
of  the  Education  Bill  of  1900.  Such  a  discussion  may  be 
conducted  with  heat,  but  especially  with  the  enormous 
number  of  peers  now  required  to  turn  a  majority  in  their 
House,  there  is  little  danger  of  precipitate  action.  Jt  is  one 
of  many  cases  where  the  conventions  of  the  Constitution 
may  appear  to  be  strained,  but  where  one  may  be  sure  they 
will  not  be  broken.1 

Moreover,  if  the  creation  of  peers  were  within  the  region 
of  practical  politics  to-day,  it  would  be  only  a  temporary 

1  The  power  to  create  peers  enough  to  swamp  the  House  has  a  potential 
value.  It  could  be  used  once  for  all  to  abolish  or  transform  the  body,  and 
this  fact  has,  no  doubt,  its  efh ct  on  the  K1  ■"<  ral  attitude  of  the  members, 
but  that  does  not  afreet  the  argument  that  as  a  means  of  maintaining 
harmony  between  the  IIoums  the  power  i.  u.-eless. 
2  k 


418         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

remedy  for  existing  grievances.  Contrary  to  the  prevalent 
opinion,  Lord  John  Russell  thought  that  in  1832  the  author- 
ity of  the  House  of  Lords  suffered,  on  the  whole,  more  from 
the  abstention  of  its  members  under  threat,  than  it  would 
have  from  an  actual  creation  of  peers  that  might  have 
brought  it  into  harmony  with  the  people.  He  remarks 
that  the  Tory  majority  of  eighty,  hostile  to  Lord  Grey's 
government,  was  held  back  by  Wellington,  but  employed 
by  Lyndhurst  to  kill  unpretending  but  useful  measures.1 
Subsequent  events  have  shown  the  impossibility  of  main- 
taining harmony  between  the  Houses  by  a  single  creation 
of  peers,  for  had  a  batch  of  Lord  Grey's  supporters  been 
given  seats  in  the  Lords  in  1832,  the  House  would  have 
been  heavily  Conservative  again  within  a  generation. 

The  difficulty  to-day  is  not  so  much  that  the  peers  are 
permanently  out  of  accord  with  the  nation,  as  that  they  are 
bound  to  one  of  the  two  parties  into  which  the  country  is 
divided.  A  mere  reduction  in  the  size  of  the  Tory  majority 
would  do  little  or  no  good ;  nor  would  the  difficulty  be  solved 
if  the  majority  were  transferred  to  the  other  party,  or  even 
if  it  shifted  at  different  periods.  In  a  country  governed 
by  party  as  strictly  as  England  is  to-day,  the  majority  in 
the  upper  House  must  at  any  one  time  belong  to  one  side  or 
the  other.  If  the  majority  shifted,  there  would  not  be  per- 
manent irritation  in  the  same  quarter ;  but  first  one  side,  and 
then  the  other,  would  complain  that  the  Lords  thwarted 
the  popular  will.  While,  therefore,  the  occasional  creation 
of  a  large  number  of  peers,  either  hereditary  or  for  life, 
might,  at  a  sacrifice  of  the  self-respect  of  the  House  of  Lords, 
produce  for  the  moment  a  greater  similarity  of  views  be- 
tween the  two  branches  of  Parliament,  a  constant  political 
harmony  could  be  attained  only  by  such  additions  to  the 
upper  House  by  each  new  set  of  ministers  as  would  make  it  a 
mere  tool  in  their  hands.  In  short,  an  upper  House  in  a 
true  parliamentary  system  cannot  be  brought  into  constant 
accord  with  the  dominant  party  of  the  day  without  destroy- 

1  "  Recollections  and  Suggestions,"  110-11. 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE   LORDS  419 

ing  its  independence  altogether ;  and  to  make  the  House  of 
Lords  a  mere  tool  in  the  hands  of  every  cabinet  would  be 
well-nigh  impossible  and  politically  absurd. 

What  is  true  of  the  creation  of  peers  is  true  also  of  any  Reform  in 
other  method  of  changing  the  membership  of  the  House.  sittonoTthe 
Suggestions  for  reforming  its  composition  have  been  based  House, 
mainly  upon  the  desire  to  reduce  the  hereditary  element, 
and  supply  its  place  by  representative  men  selected  in  other 
ways.  The  House  contains,  of  course,  many  drones,  who 
have  inherited  the  right,  without  the  desire,  for  public  work. 
Either  they  do  not  attend  at  all,  or  they  come  only  to  swell 
a  foregone  majority  upon  some  measure  that  has  attracted 
popular  interest.  They  give  no  time  or  thought  to  the  work 
of  the  House,  and  their  votes,  on  the  rare  occasions  when 
they  are  cast,  are  peculiarly  exasperating  to  their  opponents. 
As  the  regular  attendants  at  the  sittings  are  few,  it  has  been 
suggested  that  the  English,  like  the  Scotch  and  Irish,  nobil- 
ity should  choose  representatives  of  their  own  order,  and 
that  the  rest  should  have  no  right  to  vote.  Just  as  the 
Scotch  and  Irish  representative  peers  are  solidly  Unionist, 
so  a  change  of  this  kind  would  merely  result  in  increasing 
the  Conservative  majority  of  the  House,  unless  some  prin- 
ciple of  minority  representation  were  adopted,  in  which 
case  the  majority,  though  numerically  smaller,  would  be 
equally  constant  and  more  subject  to  party  dictation. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  proposed  to  make  the  House 
more  broadly  representative  of  the  nation  by  a  more  or  less 
extended  creation  of  life  peers,  nominated,  in  part,  perhaps, 
by  sundry  public  bodies  in  the  United  Kingdom.  It  may 
be  doubted,  however,  whether  life  peers  are  needed  to  in- 
crease the  eminence  or,  in  one  sense,  the  representative 
character  of  the  House.  The  peerage  has  been  opened  freely 
to  men  distinguished  in  various  fields;  and  while  many  men 
without  wealth  have  doubtless  been  precluded  from  an 
honour  that  would  burden  their  descendants,  many  others 
have  come  in.  The  number  of  hereditary  members  of  the 
House  has  increased  nearly,  although  not  quite,  in  propor- 


420 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Reform 
Unlikely  to 
Add  Much 
Strength. 


tion  to  population ;  and  only  about  one  fourth  of  the  present 
members  sit  by  virtue  of  titles  dating  before  1800.  A  large 
share  of  the  creations  have  been  made  for  political  service ; 
but  others  have  been  conferred  in  consequence  of  wealth 
amassed  in  commercial  and  industrial  pursuits;  the  most 
distinguished  lawyers  and  soldiers  have  always  been  re- 
warded by  a  peerage ;  and  so  in  more  recent  times  have  a 
few  men  of  eminence  in  science  and  literature.  A  body  that 
contains,  or  has  recently  contained,  such  men  as  Tennyson, 
Acton,  Kelvin,  Lister,  Rayleigh,  and  many  more,  can  bear 
comparison  in  personal  distinction  with  any  legislative 
chamber  the  world  has  ever  known.  Therefore  one  may 
fairly  doubt  whether  the  defect  to  be  remedied  by  a  creation 
of  life  peers  is  either  a  lack  of  brains  in  the  House,  or  a 
failure  of  its  members  to  represent  the  deeper  currents  of 
national  life. 

But  the  personal  distinction  of  members,  in  fields  outside 
of  public  affairs,  has  very  little  connection  with  the  political 
power  of  a  body ;  and  the  House  of  Lords  itself  furnishes 
one  of  the  most  striking  proofs  of  that  fact.  The  men 
whose  names  have  been  mentioned  have  taken  no  part  in 
the  work  of  the  House,  and  such  people  rarely  do.  More- 
over, if  they  take  part  they  rarely  do  it  well.  Occasionally 
such  a  man  may  have  a  chance  to  say  something  on  the 
subject  of  his  own  profession  that  carries  weight.  The 
speech  of  Lord  Roberts  in  July,  1905,  for  example,  about 
the  inefficiency  of  the  British  Army,  was  considered  a  very 
impressive  utterance,  but,  except  for  the  rule  of  office  that 
sealed  his  mouth  in  any  other  place,  he  might  have  deliv- 
ered it  with  just  as  much  effect  elsewhere.  Men  who 
would  be  created  life  peers  on  account  of  their  distinction 
in  other  lines  would  either  take  no  interest  in  politics,  or 
would  take  it  so  late  in  life  that  they  would  rarely  carry 
weight  with  the  public.  Such  influence  and  repute  as  the 
House  of  Lords  now  possesses  is  derived  not  from  the  per- 
sonal fame  of  the  members  but  from  the  social  lustre  of  the 
peerage,  and  no  creation  of  life  peers  would  be  likely  to  add 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE   LORDS  421 

anything  to  that.  The  authority  of  a  public  body  depends 
not  upon  the  eminence  but  upon  the  political  following  of 
its  members;  and  it  is  self-evident  that  no  leading  English 
statesman  in  the  full  tide  of  his  vigour  and  popularity  would 
willingly  exchange  a  seat  in  the  House  of  Commons  for  an 
appointment  for  life  in  any  second  chamber,  so  that  a  House 
of  Lords  constructed  on  these  principles  would  become  in 
large  part  an  asylum  for  decrepit  politicians. 

Another  suggestion  of  a  similar  kind  is  that  the  House 
should  be  remodelled  upon  the  lines  of  the  Privy  Council, 
but  the  Privy  Council  to-day  as  a  working  body  is  nothing 
but  the  ministry,  the  other  members  attending  only  on 
ceremonial  occasions.  It  is  a  mere  instrument  of  govern- 
ment in  the  hands  of  the  cabinet;  nor,  so  far  as  English 
politics  are  concerned,  can  it  very  well  be  anything  else. 
The  proposal  that  colonial  members  should  sit  in  the 
House  of  Lords  is  interesting  from  other  points  of  view,  but 
clearly  it  could  not  be  applied  in  the  case  of  domestic  legis- 
lation. That  the  will  of  the  House  of  Commons  on  English 
questions  should  be  thwarted  by  representatives  from  other 
parts  of  the  empire  would  be  far  more  unfortunate  than 
to  have  it  thwarted  by  hereditary  English  nobles. 

But  if  a  change  in  the  composition  of  the  House  of  Lords  other 
would  be  very  unlikely  to  raise  its  political  position  as  a  Results*6 
whole,  it  might  well  reduce  the  personal  influence  of  in- 
dividual peers.  If  the  House  came  to  be  regarded  as  mainly 
a  collection  of  persons  holding  seats  for  life,  the  social  posi- 
tion of  its  members  might  be  very  different  from  that  of  an 
hereditary  nobility.  A  radical  reform  in  the  composition  of 
the  House  might  also  very  well  produce  a  change  of  another 
kind.  Perhaps  the  most  important  function  of  the  House 
of  Lords  at  the  present  day,  and  probably  the  chief  privilege 
of  its  members,  comes  from  the  fact  that  it  is  largely  a  reser- 
voir of  ministers  of  state.  By  the  present  traditions  min- 
isters must  be  all  taken  from  one  House  or  the  other;  and 
a  large  proportion  of  them  are  always  taken  from  the  peers. 
This  gives  a  nobleman,  who  is  sincerely  interested  in  public 


422  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

life,  even  if  of  somewhat  slender  ability,  a  fair  prospect  of 
obtaining  a  position  of  honour  and  usefulness.  Now,  if  a 
number  of  life  peers  were  to  be  created,  it  would  clearly  be 
possible  to  confer  a  title  upon  a  man  for  the  purpose  of 
making  him  a  minister.  If  this  were  done  commonly,  it 
might  affect  not  only  the  position  of  the  existing  peers,  but 
also  that  of  the  House  of  Commons.  For  a  man  not  born  to 
a  coronet  would  be  able  to  achieve  a  high  office  of  state 
without  an  apprenticeship  in  the  popular  chamber.  Thus 
a  channel  might  be  opened  for  a  direct  connection  between 
the  cabinet  and  the  political  forces  of  the  nation  without 
the  mediation  of  the  House  of  Commons.  The  change 
might  be  a  first  step  in  lessening  the  authority  of  Parlia- 
ment, because  cabinets,  as  will  be  explained  in  the  follow- 
ing chapter,  being  really  made  or  destroyed  by  the  popular 
voice  uttered  in  general  elections,  much  of  the  power  of 
the  House  of  Commons  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  it  is 
the  sole  recruiting  ground  for  all  ministers  not  hereditary 
peers. 

Unsatisfactory,  therefore,  as  the  present  position  of  the 
House  of  Lords  is  to  many  people  in  England,  the  diffi- 
culties that  surround  the  question  of  reform  are  very  great ; 
and  a  half-unconscious  perception  of  these  explains  in  large 
part  the  fact  that  although  proposals  to  reform  the  House 
have  been  made  of  late  years  by  leading  men  of  every  shade 
of  political  opinion,  none  of  them  has  borne  fruit,  or  even 
taken  the  shape  of  a  definite  plan  commanding  any  con- 
siderable amount  of  support.  To  reform  the  House  of 
Lords,  or  to  create  some  other  satisfactory  second  chamber 
may  not  be  an  impossible  task,  but  it  is  one  that  will 
require  constructive  statesmanship  in  a  high  degree;  and 
to  obtain  the  best  chance  of  success  it  ought  to  be  under- 
taken at  the  most  unlikely  time,  a  time  when  the  question 
provokes  no  passionate  interest. 


CHAPTER  XXII  A 

The  House  of  Lords  and  the  Act  of  1911 

During  the  brief  tenure  of  office  by  the  Liberals  from 
1892  to  1895  the  House  of  Lords  increased  its  apparent 
power  by  claiming  the  right  to  appeal  from  the  House  of 
Commons  to  the  electorate  as  the  ultimate  source  of  author- 
ity. At  that  time  the  Liberal  majority  in  the  Commons 
was  so  small,  its  dread  of  a  general  election  so  great,  as  to 
furnish  a  substantial  basis  for  the  claim  ;  and  in  fact  the 
general  election  of  1895,  which  resulted  in  a  large  majority 
for  the  Unionists,  could  be  construed  as  a  popular  rati- 
fication of  the  action  of  the  peers.  The  Parliament  of 
1906  was  in  a  very  different  position.  The  Liberals, 
with  their  allies,  the  Labour  members  and  the  Nationalists, 
held  more  than  three  quarters  of  the  seats  in  the  Commons, 
and  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  for  the  moment,  at  least, 
they  had  the  support  of  the  country.  Yet  the  House  of 
Lords  exercised  its  power  freely.  In  1906  it  mutilated 
the  Education  Bill,  and  rejected  the  bill  to  abolish  plural 
voting  at  parliamentary  elections.  In  1907  it  rejected  the 
Land  Values  (Scotland)  Bill  for  the  assessment  of  the 
capital  value  of  Scottish  land  with  a  view  to  ultimate 
taxation;  and  the  Conservative  peers  announced  their 
intention  to  amend  the  Small  Landowners  (Scotland) 
Bill  in  such  a  way  that  the  Government  abandoned  it. 
In  1908  the  Lords  rejected  this  bill  when  sent  to  them  again, 
and  also  the  Licensing  Bill,  designed  to  reduce  the  number 
of  liquor  licenses  and  provide  for  a  local  option  on  the 
granting  of  new  ones.  Moreover,  they  destroyed  a  second 
Land  Values  (Scotland)  Bill  by  amendments  which  the 
Commons    were    unwilling    to    consider.       In     1909    again 

423 


424         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

a  similar  fate  befell  the  Small  Dwelling  Houses  in  Burghs 
Letting  and  Rating  (Scotland)  Bill,  the  peers  objecting 
to  the  provision  for  a  compulsory  payment  of  rates  by 
the  landlord.  In  the  same  year  they  rejected  the  London 
Elections  Bill  to  prevent  plural  voting  in  the  London 
boroughs.1  The  Commons  resented  these  votes,  and  as 
early  as  June  26,  1907,  resolved,  on  the  motion  of  the  Prime 
Minister;  "That,  in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  will  of  the 
people  as  expressed  by  their  elected  representatives,  it  is 
necessary  that  the  power  of  the  other  House  to  alter  or 
reject  Bills  passed  by  this  House  should  be  so  restricted  by 
Law  as  to  secure  that  within  the  limits  of  a  single  Parliament 
the  final  decision  of  the  Commons  shall  prevail."  Never- 
theless, the  House  of  Lords  might  long  have  remained 
unshorn  of  its  power  had  it  not  rejected  the  government 
measures  for  increasing  taxation  embodied  in  the  Finance 
Bill  of  1909. 

In  1908  an  act  had  been  passed  to  provide  old  age  pen- 
sions for  all  British  subjects  over  seventy  years  of  age, 
who  had  resided  in  the  United  Kingdom  for  the  last  twenty 
years,  were  not  at  the  time  in  receipt  of  poor  relief,  had 
not  habitually  failed  to  work  according  to  their  ability, 
and  did  not  enjoy  an  income  of  more  than  thirty  guineas 
a  year.  A  measure  for  that  object  had  long  been  advocated 
by  members  of  both  parties,  and  although  the  Conservatives 
in  the  Commons  disapproved  of  this  particular  bill,  they 
declared  that  they  believed  in  the  principle  and  generally 
abstained  from  the  division  on  the  third  reading,  at  which, 
indeed,  only  ten  members  voted  against  the  bill  and 
315  in  its  favour.  Nor  did  the  bill  meet  with  serious  re- 
sistance in  the  House  of  Lords  where  the  second  reading  was 
carried  by  a  vote  of  123  to  16.  Unlike  the  old  age  pensions 
in  Germany,  which  are  defrayed  in  large  part  from  contribu- 
tions imposed  upon  employers  and  workmen,  the  English 

1  In  his  new  edition  of  May's  Constitutional  History  of  England  (V., 
III.,  343),  Francis  Holland  says:  "During  the  four  years  of  the  Parlia- 
ment of  1906  no  Government  measure  against  the  third  reading  of  which 
the  official  Opposition  voted  in  the  House  of  Commons  passed  into  law." 


THE   LORDS  AND  THE  ACT   OF    1911  425 

pensions  are  paid  wholly  from  the  national  treasury.  They 
run  from  one  shilling  to  five  shillings  a  week  according  to 
the  income  of  the  recipient,  and  involve  a  large  expenditure, 
larger  even  than  had  been  anticipated.  After  a  year's 
experience  their  cost  was  estimated  in  the  budget  of  1909- 
1910  at  £8,750,000,  and  this,  coupled  with  an  increase  in 
the  navy,  caused  a  demand  for  additional  revenue. 

The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  proposed  to  raise  the 
sums  required  mainly  by  direct  taxation,  in  large  part  of 
a  novel  kind.  The  Finance  Bill  of  1909,  in  which  his  pro- 
posals were  embodied,  provided  for  a  capital  valuation 
of  land  and  the  payment  of  an  Increment  Duty  of  twenty 
per  cent,  when  land  was  sold,  or  at  stated  periods  if  it  re- 
mained unsold ;  that  is,  one-fifth  of  the  increase  in  price 
since  the  last  valuation  was  to  be  paid  as  a  tax  at  these 
times.  The  assessment  was  laid  on  all  land  whose  value 
was  not  purely  agricultural,  save  that  the  sites  of  small 
dwelling  houses  occupied  by  their  owners  were  exempted. 
A  Reversion  Duty  of  ten  per  cent,  was  also  to  be  charged 
upon  the  increase  in  value  of  land,  not  agricultural,  at  the 
termination  of  long  leases.  These  two  duties  were  taxation 
upon  what  is  known  as  the  "unearned  increment"  of  land 
actually  or  potentially  urban.  Then  there  was  an  annual 
Undeveloped  Land  Duty  of  a  halfpenny  in  the  pound  on  the 
existing  site  value  of  urban  land  not  covered  by  buildings  ; 
for  hitherto  taxes  on  land  had  been  assessed  only  upon  its 
rental  value  in  its  actual  condition,  not  upon  the  capital 
value  for  which  it  could  be  sold  —  and  in  the  case  of  un- 
developed land  in  or  near  large  cities  the  difference  is  very 
great.1  There  was  also  a  mineral  Rights  Duty  of  five  percent, 
on  the  rental  value  of  the  right  to  work  minerals.  More- 
over, the   Finance   Bill   imposed   a   graduated   supertax   on 

1  This  duty  was  to  be  assessed  only  on  the  excess  above  the  value  of  tho 
land  for  purely  agricultural  purposes.  It  was  not  to  be  charged  at  all 
on  land  worth  less  than  £•">()  an  acre,  or  on  a  total  ownership  worth  for 
agricultural  purposes  less  than  C">(X),  although  the  value  of  the  land  was  not 
wholly  agricultural.  This  last  provision  was  a  part  of  the  policy  of  exemp- 
tion for  small  landowners. 


426         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

incomes,  and  added  to  the  death  duties.  Indirect  taxation, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  by  no  means  wholly  omitted,  for  there 
were  Duties  on  Licenses  for  the  manufacture  and  sale  of 
spirits,  and  the  Stamp  Duties  were  increased. 

The  proposals  of  the  government  provoked  strong  opposi- 
tion, and  the  Conservatives  denounced  them  as  a  social- 
istic attack  on  property.  The  feeling  was  shared  by  many 
of  the  merchants  in  the  City,  who  declared  that  the  taxes 
would  drive  capital  abroad.  But  the  cabinet  answered 
that  expenditure  was  increased  by  measures  to  which  all 
parties  agreed  in  principle,  and  that  if  a  larger  revenue 
must  be  procured,  the  only  alternative  to  taxing  wealth  was 
to  tax  poverty.  The  greater  part  of  the  Conservatives  urged 
as  a  source  of  revenue  a  preferential  tariff.  To  this  the  min- 
isters were,  of  course,  opposed,  insisting  that  their  proposals 
were  not  only  a  financial  necessity,  but  economically  and 
socially  right.  One  portion  of  their  allies  was  not,  however, 
entirely  satisfied  with  the  budget,  for  the  Nationalists 
objected  to  a  license  duty  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
fall  with  disproportionate  weight  on  Ireland.  For  that 
reason  most  of  them  voted  against  the  second  reading  of 
the  bill,  which  was,  nevertheless,  carried  by  a  vote  of  366 
to  209 ; x  but  at  a  later  stage,  when  the  bill  came  up  for  the 
third  reading,  their  leaders  had  become  convinced  that  it 
would  be  unwise  to  oppose  the  government,  and  hence  only 
ten  Nationalists  abstained,  and  only  one  voted  for  the  motion 
to  reject,  which  was  defeated  by  a  majority  of  379  to  149. 

While  the  constitutional  authority  of  the  House  of  Lords 
to  amend  a  money  bill  had  been  steadily  denied  by  the 
Commons,  its  right  to  reject  such  a  bill  had  been  generally 
admitted  in  principle ;  but  since  the  practice  had  been 
adopted  of  combining  all  the  financial  measures  of  a  session 
in  a  single  bill,  people  had  assumed  that  the  Peers  would 
not  venture,  by  rejecting  it,  to  leave  the  government  without 
any  of  the  taxes  voted  annually,  and  hence,  with  revenues 

1  Strictly  speaking,  this  was  the  vote  against  the  motion  that  the  bill 
be  read  this  day  three  months. 


THE  LORDS  AND  THE    ACT  OF   1911  427 

insufficient  for  the  public  service  of  the  year.1  When, 
however,  the  Finance  Bill  of  1909  came  before  the  Lords 
late  in  the  autumn  it  was  received  with  a  storm  of  opposi- 
tion on  account  of  its  commercial  and  social  effects  as  well 
as  on  financial  grounds.  It  was  said  to  be  more  than  a 
money  bill,  more  far-reaching  than  an  ordinary  budget,  and 
therefore  a  proper  case  for  rejection  pending  an  appeal 
to  the  electorate.  After  a  long  debate  the  Peers,  by  a  vote 
of  350  to  75,  adopted  the  motion  of  Lord  Lansdowne,  the 
Conservative  leader;  "That  this  House  is  not  justified 
in  giving  its  consent  to  this  Bill  until  it  has  been  submitted 
to  the  judgment  of  the  country."  Their  action  forced  a 
crisis.  The  government  could  not  remain  without  the 
revenue  it  needed.  It  could  not  drop  the  budget,  like  other 
bills,  for  the  time ;  and  to  abandon  its  policy  by  trying  to 
frame  a  new  budget  satisfactory  to  the  Peers  was,  of  course, 
out  of  the  question.  It  could  only  accept  the  challenge. 
On  December  2  the  Commons  adopted  a  resolution ; 
"That  the  action  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  refusing  to  pass 
into  law  the  financial  provision  made  by  this  House  for  the 
Service  of  the  year  is  a  breach  of  the  Constitution  and  a 
usurpation  of  the  rights  of  the  Commons;"  and  Parliament 
was  forthwith  dissolved. 

At  the  general  election  in  January,  1910,  the  government 
lost  over  one  hundred  seats,  the  Labour  Party  losing  about 
a  dozen  and  the  Liberals  the  rest.  Yet  the  victory  was  theirs, 
for  although  the  number  of  its  supporters  in  the  new  Par- 
liament was  reduced,  the  ministry  had  with  its  allies  a  ma- 
jority of  124.  But  the  situation  was  peculiar,  and  illustrates 
the  effect  of  party  government  in  England.  The  Liberals 
and  Unionists  had  been  returned  in  almost  equal  numbers, 
and  the  majority  depended  upon  the  40  Labour  members 
and  the  82  Nationalists,  the  latter  holding  the  balance  of 
power.     Now  the  members  of  this  party  were  in  fact  opposed 

1  Tn  1000  the  government  had  power  to  borrow  money  under  the  Appro- 
priation Act.  and  in  fact  the  annual  taxes  were  for  the  most  part  paid  volun- 
tarily as  it  was  certain  that  an  act  would  subsequently  be  passed  to  collect 
them. 


428  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  the  Duties  on  Licenses,  although  most  of  them  had  sup- 
ported the  Finance  Bill  on  its  final  stage;  and  hence  the 
election,  regarded  merely  as  a  popular  vote  on  that  issue, 
might  be  considered  hostile  to  an  essential  part  of  the  bill. 
But  the  Nationalists  were  far  less  interested  in  the  question 
of  taxation  than  in  Home  Rule,  and  in  order  to  attain  it, 
and  to  remove  the  power  of  the  House  of  Lords  to  obstruct 
it,  they  were  willing  to  support  the  Liberal  government  in 
the  financial  measures  on  which  its  tenure  of  office  depended. 
The  Finance  Bill  of  1909  was  therefore  reintroduced  with 
slight  changes,  and  passed  by  the  House  of  Commons ; 
whereupon  the  Lords,  yielding,  as  they  had  declared  they 
would,  to  the  verdict  of  the  nation,  accepted  it  without  a 
division. 

In  the  meanwhile,  and  in  deference,  it  was  charged,  to 
the  demands  of  the  Nationalists,  the  government,  before 
proceeding  with  the  Finance  Bill,  had  brought  into  the 
House  of  Commons  resolutions  declaring  it  expedient 
"that  the  House  of  Lords  be  disabled  by  Law  from  reject- 
ing or  amending  a  Money  Bill,"  and  "that  the  powers  of 
the  House  of  Lords  as  respects  Bills,  other  than  Money 
Bills,  be  restricted  by  Law  so  that  any  such  Bill  which 
has  passed  the  House  of  Commons  in  three  successive 
Sessions"  .  .  .  "shall  become  Law  without  the  consent  of 
the  House  of  Lords  on  the  Royal  Assent  being  declared ; 
provided  that  at  least  two  years  shall  have  elapsed  between 
the  date  of  the  first  introduction  of  the  Bill  in  the 
House  of  Commons  and  the  date  on  which  it  passes  the 
House  of  Commons  for  the  third  time."  A  final  reso- 
lution added,  "that  it  is  expedient  to  limit  the  duration 
of  Parliament  to  five  years."  These  resolutions  were 
adopted  by  the  Commons  on  April  14  1910,  and  there- 
upon the  Parliament  Bill  based  upon  them  was  introduced. 
In  speaking  of  it,  Mr.  Asquith  declared  that  if  the  Lords 
refused  to  accept  the  plan,  the  government  would  either 
resign  or  dissolve,  and  would  not  dissolve  except  under  such 
conditions   as   would   secure   that   in   the   new   Parliament 


THE   LORDS  AND  THE  ACT   OF    1911  429 

the  judgment  of  the  people  as  expressed  at  the  elections 
should  be  carried  into  law ;  in  short,  that  the  King  would, 
if  necessary,  consent  to  overcome  the  resistance  of  the 
House  of  Lords  by  a  creation  of  peers. 

The  Lords  were  expected  to  take  up  the  resolutions 
immediately  after  the  spring  recess,  but  before  its  close 
King  Edward  VII.  died  on  May  6.  His  death  and  the 
accession  of  George  V.  caused  a  truce  in  political  strife, 
and  an  attempt  was  made  to  reach  an  accord  between  the 
parties  by  means  of  a  private  conference  of  their  leaders. 
During  the  summer  and  autumn  twenty-one  meetings 
were  held  —  a  sufficient  proof  that  the  effort  was  serious  — 
but  the  negotiations  were  fruitless,  and  on  November  10 
the  conference  broke  up,  unable  to  agree.  Thereupon  the 
government  announced  that  after  passing  the  Finance 
Bill  for  the  year,  and  a  few  other  necessary  measures, 
Parliament  would  be  dissolved  on  November  28 ;  adding 
that  it  was  useless  to  submit  to  the  Lords  a  Parliament 
Bill  which  they  were  certain  to  reject. 

The  Lords  had  already  become  alarmed.  As  early  as 
1907  they  had  appointed  a  committee  to  consider  a  reform 
in  the  composition  of  their  House,  but  no  action  had  been 
taken  upon  its  report.  Now  the  question  was  urgent. 
In  March,  1910,  they  adopted,  on  the  motion  of  Lord  Rose- 
bery,  resolutions  that  a  strong  second  chamber  was  needed, 
that  it  could  best  be  obtained  by  a  reform  of  the  existing 
body,  and  that  the  possession  of  a  peerage  should  no  longer 
of  itself  give  a  right  to  sit  and  vote  in  the  House  of  Lords. 
In  November  the  sudden  announcement  of  a  general  elec- 
tion gave  little  time  to  formulate  a  definite  policy  on  the 
vital  issue  of  the  day.  On  the  eve  of  dissolution  Lord 
Lansdowne,  the  leader  of  the  Conservative  peers,  asked 
that  the  Parliament  Bill  be  introduced  into  that  House 
by  the  government;  and  at  the  same  time  Lord  Rosebery 
brought  forward  a  further  resolution  of  which  he  had 
previously  given  notice.  It  provided  that  the  House 
should  hereafter  consist   of  representatives  chosen  by  and 


430         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

from  the  hereditary  peers,  of  members  nominated  by  the 
Crown,  of  peers  sitting  by  virtue  of  offices  they  had  held 
and  other  qualifications,  and  finally  of  members  chosen  from 
outside.  The  resolution  was  adopted  without  a  division, 
for  the  government  took  little  interest  in  the  subject,  feel- 
ing that  a  reduction  of  power  must  precede  any  reform  of 
organization ;  and  in  fact  the  ministers  were  by  no  means 
agreed  upon  the  future  composition  of  the  second  chamber, 
although  the  preamble  to  the  Parliament  Bill  stated  an 
intention  to  create  a  new  body  of  that  kind. 

The  pressing  question  was  that  of  the  power  of  the  House, 
and  the  Lords,  in  order  to  present  an  alternative  plan 
for  solving  deadlocks  between  the  Houses,  suspended  their 
debate  upon  the  Parliament  Bill  to  take  up  resolutions 
moved  by  Lord  Lansdowne  for  the  purpose.  These  de- 
clared that  the  Lords  were  prepared  to  forego  the  right  to 
reject  or  amend  money  bills,  if  effectual  provision  were 
made  against  tacking  other  matters  thereto, — the  question 
whether  a  measure  were  purely  a  money  bill  to  be  decided 
by  a  joint  committee  with  the  Speaker  as  chairman.  They 
declared  further  that  differences  between  the  two  Houses 
on  other  than  money  bills  should  be  settled  by  a  joint  sitting, 
unless  the  matter  were  of  great  gravity  and  had  not  been 
adequately  presented  to  the  judgment  of  the  people,  when 
it  should  be  submitted  to  the  voters  by  referendum.  The 
Liberals  objected  to  the  referendum  as  unworkable,  as  expen- 
sive, because  it  would  be  used  by  the  House  of  Lords  only 
against  Liberal  measures,  and  because  it  would  destroy 
the  sense  of  responsibility  and  undermine  representative 
government.  But  Lord  Lansdowne's  resolutions  were 
adopted  by  the  Peers,  and  the  issue  was  ripe  for  the 
electorate. 

The  chief  question  in  the  election  of  December,  1910, 
was  of  course  the  so-called  "veto"  of  the  House  of  Lords; 
but  Tariff  Reform,  the  Referendum,  and  Home  Rule  were 
also  prominent,  the  last  two  being  given  peculiar  signifi- 
cance by  Mr.  Balfour's  statement  that  he  had  no  objec- 


THE  LORDS  AND  THE  ACT  OF   1911  431 

tion  to  submitting  a  Tariff  Reform  Bill  to  popular  vote, 
and  by  Mr.  Asquith's  pledging  of  his  party  afresh  to  Home 
Rule.  The  election  made  almost  no  change  in  the  relative 
strength  of  parties,  and  the  Liberal  ministry  returned  to 
power  with  a  mandate  to  carry  out  its  policy  of  reducing 
the  power  of  the  House  of  Lords.  The  Parliament  Bill 
was  therefore  passed  by  the  Commons,  and  sent  to  the 
other  House.  Meanwhile  the  Lords  had  been  engaged  in 
discussing  bills  for  a  referendum,  and  for  a  drastic  reform 
in  the  composition  of  their  chamber  whereby  it  would 
cease  to  be  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  one  party  in  the 
state.  But  the  time  for  alternative  plans  had  passed, 
and  the  only  serious  question  was  what  the  Lords  would 
do  with  the  government  bill  in  face  of  the  late  election. 
They  did  not  venture  to  reject  it,  but  proposed  to  bring 
it  more  nearly  into  accord  with  their  own  plan  by  except- 
ing from  its  operation  organic  changes  in  the  constitution 
and  other  grave  matters.  For  this  purpose  they  inserted 
amendments  that  any  bill  affecting  the  existence  of  the 
Crown  or  the  Protestant  succession,  establishing  a  national 
parliament  or  council  in  Ireland,  Scotland,  Wales  or  Eng- 
land, or  raising  an  issue  of  great  gravity  upon  which  the 
judgment  of  the  people  had  not  been  ascertained,  should 
not  be  passed  over  the  House  of  Lords  without  a  referendum. 
A  joint  committee,  in  which  the  Speaker  was  to  preside 
and  have  a  casting  vote,  was  to  decide  whether  a  bill  fell 
within  these  provisions,  and  also  whether  it  was  a  money 
bill  or  not. 

The  prime  minister  now  made  public  the  assent  given 
by  the  King  before  the  general  election  to  the  creation  of 
peers  in  case  of  necessity  ;  and  the  Commons  thus  fortified 
disagreed  with  all  the  important  amendments  of  the  Lords, 
save  one  which  excepted  from  the  act  any  bill  to  extend 
the  duration  of  Parliament.  When  the  bill  came  back  to 
the  Upper  House,  Lord  Lansdowne  advised  his  followers 
to  abstain  from  voting  and  allow  the  measure  to  pass  as 
it    stood  ;     but    some    of    the    influential    peers,    with    the 


432  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF   ENGLAND 

former  Chancellor,  Lord  Halsbury,  at  their  head,  deter- 
mined to  fight  to  the  end  rather  than  submit.  They  were 
known  as  the  "Die-hards,"  and  were  numerous  enough 
to  place  the  result  in  doubt.  Fearing,  however,  the  crea- 
tion of  several  hundred  new  peers,  a  few  of  the  Unionists 
decided  to  support  the  bill,  and  their  votes  with  those  of  the 
Liberals,  the  two  Archbishops  and  eleven  Bishops,  made  up 
the  majority  of  131  to  114.  It  was  1832  over  again.  As 
in  that  case,  the  House  of  Lords  accepted  the  inevitable, 
and  the  Parliament  Bill  became  law  on  August  18,  191 1.1 

After  declaring  that  the  second  chamber  shall  hereafter 
be  reconstructed  on  a  popular  instead  of  an  hereditary 
basis,  the  act 2  provides  in  substance  that  if  a  money  bill, 
having  been  passed  by  the  House  of  Commons  and  sent  to 
the  House  of  Lords  at  least  a  month  before  the  end  of  the 
session,  is  not  passed  by  that  House  without  amendment 
within  one  month  it  shall  become  an  act  on  the  royal  as- 
sent being  signified.  A  money  bill  is  defined  as  a  public 
bill  which  n  the  opinion  of  the  Speaker  deals  only  with  the 
imposition,  repeal  or  regulation  of  taxation ;  with  the 
imposition  or  repeal  of  charges  on  the  Consolidated  Fund 
or  on  money  provided  by  Parliament ;  with  the  appropria- 
tion, receipt,  issue  or  audit  of  public  money ;  with  the 
raising,  guarantee  or  payment  of  a  loan ;  or  with  matters 
incidental  to  those  subjects.  Provisions  dealing  with  the 
taxation,  money  or  loans  of  local  authorities  for  local  pur- 
poses are  expressly  excluded.  In  regard  to  other  bills  the 
act  provides  that  if  any  public  bill  (other  than  a  money 
bill  or  one  to  extend  the  term  of  Parliament  beyond  five 
years)  is  passed  by  the  House  of  Commons  in  three  suc- 
cessive sessions  (whether  of  the  same  Parliament  or  not) 
and  is  not  passed  by  the  House  of  Lords  without  amend- 
ment or  with  such  amendments  only  as  the  Commons 
accept,  it  shall  become  an  act  on  the  royal  assent  being  sig- 

1  An  excellent  short  account  of  the  struggle  over  the  Parliament  Bill 
is  given  in  the  final  chapter  of  Francis  Holland's  new  edition  of  May's 
Constitutional  History  of  England. 

2  1-2  Geo.  V..  e.  13. 


THE  LORDS  AND  THE  ACT  OF   1911  433 

nified  ;  provided  two  years  have  elapsed  between  the  second 
reading  in  the  House  of  Commons  at  the  first  session  and 
the  final  passage  by  that  House  in  the  third  session.  The 
bill  must  be  passed  by  the  Commons  each  time  in  identical 
form,  save  for  alterations  made  necessary  by  the  lapse  of 
time,  and  for  amendments  agreed  to  by  both  Houses. 
The  certificate  of  the  Speaker  that  the  provisions  of  the 
act  have  been  complied  with  is  made  conclusive.  The 
act,  which  it  may  be  observed  does  not  affect  legislation 
by  private  bill  or  provisional  order,  ends  with  a  provision 
that  the  duration  of  Parliament  shall  be  five  years  instead 
of  seven. 

The  act  bears  the  marks  of  the  conditions  under  which 
it  was  passed.  It  is  an  effort  by  the  dominant  party  in 
the  nation  to  remove  a  political  grievance,  not  a  method- 
ical attempt  to  confer  on  a  second  chamber  the  powers 
appropriate  to  such  a  body  in  the  parliamentary  govern- 
ment of  England.  The  Liberal  majority  could  hardly 
suffer  their  policy  on  important  questions  to  be  thwarted 
by  a  house  permanently  under  the  control  of  their  opponents, 
and  if  a  referendum  to  be  applied  equally  to  the  bills  of 
both  parties  were  not  adopted,  they  curtailed  the  powers 
of  the  House  of  Lords  no  more  than  was  necessary  to  secure 
the  enactment  of  their  measures  within  a  reasonable  time. 
In  fact,  the  legal  rights  of  the  House  have  been  reduced 
little  below  the  authority  actually  exerted  by  it  before 
1892,  and  unless  its  composition  is  radically  changed  it 
will  still  remain  to  some  extent  a  political  handicap  in 
favour  of  the  Conservatives. 

Over  money  bills  the  power  of  the  House  of  Lords  is 
virtually  abolished;  but  although  such  bills  are  carefully 
defined,  their  scope,  like  everything  else  in  the  British 
Constitution,  will  in  fact  depend  upon  the  continuity  of 
tradition  and  the  sense  of  fair  play.  Almost  anything  can  be 
accomplished  under  the  form  of  taxation  and  appropriation  ; 
as  the  right  of  state  banks  to  issue  notes  was  destroyed  in 
America  and  a  uniform  issue  of  national  hank  notes  substi- 

2  F 


434         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

tuted  by  federal  taxes ;  and  as  the  payment  of  members  of 
Parliament,  certainly  an  important  constitutional  change, 
was  introduced,  in  August,  1911,  by  a  resolution  of  the 
House  of  Commons  followed  by  a  vote  in  Supply,  without 
other  statutory  enactment  —a  procedure  severely  criticised 
by  the  Opposition.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that  the 
local  provincial  police  in  England,  and  the  elementary 
schools  before  1870  were  built  up  solely  by  the  practice  of 
Treasury  grants.  That  the  Speaker  will  look  beneath  the 
form  to  the  substance  is  shown  by  his  ruling  that  the  Finance 
Bill  of  1911  was  not  a  money  bill  within  the  meaning  of 
the  act ; *  and  if  the  progress  of  democracy  and  the  payment 
of  members  of  Parliament  do  not  greatly  change  the  tone 
of  the  House  of  Commons,  by  reducing  its  respect  for 
tradition  or  its  patience  of  obstacles  to  legislation,  there 
is  small  probability  of  abuse  in  its  exclusive  control  over 
money  bills. 

In  the  case  of  other  measures  the  difficulties  are  likely 
to  be  more  serious.  Quite  apart  from  the  danger  of  losing 
office  on  some  unforeseen  contingency  before  the  end  of  a 
Parliament,  no  ministry  can  calculate  with  any  certainty 
on  retaining  a  majority  at  the  next  general  election. 
Hence  a  Liberal  cabinet  cannot,  in  a  Parliament  limited 
to  five  years,  expect  to  enact  against  the  opposition  of 
the  House  of  Lords  a  bill  passed  by  the  Commons  later 
than  the  second,  or  at  most  the  third,  session ;  and 
under  the  present  procedure  very  few  important  measures 
can  practically  be  passed  in  a  session.  Moreover,  in  order 
to  become  law  without  the  assent  of  the  Peers,  the  bill  must 
be  passed  by  the  Commons  in  each  of  the  three  sessions  in 
identical  terms,  save  only  for  changes  made  necessary  by  the 
time  elapsed  or  agreed  to  by  both  Houses.  Now  most  conten- 
tious public  bills  involve  a  compromise  of  conflicting  views, 
and  if  after  two  years  the  composition  of  the  cabinet  has 
altered,  there  will  be  new  members  who  would    probably 

1  Dec.  15,  1011.  Pari.  Deb.  5  Ser.  XXXII.,  2707.  He  gave  no 
reasons  for  his  decision. 


THE  LORDS  AND  THE  ACT  OF    1911  435 

have  framed  the  measure  somewhat  differently ;  but  they 
must  take  it  as  it  stands  or  abandon  it.  Most  bills  also  are 
found  after  a  couple  of  years  to  have  been  imperfect.  Time 
reveals  defects,  new  points  of  view  develop,  grievances 
change,  people  want  more  or  less  drastic  provisions.  The 
Lords  may,  of  course,  accept  amendments,  but  if  hostile 
to  the  bill  as  a  whole  they  may  well  be  reluctant  to 
remove  serious  obstacles  to  its  enactment.  The  ministers 
are  not  unlikely,  therefore,  to  be  placed  in  the  awkward 
position  of  insisting  on  passing  a  bill  admittedly  defective 
without  alteration ;  of  staking  their  existence  on  opposing, 
on  the  ground  that  the  Lords  will  not  accept  it,  an  amend- 
ment which  is  obviously  wise,  which  appeals  now  to  many 
of  their  supporters ;  and  this  perhaps  at  a  time  when  the 
momentum  that  originally  carried  the  bill  has  waned,  when 
public  interest  is  focussed  elsewhere.  Take,  for  example, 
the  Home  Rule  Bill  of  the  present  session,  which  is  essen- 
tially a  series  of  compromises,  which  bristles  with  con- 
troversial points  at  every  clause,  and  which,  in  the  pow- 
ers that  it  confers  and  those  that  it  withholds  is  probably 
not  completely  satisfactory  to  anyone.  It  is  a  very 
different  thing  to  carry  through  such  a  bill  hot  from  the 
forge,  and  to  pass  it  again  hard,  cold,  and  rigid  two  years 
later. 

Much  will  depend  upon  the  exercise  by  the  House  of  Lords 
of  the  remnant  of  its  powers.  If  it  is  not  cowed  by  defeat, 
it  may  use  them  freely,  and  if  wisely,  not  without  effect. 
The  act  may  of  course  prove  to  be  only  a  first  step  in  a  radical 
reorganization  of  the  composition  as  well  as  of  the  powers 
of  the  House,  and  in  that  case  it  is  useless  to  speculate  at 
present  on  what  the  changes  will  be.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  act  proves  to  be  a  mere  makeshift  without  further  con- 
sequences in  the  near  future  —  and  the  British  Constitution 
has  experienced  such  things  —  the  House  of  Lords  may  still 
be  to  some  extent  an  instrument  of  party,  it  may  not  be 
without  influence  on  h"_rislat  ion  :  but  its  claim  of  right  to 
appeal   from    the    Commons   to    the  people,    if   not    wholly 


436  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

destroyed,  has  been  much  shattered.  Conservatives 
talked  at  the  time  the  act  was  passed  of  setting  the 
authority  of  the  Lords  up  again  when  they  came  to  power, 
but  sometimes  all  the  King's  horses  and  all  the  King's 
men  cannot  undo  the  effects  of  a  fall. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

THE   CABINET   AND   THE   COUNTRY 

If  the  predominance  of  the  House  of  Commons  has  been  Transfer 
lessened  by  a  delegation  of  authority  to  the  cabinet,  it  has  ?f  Po^er,. 

"  ;  from  Parlia- 

been  weakened  also  by  the  transfer  of  power  directly  to  the  ment  to  the 

electorate.    The  two  tendencies  are  not,  indeed,  unconnected.     eople' 

The  transfer  of  power  to  the  electorate  is  due  in  part  to  the 

growing  influence  of  the  ministers,  to  the  recognition  that 

policy  is  mainly  directed,  not  by  Parliament,  but  by  them. 

The  cabinet  now  rules  the  nation  by  and  with  the  advice   its  Causes 

and  consent  of  Parliament;    and  for  that  very  reason  the  iV  th!l    r 

^  Growth  of 

nation  wishes  to  decide  what  cabinet  it  shall  be  that  rules.  Power  of 
No  doubt  the  ministry  depends  for  its  existence  upon  the 
good  pleasure  of  the  House  of  Commons;  but  it  really  gets 
its  commission  from  the  country  as  the  result  of  a  general 
election.  Even  if  its  life  should  be  cut  short  by  the  Com- 
mons, the  new  cabinet  would  not  now  rest  for  support  upon 
that  Parliament;  but  would  at  once  dissolve  and  seek 
a  fresh  majority  from  the  electors.  This  was  by  no  means 
true  forty  years  ago.  The  Parliament  elected  in  1852, 
which  sat  a  little  more  than  four  years,  supported  during 
the  first  half  of  that  time  a  coalition  ministry  of  Liberals 
and  Peelites,  and  during  the  second  half  a  ministry  of 
Liberals  alone.  The  following  Parliament  affords  an  even 
better  illustration.  It  met  in  1X57  with  a  largo  majority  for 
the  Liberal  cabinet  of  Lord  Palmerston ;  but  in  less  than 
a  year  he  was  defeated  and  resigned,  to  be  succeeded  by  the 
Conservatives  under  Lord  Derby,  who  carried  on  the  gov- 
ernment for  another  year  before  dissolving.  The  case  of 
the  next  Conservative  administration  is  more  striking  still. 
Coming  into  office   in    lS(iG,   in   face  of  a  hostile1   majority, 

•».:7 


438 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


strongly  Liberal,  but  hopelessly  divided  upon  questions  of 
reform,  it  remained  in  power  more  than  two  years,  and 
brought  to  pass  a  drastic  extension  of  the  franchise  before 
it  dissolved  Parliament.  Nothing  of  the  kind  has  occurred 
since  that  time.  Every  subsequent  change  of  ministry  has 
either  been  the  immediate  consequence  of  a  general  election, 
or  if  not,  the  new  cabinet  has  kept  the  old  Parliament 
together  only  so  long  as  was  absolutely  necessary  to  dispose 
of  current  business,  and  has  then  appealed  to  the  people. 
Practically,  therefore,  a  change  of  ministry  to-day  is  either 
the  result  of,  or  is  at  once  ratified  by,  a  general  election. 
(2)  The  in-  The  decline  in  the  power  of  the  House  is  partly  due  also  to 
crease  of  the  ^e  extension  of  the  franchise,  and  the  consequent  growth 
in  size  of  the  electorate,  which  has  become  so  large  that  the 
voters  cannot  be  reached  by  private  or  personal  contact, 
but  only  by  publicity.  A  cynic  might  well  say  that  if  oli- 
garchy fosters  intrigue,  democracy  is  based  upon  advertise- 
ment, for  in  order  to  control  the  electorate  it  is  no  longer 
enough,  as  it  was  a  hundred  years  ago,  to  be  backed  by  a 
few  influential  patrons  or  to  enlist  the  support  of  the  mem- 
bers of  Parliament.  The  immense  mass  of  the  voters  must 
be  addressed,  and  hence  public  questions  must  be  dis- 
cussed not  only  in  Parliament,  but  in  the  ears  of  the  people 
at  large. 

A  third  reason  why  power  tends  to  pass  away  from  the 
House  is  the  greater  control  exerted  in  political  affairs  by 
public  opinion,  in  consequence  of  the  rapid  means  of  dis- 
seminating knowledge  and  of  forming  and  expressing  a 
judgment.  Whatever  may  be  the  importance  of  the  edi- 
toiial  columns  of  the  daily  press  in  creating,  or  giving 
voice  to,  the  general  sentiment  —  and  there  is  reason  to 
suppose  that  editorials  are  of  less  consequence  in  both 
respects  than  they  were  formerly  —  it  is  certainly  clear 
that  the  multiplication  of  cheap  newspapers  has  made  it 
possible  for  vastly  larger  numbers  of  men  to  become  rapidly 
acquainted  with  current  events ;  while  the  post  and  tele- 
graph, and  the  habit  of  organisation,  have  made  it  much 


(3)  The 
Control 
by  Public 
Opinion. 


THE  CABINET   AND  THE  COUNTRY  439 

more  easy  for  them  to  express  their  views.  A  debate,  a  vote, 
or  a  scene,  that  occurs  in  Parliament  late  at  night  is  brought 
home  to  the  whole  country  at  breakfast  the  next  morning, 
and  prominent  constituents,  clubs,  committees  and  the 
like,  can  praise  or  censure,  encourage  or  admonish,  their 
member  for  his  vote  before  the  next  sitting  of  the  House. 
Rousseau's  charge  that  the  English  were  free  only  at  the 
moment  of  electing  a  Parliament,  and  then  were  in  bondage 
during  the  whole  of  its  term,  was  by  no  means  really  true 
when  he  wrote  it,  and  is  far  less  true  to-day.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  there  has  ceased  to  be  any  clamour  for  annual 
Parliaments,  almost  the  only  one  of  the  famous  six  points 
in  the  People's  Charter  that  has  not  been  substantially 
achieved.1  Parliaments  have  not  grown  shorter.  On  the 
contrary,  in  the  twenty  years  from  1832  to  1852,  when  the 
cry  of  the  Chartists  was  heard,  the  average  duration  of 
Parliaments  was  four  years,  and  since  the  extension  of  the 
suffrage  in  1868  they  have  averaged  four  years  and  three- 
quarters. 

The  passing  of  political  power  from  the  House  of  Com-  its  Mam- 
mons to  the  people  is  shown  by  many  unmistakable  signs,  festatlons- 
and  by  none  more  clearly  than  by  the  frequent  reference  in 
Parliament  itself  to  the  opinions  of  the  "man  in  the  street." 
Ho  is  said  to  fear  this,  or  be  shocked  by  that,  or  expect  the 
other;  and  the  House  is  supposed  to  pay  some  regard  to  his 
views,  not  because  he  is  peculiarly  gifted  with  knowledge, 
experience,  or  wisdom,  in  greater  measure  than  the  mem- 
bers themselves.  Far  from  it.  He  is  cited  as  a  specimen  of 
average  humanity;  the  person  to  whom  Carlyle  referred 
when  he  spoke  of  modern  Parliaments  with  twenty-seven 
millions,  mostly  fools,  listening  to  them.2  The  members 
of  the  House  are  supposed  to  heed  him  because  they  are 
his  representatives;    for  he  is  taken  as  a  type  of  the  voter 

'The  six   points   were:     universal   suffrage,   annual    Parliaments,  equal 
electoral   districts,  abolition   of  property  qualification,  vote  by  ballot ,  and 

payment  of  members.      ( )f  all  these  demands  annual  Parliaments  and  pay- 
ment of  members  alone  have  not  been  substantially  attained. 
2  "Latter  Day  Pamphlets:    Tin'  Stump  Orator,"  No.  5. 


440         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

of  fair  intelligence.     In  fact  he  is  the  personification  of  what 
is  believed  to  be  outside  opinion. 
The  Another  sign  of  the  times  is  found  in  the  doctrine,  now 

Do^trme  sanctioned  by  the  highest  authority,  that  Parliament  cannot 
legislate  on  a  new  question  of  vital  importance  without  a 
mandate  from  the  nation.  The  theory  that  the  individual 
representative  is  a  mere  delegate  of  his  constituents,  so 
that  he  is  bound  to  resign  and  submit  to  reelection  if  he 
changes  his  views,  has  long  been  a  subject  of  discussion; 
but  the  idea  that  Parliament  as  a  whole  exercises  a  delegated 
authority  in  the  sense  that  it  is  morally  restrained  from 
dealing  with  questions  that  have  not  been  laid  before  the 
people  at  the  preceding  general  election  would  formerly 
have  been  regarded  as  a  dangerous  political  heresy.  Yet 
during  the  recent  agitation  in  regard  to  fiscal  policy,  Mr. 
Balfour,  while  repudiating  the  suggestion  that  the  existing 
Parliament,  having  been  elected  on  the  single  issue  of  the 
South  African  War,  ought  to  be  dissolved  when  peace  was 
made,1  refused  to  grant  time  for  a  debate  on  free  food,  on 
the  ground  that  it  would  be  constitutionally  improper  for 
Parliament  to  act  on  the  question  until  it  had  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  people  at  a  general  election,2  and  that  it  would 
be  unwise  for  the  House  to  discuss  a  subject  on  which  it 
could  not  act.3 

Based  upon  a  similar  principle  is  the  claim  reiterated  by 
the  Opposition  during  the  latter  part  of  Mr.  Balfour's  ad- 
ministration, that,  although  supported  by  a  majority  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  he  ought  to  resign,  because  a  long 
series  of  by-elections  had  shown  that  he  had  lost  the  confi- 
dence of  the  country.  His  retention  of  office  under  those 
conditions  was  said  to  be  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  Con- 
stitution ; 4  and  Mr.  Balfour's  resignation  late  in  1905,  when 
Parliament  was  not  in  session,  involved  an  acknowledg- 
ment, if  not  of  the  necessity,  at  least  of  the  propriety,  of 

1  E.g.  Hans.  4  Sor.  CXXXIL,  1013-15;    CXLI.,  162. 

2  Ibid.,  CXXXI.,  G79;  CXLVI.,  987-89. 

8  Ibid.,  CXLI.,  163;  CXLV.,  622,  627;  CXLVI.,  496. 
*  Ibid.,  CXXXIL,  1005,  1019;    CXLI.,  122-23,  180-82. 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE  COUNTRY  441 

withdrawing  from  office  in  such  a  case.  Former  cabinets 
have  sometimes  broken  up  on  account  of  dissensions  among 
their  members,  or  the  impossibility  of  maintaining  an  effi- 
cient government;  but  there  has  been  no  previous  instance 
of  a  cabinet,  supported  by  a  majority  in  Parliament,  which 
has  resigned  apparently  in  consequence  of  a  change  of 
popular  sentiment. 

But  perhaps  the  most  ominous  sign  that  power  is  passing  Waning 
away  from  the  House  is  the  slowlv  waning  interest  in  par-  }nt?rest 
liamentary  debates.  In  the  eighteenth  century  the  House  of  Debates 
strove  to  prevent  the  publication  of  its  discussions.  Now 
the  debates  are  printed  under  a  contract  with  the  govern- 
ment, which  provides  that  no  speech  shall  be  reported  at 
less  than  one  third  of  its  actual  length; l  and  most  A  the 
members  like  to  appear  in  the  newspapers  as  prominently 
as  they  can.  But,  if  the  desire  of  the  members  to  be  re- 
ported is  still  increasing,  the  eagerness  of  the  public  to  read 
what  they  say  is  less  keen.  Men  who  are  thoroughly  famil- 
iar with  the  reporters'  gallery  tell  us  that  the  demand  for 
long  reports  of  speeches  in  Parliament  has  declined,  and  that 
editors  find  it  for  their  interest  to  cut  them  down,  often 
substituting  for  the  remarks  of  the  members  themselves 
descriptive  sketches  of  what  took  place.2  One  cause  of  this 
is,  no  doubt,  the  length  of  the  debates,  and  the  number 
of  minor  speakers  taking  part,  which  tends  naturally  to 
dull  the  popular  craving  to  read  them.  Then  there  is  the 
fact  that  Parliament  is  no  longer  the  only  place  where  the 
party  leaders  make  notable  speeches.  In  short,  the  pre- 
dominance of  the  House  of  Commons  as  the  great  forum  for 
the  discussion  of  public  questions  has  been  undermined  by 
the  rise  and  growth  of  the  platform. 

1  Cabinet  ministers  and  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition  are  reported  in  full 
in  the  Parliamentary  Debates,  and  other  members  usually  at  about  two- 
thirds  length.  Maedonagh'.s  "Book  of  Parliament"  contains  an  interesting 
chapter  on  "The  Reporters'  Gallery." 

:  Macdonagh,  31.").  And  see  an  article  by  Alfred  Kinnear,  and  an 
answer  bv  A.  P.  Nicholson  in  the  Contemporary  Review  for  March  and  April, 
100."),  LXXXVII.,  3fi9,  ;">77. 


442  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

History  of  After  a  long  slumber  the  habit  of  speaking  at  public  meet- 
loTm  at"  ^nSs  revived  about  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century ; ' 
and  a  little  later  it  was  taken  up,  in  connection  with  the 
early  political  associations,  as  a  systematic  means  of  agita- 
tion in  the  hope  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear  upon  Parlia- 
ment. At  an  early  time  leaders  of  the  party  in  opposition 
were  present ;  but  after  the  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion public  meetings  came  to  be  used  mainly  by  the  work- 
ing classes,  and  were  regarded  as  seditious.  Men  who  took 
part  in  them  were  prosecuted,  and  acts  were  passed  to  sup- 
press them.  These  were  so  effective  that  by  the  opening  of 
the  next  century  political  meetings  had  ceased  to  be  held ; 
except  at  elections,  when  some  of  the  candidates  for  Par- 
liament made  speeches  to  their  constituents.  The  repres- 
sive statutes  were,  however,  temporary,  and,  although  they 
were  reenacted  more  than  once,  the  meetings  revived  during 
the  intervals  of  freedom.  The  last  of  these  special  statutes, 
one  of  the  famous  Six  Acts  of  1819,  expired  in  1825,  and  from 
that  time  the  platform  entered  upon  a  fresh  career,  marked 
by  three  new  features :  the  participation  of  all  classes ;  the 
organised  effort  to  bring  about  a  definite  political  change  by 
a  legitimate  creation  of  public  opinion  ;  and  the  growing  use 
of  public  speaking  by  parliamentary  leaders  as  a  regular 
engine  of  party  warfare.  Moreover,  the  influence  of  the 
platform  was  much  enlarged  by  the  practice,  which  began 
shortly  before  that  time,  of  reporting  the  meetings  and 
speeches  at  considerable  length  in  the  provincial  press. 
The  The  first  movement  at  this  period  in  which  the  platform 

WFoMiiar  plavcd  a  leading  part  was  conducted  by  the  Catholic  Asso- 
Movements  ciation  in  Ireland,  and  ended  in  the  removal  of  Catholic 
disabilities  by  the  Act  of  1829.  But  far  more  important 
examples  of  the  use  of  public  meetings  are  to  be  found  in 
England.  Throughout  the  agitation  that  accompanied  the 
passage  of  the  Reform  Act  of  1832,  public  meetings  were 
innumerable,  and  the  platform  was  raised  to  a  dignity  and 

1  The  best  work  on  this  subject  is  Jephson's  "The  Platform  :  Its   Rise 
and  Progress." 


for  Reform. 


THE  CABINET  AND  THE  COUNTRY  443 

influence  much  greater  than  ever  before.  In  fact  its  posi- 
tion as  a  recognised  power  in  English  public  life  began  at 
that  time.  Its  rapid  advance  in  good  repute  was  much 
helped  by  the  fact  that  during  the  struggle  for  reform  it 
was  used  mainly  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  ministry; 
but  this  was  not  yet  its  characteristic  function.  For  the 
next  score  of  years  it  was  chiefly  employed  in  attempts  to 
force  upon  the  attention  of  Parliament,  by  popular  agita- 
tion, measures  which  did  not  otherwise  receive  serious  con- 
sideration. Two  efforts  of  the  kind  are  especially  note- 
worthy. One  of  them,  that  of  the  Anti-Corn-Law  League, 
by  the  completeness  of  its  organisation,  by  the  cohesion 
and  eloquence  of  its  leaders,  by  confining  its  attention  to 
one  point,  and  by  good  fortune,  succeeded  in  accomplish- 
ing its  object.  The  other,  that  of  the  Chartists,  lacking 
these  advantages,  failed;  and  although  most  of  the  demands 
of  the  Chartists  were  afterward  obtained,  that  was  the 
result  not  of  their  endeavours,  but  of  other  causes. 

Meanwhile  the  platform  was  used  more  and  more  freely  The 
by  the  parliamentary  leaders,  but  this  came  gradually.  J^1^™ 
Pitt  spoke  only  in  the  House  of  Commons ;  and  in  fact  until  Ministers. 
a  few  years  before  the  Reform  Bill  almost  no  minister,  ex- 
cept Canning,  made  political  speeches  outside,  and  his  were 
addressed  mainly  to  his  own  constituents.  In  1823,  how- 
ever, he  delivered  a  speech  at  Plymouth,  in  which  for  the 
first  time  a  statement  about  foreign  policy  was  made  by  a 
minister  in  public,  and  five  years  later  the  change  in  the 
government's  policy  about  Catholic  disabilities  was  an- 
nounced at  a  banquet.  With  the  reform  movement  the 
ministers  began  to  take  the  public  a  little  more  into  their 
confidence.  At  the  general  election  of  1831,  Lord  John 
Russell  made  the  first  public  speech  intended  as  an  elec- 
tion cry,1  and  aroused  an  echo  at  meetings  throughout  the 
land.  In  the  same  year  Lord  Grey  talked  about  the  bill 
at  the  Lord  Mayor's  dinner,  a  festivity  that  became  in  after 
years  a  regular  occasion  for  announcements  of  government 

1  J.ph.-on,  II.,  6;"). 


444  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF    ENGLAND 

policy.  From  that  time  the  use  of  the  platform  grew  rapidly 
in  favour  with  the  cabinet.  In  1834  Lord  Brougham  made 
the  unfortunate  series  of  harangues  in  Scotland  that  wrecked 
his  political  career.  A  little  later  Lord  Melbourne  explained 
his  own  dismissal  in  a  public  speech ;  and  Peel,  on  taking 
office,  declared  his  policy  in  an  address  to  his  constituents. 
So  important  a  matter,  indeed,  did  the  platform  become 
in  public  life,  that  Lord  Melbourne,  referring  to  the  per- 
formances of  Brougham  and  O'Connell,  spoke  of  the  vaca- 
tion as  a  trying  time.1  Thereafter  the  platform  was  con- 
stantly used  both  by  ministers  and  leaders  of  the  Opposition 
to  bring  public  opinion  to  their  side. 

As  usual  in  English  politics,  practice  outran  theory ;  for  so 
late  as  1886  Mr.  Gladstone,  in  answer  to  a  remonstrance 
from  the  Queen,  felt  it  necessary  to  excuse  himself  for  mak- 
ing speeches  outside  of  his  constituency,  on  the  ground  that 
in  doing  so  he  was  merely  following  the  example  of  the  Con- 
servatives.2 Yet  in  1879  he  had  set  the  nation  ablaze  by  his 
Midlothian  campaign ;  and  although  his  orations  there  were 
delivered  as  a  candidate  for  the  seat,  they  were,  and  must 
have  been  intended  to  be,  published  by  the  newspapers  all 
over  the  country.3  It  was,  in  fact,  at  this  very  time  that 
Lord  Ilartington  spoke  of  the  far  greater  interest  taken  in 
public  speeches  than  in  debates  in  Parliament.4  Not  that 
the  platform  became  at  once  of  especial  value  to  the  party 
leaders.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  at  first  used  much  more 
frequently  by  the  Anti-Corn-Law  League,  the  Chartists 
and  others.     But  since  the  introduction  of  something  very 

1  Walpole,  "Life  of  Lord  John  Russell,"  I.,  248. 

2  Morley,  "Life  of  Gladstone,"  III.,  344. 

3  Mr.  Lecky  expressed  a  common  opinion  in  the  introduction  to  the 
second  edition  of  his  "  Democracy  and  Liberty"  (p.  liii.),  where  he  spoke  of 
Mr.  Gladstone  as  "the  first  English  minister  who  was  accustomed,  on  a 
large  scale,  to  bring  his  policy  in  great  meetings  directly  before  the  people," 
adding  that  he  "completely  discarded  the  old  tradition  that  a  leading  min- 
ister or  ex-minister  should  confine  himself  almost  exclusively  to  Parliamen- 
tary  utterances  and  should  only  on  rare  occasions  address  the  public  out- 
side." .Mr.  Gladstone's  power  was,  indeed,  due  quite  as  much  to  the  effect 
of  his  public  speeches  as  to  his  influence  over  the  House  of  Commons. 

'Quoted  by  Jephson,   II.,  391. 


THE   CABINET  AND  THE  COUNTRY  445 

near  manhood  suffrage,  which  began  in  1868,  great  popular 
movements,  unconnected  with  party  politics,  have  become 
well-nigh  impossible.  In  a  real  democracy  there  is  little 
use  in  trying  to  overawe  the  government  by  a  display  of 
physical  force,  and  hence  an  agitation  has  for  its  natural 
object  the  winning  of  votes.  But  the  House  of  Commons 
has  now  been  brought  so  fully  into  accord  with  the  masses  of 
the  people  that  any  strong  popular  sentiment  is  certain  to 
find  immediate  expression  there.  Once  in  the  House  it  is  on 
the  edge  of  a  whirlpool,  for  even  if  it  originates  quite  outside 
of  the  existing  parties,  and  gives  rise,  at  first,  to  a  new  polit- 
ical group,  it  can  hardly  fail,  as  it  gathers  headway,  to  be 
drawn  into  the  current  of  one  of  the  two  great  parties, 
and  find  a  place  in  their  programme.  Now  in  any  question 
connected  with  party  politics  the  highest  interest  attaches 
to  the  speeches  of  the  party  leaders,  both  because  they  are 
the  standard  bearers  in  the  fight,  and  because  they  are  the 
men  who  have  power,  or  at  the  next  turn  of  the  wheel  will 
have  power,  to  give  effect  to  their  opinions. 

The  platform  has  thus  had  a  perfectly  natural  evolution.   Public 
So  long  as  elections  to  the  House  of  Commons  were  controlled  sPea^in? 

°  now  Uni- 

by  a  small  number  of  persons,  public  speaking  could  be  versai. 
effective  only  occasionahy,  when  popular  feeling  could  be 
deeply  stirred  over  some  grievance  ;  and  it  was  employed 
chiefly  by  outsiders  in  an  effort  to  force  the  hands  of  Par- 
liament. This  was  in  part  true  even  after  1832.  But  when 
the  suffrage  was  more  widely  extended  in  1808,  so  that 
elections  depended  upon  the  good-will  of  the  masses,  it 
became  necessary  for  any  one  with  political  aspirations  to 
reach  the  public  at  large,  and  the  most  obvious  means  of 
so  doing  was  from  the  platform.  Speeches  by  candidates 
at  elections  became  universal,  and  in  order  not  to  let  the 
flume  of  loyalty  burn  low,  it  has  been  increasingly  common 
to  fan  it  at  other  times,  by  the  talking  of  members  to  their 
constituents,  and  still  more  by  addresses  to  the  whole  com- 
munity on  the  part  of  leaders  of  national  reputation.  Pub- 
lic  speaking  has,  therefore,  become  constant,  without  regaid 


446 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


The  Plat- 
form has  In- 
creased the 
Influence 
of  Party 
Leaders. 


to  the  existence  of  any  issue  of  unusual  prominence.  James 
Russell  Lowell  long  ago  made  a  remark  to  the  effect  that 
democracy  is  government  by  declamation,  and  certainly 
household  suffrage  has  loosened  the  tongues  of  public  men. 
An  observer  at  the  present  day  is  struck  by  the  fluency  of 
Englishmen  upon  their  feet,  and  by  the  free  use  of  humour  as 
a  means  of  emphasis,  instead  of  the  sonorous  phrases  for- 
merly styled  oratory. 

It  has  now  become  a  settled  custom  for  the  cabinet  min- 
isters and  the  leaders  of  the  parliamentary  Opposition  to 
make  a  business  of  speaking  during  the  late  autumn  and 
the  spring  recess ;  and  the  habit  tends  to  magnify  their 
power,  for  they  are  the  only  persons  who  have  fully  the  ear 
of  the  public.  Except  for  a  few  important  utterances,  the 
debates  in  Parliament  are  not  very  widely  read ;  editorials 
in  the  press  are  read  solely  by  members  of  one  political 
faith ;  the  remarks  of  private  members  to  their  constituents 
are  published  only  in  the  local  papers ;  but  public  speeches 
by  the  chief  ministers,  and  to  a  less  extent  those  by  the  prin- 
cipal leaders  of  the  Opposition,  are  printed  at  great  length 
by  the  newspapers  of  both  parties,  and  are  read  everywhere.1 

Moreover,  the  platform  gives  a  greater  freedom  than  the 
floor  of  the  House.  The  ministers  do  not  want  to  bring 
before  Parliament  a  policy  they  are  not  immediately  pre- 
pared to  push  through,  nor  would  it  be  easy  to  find  time 
amid  the  business  of  a  session  to  do  so.  It  is  not  altogether 
an  accident,  it  is  rather  a  sign  of  the  times,  that  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain broached  his  plan  of  preferential  tariffs,  not  in  Par- 
liament, but  at  a  public  meeting  in  Birmingham.  It  was, 
indeed,  a  strange  thing  to  see  an  ardent  discussion  on  a  most 
important  question  conducted  in  public  meetings  and  in  the 
press,  while  the  ministers  were  striving  to  prevent  debate 
upon  it  in  the  House  of  Commons.     It  was  a  mark  of  the 


1  Mr.  Kinnear  in  the  Contemporary  Review  for  March,  1905,  says  that  the 
demand  by  newspapers  for  public  speeches  by  leading  statesmen  has  declined. 
Tin  y  would  probably  have  more  readers,  though  fewer  hearers,  if  they  were 
neither  so  long  nor  so  frequent. 


THE  CABINET   AND  THE  COUNTRY  447 

limitation  which  the  course  of  events  has  placed  upon  Par- 
liament. The  platform  has  brought  the  ministers  face  to 
face  with  the  people,  and  this  has  increased  the  political 
importance  of  both.  Not  only  is  the  electorate  the  ultimate 
arbiter  in  political  matters,  but  the  platform  has  in  some 
degree  supplanted  the  House  as  the  forum  where  public 
questions  are  discussed. 

Frequent  public  addresses  by  the  men  in  whom  the  whole  Its  Benefit* 
responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  national  affairs  is  concen- 
trated, and  by  those  who  will  be  responsible  when  the  next 
change  of  ministry  occurs,  cannot  fail  to  educate  the  voters, 
and  quicken  their  interest  in  all  the  political  issues  of  the 
day.  Moreover,  the  process  is  not  confined  to  the  inter- 
mittent periods  of  election,  but  goes  on  all  the  time ;  and 
although  the  practice,  brought  into  vogue  by  the  Anti-Corn- 
Law  League,  of  joint  debates  at  public  meetings  has  not 
taken  permanent  root  in  England,  the  same  result  is  reached 
in  another  way,  because  the  party  leaders  answer  one  an- 
other's speeches  from  different  platforms,  and  if  the  listeners 
are  not  identical,  the  public  reads  both  arguments.  Sir 
Henry  Maine  spoke  of  the  tendency  to  look  upon  politics 
as  a  "deeply  interesting  game,  a  never-ending  cricket- 
match  between  Blue  and  Yellow";  '  and  the  fact  that  this 
aspect  of  the  matter  is  more  marked  in  England  than  any- 
where else  makes  English  politics  the  most  interesting,  and 
the  most  easy  to  follow,  in  the  world.  The  rulers  of  the 
country,  and  those  who  both  have  been  and  will  be  her 
rulers,  fight  at  close  range  across  a  table  for  six  months  of 
the  year,  and  during  the  rest  of  the  time  they  carry  on  the 
ceaseless  war  by  public  speaking.  As  in  the  Athenian 
democracy,  the  citizens  witness  a  constant  struggle  among 
rival  statesmen  for  supremacy,  but  in  England  they  are 
merely  spectators  until  a  general  election  summons  them 
to  give  their  verdict.  One  can  hardly  conceive  of  a  system 
better-  calculated  to  stimulate  interest  in  politics  without 
instability  in  the  government. 

1  "  Popular  ( lovcrniuciit ,"    1  1'J. 
2f 


448         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Its  Perils.  But  if  the  platform  educates  the  voter,  it  has  its  dangers 

also.  Bismarck  is  reported  to  have  said  that  the  qualities 
of  the  orator  are  not  only  unlike,  but  incompatible  with, 
those  of  the  statesman ;  and  certainly  the  continual  need  of 
taking  the  public  into  one's  confidence  is  hard  to  reconcile 
with  the  execution  of  far-reaching  plans  for  the  national 
welfare,  for  until  the  results  are  in  sight,  these  cannot  be 
made  intelligible  to  the  mass  of  the  people.  The  English 
statesman  is  called  upon  at  all  times  to  show  his  hand,  at  the 
risk  of  seeming  disingenuous  or  secretive  if  he  does  not  do  so. 
His  whole  policy  is  analysed  and  criticised ;  the  seeds  he 
plants  are  dug  up  prematurely  to  see  if  they  are  sprouting. 
Hence  he  is  under  a  strong  temptation  to  take  a  stand  that 
will  win  immediately  popular  approval.  In  short,  he  lives 
in  a  glass  house,  which  is  likely  to  mean  a  very  respectable 
but  rather  superficial  life. 

Moreover,  in  the  custom  of  speaking  from  the  platform 
there  lurks  a  danger  to  the  system  of  cabinet  government; 
for  that  system  is  based  upon  the  principle  that  the  initiative 
in  public  policy  rests  with  the  ministers,  and  the  main  issue 
decided  at  a  general  election  is  whether  the  cabinet  shall 
remain  in  power.  Now  ministers  have  not  always  been  in 
the  habit  of  arranging  what  shall  be  said  upon  the  platform 
with  the  same  care  as  what  measures  shall  be  brought  before 
Parliament.  But  in  view  of  the  present  importance  of  the 
platform  it  is  obvious  that  if  the  cabinet  system  is  to  con- 
tinue, the  ministers  must  present  a  unanimous  front  to  the 
public  as  well  as  to  Parliament ;  and  this  consideration 
leads  to  a  study  of  the  function  of  party  in  the  English 
political  system. 


PART   II.  — THE    PARTY    SYSTEM 
CHAPTER  XXIV 

PARTY   AND   THE    PARLIAMENTARY   SYSTEM 

The  last  generation  has  made  great  strides  in  the  study  Lack  of  a 
of  psychology.     The  workings  of  the  individual  mind,  and  0fS>p0ih!cal 
its  reaction  to  every  stimulus  or  impression,  especially  under  Parties, 
morbid  conditions,  have  been  examined  with  far  more  care 
than  ever  before.     Social  psychology  has  also   come  into 
view,  and  attempts  have  been  made  to  explain  the  psychol- 
ogy of  national  traits,  and  of  abnormal  or  unhealthy  popular 
movements,  notably  mobs.     But  the  normal  forces  that  gov- 
ern the  ordinary  conduct  of  men  in  their  public  relations 
have  scarcely  received  any  scientific  treatment  at  all.     In 
short,  we  are  almost  wholly  lacking  in  a  psychology  of  politi- 
cal parties,  the  few  scattered  remarks  in  Maine's  "Popular 
Government"  being,  perhaps,  still  the  nearest  approach  to 
such  a  thing  that  we  possess.1 

The  absence   of  treatises  on  the  subject  is  all  the   more  Although 
remarkable   because    the    phenomena    to    be   studied   are   ]'arties  are 

1  l  niversal. 

almost  universal  in  modern  governments  that  contain  a 
popular  element.  Experience  has,  indeed,  shown  that 
democracy  in  a  great  country,  where  the  number  of  voters 
is  necessarily  large,  involves  the  permanent  existence  of 
political  parties;  and  it  would  not  be  hard  to  demonstrate 
that  this  must  in  the  nature  of  things  be  the  case.     That 

1  Rohmcr's  Lehre  von  dni  politixchm  Partcirn,  which  attempts  to  explain 
the  division  into  parties  hy  natural  differences  of  temperament  cor  responding 

to  the  four  perio-ls  of  man's  life,  is  highly  siiKKcstivc,  hut  is  rather  philo- 
sophic than  psychological  ;  and  like  most  philosophical  treatises  on  political 
subjects  it  is  based  upon  the  writer's  own  time  and  place  rather  than  upon  a 
study  of  human  nature'  under  different  conditions. 

■II' 


450         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

parties  exist,  and  are  likely  to  continue  to  do  so,  has  pro- 
voked general  attention.  By  all  statesmen  they  are  recog- 
nised as  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with  in  public  life ;  and, 
indeed,  efforts  have  been  made  in  various  places  to  deal  with 
them  by  law.  In  the  United  States,  for  example,  the  local 
caucuses,  or  conventions  of  the  parties,  and  their  methods  of 
nominating  candidates,  have  of  late  years  been  regulated  by 
statute;  while  in  Switzerland  and  Belgium,  elaborate  schemes 
of  proportional  representation  have  been  put  into  operation 
to  insure  a  fair  share  of  seats  to  the  groups  in  the  minority. 
Modem  But  if  political  parties  have  become  well-nigh  universal 

Parties.  a^  ^ne  present  time,  they  are  comparatively  new  in  their 
modern  form.  No  one  in  the  eighteenth  century  foresaw 
party  government  as  it  exists  to-day,  enfolding  the  whole 
surface  of  public  life  in  its  constant  ebb  and  flow.  An  occa- 
sional man  like  Burke  could  speak  of  party  without  con- 
demnation ; x  but  with  most  writers  on  political  philosophy 
parties  were  commonly  called  factions,  and  were  assumed 
to  be  subversive  of  good  order  and  the  public  welfare. 
Men  looked  at  the  history  with  which  they  were  familiar; 
the  struggles  for  supremacy  at  Athens  and  at  Rome ;  the 
Guelphs  and  Ghibelines  exiling  one  another  in  the  Italian 
republics ;  the  riots  in  the  Netherlands ;  the  civil  war  and 
the  political  strife  of  the  seventeenth  century  in  England. 
It  was  not  unnatural  that  with  such  examples  before  their 
eyes  they  should  have  regarded  parties  as  fatal  to  the  pros- 
perity of  the  state.  To  them  the  idea  of  a  party  opposed 
to  the  government  was  associated  with  a  band  of  selfish 
intriguers,  or  a  movement  that  endangered  the  public  peace 
and  the  security  of  political  institutions. 

Foreign  observers,  indeed,  point  out  that  for  nearly  three 
hundred  years  political  parties  have  existed  in  England,  as 
they  have  not  in  continental  countries;    and  that  the  pro- 

1  In  his  oft-quoted,  but  very  brief,  remarks  in  the  "Observations  on  '  The 
Present  State  of  the  Nation,'  "and  "Thoughts  on  the  Cause  of  the  Present 
Discontents."  But  twenty-five  years  later  in  a  letter  to  Richard  Burke  he 
falls  into  the  current  talk  about  the  evils  of  domination  by  a  faction. 


PARTY  AND  THE  PARLIAMENTARY  SYSTEM     451 

cedure  of  the  House  of  Commons  has  consistently  protected 
the  Opposition  in  its  attacks  upon  the  government.1  This  is 
true,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  even  in  the  seventeenth 
century  party  struggles  were  carried  on  both  in  Parliament 
and  by  pamphlets  and  public  speeches,  with  a  freedom  un- 
known in  most  other  nations;  but  still  they  were  a  very 
different  thing  from  what  they  are  now.  They  were  never 
far  removed  from  violence.  When  the  Opposition  of  those 
days  did  not  actually  lead  to  bloodshed,  it  was  perilously 
near  to  plots  and  insurrection ;  and  the  fallen  minister,  who 
was  driven  from  power  by  popular  feeling  or  the  hostility 
of  Parliament,  passed  under  the  shadow  at  least  of  the  scaf- 
fold. Danby  was  impeached,  and  Shaftesbury,  his  rival, 
died  a  refugee  in  Holland.  With  the  accession  of  the  House 
of  Hanover,  and  the  vanishing  of  the  old  issues,  political 
violence  subsided.  The  parties  degenerated  into  personal 
factions  among  the  ruling  class;  and  true  parties  were 
evolved  slowly  by  the  new  problems  of  a  later  generation. 

The  expression,  "His  Majesty's  Opposition,"  said  to  have  "His  Maj- 
been  coined  by  John  Cam  Hobhouse  before  the  Reform  Bill,2 
would  not  have  been  understood  at  an  earlier  period ;  and 
it  embodies  the  greatest  contribution  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury to  the  art  of  government — that  of  a  party  out  of  power 
which  is  recognised  as  perfectly  loyal  to  the  institutions  of 
the  state,  and  ready  at  any  moment  to  come  into  office 
without  a  shock  to  the  political  traditions  of  the  nation. 
In  countries  where  popular  control  of  public  affairs  has  en- 
dured long  enough  to  be  firmly  established,  an  Opposition 
is  not  regarded  as  in  its  nature  unpatriotic.  On  the  contrary, 
the  party  in  power  has  no  desire  to  see  the  Opposition  disap- 
pear. It  wants  to  remain  in  power  itself,  and  for  that  reason 
it  wants  to  keep  a  majority  of  the  people  on  its  side  ;  but  it- 
knows  well  that  if  the  Opposition  were  to  become  so  enfeebled 
as  to  be  no  longer  formidable,  rifts  would  soon  appear  in  its 

1  E.g.  Redlich,  Hrrht  und  Terhnik,  71-70. 

2  Cf.  Review  of  his   unpublished    "  Recollections  of  a  Long  Life,"  in  Ihc 
Edinburgh  H<  ri,  w,  April,  1871,  p.  301. 


osty's  Op- 
position." 


452 


THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Conditions 
of  Good 
Party  Gov- 
ernment. 


Opposition 
must  not 
be  Revolu- 
tionary. 


own  ranks.  In  the  newer  democracies,  such  as  France  and 
Italy,  there  are  large  bodies  of  men  whose  aims  are  revolu- 
tionary, whose  object  is  to  change  the  existing  form  of 
government,  although  not  necessarily  by  violent  means. 
These  men  are  termed  "irreconcilables,"  and  so  long  as  they 
maintain  that  attitude,  quiet  political  life  with  a  peaceful 
alternation  of  parties  in  power  is  an  impossibility. 

The  recognition  of  the  Opposition  as  a  legitimate  body, 
entitled  to  attain  to  power  by  persuasion,  is  a  primary  con- 
dition of  the  success  of  the  party  system,  and  therefore  of 
popular  government  on  a  large  scale.  Other  conditions  of 
success  follow  from  this. 

If  the  Opposition  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  revolutionary, 
its  objects  must  not  be  of  that  character,  either  in  the  eyes 
of  its  own  adherents,  or  in  those  of  other  people.  As  Pro- 
fessor Dicey  has  put  it,  parties  must  be  divided  upon  real 
differences,  which  are  important,  but  not  fundamental. 
There  is,  of  course,  no  self-evident  line  to  mark  off  those 
things  that  are  revolutionary  or  fundamental ;  and  herein  lies 
an  incidental  advantage  of  a  written  constitution  restrict- 
ing the  competence  of  the  legislature,  for  it  draws  just  such  a 
line,  and  goes  far  to  confine  the  immediate  energies  of  the 
parties  to  questions  that  are  admitted  not  to  be  revolu- 
tionary.1 In  the  absence  of  a  constitution  of  that  kind, 
party  activity  must  be  limited  to  a  conventional  field,  which 
is  regarded  by  the  public  opinion  of  the  day  as  fairly  within 
the  range  of  practical  politics.  Clearly  the  issues  must  not 
involve  vital  matters,  such  as  life  or  confiscation.  When, 
during  the  progress  of  the  French  Revolution,  an  orator 
argued  in  favour  of  the  responsibility  of  the  ministers,  and 
added  "By  responsibility  we  mean  death,"  he  advocated  a 
principle  inconsistent  with  the  peaceful  alternation  of  par- 
ties in  power. 

1  Neither  in  Franco  nor  in  Italy  does  the  constitution  really  perform  that 
service;  because  in  each  case  it  does  little  more  than  fix  the  framework  of 
the  government,  without  placing  an  effective  restraint  upon  legislative 
action;  and  because  the  constitution  itself  is  not  felt  to  be  morally  binding 
by  the  irreconcilables. 


PARTY  AND  THE  PARLIAMENTARY  SYSTEM     453 

For  the  same  reason  there  is  grave  danger  when  the  lines  Lines  of 
of  cleavage  of  the  parties  coincide  with  those  between  the  Clcavaee 

°  x  must  not 

different  social  classes  in  the  community,  because  one  side  is  be  Social. 
likely  to  believe  that  the  other  is  shaking  the  foundations  of 
society,  and  passions  are  kindled  like  those  that  blaze  in 
civil  war.  This  is  true  whenever  the  parties  are  separated 
by  any  of  the  deeper  feelings  that  divide  mankind  sharply 
into  groups;  and  especially  when  two  or  three  such  feelings 
follow  the  same  channel.  The  chief  difficulty  with  Irish 
Nationalism,  as  a  factor  in  English  politics,  lies  in  the  fact 
that  to  a  great  extent  the  line  of  cleavage  is  at  once 
racial,  religious,  social,  and  economic. 

In  order  that  the  warfare  of  parties  may  be  not  only  safe,  issues  must 
but  healthv,  it  must  be  based  upon  a  real  difference  of  be  !!:l*7l 

*  ;  1  on  Public 

opinion  about  the  needs  of  the  community  as  a  whole.     In  Matters, 
so  far  as  it  is  waged,  not  for  public  objects,  but  for  the  private 
gain,  whether  of  individuals,  or  of  classes,  or  of  collective 
interests,  rich  or  poor,  to  that  extent  politics  will  degenerate 
into  a  scramble  of  self-seekers. 

Before  inquiring  how  far  these  conditions  have  been  ful-  Relation  of 
filled  in  England  we  must  consider  the  form  that  party  has  ]]a!','('s  ,to 

&  i         ~  Political 

assumed  there,  and  the  institutions  to  which  it  has  given  institutions, 
birth.     England  is,  in  fact,  the  only  large  country  in  which 
the  political  institutions  and  the  party  system  are  thoroughly 
in  harmony. 

The  framers  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  inAmeiica. 
did  not  foresee  the  role  that  party  was  to  play  in  popular 
government,1  and  they  made  no  provision  for  it  in  their 
plan  ;  yet  they  established  a  system  in  which  parties  were  a 
necessity.  It  was  from  the  first  inevitable,  and  soon  be- 
came clear,  that  the  real  selection  of  the  President  would  not 
be  left  to  the  judgment  of  the  electoral  college  —  a  result 
made  the  more  certain,  first,  by  providing  that  the  members 
should  assemble  by  States,  and  hence  should  not  meet 
together  as  a  whole  for  deliberation;    and  second,  by  ex- 

1  For  the  views  of  these  men  on  the  relation  of  parties  or  "factions"  to 
public  lifer  see  "Tiu;  Federalist,"  No.  10,  written  by  Madison. 


454         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

eluding  from  the  college  all  congressmen  and  holders  of 
federal  offices,  that  is,  all  the  leading  men  in  national  public 
life.1  If  the  electoral  college  was  not  really  to  select  the 
President,  it  must  become  a  mere  machine  for  registering 
the  results  of  a  popular  vote  throughout  the  nation,  and  the 
candidates  for  the  presidency  must  be  designated  before- 
hand in  some  way. 

In  a  small  district  where  the  voters  are  few,  and  an  inter- 
change of  opinions  naturally  takes  place  by  informal  con- 
ference, public  officers  may  be  elected  by  popular  vote  with- 
out the  existence  of  any  machinery  for  nomination ;  but 
in  a  large  constituency,  where  the  voters  are  not  person- 
ally acquainted  with  each  other,  men  who  have  the  same 
objects  in  \ie\v  must  get  together,  agree  upon  a  candidate, 
and  recommend  him  to  the  public.  Otherwise  votes  will  be 
thrown  away  by  scattering  them,  and  it  will  be  mere  chance 
whether  the  result  corresponds  with  the  real  wishes  of  the 
voters  or  not.  In  short,  there  must  be  some  process  for 
nominating  candidates ;  that  is,  some  party  organisation ; 
and  the  larger  the  electorate  the  more  imperative  the  need  of 
it.  Now  the  electorate  that  practically  chooses  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  is  by  far  the  largest  single  constitu- 
ency that  has  ever  existed  in  the  world.  It  is,  in  fact,  note- 
worthy that  democracy  throughout  Europe  adheres  to  the 
custom  of  dividing  the  country  for  political  purposes  into 
comparatively  small  electorates ;  while  in  the  United  States 
it  is  the  habit  to  make  whole  communities  single  constitu- 
encies for  the  choice  of  their  chief  magistrates  —  state  gov- 
ernors or  national  president  —  a  condition  of  things  that 

1  Professor  Max  Farrand  has  pointed  out  to  me  that  the  question  of  hav- 
ing the  electors  for  the  whole  country  meet  in  one  place  was  discussed  in  the 
Constitutional  Convention,  and  was  rejected  in  favour  of  the  present  plan, 
because  under  the  latter,  "As  the  Flectors  would  vote  at  the  same  time 
throughout  the  U.S.  and  at  so  great  a  distance  from  each  other,  the  great 
evil  of  cabal  was  avoided."  (!.  Hunt's  "Writings  of  Madison,"  IV.,  365-G6. 
Cabal  had  a  vague  and  spectral  meaning,  but  covered  anything  in  the  nature 
of  party.  The  exclusion  from  the  electoral  college  of  members  of  Congress 
and  federal  office-holders  was  defended  on  the  same  ground.  Cf.  "The 
Federalist,"  No.  68. 


TARTY  AND  THE  PARLIAMENTARY  SYSTEM  455 

involves  elaborate  party  machinery  for  nomination,  and 
hence  the  creation  of  huge  party  organisations  on  a  popular 
basis. 

The  form  of  government  in  the  United  States  has  thus 
made  parties  inevitable ;  and  yet  they  were  furnished  with 
no  opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  their  functions  by  the 
regular  organs  of  the  state.  There  were  no  means  provided 
whereby  a  party  could  formulate  and  carry  through  its 
policy,  select  its  candidates  for  high  office,  or  insure  that 
they  should  be  treated  as  the  real  leaders  of  the  party  and 
able  to  control  its  action.1  The  machinery  of  party,  there- 
fore, from  the  national  convention  to  the  legislative  caucus, 
has  perforce  been  created  outside  the  framework  of  the  gov- 
ernment, and  cannot  be  nicely  adjusted  thereto. 

The  European  countries,  on  the  other  hand,  that  have  in 
adopted  the  English  parliamentary  system,  have  usually  Emmie 
copied  those  features,  like  the  responsibility  of  the  min- 
isters, which  were  most  readily  perceived,  without  acquiring 
at  the  same  time  the  substructure  on  which  the  system  rests, 
the  procedure  which  prevents  friction,  or  the  national 
traditions  which  supply  the  motive  power.  The  result 
has  been  that  a  form  of  government  well  fitted  to  the  great 
English  parties  has  proved  very  imperfectly  suited  to  the 
numerous  political  groups  that  exist  in  most  of  the  conti- 
nental legislatures.2  In  France  the  conditions  have  indeed 
changed  much  in  the  last  few  years,  the  procedure  has  been 
gradually  better  adapted  to  the  parliamentary  system,  and 

1  In  his  "Rise  and  Growth  of  American  Polities,"  a  hook  full  of  pene- 
trating suggestions,  Mr.  Henry  Jones  Ford  has  argued  that  party  exists  in 
America  in  order  to  hring  about  an  accord  among  public  bodies  that  were 
made  independent  by  the  Constitution;  to  force  into  harmonious  action  the 
various  representatives  of  the  people.  Professor  Goodnow  develops  tin: 
f-ame  idea  from  a  different  standpoint  in  his  "  Politics  and  Administration." 
But,  especially  in  view  of  the  comparatively  small  accord  among  public 
bodies,  or  harmonious  action  of  the  public  representatives,  and  the  enor- 
mous influence  of  parties  in  elections,  it  seems  to  the  writer  more  correct  to 
say  that  parties  in  America  exist  mainly  for  the  selection  of  candidates. 

2  This  subject  is  treated  in  Duprie/.'s  admirable  work  Lis  M  iin'strrs, 
in  Bodley's  "France,"  and  in  the  writer's  "Governments  and  Parties  in 
Continental  Europe." 


456  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

the  ministries  have  gained  in  stability;  but  as  yet  the 
difficulties  are  by  no  means  overcome.  In  some  of  the 
smaller  countries,  such  as  Belgium  and  Switzerland,  the 
organs  of  government  and  the  system  of  parties  are  less 
inconsistent ;  in  Belgium  because  she  followed  British 
precedents  more  faithfully;  in  Switzerland  because  she 
was  enabled  by  her  small  size,  coupled  with  a  federal  struc- 
ture, to  create  a  novel  polity  of  her  own,  in  which  parties 
are  given  no  constitutional  sphere  of  action,  and  play  an 
unusually  subordinate  part.  In  none  of  these  countries, 
however,  is  the  form  of  government  so  fully  consonant  with 
the  party  system  as  it  is  in  Great  Britain. 
English  In  England  the  party  system  is  no  more  in  accord  with 

ta^y'svstem  the  strictly  legal  institutions,  with  King,  Lords  and  Corn- 
Grew  out       mons,  than  it  is  elsewhere ;    but  it  is  in  absolute  harmony 

of  Parties.  ■    i        i  •  i   •    i  1    i  i  •  i 

with  those  conventions,  which,  although  quite  unknown  to 
the  law,  make  up  the  actual  working  constitution  of  the 
state.  It  is  in  harmony  with  them  because  they  were 
created  by  the  warfare  of  parties,  were  evolved  out  of  party 
life.  Government  by  a  responsible  ministry  was  not  the 
inevitable  consequence  of  the  long  struggle  between  the 
House  of  Commons  and  the  Crown.  Some  other  means 
might  very  well  have  been  devised  for  taking  the  executive 
power  out  of  the  personal  control  of  the  King.  It  was 
rather  the  result  of  the  condition  of  the  House  itself;  for 
it  is  inconceivable  that  this  form  of  government  should 
have  appeared  if  Parliament  had  not  been  divided  into 
Whigs  and  Tories.  In  fact  the  whole  plan  would  be  sense- 
less if  parties  did  not  exist.  The  reason  for  the  resigna- 
tion of  a  ministry  upon  the  rejection  of  a  measure  it  has 
proposed  is  that  the  defeat  indicates  a  general  loss  of  con- 
fidence in  the  policy  of  the  party  in  power,  and  the  pref- 
erence for  another  body  of  leaders  with  a  different  policy. 
If  this  were  not  so.  the  Swiss  practice  of  remaining  in  office, 
but  yielding  on  the  point  at  issue,  would  be  far  more  sen- 
sible. The  parliamentary  system  is  thus  a  rational  expres- 
sion of  the  division  of  the  ruling  chamber  into  two  parties. 


PARTY   AND  THE  PARLIAMENTARY  SYSTEM  457 

Neither  the  parliamentary  system  nor  the  party  system,  it  has  Mad« 
neither  the  responsibility  of  ministers  to  the  House  of  stToiTer 
Commons  nor  the  permanent  division  into  two  parties, 
grew  up  in  a  day.  Throughout  the  eighteenth  century  the 
principle  of  cabinet  responsibility  was  but  dimly  recog- 
nised ;  while  parties  at  times  disintegrated,  and  the  wheels 
of  government  were  kept  going  by  means  of  corruption, 
which  has  served  in  all  ages  as  a  lubricant  for  ill-adjusted 
political  m:  chinery.  But  little  by  little,  with  halting  steps, 
the  rivalry  of  parties  built  up  the  responsibility  of  ministers, 
and  this  in  turn  helped  to  perpetuate  the  party  divisions; 
for  the  parliamentary  system,  like  every  rational  form  of 
government,  reacts  upon  and  strengthens  the  conditions 
of  its  own  existence.  It  is  based  upon  party,  and  by  the 
law  of  its  nature  tends  to  accentuate  party.  Ministers 
perceived  that  their  security  depended  upon  standing 
together,  presenting  a  united  front,  and  prevailing  upon 
their  friends  to  do  the  same.  The  leaders  of  the  Oppo- 
sition learned  also  that  their  chance  of  attaining  to  power 
was  improved  by  pursuing  a  similar  course.  In  this  way 
two  parties  are  arrayed  against  one  another  continually, 
while  every  member  of  Parliament  finds  himself  powerfully 
drawn  to  enlist  under  one  banner  or  the  other,  and  follow 
it  on  all  occasions.  lie  cannot  consider  measures  simply 
on  their  merits,  but  must  take  into  account  the  ultimate 
effect  of  his  vote.  As  soon  as  men  recognise  that  the  defeat 
of  a  government  bill  means  a  change  of  ministry,  the  pres- 
sure is  great  to  sacrifice  personal  opinions  on  that  bill  to 
the  greater  principles  for  which  the  party  stands;  and  the 
more  fully  the  system  develops,  the  clearer  becomes  the 
incompatibility  between  voting  as  the  member  of  Parlia- 
ment pleases  on  particular  measures,  and  maintaining  in 
power  the  party  he  approves.  In  short,  the  action  of  the 
House  of  Commons  has  tended  to  become  more  and  more 
party  action,  with  the  ministers,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
gradually  drawing  the  initiative  in  legislation,  and  the  con- 
trol over  procedure,  more  and  more  into  their  own  hands. 


458  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

it  is  Gov-  The  English   government  is  builded  as  a  city  that  is  at 

ernment  ...... 

by  Party.  unity  in  itself,  and  party  is  an  integral  part  of  the  fabric. 
Party  works,  therefore,  inside,  instead  of  outside,  the  regu- 
lar political  institutions.  In  fact,  so  far  as  Parliament  is 
concerned,  the  machinery  of  party  and  of  government  are 
not  merely  in  accord ;  they  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
The  party  cabal  has  become  the  Treasury  Bench.  The 
ministers  are  the  party  chiefs,  selected  not  artificially  but 
by  natural  prominence,  and  the  majority  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  which  legislates,  appropriates  money,  super- 
vises and  controls  the  administration,  and  sustains  or  dis- 
cards ministers,  is  the  party  itself  acting  under  the  guidance 
of  those  chiefs.  The  parliamentary  system,  as  it  has  grown 
up  spontaneously  in  England,  is  in  its  origin  and  nature 
government  by  party,  sanctioned  and  refined  by  custom. 
In  that  respect  it  differs,  not  only  from  national  political 
systems  elsewhere,  but  also  from  British  local  government. 
This  last  is  not  an  outgrowth  of  party,  but,  like  most  of 
the  existing  popular  institutions  in  other  countries,  was 
designed,  not  evolved.  In  it,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter, 
party  has  no  organic  connection  with  the  ruling  bodies,  and 
has  not  the  same  controlling  authority  as  in  national  affairs, 
it  can  If  the  existence  of  a  responsible  ministry  normally  in- 

withT  y  v°lyes  government  by  party,  it  also  requires  as  a  condition 
Parties.  of  success  that  there  shall  be  only  two  parties.  The  ills 
that  have  flowed  from  the  subdivision  of  the  French,  the 
Italian  and  other  parliaments,  into  a  number  of  groups 
are  now  an  oft-told  tale.  The  consequences  there  are  very 
different  from  those  that  occur  where  the  executive  is  not 
responsible  to  the  legislature.  In  this  last  case  the  presence 
of  several  groups  may  result  in  the  election  of  a  president,  a 
council  or  an  assembly,  representing  a  minority  of  the  voters, 
and  if  so  the  popular  will  may  not  be  truly  expressed.  Yet 
the  government  will  go  on  unshaken  until  the  next  periodic 
election.  But  with  similar  conditions  under  the  parlia- 
mentary system  the  administration  itself  will  be  weak, 
its  position  unstable,  its  tenure  of  office  dependent  upon 


PARTY  AND  THE  PARLIAMENTARY  SYSTEM     459 

the  pleasure  of  a  group  that  may  be  ready  to  sacrifice  every- 
thing else  for  a  single  object.  Parnell  was  quite  right  in 
his  reckoning  that  if  he  could  keep  the  Home  Rulers  to- 
gether until  they  held  the  balance  of  power  in  the  House, 
one  or  other  of  the  great  parties  must  make  terms  with  them, 
or  parliamentary  government  would  be  unworkable. 

In  the  English  system  the  initiative  in  most  matters  of  Opposition 
importance  has  come  into  the  hands  of  the  cabinet  minis-  "ot  Entire'y 

1  Genuine. 

ters,  as  the  representatives  and  leaders  of  the  predominant 
party.  It  is  their  business  to  propose,  and  it  is  the  business 
of  the  Opposition  to  oppose.  But  the  attitude  of  the  latter 
is  not  quite  spontaneous.  On  rare  occasions  it  congratu- 
lates the  government  upon  some  action,  which  it  supports 
heartily.  More  commonly  it  seeks  to  criticise  everything, 
to  find  all  imaginable  faults.  Impotent  to  legislate,  it 
tries  to  prevent  the  majority  from  doing  so;  not  content 
with  expressing  its  views  and  registering  a  protest,  it  raises 
the  same  objections  at  every  stage  in  the  passage  of  a  bill ; 
and  sometimes  strives  to  delay  and  even  to  destroy  measures 
which  it  would  itself  enact  if  in  power.  Its  immediate 
object  is,  in  fact,  to  discredit  the  cabinet.  Now  this  sounds 
mischievous,  and  would  be  so  were  Parliament  the  ultimate 
political  authority.  But  the  parties  are  really  in  the  posi- 
tion of  barristers  arguing  a  case  before  a  jury,  that  jury 
being  the  national  electorate;  and  experience  has  shown, 
contrary  to  the  prepossessions  of  non-professional  legal 
reformers  in  all  ages,  that  the  best  method  of  attaining 
justice  is  to  have  a  strong  advocate  argue  on  each  side 
before  an  impartial  umpire.  Unfortunately  the  jurymen  in 
this  case  are  not  impartial,  and  the  arguments  are  largely 
addressed  to  their  interests,  but  that  is  a  difficulty  insepa- 
rable from  democracy,  or,  indeed,  from  any  form  of  gov- 
ernment. 

Another  result  of  party  government   that   is  constantly  Waste 
decried   is  the    waste   of   capacity   it    involves.      Why,    it    is   '    C;ii':1<'"> 
asked,    should    an    excellent    administrator    leave    his    post, 
because  some  measure  quite  unconnected  with  his   depart- 


460         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

ment  —  a  measure,  it  may  be,  that  he  has  himself  opposed 
in  the  cabinet  —  is  rejected  by  the  House  of  Commons? 
Such  a  system  interferes  with  that  continuity  of  policy 
which  is  often  essential  to  success  both  in  foreign  and 
internal  affairs,  and  this  is,  no  doubt,  an  evil ;  but  owing 
to  the  presence  of  a  highly  trained  body  of  permanent 
officials,  who  carry  on  the  traditions  and  largely  control 
the  policy  of  the  departments,  it  is  not  so  important  in 
England  as  one  might  suppose.  The  system  also  debars 
one  half  of  the  talent  in  public  life  from  the  service  of  the 
state ;  but  this  misfortune  is  one  that,  for  one  reason  or 
another,  has  existed  to  some  extent  in  all  countries  at  all 
times.  The  idea  of  a  state  where  all  the  ablest  men  in  the 
land  join,  without  regard  to  political  opinions,  to  devote 
the  best  of  their  talents  to  the  public  service,  is  enchanting, 
but  it  has  never  been  permanently  realised  anywhere, 
issues  Another  criticism  levelled  at  party  government  in  England 

solely  on  6  arises  from  the  impossibility  of  supporting  the  party  in 
their  Merita,  power  on  one  issue  and  opposing  it  on  another.  A  voter 
at  the  last  election  who  objected  strongly  to  any  change 
in  fiscal  policy,  and  equally  strongly  to  any  concessions 
on  the  subject  of  Home  Rule,  found  himself  on  the  horns 
of  a  dilemma.  He  was  compelled  to  make  up  his  mind 
which  issue  he  thought  most  important,  and  trust  to  Provi- 
dence about  the  other.  In  a  party  government,  where 
the  cabinet  must  resign  if  any  of  its  vital  measures  are  re- 
jected, those  measures  cannot  be  considered  by  individuals 
on  their  merits.  The  policy  of  one  party  or  the  other  must 
be  supported  as  a  whole.  This  is  certainly  a  limitation 
on  personal  freedom  of  action,  and  it  acts  as  a  restraint 
just  to  the  extent  that  the  government  is  conducted  strictly 
on  party  lines.  The  party  system  certainly  involves  com- 
promise of  opinion ;  but  then  there  is  some  compromise 
required  for  the  enactment  of  every  public  measure,  whether 
parties  exist  or  not,  for  it  never  happens  that  the  legislators 
who  vote  for  any  bill  are  all  perfectly  satisfied  with  every 
one  of  its  clauses. 


PARTY   AND  THE   PARLIAMENTARY   SYSTEM  401 

Government  by  part}'  is  not  an  ideal  regimen.  Like 
everything  else  it  contains  both  good  and  evil.  A  political 
organisation,  indeed,  that  avoided  all  strife  and  all  waste 
would  certainly  be  impossible,  and  would  probably,  by 
relaxing  effort  and  sapping  the  springs  of  human  nature, 
prove  undesirable.  As  yet  it  is  too  early  to  strike  a  final 
balance  between  the  merits  and  the  defects  of  the  party 
system  in  England,  and  it  would  be  hopeless  to  attempt 
it  here.  Both  good  and  evil  will  appear  more  fully  as  we 
proceed. 


CHAPTER   XXV 

PARTY   ORGANISATION  IN   PARLIAMENT 

The  Need  In  every  legislative  body  a  vote  is  supposed  to  express 

of  w  hips.  ^e  sense  of  the  House,  and  there  is  a  universal  fiction  that 
all  the  members  are  constantly  present;  but  this  is  often 
far  from  being  the  fact ;  and  it  always  behooves  any  one 
interested  in  a  particular  matter  to  expend  no  small  amount 
of  labour  in  making  sure  that  those  persons  who  agree  with 
him  are  on  hand  when  the  decisive  moment  comes.  All 
this  applies  with  peculiar  force  to  the  House  of  Commons; 
for  not  only  the  fate  of  the  particular  measure  under  con- 
sideration, but  the  very  life  of  the  ministry  itself,  may 
depend  upon  a  single  division ;  and  it  is  the  more  true  be- 
cause the  average  attendance,  while  a  debate  is  going  on, 
is  unusually  small.  When  the  division  bell  rings,  two  min- 
utes are,  indeed,  given  for  the  members  to  rush  in  from  the 
lobbies,  the  library,  the  smoking  and  dining  rooms,  and 
the  terrace,  yet  the  government  cannot  trust  to  luck  for 
the  presence  of  enough  of  its  followers  in  the  precincts  of 
the  House  to  make  up  a  majority.  There  must  be  some- 
one whose  duty  it  is  to  see  that  they  are  within  call, 
who  The  duty  of  keeping  the  members  of  a  party  on  hand 

is  performed  by  the  whips,  whose  name  is  abbreviated 
from  the  men  who  act  as  whippers-in  at  a  fox-hunt.  They 
are  all  members  of  the  House,  and  those  on  the  government 
side  receive  salaries  from  the  public  purse  on  the  theory 
that  it  is  their  business  to  "keep  a  house"  during  supply; 
that  is,  to  insure  the  presence  of  a  quorum,  so  that  the 
appropriations  may  be  voted.  The  chief  government  whip 
holds  the  office  of  Parliamentary  Secretary  to  the  Treas- 
ury, with  a  salary  of  £2000.     Formerly  he  was  often  called 

462 


PARTY   ORGANISATION   IN   PARLIAMENT  403 

simply  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  —  an  expression 
occasionally  confusing  to  the  readers  of  books  written  a 
generation  ago.  He  is  sometimes  called,  also,  Patronage 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury ;  and  in  old  times  no  small  part  of 
his  functions  consisted  in  distributing  patronage,  in  the  days 
when  it  was  freely  employed  to  secure  the  support  of  mem- 
bers of  Parliament.  In  fact  he  is  still  a  channel  for  the 
disposition  of  such  minor  patronage  as  remains  in  the  gift 
of  the  Prime  Minister,  including  the  creation  of  lesser  titles. 
He  is  assisted  by  three  other  members,  who  hold  the  office 
of  Junior  Lords  of  the  Treasury,  with  the  salary  of  c£1000 
apiece.1  As  has  already  been  explained,  the  Treasury 
Board  never  meets,  so  that  the  duties  of  the  Junior  Lords 
are  to-day  almost  entirely  confined  to  acting  as  whips ;  and, 
to  enable  them  to  do  that  more  effectively,  one  of  them 
is  always  a  Scotch  member.  The  position  of  whip  is  one 
cf  great  importance,  but  it  entails  some  sacrifices,  for  by 
custom  the  whips  take  no  part  in  debate,  and  although 
their  work  is  felt  throughout  the  House,  it  is  little  seen 
by  the  public.  The  chief  whip,  however,  is  often  given 
afterwards  a  position  in  the  ministry,  or  otherwise  re- 
warded. 

The  Opposition  also  has  its  whips,  usually  three  in  num- 
ber, whose  position  is  important;  though  not  so  important 
as  that  of  the  government  whips,  because  while  a  failure 
to  have  the  full  strength  of  the  party  present  may  be  unfor- 
tunate, it  cannot,  as  in  the  case  of  the  government,  be  dis- 
astrous. Naturally  the  Opposition  whips  have  no  salaries, 
but  they  are  sustained  by  the  hope  that  their  turn  will 
come. 

The    government    whips  act    as   the    aides-de-camp,  and   Duties  of 
intelligence   department,   of  the  leader  of  the    House.     In 
the  former  capacity  they  arrange  for  him  with  the  whips 
on  the  other  side  those  matters  in  which  it  is  a  convenience 
to    have    an    understanding.     The    membership    of    select 

1  Formerly  the  Parliamentary  Groom  in  Waiting  acted  also  as  a  whip; 
but  the  office  was  abolished  in  1892. 
2a 


in  the 
Members 


464         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

committees,  for  example,  is  generally  settled  between  the 
chief  whips  on  the  two  sides  of  the  House;  and  the  time 
when  the  test  vote  on  some  great  measure  will  take  place 
is  usually  arranged  beforehand  in  the  same  way. 
They  bring  When  an  important  division  is  likely  to  occur,  each  side 
musters  its  whole  force  for  a  great  trial  of  strength ;  and 
not  only  the  majority,  but  the  size  of  the  majority,  is  a 
matter  of  importance  to  the  ministers,  for  it  shows  how 
completely  they  can  depend  upon  the  support  of  their 
followers.  But  it  is  not  on  vital  questions  alone  that  the 
government  must  avoid  being  beaten,  because  a  defeat, 
even  though  not  such  a  one  as  would  cause  resignation, 
nevertheless  weakens  to  some  extent  the  credit  of  the 
cabinet.  It  gives  the  public  the  impression  that  the  min- 
isters are  losing  popularity;  either  that  their  followers 
are  becoming  rebellious  and  voting  against  them,  or,  at 
least,  that  they  are  so  far  indifferent  or  disaffected  as  to 
stay  away.  Nothing  succeeds  like  success ;  and  it  is  a 
maxim  in  politics  as  well  as  in  war  that  one  must  maintain 
a  reputation  for  being  invincible.  Any  defeat  of  the  govern- 
ment always  causes  cheers  of  triumph  among  the  Opposi- 
tion ;  and  especially  of  late  years,  when  defeats  have  become 
more  rare,  it  is  a  thing  that  requires  explanation. 

The  whips  must,  therefore,  always  keep  a  majority  within 
sound  of  the  division  bell  whenever  any  business  that  may 
affect  the  government  is  under  consideration.  For  this 
purpose  they  are  in  the  habit  of  sending  out  almost  every 
day  to  all  their  supporters  lithographed  notices  stating  that 
a  vote  on  such  and  such  a  matter  is  likely  to  come  on,  and 
requesting  the  attendance  of  the  member.  These  notices 
are  underscored,  in  accordance  with  the  importance  of 
attendance,  from  a  single  line,  meaning  that  the  whip 
desires  the  member's  attendance,  to  four  lines,  or  a  couple 
of  very  thick  lines,  which  mean  "come  on  pain  of  being 
thought  a  deserter."  In  fact  the  receipt  of  messages  of 
this  kind  is  the  test  of  party  membership.  In  1844  a  cor- 
respondence on  the  subject  took  place  between  Peel  and 


PARTY   ORGANISATION   IN    PARLIAMENT  465 

Disraeli  shortly  before  the  final  breach  occurred.  Disraeli, 
who  had  been  criticising  the  policy  of  the  government  in 
Ireland  and  Servia,  was  not  sent  the  usual  whips,  and  pro- 
tested on  the  ground  that  he  had  not  ceased  to  be  a  member 
of  the  party.1 

All  this  is  not  so  important  in  the  case  of  the  Opposition; 
for,  the  consequences  of  being  caught  napping  are  not  so 
serious.  It  is  enough  for  them  to  summon  their  full  force 
from  time  to  time,  when  a  good  chance  for  a  large  vote 
occurs.  The  proceedings  of  their  whips,  therefore,  though 
generally  the  same,  are  somewhat  less  systematic. 

The  whips  act  also  as  an  intelligence  department  for  They  must 
the  government  leader.  It  is  their  business  not  only  to  J},'!'1^.81 
summon  the  members  of  the  party  to  the  House,  but  to  bers  are 
know  that  they  are  there.  By  the  door  leading  to  the  coat 
room,  through  which  the  members  ordinarily  enter  the 
House  from  Palace  Yard,  there  are  seats;  and  here  may 
always  be  seen  one  of  the  government  whips,  and  often  one 
from  the  Opposition.  Each  of  them  takes  note  of  every 
member  who  goes  in  and  out,  sometimes  remonstrating 
with  him  if  he  is  leaving  without  sufficient  reason.  By  this 
means  the  whip  is  expected  to  be  able,  at  any  moment, 
to  tell  just  how  large  a  majority  the  government  has  within 
the  precincts  of  the  House;  and  on  the  most  important 
divisions  the  whip  sees  that  every  member  of  the  party, 
who  is  well,  is  either  present  or  paired.  Of  course,  the 
same  thoroughness  cannot  be  attained  on  smaller  questions; 
and  although  the  government  whip  tries  to  have  constantly 
on  hand  more  members  of  his  own  party  than  of  the  Oppo- 
sition, it  is  not  always  possible  to  do  so.  lie  may  have 
expected  a  vote  to  take  place  at  a  given  hour,  and  sent  out 
a  notice  to  every  one  to  be  present  at  that  time,  and 
the  debate  may  suddenly  show  signs  of  coming  to  an  end 
earlier.  In  that  case  it  is  usually  possible  to  get  some 
member  of  the  government  to  talk  against  time  while  the 
needed  members  are  fetched  in.      At  times  even  this  resource 

1  Purker,  ".Sir  Robert  lVd,"  III.,  1 11— 17. 


466         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Snap  Votes,  fails,  and  the  government  is  occasionally  defeated  on  what 

is  known  as  "a  snap  vote." 
That  Humorous  anecdotes  are  told  of  frantic  attempts  to  bring 

of  1895.  m  ^g  member  and  0f  practical  jokes  in  trying  to  prevent 
it ; *  but  the  only  one  of  these  cases  that  led  to  serious 
results  occurred  in  1895.  The  Liberal  government  had 
been  desperately  clinging  for  life  to  a  small  majority  of 
about  a  dozen,  when  there  came  on  for  debate  a  motion 
to  reduce  the  salary  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War, 
made  in  order  to  draw  attention  to  an  alleged  lack  of  cord- 
ite. The  whips  sitting  by  the  regular  entrance  of  the 
House  had  in  their  tally  the  usual  majority  for  the  govern- 
ment ;  but  a  score  of  Tories  had  gone  from  the  Palace  Yard 
directly  to  the  terrace,  without  passing  through  the  ordinary 
coat-room  entrance.  When  the  division  bell  rang  they 
came  straight  from  the  terrace  to  the  House,  and  to  the 
surprise  no  less  of  the  tellers  than  of  every  one  else,  the 
government  was  defeated  by  a  few  votes.  This  was  clearly  a 
"  snap"  division,  which  would  not  ordinarily  have  been  treated 
as  showing  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  ministry.  But  the 
time  comes  when  a  tired  man  in  the  sea  would  rather  drown 
than  cling  longer ;  and  that  was  the  position  of  Lord  Rose- 
bery's  government, 
whips  must  The  whips  keep  in  constant  touch  with  the  members  of 
Know  the      thgjj.  party.     It  is  their  business  to  detect  the  least  sign 

Temper  of  L  J  ° 

the  Party,  of  disaffection  or  discontent ;  to  know  the  disposition  of 
every  member  of  the  party  on  every  measure  of  importance 
to  the  ministry,  reporting  it  constantly  to  their  chief.  A 
member  of  the  party,  indeed,  who  feels  that  he  cannot 
vote  for  a  government  measure,  or  that  he  must  vote  for  an 
amendment  to  it,  is  expected  to  notify  the  whip.  If  there 
are  few  men  in  that  position,  so  that  the  majority  of  the 
government  is  ample,  and  the  result  is  not  in  danger,  the 
whip  will  make  no  objection.  A  novice  in  the  strangers' 
gallery,  who  hears  three  or  four  men  on  the  government 
side   attack    one    of    its    measures  vigorously,   sometimes 

1Macdonagh,  "Book  of  Parliament/'  372-78. 


PARTY  ORGANISATION   IN  PARLIAMENT  467 

thinks  that  there  is  a  serious  risk  of  defeat ;  but  if  he  watched 
the  countenance  of  the  chief  whip  on  the  extreme  end  of 
the  Treasury  Bench,  he  would  see  no  sign  of  anxiety,  and 
when  the  division  takes  place  the  majority  of  the  govern- 
ment is  about  the  normal  size.  The  fact  is  that  the  whip 
has  known  all  along  just  how  many  men  behind  him  would 
vote  against  the  government,  just  how  many  would  stay 
away,  and  that  it  really  made  no  difference. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  majority  of  the  government  Methods 
is  narrow,  or  the  number  of  refractory  members  is  consider-  of  ?.ressure 

'  J  on  Mem- 

able,  the  whip  will  try  to  reason  with  them ;  and  in  a  crisis,  bcrs. 

where  a  hostile  vote  will  be  followed  by  a  dissolution,  or 

by  a  resignation  of  the  ministry  which  involves,  of  course, 

a  dissolution,  his  reasoning  is  likely  to  be  effective;    for  Fear  of 

no  member  wants  to  face  unnecessarily  the  expense  of  a  Dlssolutlon- 

general  election,  or  the  risk  of  losing  his  seat.     The  strength 

of  motives  of  this  kind  naturally  depends  very  much  upon 

his  tenure  of  the  seat.     If,  as  sometimes  happens,  he  is  the 

only  member  of  the  party  who  has  a  good  chance  of  carrying 

the  seat,  or  if  his  local  or  personal  influence  there  is  so  strong 

that  he  is  certain  to  carry  it,  he  will  hold  a  position  of  more 

than  usual  independence.     But  this  is  rarely  the  case. 

Nor  is  the  fear  of  dissolution  the  only  means  by  which  Action 
pressure  can  be  brought  to  bear  upon  a  member  who  strays 
too  far  from  the  party  fold.  His  constituents,  or  the  local 
party  association  —  which  for  this  purpose  is  much  the 
same  thing  —  can  be  relied  upon  to  do  something.  Any 
direct  attempt  by  the  whips  to  bring  pressure  upon  a  mem- 
ber through  his  constituents  would  be  likely  to  irritate, 
and  do  more  harm  than  good.  But  it  is  easy  enough,  in 
various  ways,  to  let  the  constituents  know  that  the  mem- 
ber is  not  thoroughly  supporting  his  party ;  and  unless 
his  vote  against  the  government  is  cast  in  the  interest  of 
the  constituents  themselves,  they  are  not  likely  to  have 
much  sympathy  with  his  independence. 

Another  means  of  pressure;  is  found   in   social   influence1.   Social 
which  counts  for  much  in  English  public  life;    and  for  that 


of  Constitu- 
ents. 


468 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Payment 
of  Election 
Expenses. 


reason  it  is  considered  important  to  have  as  chief  whip  a 
man  of  high  social  standing  as  well  as  of  pleasant  manners 
and  general  popularity.  The  power  of  social  influence  has 
always  been  great  in  England,  more  particularly  among  the 
Conservatives.  In  1853,  Disraeli,  who  was  trying  hard  to 
build  up  the  Tory  party,  and  had  at  the  time  little  else  to 
build  it  with,  urged  the  importance  of  Lord  Derby's  asking 
all  his  followers  in  Parliament  to  dinner  in  the  course  of  the 
session.1  Nor  does  the  use  of  influence  of  this  kind  appear 
to  have  declined.  It  has  been  said  of  late  years  that  if  a 
Unionist  did  not  vote  with  his  party,  he  was  not  invited  to 
the  functions  at  the  Foreign  Office ;  and  the  weakness  of  the 
Liberals  for  nearly  a  score  of  years  after  the  split  over 
Home  Rule  was  due  in  no  small  part  to  the  fact  that  they 
had  very  little  social  influence  at  their  command.  A  sudden 
political  conversion  some  years  ago  was  attributed  to  disap- 
pointment of  the  member  at  the  small  number  of  invita- 
tions received  through  Liberal  connections ;  and  the  change 
of  faith  no  doubt  met  its  reward,  for  it  was  followed  in  time 
by  knighthood. 

Finally  the  whips  have,  upon  a  certain  number  of  members, 
a  claim  arising  from  gratitude.  Elections  are  expensive 
for  the  candidate,  and  it  is  not  always  easy  to  find  a  man  who 
is  ready  to  incur  the  needful  cost  and  trouble,  especially 
when  the  chance  of  success  is  not  large.  Under  these  con- 
ditions the  central  office  of  the  party,  which  is  under  the 
control  of  the  leaders  and  the  whip,  will  often  contribute 
toward  a  candidate's  expenses.  It  is  done  most  frequently 
in  well-nigh  hopeless  constituencies,  and  therefore  the  pro- 
portion of  men  who  have  received  such  aid  is  much  greater 
among  defeated  than  among  elected  candidates ;  although 
the  cases  are  by  no  means  confined  to  the  former  class. 
How  often  aid  is  given,  and  in  what  cases  it  is  given,  is 
never  known,  for  the  whip  naturally  keeps  his  own  counsel 
about  the  matter;  but  the  number  of  members  on  each 
side  of  the  House,  a  part  of  whose  election  expenses  have 


1  Malmesbury,  "Memoirs  of  an  Ex-Minister,"  I.,  382. 


PARTY  ORGANISATION  IN  PARLIAMENT  469 

been  paid  from  the  party  treasury,  is  not  inconsiderable. 
Upon  these  men  the  whips  have,  of  course,  a  strong  claim 
which  can  be  used  to  secure  their  attendance  and  votes 
when  needed. 

If  all  the  means  of  pressure  which  the  whips  can  bring  to 
bear  are  unavailing,  and  the  supporters  of  the  government 
who  propose  to  vote  against  it  are  enough  to  turn  the  scale, 
or  if  the  whips  report  that  the  dissatisfaction  is  widespread, 
the  cabinet  will,  if  possible,  modify  its  position.  This  is 
said  to  have  been  the  real  cause  of  the  apparent  surren- 
der of  the  Liberal  ministry  to  the  demands  of  the  Labour 
Party  upon  the  bill  to  regulate  the  liability  of  trade  unions 
in  1906.  The  whips  found  that  many  of  their  own  followers 
had  pledged  themselves  so  deeply  that  they  could  not  sup- 
port the  government  bill  as  it  stood. 

When  the  government  is  interested  in  the  result  of  a  vote,  The  Whipe 
it  informs  the  Speaker  that  it  would  like  its  whips  appointed  as  TeUers- 
tellers  in  the  division,  a  suggestion  with  which  he  always 
complies.  This  is  the  sign  that  the  ministers  are  calling 
for  the  support  of  all  their  followers,  and  that  the  division 
is  to  be  upon  party  lines.  Often  in  the  course  of  a  debate 
upon  some  amendment  to  a  government  bill,  one  hears  a 
member,  rising  behind  the  Treasury  Bench,  appeal  to  the 
leader  of  the  House  not  to  put  pressure  upon  his  supporters 
on  that  question.  He  means  that  the  government  whips 
shall  not  be  made  the  tellers,  in  which  case  each  member  is 
free  to  vote  as  he  thinks  best  without  a  breach  of  party 
loyalty,  and  the  result,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  not  regarded 
as  a  defeat  for  the  cabinet.  Occasionally  this  is  done,  but 
not  often;  because  on  the  question  so  treated  the  govern- 
ment, in  abandoning  its  leadership,  is  exposed  to  a  charge 
of  weakness ;  and  also  because  it  is  unsafe  to  do  it  unless 
the  ministers  are  quite  indifferent  about  the  result,  for  the 
effect  of  the  pressure  on  the  votes  of  many  members  is  very 
great. 

The  whips  may  be  said  to  constitute  the  only  regular  party 
organisation  in  the   House  of  Commons,   unless  we  include 


470 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


No  Other 
Party  Ma- 
chinery in 
Parliament. 


under  that  description  the  two  front  benches.  The  very 
fact,  indeed,  that  the  ministry  and  the  leaders  of  the  Oppo- 
sition furnish  in  themselves  the  real  party  machinery  of 
the  House,  avoids  the  need  of  any  other.  The  ministers 
prepare  and  carry  out  the  programme  of  the  party  in  power, 
while  a  small  coterie  of  leaders  on  the  other  side  devise  the 
plans  for  opposing  them.  The  front  bench  thus  does  the 
work  of  a  party  committee  or  council,  and  in  neither  of  the 
great  parties  is  there  anything  resembling  a  general  caucus 
for  the  discussion  and  determination  of  party  policy.  Some- 
times a  great  meeting  of  the  adherents  of  the  party  in  Parlia- 
ment is  called  at  one  of  the  political  clubs  or  elsewhere,  when 
the  leaders  address  their  followers.  But  it  is  held  to  exhort, 
not  to  consult ;  and,  in  fact,  surprise  is  sometimes  expressed 
by  private  members  that  the  chiefs  take  them  so  little  into 
their  confidence.1 

The  organisation  of  the  two  great  parties  in  Parliament 
has  almost  a  military  character,  with  the  cabinet  as  the 
general  staff,  and  the  leader  of  the  House  as  the  commander 
in  the  field.  This  is  naturally  far  less  true  of  lesser  groups, 
which  have  not  the  tradition  of  cabinet  leadership  to  keep 
them  in  line.  In  their  case  a  real  caucus  of  the  party,  to 
consider  the  position  it  shall  assume  in  a  crisis,  is  not  un- 
known. Two  particularly  celebrated  meetings  of  that  kind 
took  place  within  a  few  years  of  each  other :  one  held  by  the 
Liberal  Unionists  before  the  vote  on  the  Home  Rule  Bill  in 
1886 ;  the  other  the  meeting  of  the  Irish  Nationalists  which 
deposed  Parnell  from  the  leadership  of  the  party  in  1890. 

A  caucus  of  one  of  the  two  great  parties  has  occasionally 
been  held  to  select  a  leader  in  the  House,  in  those  rare  cases 
where  it  has  found  itself  in  Opposition  without  a  chief.  This 
happened,  for  example,  in  1899,  when  the  post  of  leader 
having  been  left  vacant  by  the  retirement  of  Sir  William 
Harcourt  therefrom  in  the  preceding  December,  the  Liberal 
members  of  the  House  met  on  the  day  before  the  opening  of 

'See,  for  example,  Sir  Richard  Temple,  "Life  in  Parliament,"  and 
especially  pp.  39-40. 


PARTY   ORGANISATION   IN  PARLIAMENT  471 

the  session,  and  chose  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  to 
succeed  him.  Sir  Henry  thenceforward  led  the  party  in 
the  Commons,  and  became,  in  due  course,  Prime  Minister, 
when  the  Liberals  came  to  power  in  1905.  Except,  however, 
for  an  accident  of  that  sort,  neither  of  the  two  great  parties 
has  any  machinery  for  choosing  its  chiefs,  or  deciding  upon 
its  course  of  action.  The  leaders,  and  when  the  party  comes 
to  power  the  ministers,  are,  no  doubt,  indirectly  selected  by 
the  party  itself,  for  they  are  the  men  who  have  shown  them- 
selves able  to  win  its  confidence,  and  command  its  support. 
But  the  choice  is  not  made  by  any  formal  vote ;  nor  is  it 
always  precisely  such  as  would  result  from  a  vote.  The 
Prime  Minister,  if  not  himself  in  the  Commons,  appoints  the 
leader  of  the  House  and  his  principal  lieutenants,  being 
guided  in  the  choice  by  his  own  estimate  of  their  hold  upon 
the  party,  and  by  the  advice  of  the  other  chiefs.  When 
appointed,  the  leader  leads,  and  the  party  follows. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 


NON-PARTY   ORGANISATIONS   OUTSIDE   OF   PARLIAMENT 


Different 
Kinds  of 
Political 
Organi- 
sations. 


The  political  organisations  outside  the  walls  of  Parlia- 
ment may,  for  convenience,  be  classified  under  four  heads ; 
although  the  groups  so  set  apart  are  not  always  perfectly  dis- 
tinct, and  a  particular  organisation  is  sometimes  on  the 
border  line  between  two  different  groups.  These  four  heads 
are :  — 

1.  Non-party  organisations,  whose  object  is  to  carry  into 
effect  some  one  project  or  line  of  policy,  but  not  to  obtain 
control  of  the  general  government,  or  to  act  as  an  inde- 
pendent political  group  in  the  House  of  Commons. 

2.  Local  party  organisations,  each  confined  to  one  locality, 
whose  primary  object  is  to  nominate  party  candidates  and 
carry  the  elections  in  that  place,  although  they  may  inci- 
dentally bring  their  influence  to  bear  on  the  national  policy 
of  the  party. 

3.  National  party  organisations,  whose  object  is  to 
propagate  the  principles  of  the  party,  to  aid  in  carrying  the 
elections  throughout  the  country,  and  also  to  formulate  and 
control  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  the  national  party  policy. 
Of  the  organisations  formed  for  such  a  purpose,  the  most 
famous  was  early  dubbed  by  its  foes  the  "Caucus,"  and  under 
that  title  the  career  of  these  bodies  on  the  Liberal  and  the 
Conservative  side  will  be  described  in  Chapters  XXIX.  and 
xxx.,  the  Labour  Party  being  treated  in  a  later  chapter 
by  itself. 

4.  Ancillary  party  organisations.  These  are  handmaids 
to  the  party,  which  make  no  pretence  of  trying  to  direct  its 
policy,  but  confine  themselves  to  the  work  of  extending  its 

472 


NON-PARTY  ORGANISATIONS  473 

popularity,  promoting  its  interests,  and  preparing  the  way  for 
its  success  at  the  polls.  They  will  be  discussed  hereafter,  but 
a  few  words  must  be  said  here  about  the  most  important  of 
them  all,  because  without  a  knowledge  of  its  character,  the 
history  of  the  caucus,  with  which  it  has  come  into  contact, 
can  hardly  be  understood.  It  is  the  central  association,  or 
central  office,  of  the  party,  composed  of  paid  officials  and 
agents,  with  or  without  the  help  of  a  group  of  wealthy  and 
influential  men.  It  raises  and  disburses  the  campaign  funds 
of  the  party,  and  takes  charge  of  general  electioneering  in- 
terests; but  it  always  acts  in  close  concert  with  the  party 
leaders  and  the  whips,  and  is,  in  fact,  under  their  immediate 
direction  and  control.  The  central  office  is  thus  a  branch  of 
the  whip's  office,  which  attends  to  the  work  outside  of  Par- 
liament, and  it  is  really  managed  by  a  principal  agent  or 
secretary  directly  responsible  to  the  parliamentary  chiefs. 

Unlike  the  instruments  of  party  inside  of  Parliament,  all  They  are 
of  these  four  classes  of  exterior  political  organisation  are  fr(^nint(he 
wholly  unconnected  with  the  constitutional  organs  of  gov-  Organs 

i  i  i        /r»  •         i  •  i    i  i  °f  State. 

eminent ;  save  that  the  central  office  is  directed  by  the 
whip.  Outside  of  Parliament,  as  in  the  United  States, 
the  organisation  of  parties  is  artificial  or  voluntary,  that 
is,  the  mechanism  stands  quite  apart  from  that  of  the  state, 
and  its  effect  thereon  is  from  without,  not  from  within. 
From  this  fact  have  flowed  important  consequences  that 
will  be  noted  hereafter. 

Among  the  different  kinds  of  political  organisation  those  The  \on- 
here  called  non-partisan  are  by  far  the  oldest.  Yet  the  term  g.^atiorns 
itself  may  be  misleading.  It  does  not  mean  that  they  have 
confined  their  efforts  to  cultivating  an  abstract  public  opin- 
ion in  favour  of  their  dogmas,  for  they  have  often  sought  to 
elect  to  Parliament  men  who  would  advocate  them  there. 
Xor  does  it  mean  that  they  have  had  no  connection  with  the 
existing  parties,  for  sometimes  one  of  the  parties  has  coun- 
tenanced and  supported  their  views,  and  in  that  case  they 
have  thrown  their  influence  in  favour  of  the  candidate's  of 
that    party.     The   term    is   used   simply    to   denote   a   body 


474         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

whose  primary  object  is  not  to  achieve  victory  for  a  regular 
political  party.  Curiously  enough,  such  a  group  of  persons 
often  comes  nearer  than  the  great  parties  of  the  present  day 
to  Burke's  definition  of  party  as"a  body  of  men  united  for 
promoting  by  their  joint  endeavours  the  national  interest 
upon  some  particular  principle  in  which  they  are  all  agreed." 
For  each  of  the  leading  parties  includes  men  who  are  not 
wholly  at  one  in  their  principles.  Party  aims  are  compli- 
cated and  confused,  and  are  attained  only  by  a  series  of 
compromises,  in  which  the  ultimate  principle  is  sometimes 
obscured  by  the  means  employed  to  reach  it.  A  party  in 
modern  parliamentary  government  would  be  more  accurately 
defined  as  a  body  of  men  united  by  the  intent  of  sustaining 
a  common  ministry. 
Their  Early  Various  organisations  of  the  kind  termed  here  "non-par- 
tisan" arose  during  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
The  first  of  these  of  any  great  importance  appears  to  have 
been  the  Society  for  Supporting  the  Bill  of  Rights,  founded 
in  1769  to  assist  Wilkes  in  his  controversy  with  the  House  of 
Commons,  and  in  general  to  maintain  the  public  liberties 
and  demand  an  extension  of  the  popular  element  in  the 
constitution.  Finding  that  the  society  was  used  to  promote 
the  personal  ambition  of  Wilkes,  some  of  the  leading  mem- 
bers withdrew,  and  founded  the  Constitutional  Society  with 
the  same  objects.  Ten  years  later  county  associations  were 
formed,  and  conventions  composed  of  delegates  therefrom 
met  in  London  in  1780  and  1781  to  petition  for  the  redress 
of  public  grievances.  Other  societies  were  established 
about  the  same  time,  and  they  were  not  always  of  a  radical 
character.  The  Protestant  Association,  for  example,  was 
formed  under  the  lead  of  Lord  George  Gordon  to  maintain 
the  disabilities  of  the  Roman  Catholics,  and  brought  about 
the  riots  of  June,  1780,  which  are  still  called  by  his  name. 

The  political  societies  of  those  days  were  short-lived,  and 
most  of  them  died  soon ;  but  the  outbreak  of  the  French 
Revolution  sowed  the  seed  for  a  fresh  crop.  In  1791  the 
working   classes  of  the   metropolis   organised  the   London 


NON-PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  475 

Corresponding  Society,  and  the  next  year  men  of  less  ex- 
treme views  founded  the  Society  of  the  Friends  of  the 
People  to  promote  moderate  reform.  Whether  radical  or 
moderate,  however,  associations  of  that  kind  could  not  live 
in  those  troublous  times.  The  repulsion  and  alarm  pro- 
voked by  the  course  of  events  in  France  were  too  strong  to 
be  resisted,  and  a  number  of  repressive  statutes  wore  passed 
to  break  them  up.  First  came  an  Act  of  1794  to  suspend  the 
writ  of  habeas  corpus,  then  in  the  following  session  another 
to  prevent  seditious  meetings,  and,  finally,  a  statute  of  1799, 
which  suppressed  the  London  Corresponding  Society  by 
name,  and  any  others  that  were  organised  with  branches. 
These  acts  and  a  series  of  prosecutions  drove  out  of  existence 
all  the  societies  aiming  at  political  reform  ;  and  during  a  few 
years,  while  the  struggle  with  France  was  at  its  height,  the 
course  of  domestic  politics  was  unvexed  by  such  movements. 
But  the  distress  that  followed  the  wars  of  Napoleon  caused 
another  resort  to  associations,  which  was  again  met  by  hos- 
tile legislation. 

The  repressive  statutes  were,  however,  temporary,  and  TheCatho- 
when  the  last  of  them  expired  in  1825,  the  way  for  popular  tion,  ami*" 
organisations    was    again    free.     The    Catholic    Association  Movements 

iiiii  c  i-tii  i  i     ^or  Inform. 

had  already  been  formed  in  Ireland  to  procure  the  removal 
of  religious  disabilities,  and  just  as  it  disbanded,  with  its 
object  won,  in  1829,  the  shadow  of  the  coming  Reform  Act 
brought  forth  a  number  of  new  political  societies  in  England. 
In  that  very  year  Thomas  Atwood  founded  at  Birmingham 
the  Political  Union  for  the  Protection  of  Public  Rights,  with 
the  object  of  promoting  parliamentary  reform;  and  after 
the  introduction  of  the  Reform  Bill  similar  unions,  formed 
to  support  it,  sprang  up  all  over  the  country.  An  attempt 
was  even  made  to  affiliate  them  together  in  a  great  national 
organisation;  but  the  government  declared  the  plan  illegal, 
and  it  was  abandoned.  Among  the  most  interesting  of  the 
societies  of  this  kind  were  those  organised  in  London.  Here, 
in  18.31,  the  National  Union  of  the  Working  Classes  was 
founded  by  artisans,  disciples  of   Robert  Owen,  commonly 


476 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


The  Anti- 
Slavery 
Societies. 


Non-Party 
Organisa- 
tions after 
1832. 


known  as  the  "  Rotundanists,"  from  the  name  of  the  hall 
where  their  meetings  were  held.  But  Francis  Place,  the  tailor, 
a  notable  figure  in  the  agitations  of  the  day,  had  no  sympa- 
thy with  the  socialistic  ideas  of  these  men,  and  dreaded  the 
effect  of  their  society  upon  the  fate  of  the  Reform  Bill.  He 
had  a  much  keener  insight  into  the  real  situation,  and 
started  as  a  counterstroke  the  National  Political  Union, 
with  the  sole  object  of  supplying  in  London  the  popular 
impulse  needed,  in  his  opinion,  to  push  the  measure  through.1 
The  Bill  was  no  sooner  passed  than  the  many  associations, 
which  had  been  founded  upon  a  union  of  the  middle  and  lower 
classes  to  effect  a  particular  reform,  began  to  die  out. 

Meanwhile  two  successive  organisations  of  a  non-partisan, 
and,  indeed,  of  a  non-political,  character,  had  been  carrying 
a  purely  humanitarian  movement  to  a  triumphant  end.  The 
Committee  for  the  Abolition  of  the  Slave  Trade  was  formed 
in  1787,  and  strove,  by  the  collection  of  evidence,  by  peti- 
tions, pamphlets  and  corresponding  local  committees,  to 
enlighten  public  opinion  and  persuade  Parliament.  After 
working  for  a  score  of  years,  supported  by  the  tireless  efforts 
of  Wilberforce  in  the  House  of  Commons,  it  prevailed  at 
last  upon  Parliament  to  suppress  the  slave-trade  by  the  Acts 
of  1806  and  1807.  Sixteen  years  thereafter  the  Anti- 
Slavery  Society  was  formed  to  urge  the  entire  abolition 
of  slavery  throughout  the  British  dominions,  and  this  it 
brought  about  in  1833,  the  strength  of  its  advocates  in  the 
Commons,  backed  by  popular  agitation  outside,  being  great 
enough  to  compel  Lord  Grey's  government  to  bring  in  a  bill 
for  the  purpose.2 

Since  1832  the  non-party  organisations  have  been,  on  the 
whole,  more  permanent,  and  more  widely  extended  than 
before ;  and,  with  some  marked  exceptions  like  that  of  the 
Chartists,  they  have  tended  to  rely  less  upon  a  display  of 

1  Graham  Wallas,  in  his  "  Life  of  Francis  Place,"  gives  a  graphic  descrip- 
tion  (if  the  movements  in  London. 

2  For  these  movements  see  Clarkson's  "History  of  the  Slave  Trade," 
"The  Life  of  Wilberforce,"  by  his  sons,  and  "The  Memoirs  of  Sir  T.  Fowell 

Buxton." 


NOX-PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  477 

physical  force,  and  more  upon  appeals  to  the  electorate  —  a  The 
change  following  naturally  enough  upon  the  enlargement  of  Chartists- 
the  franchise.  Chartism  developed  out  of  a  large  number 
of  separate  local  organisations  of  workingmen,  who  realised 
that  they  had  gained  no  political  power  from  the  Reform 
Act,  and  demanded  a  reform  of  Parliament  in  a  really 
democratic  spirit.  The  movement  took  its  name  from  the 
People's  Charter,  with  its  six  points,  published  in  1838  by 
the  London  Working  Men's  Association.  To  this  the  vari- 
ous local  bodies  adhered,  sending  the  next  year  delegates 
to  a  great  People's  Parliament  in  London.  But  the  violence 
of  the  language  used  by  the  Chartists  opened  a  door  for 
prosecution ;  the  leaders  became  frightened,  and  for  the 
moment  the  agitation  lost  its  force.  In  1840  it  was  reorgan- 
ised, and  was  supported  by  several  hundred  affiliated  bodies. 
From  first  to  last,  however,  it  was  weakened  by  dissensions 
among  the  leaders,  relating  both  to  the  methods  of  opera- 
tion and  to  subordinate  issues.  The  movement  culminated 
in  1848,  in  the  mass  meeting  on  Kennington  Common, 
which  was  to  form  in  procession,  and  present  a  mammoth 
petition  to  Parliament.  The  plan  had  caused  grave  anxiety; 
troops  were  brought  up,  thousands  of  special  constables  were 
sworn  in ;  but  at  the  last  minute  Feargus  O'Connor,  the 
leader  of  the  Chartists,  lost  his  nerve,  and  gave  up  the  pro- 
cession. The  great  demonstration  was  a  fiasco,  and  soon 
after  the  whole  movement  collapsed. 

One  of  the  many  reasons  for  the  failure  of  Chartism  was  The  Anti- 
the  existence  at  the  same  time  of  the  most  successful  non-  ^orn-Law 
partisan  organisation  that  England  has  ever  known,  the 
Anti-Corn-Law  League.  This,  like  the  Anti-Slavery  Asso- 
ciation of  an  earlier  day,  was  formed  to  advocate  a  single 
specific  reform,  and  to  its  steadfast  fidelity  to  that  principle 
its  success  was  largely  due.  It  excluded  rigidly  all  questions 
of  party  politics,  and  in  fact  its  most  prominent  leader,  Cob- 
den,  always  retained  a  profound  distrust  of  both  parties. 
The  reform  embodied,  however,  in  the  eyes  of  its  votaries, 
both  an  economic  and  a  moral  principle,  so  that  they  were 


478         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

able  to  appeal  at  the  same  time  to  the  pocket  and  the  con- 
science of  the  nation  —  a  combination  that  goaded  Carlyle 
into  his  reference  to  Cobden  as  an  inspired  bagman  preaching 
a  calico  millennium.  As  the  League  appealed  to  more  than 
one  motive,  so  it  used  freely  more  than  one  means  of  making 
the  appeal.  After  a  number  of  local  associations  had  been 
formed,  a  meeting  of  delegates  from  these,  held  in  1839, 
founded  the  League,  which  proceeded  to  organise  branches 
all  over  the  country,  sent  forth  speakers  and  lecturers,  worked 
the  press,  collected  information,  issued  pamphlets  by  the  ton, 
petitioned  Parliament,  and  strove  to  elect  candidates  who 
would  support  its  views.  All  this  was  done  upon  a  huge 
scale  with  indefatigable  energy.  The  movement  derived 
its  force  from  the  middle-class  manufacturers,  but  they 
strained  every  nerve  to  indoctrinate  the  working  classes  in 
the  cities,  and  later  the  rural  population,  until  at  last  public 
opinion  was  so  far  won  that  the  crisis  caused  by  the  failure 
of  the  Irish  potato  crop  brought  about  the  repeal  of  the  Corn 
Laws  in  1846.  The  League  had  done  its  work  and  dissolved, 
other  Non-  There  have  been,  and  still  are,  a  large  number  of  other 
associations  of  a  non-partisan  character,  which  bestir  them- 
selves about  some  political  question.  Often  they  exist  in 
pairs  to  advocate  opposing  views,  like  the  Marriage  Law 
Reform  Association,  and  the  Marriage  Law  Defence  Union, 
the  Imperial  Vaccination  League,  and  the  National  Anti- 
Vaccination  League.  These  associations  are  of  many  differ- 
ent kinds.  Some  of  them  are  organised  for  other  objects, 
concerning  themselves  with  legislation  only  incidentally, 
and  taking  no  part  at  elections,  like  the  Association  of  Cham- 
bers of  Commerce,  and  the  Association  of  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions. Some  exist  primarily  for  other  purposes,  but  are 
very  active  in  politics,  like  certain  of  the  trade  unions;1 
others  are  formed  solely  for  the  diffusion  of  political  doc- 
trines, but  generally  abstain  from  direct  electoral  work,  like 

1  This  does  not  refer  to  the  political  labour  organisations  that  have 
grown  out  of  the  trade  unions,  but  must  now  be  classed  as  regular  parties. 
For  the  earlier  political  activity  of  the  trade  unions,  as  such,  see  Sidney  and 
Beatrice  Webb,  "Industrial  Democracy,"  I.,  247  et  seg. 


Partisan  As 
sociations 


NON-PARTY  ORGANISATIONS  479 

the  Fabian  Society,  with  its  socialist  ideals;  and,  finally, 
there  are  organisations  which,  although  not  primarily  par- 
tisan, in  fact  exert  themselves  vigorously  to  help  the  candi- 
dates of  one  of  the  great  parties.  To  the  last  class  belongs 
the  Liberation  Society,  formerly  very  active  in  urging  the 
disestablishment  of  the  Church,  and  throwing  its  influence 
in  favour  of  the  Liberals;  and  also  its  opponent,  the  Com- 
mittee for  Church  Defence,  equally  strong  on  the  side  of  the 
Conservatives.  More  active  than  either  of  them  at  the 
present  day  is  the  Free  Church  Federation,  which  has  been 
brought  into  the  political  arena  by  its  repugnance  to  the 
Education  Act  of  1902.  In  the  same  category  must  be 
placed  the  National  Trade  Defence  Association,  an  organisa- 
tion formed  by  the  liquor  dealers  to  resist  temperance  legis- 
lation, and  perhaps  Mr.  Chamberlain's  recent  Tariff  Reform 
League,  both  of  which  support  the  Tories.  It  so  happens 
that  the  societies  that  oppose  the  last  two  bodies  are  not 
so  consistently  devoted  to  the  Liberals.  Then  there  are 
societies  of  another  type  formed  for  a  transitory  purpose  in 
foreign  affairs :  such  as  the  Eastern  Question  Association 
of  1876,  which  opposed  Disraeli's  Turkish  policy,  and 
the  present  Balkan  Committee  working  for  freedom  in 
Macedonia. 

All  associations  that  attempt  to  influence  elections  are  in 
the  habit  of  catechising  the  candidates  and  publishing  their 
answers,  sometimes  producing  a  decided  effect  upon  the  vote. 
Now  it  may  be  suggested  that  societies  which  take  an  active 
part  in  elections,  and  always  throw  their  influence  on  the 
same  side,  ought  not  to  be  classed  as  non-partisan,  but  rather 
as  adjuncts  to  the  great  parties;  and  yet  they  differ  from 
the  true  ancillary  organisations  because  their  primary  object 
as  societies  (whatever  the  personal  aim  of  individual  members 
may  be)  is  not  to  place  the  party  in  power,  but  to  carry 
through  a  particular  policy  with  which  that  party  happens 
to  be  more  nearly  in  sympathy  than  its  rival. 


2h 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

LOCAL  PARTY  ORGANISATIONS 

Contrasted  with  those  bodies  which  are  non-partisan, 
but  extend  over  the  whole  country,  or  at  least  over  an  in- 
definite area,  stand  the  local  party  organisations.  Before 
the  Reform  Act  of  1832  local  organisations  such  as  exist 
to-day  for  the  election  of  parliamentary  candidates  were 
almost  unknown.  They  would,  indeed,  have  been  of  little 
use  in  most  of  the  old  electorates.  Not  to  speak  of  the 
rotten  boroughs,  which  were  sold  for  cash,  a  large  number 
of  the  smaller  constituencies  were  pocket  boroughs,  in  the 
hands  of  patrons  who  would  not  have  suffered  any  one  else 
to  influence  the  voters.  In  1807,  when  Lord  Palmerston  was 
elected  to  Parliament  for  Newtown  in  the  Isle  of  Wight,  Sir 
Leonard  Holmes,  who  controlled  the  seat,  made  a  stipula- 
tion that  he  should  " never,  even  for  an  election,  set  foot 
in  the  place.  So  jealous  was  the  patron  lest  any  attempt 
should  be  made  to  get  a  new  interest  in  the  borough."  1 

Even  in  the  counties  the  voters  were  so  much  under  the 
personal  lead  of  the  landowners  that  party  machinery  would 
have  been  superfluous.  A  few  of  the  large  boroughs  had, 
indeed,  an  extended  franchise  and  a  wide  electorate.  Most 
notable  among  them  was  Westminster,  and  here  a  real  politi- 
cal organisation  for  the  election  of  members  to  Parliament 
existed  for  some  years  before  the  great  reform.  It  was, 
however,  conducted  in  the  interest  neither  of  the  Whigs, 
nor  of  the  Tories,  but  of  Radical  Reformers,  who  were  truly 
independent  of  both  parties.2 

1  Bulwer,  "Life  of  Palmerston,"  I.,  23-24. 

2  Cf.  Wallas,  "  Life  of  Francis  Place,"  Chs.  ii.,  v. 

480 


LOCAL  PARTY  ORGANISATIONS  481 

With  the  extension  of  the  franchise  a  change  began  in  Their 
the  political  status  of  the  voters.  In  many  constituencies  0rigin" 
it  was  no  longer  enough  to  secure  the  support  of  a  few  influ- 
ential persons;  and  the  winning  of  a  seat  by  either  party 
depended  upon  getting  as  many  of  its  adherents  as  possible 
upon  the  voting  lists.  The  watchword  of  the  new  era  was 
given  by  Sir  Robert  Peel  in  his  celebrated  advice  to  the 
electors  of  Tamworth  in  1841,  "Register,  register,  register!" 
It  was  the  more  important  for  the  parties  to  take  the  mat- 
ter in  hand,  because  disputes  about  the  complex  electoral 
qualifications,  instead  of  being  settled  on  the  initiative  of 
the  state,  were  left  to  be  fought  out  before  the  revising  bar- 
rister by  the  voters  themselves,  who  were  apt  to  be  very 
negligent  unless  some  one  made  a  systematic  effort  to  set 
them  in  motion.  It  was  not  less  necessary  for  the  parties 
to  keep  the  matter  constantly  in  hand,  because,  the  dura- 
tion of  Parliament  being  uncertain,  it  could  not  be  put  off 
until  shortly  before  the  election.  The  lists  must  be  kept 
always  full  in  view  of  a  possible  dissolution.  Often  the 
work  was  done  on  behalf  of  the  sitting  member  or  the  pro- 
spective candidate  by  his  agent  on  the  spot,  without  any 
formal  organisation.  But  this  was  not  always  true,  and, 
in  fact,  the  Reform  Bill  was  no  sooner  enacted  than  local 
registration  societies  began  to  be  formed,  which  for  some 
years  increased  rapidly  in  number  among  both  Liberals  and 
Conservatives.1 

1  By  1837  Conservative  registration  societies  had  become  common 
throughout  the  coun-try.  (Publications  of  the  National  Union  of  Conserva- 
tive Associations,  1868,  No.  4.) 

By  far  the  best,  and  in  fact  the  only  comprehensive,  work  on  the  party 
organisations  in  Great  Britain  is  Ostrogorski's  "  Democracy  and  the  Or- 
ganisation of  Political  Parties,"  Vol.  I.  His  description  is  very  complete, 
but,  while  accurate,  is  likely  to  mislead  a  superficial  reader,  who  might 
easily  get  an  impression  that  the  extreme  cases  were  typical,  although  the 
writer  takes  pains  not  to  say  so.  Mr.  Bryce's  caution  in  the  preface  should, 
therefore,  be  borne  in  mind.  Mr.  Ostrogorski  appears  to  look  on  democracy, 
and  on  party  machinery  in  particular,  from  the  outside,  as  something  artificial 
and  weird,  rather  than  the  natural  result  of  human  conduct  under  the  exist- 
ing conditions.  He  does  not  seem  to  put  himself  quite  in  the  shoes  of  Mr. 
Chamberlain,  Mr.  Gladstone,  Mr.  Schnadhorst,  Lord  Randolph  Churchill, 
Lord  Salisbury,  Captain  Middlcton,  or  other  men  who  have  come  into  con- 


482         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Their  Early  The  primary  object  of  the  registration  societies  was  to 
Objects.  ge^  ^ie  names  0f  their  partisans  on  to  the  lists,  and  keep 
those  of  their  opponents  off;  and  they  are  said  to  have 
done  it  with  more  zeal  than  fairness,  often  with  unjust 
results,  for  any  claim  or  objection,  though  really  ill-founded, 
was  likely  to  be  allowed  by  the  revising  barrister  if  unop- 
posed.1 From  registration  a  natural  step  led  to  canvassing 
at  election  time ;  that  is,  seeking  the  voters  in  their  own 
homes ;  persuading  the  doubtful ;  when  possible,  converting 
the  unbelieving;  and,  above  all,  making  sure  that  the 
faithful  came  to  the  polls.  This  had  always  been  done 
by  the  candidates  in  popular  constituencies;  and  now  the 
registration  societies  furnished  a  nucleus  for  the  purpose, 
with  a  mass  of  information  about  the  persons  to  be  can- 
vassed, already  acquired  in  making  up  the  voting  lists. 
The  nomination  of  candidates  did  not  necessarily  form  any 
part  of  their  functions.  The  old  theory  prevailed,  of  which 
traces  may  be  found  all  through  English  life,  that  the  can- 
didate offered  himself  for  election,  or  was  recommended 
by  some  influential  friend.  The  idea  that  he  ought  to  be 
designated  by  the  voters  of  his  party  had  not  arisen ;  nor 
did  the  local  societies,  which  were  merely  self-constituted 
bodies,  claim  any  right  to  speak  for  those  voters.  No 
doubt  they  often  selected  and  recommended  candidates; 
but  they  did  so  as  a  group  of  individuals  whose  opinions 
carried  weight,  not  as  a  council  representing  the  party. 

The  time  was  coming,  however,  when  another  extension 
of  the  franchise,  and  the  growth  of  democratic  ideas,  would 
bring  a  demand  for  the  organisation  of  the  societies  on  a 
representative  basis.  The  change  began  almost  imme- 
diately after  the  passage  of  the  Reform  Act  of  1867;  and 
the  occasion  —  it  cannot    properly  be   called  the  cause  — 

tact  with  the  party  organisations,  and  ask  what  he  himself  would,  or  might, 
have  done  in  the  same  position.  Hence  his  analysis  has  a  slight  air  of  un- 
reality, and  does  not  wholly  approve  itself  as  a  study  of  ordinary  political 
motives.  But  apart  from  this  criticism,  the  work  is  admirably  done,  and 
is  an  invaluable  contribution  to  political  science. 
1  Ostrogorski,   I.,   156-58. 


LOCAL  PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  483 

of  the  movement  is  curious.  When  discussion  in  England 
was  busy  with  Hare's  plan  for  proportional  representa- 
tion, which  John  Stuart  Mill  hailed  as  the  salvation  of 
society,  serious  voices  were  heard  to  object  to  the  scheme 
on  the  ground  that  it  would  lead  to  the  growth  of  party 
organisations,  and  would  place  the  voter  in  the  grip  of  a 
political  machine.1  It  is,  therefore,  interesting  to  note 
that  the  first  outcry  in  England  against  actual  party  ma- 
chinery was  directed  at  an  organisation  which  sprang  from 
the  minute  grain  of  minority  representation  in  the  Act  of 
1867. 

By  the  Reform  Act  of  1867  the  great  towns  of  Liverpool,  The 
Manchester,  Birmingham  and  Leeds  were  given  three  hamCaucua 
members  of  Parliament  apiece ;  but  in  order  to  provide 
some  representation  for  the  minority,  the  Lords  inserted,  Its  °biect- 
and  the  Commons  accepted,  a  clause  that  no  elector  in  those 
towns  should  vote  for  more  than  two  candidates.2  Much 
foresight  was  not  required  to  perceive  that  if  one  of  those 
towns  elected  two  Liberals  and  a  Conservative,  two  of  her 
members  would  neutralise  each  other  on  a  party  division, 
and  her  weight  would  be  only  one  vote ;  while  a  much 
smaller  town  that  chose  two  members  of  the  same  party 
in  the  ordinary  way  would  count  for  two  in  a  division.  Such 
a  result  seemed  to  the  Radicals  of  Birmingham  a  violation 
of  the  democratic  principle,  and  they  were  determined  to 
prevent  it  if  possible.  They  had  on  their  side  more  than 
three  fifths  of  the  voters,  or  more  than  half  as  many  again 
as  their  opponents,  and  this  was  enough  to  carry  all  three 
seats  if  their  votes  were  evenly  distributed  between  three 
candidates.  But  to  give  to  three  candidates  the  same  num- 
ber of  votes  when  each  elector  could  vote  for  only  two  of 

1  Trevelyan,  "  A  Few  Remarks  on  Mr.  Hare's  Scheme  of  Representation." 
Macmillnn,  April,  1862;  Bagehot,  "English  Constitution,"  1  Ed.,  188-94; 
and  see  Hans.  3  Ser.  CLXXXIX.,  458.  See  also  Leslie  Stephen,  "  The  Value 
of  Political  Machinery,"  F ortnighlhj ,   December,   1875. 

2  The  provision  was  applied  also  to  the  county  constituencies  returning 
three  members,  which  some  of  them  did  under  the  Reform  Act  of  1832.  In 
the  City  of  London,  which  had  four  seats,  an  elector  was  to  vote  for  only 
three  candidates.     30-31  Vic,  e.   102,  §§  9,  10,  !8. 


mation. 


484  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

them  was  not  an  easy  thing  to  do,  and  failure  might  mean 
the  loss  of  two  seats.  Very  careful  planning  was  required 
for  success,  very  strict  discipline  among  the  voters,  and 
hence  a  keen  interest  in  the  result  among  the  mass  of  the 
people  and  perfect  confidence  in  the  party  managers, 
its  For-  To  provide  the  machinery  needed,  Mr.  William  Harris, 

the  Secretary  of  the  Birmingham  Liberal  Association,  a  self- 
constituted  election  committee  of  the  familiar  type,  pro- 
posed to  transform  that  body  into  a  representative  party 
organisation;  which  was  forthwith  done  in  October,  1867. 
The  new  rules  provided  that  every  Liberal  subscribing  a 
shilling  should  be  a  member  of  the  association,  and  that 
an  annual  meeting  of  the  members  should  choose  the  officers 
and  twenty  members  to  serve  upon  an  executive  committee. 
This  committee,  which  had  charge  of  the  general  business 
of  the  association,  was  to  consist  of  the  four  officers  and 
twenty  members  already  mentioned,  of  twenty  more  to  be 
chosen  by  the  Midland  branch  of  the  National  Reform 
League  when  formed,  and  of  three  members  chosen  by  a 
ward  committee  to  be  elected  by  the  members  of  the  asso- 
ciation in  each  ward.  According  to  a  common  English 
custom  the  committee  had  power  to  add  to  its  members 
four  more  persons  chosen,  or,  as  the  expression  goes,  co- 
opted,  by  itself.  There  was  also  a  larger  body,  consisting 
of  the  whole  executive  committee  and  of  not  more  than 
twenty-four  members  elected  by  each  of  the  ward  com- 
mittees. It  was  officially  called  the  general  committee, 
but  was  commonly  known  from  the  approximate  number 
of  its  members  as  "The  Four  Hundred."  It  was  to  have 
control  of  the  policy  of  the  association,  and  to  nominate 
the  three  Liberal  candidates  for  Parliament  in  the  borough.1 
The  number  of  Liberal  voters  in  each  of  the  several 
wards  was  then  carefully  ascertained ;  and  those  in  one 
ward  were  directed  to  vote  for  A  and  B ;   those  of  another 

1  Ostrogorski,  "The  Introduction  of  the  Caucus  into  England,"  Politi- 
cal Science  Quarterly,  June,  1893,  p.  287.  Langford,  "  Modern  Birmingham," 
II.,  362-63. 


LOCAL  PARTY  ORGANISATIONS  485 

for  A  and  C;  those  of  a  third  for  B  and  C;  and  so  on,  in 
such  a  way  that  the  total  votes  cast  for  each  of  the  three 
candidates  should  be  as  nearly  as  possible  the  same.  Pro- 
tests were,  of  course,  made  against  voting  by  dictation. 
It  offended  the  sense  of  personal  independence ;  but  the 
great  mass  of  Liberals  voted  as  they  were  told,  and  all 
three  of  the  candidates  were  elected. 

The  association  had  accomplished  a  great  feat.  Throe  its  Early 
Liberals  had  been  sent  to  Parliament  from  Birmingham  in  Xlctonea 
spite  of  the  minority  representation  clause.  But  a  chance 
for  another  victory  of  the  same  kind  did  not  come  again 
until  the  dissolution  six  years  later ;  and  at  first  the  managers 
were  less  fortunate  in  the  elections  to  the  school  board. 
The  Education  Act  of  1870  provided  for  cumulative  voting 
at  the  election  of  these  bodies;  that  is,  the  elector  might 
cast  all  the  votes  to  which  he  was  entitled  for  one  candidate, 
or  distribute  them  in  any  way  he  pleased.  The  system 
made  it  possible  for  very  small  minorities  to  elect  one  or 
more  candidates,  and  the  Liberal  Association,  in  trying  to 
elude  its  effects,  as  they  had  done  in  the  case  of  the  parlia- 
mentary election,  attempted  too  much  and  carried  only  a 
minority  of  the  board.  For  a  time  the  organisation  lan- 
guished; but  it  was  soon  recalled  to  a  more  vigorous  life 
than  ever. 

In  1873  the  association  was  revived  for  the  purpose  of  its  Revival 
getting  control  of  the  municipal  government  of  the  town, 
and  introducing  a  more  progressive  policy  in  its  admin- 
istration. Two  names  are  especially  associated  with  the 
new  departure,  that  of  Mr.  Schnadhorst,  the  secretary  of 
the  association,  who  had  a  genius  for  organising,  and  that 
of  Mr.  Chamberlain,  who  was  the  leading  spirit  of  the  move- 
ment, and  became  the  mayor  of  the  borough  in  the  follow- 
ing autumn.  These  men  proceeded  to  reconstruct  the  asso- 
ciation on  a  slightly  different,  and  apparently  even  more 
democratic,  plan.  Taking  the  wards  as  the  sole  basis  of 
the  fabric,  an  annual  meeting  was  held  in  each  ward,  at 
which   any  Liberals  residing  there  might  take  part.     They 


486         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

were  entitled  to  do  so  whether  voters  or  not,  and  without 
regard  to  any  subscription,  provided  they  signified  their 
adherence  to  the  objects  and  organisation  of  the  associa- 
tion, a  statement  which  was  understood  to  imply  a  willing- 
ness to  accept  the  decisions  of  the  majority.  The  meeting 
elected  a  committee,  a  chairman  and  a  secretary  for  the  ward  ; 
three  persons  to  serve  with  those  two  officers  upon  the  execu- 
tive committee  of  the  central  association;  and  a  number 
of  persons,  fixed  in  1877  at  thirty,  to  serve  on  the  general 
committee.  The  central  executive  committee  contained,  in 
addition  to  the  five  members  so  elected  in  each  ward,  the 
four  officers  of  the  association,  and  thirty  members  coopted 
by  itself.  It  chose  seven  of  its  own  members,  who  with 
the  four  officers  formed  a  management  sub-committee  of 
eleven.  The  general  committee  of  the  association  was 
composed,  as  before,  of  the  whole  executive  committee, 
together  with  the  thirty  representatives  from  each  ward ; 
and,  as  there  were  sixteen  wards,  it  numbered  by  1877 
five  hundred  and  ninety-four  members;  and  was  known 
as  the  "Six  Hundred"  of  Birmingham.  It  had  power  to 
determine  the  policy  of  the  association,  and  to  nominate 
the  candidates  for  Parliament  and  the  school  board.  The 
members  of  the  town  council,  on  the  other  hand,  being 
elected  by  wards,  were  nominated  by  the  ward  committees ; 
but  the  whole  association  was  bound  to  support  them, 
its  Such  was  the  new  organisation  of  the  Liberal  Association.1 

ciency.  j^g  eff^c^enCy  as  an  engine  for  controlling  elections  is  proved 
by  the  fact  that  during  the  four  years  from  1873  to  1876, 
inclusive,  it  carried  all  three  seats  in  Parliament  in  spite  of 
the  provision  for  minority  representation,  a  majority  of  the 
school  board  at  each  election  in  spite  of  the  provision  for 
cumulative  voting,  and  all  but  two  of  the  sixty-eight  mem- 
bers elected  to  the  town  council  during  that  period.2  The 
association  was,  indeed,  well  constructed  for  the  purposec 

1  H.   W.  Cro.sskcy,  "The  Liberal  Association  —  the  GOO  —  of  Birming- 
ham."     Macmillan,  February,  1877. 

2  II.  W.  Crosskey,  ut  supra. 


LOCAL  PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  487 

As  in  the  case  of  every  political  organisation  based  upon 
primary  meetings,  an  attempt  to  wrest  the  control  from 
those  who  held  it  was  a  difficult  undertaking.  To  be  suc- 
cessful more  than  half  the  wards  must  be  captured  at  one 
time,  and  that  in  the  face  of  vigilant  men,  who  knew  all 
the  ropes,  who  had  the  management  sub-committee  in  their 
hands,  and  who  by  means  of  cooptation  could  convert  a 
narrow  majority  into  a  larger  one,  and  thus  perpetuate 
their  own  power.  On  the  other  hand,  a  revolt  against  the 
nominations  actually  made  was  well-nigh  precluded  by  the 
agreement  virtually  entered  into  on  joining  the  associa- 
tion, to  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  majority.  It  has  been 
said  that  for  a  dozen  years  the  men  who  conducted  the 
organisation  sent  travelling  companions  to  one  ward  meet- 
ing after  another  to  insure  the  election  of  their  supporters 
to  the  various  committees.1  Whether  this  be  true  or  not, 
it  is  certain  that  the  power  of  the  managers  was  never  over- 
turned. Their  rule  has,  indeed,  been  prolonged  over  such 
a  period  that  it  must  be  attributed  both  to  the  excellence 
of  the  mechanism  and  to  their  own  popularity.  Through- 
out the  many  vicissitudes  of  his  long  career,  from  his  early 
years  of  advanced  radicalism,  through  his  breach  with  Mr. 
Gladstone  over  the  Home  Rule  Bill,  his  subsequent  junc- 
tion with  the  Conservatives,  and  finally  his  advocacy  of  a 
wholly  new  policy  about  preferential  tariffs,  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain has  never  failed  to  carry  every  one  of  the  parliamentary 
seats  in  Birmingham  for  his  own  adherents.  Such  a  result 
shows  a  power  which  nothing  but  a  strong  personal  hold 
upon  the  people,  and  a  hold  coupled  with  a  highly  efficient 
organisation,   could  have  secured. 

The  system  adopted  by  the  Liberals  in  Birmingham  was  Criticisms 
copied  in  other  places,  and  soon  became  the  subject  of  £vstpem_ 
vehement  discussion,  the  arguments  for  and  against  it  be- 
ing the  same  that  are  commonly  used  in  the  case  of  every 
party  organisation.  Its  adversaries  declared  that  it  threw 
absolute  power  into  the  hands  of  men  with  time  to  devote 
1  Ostrogorski,  I..  !f)f>-07. 


488         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  working  the  machinery ;  that  it  set  up  a  tyranny  which 
crushed  out  individuality,  extinguished  free  discussion  of 
opinions,  destroyed  independence  in  public  life,  caused  a 
loss  of  variety  and  fertility  in  Liberalism,  and  brought  party 
politics  into  municipal  affairs  where  they  ought  not  to  be. 
it*  Defence.  To  these  criticisms  the  advocates  of  the  system  replied 
that  the  association  was  conducted  by  the  men  with  the 
most  public  spirit,  because  they  were  willing  to  devote  time 
and  thought  to  the  work ;  that  it  could  not  create  a  tyranny, 
because  the  ward  meetings  were  open  to  all  Liberals,  who 
could  at  any  time  overthrow  the  management  if  they  chose ; 
that,  in  regard  to  independence,  every  Liberal  had  a  right 
to  speak  freely  at  the  ward  meetings,  to  persuade  his  fellows 
to  adopt  his  views  if  he  could,  and  that  this  is  the  only  right 
he  ought  to  enjoy,  because  "a  minority  has  no  right  to 
thwart  a  majority  in  determining  the  course  of  Liberal 
policy."  They  insisted  that  the  association  was  simply 
"a  method  by  which  those  who  believe  in  human  progress 
.  .  .  can  take  counsel  together;  come  to  an  agreement  as 
to  their  nearest  duty ;  and  give  their  decisions  practical 
effect  in  the  legislation  of  their  town  and  country."  They 
claimed  that  such  men  "are  bound  to  select  representatives 
who  will  support  the  definite  measures  they  believe  to  be 
immediately  necessary  for  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the 
land."  1  In  short  the  Radicals  of  Birmingham  looked  upon 
themselves  as  reformers  with  a  mission  to  fulfil,  and  felt 
the  impatience  —  perhaps  one  may  say  intolerance  — 
which  men  in  that  position  always  feel  for  the  hesitating, 
the  wavering,  and  the  independent  members  of  their  own 
party.  To  the  Radicals  the  association  appeared  as  an 
effective  instrument  for  putting  their  ideals  into  practice, 
and  seemed  wholly  good;  while  others,  who  had  not  the 
same  faith  in  the  end  to  be  attained,  felt  keenly  the  evils 
which  the  organisation  actually  involved,  and  still  more 
the  abuses  to  which  it  might  give  rise  in  the  future. 

1  H.  W.  Crosskcy,  "The  Birmingham  Liberal  Association  and  its  Assail- 
ants."    Macmillan,  December,  1878. 


LOCAL  PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  489 

In  regard  to  the  charge  of  bringing  politics  into  municipal  The  caucus 
affairs  the  Radicals  boldly  justified  their  course,  insisting  Politics, 
that  they  stood  for  a  definite  progressive  policy  in  local, 
as  well  as  in  national,  affairs.1  Under  the  lead  of  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain, who  was  elected  mayor  of  Birmingham  in  the  au- 
tumn of  1873  —  the  same  year  in  which  the  association 
was  revived  —  the  town  council  entered  upon  a  period 
of  great  activity.  It  improved  the  ordinary  public  ser- 
vices, such  as  paving  and  sanitation  ;  reorganised  the  health 
department ;  and  inaugurated  an  efficient  system  of  sewer- 
age with  a  large  filtration  farm,  which  was,  at  least,  a  great 
improvement  on  what  had  gone  before.  It  undertook  also 
a  number  of  public  works  of  a  class  now  called  "municipal 
trading."  The  first  of  these  was  the  supply  of  gas,  both 
for  lighting  the  streets  and  for  private  use.  There  were 
at  the  time  two  gas  companies  in  Birmingham,  and  Mr. 
Chamberlain  persuaded  the  council  that  the  town  could 
make  a  profit  by  buying  their  property,  and  conducting 
the  business  itself.  A  bargain  was  struck  with  the  com- 
panies, and  the  purchase  was  made.  It  was  no  sooner 
done  than  a  proposal  was  made  to  apply  the  same  principle 
to  water,  which  was  also  in  the  hands  of  a  private  company. 
In  this  case,  however,  the  object  was  not  profit,  but  an  im- 
provement of  the  supply  with  a  view  to  better  health,  for 
a  large  part  of  the  population  still  depended  upon  wells, 
many  of  them,  of  course,  in  a  dangerous  condition.  Again 
a  bargain  was  made  with  the  company,  and  the  water  passed 
in  turn  under  public  control. 

Finally  an  ambitious  plan  was  adopted  for  improving 
the  appearance  of  the  town.  Parliament  has  enacted  a 
long  series  of  statutes  intended  to  secure  better  houses 
for  the  working  classes.  One  of  them,  the  Artisans  and 
Labourers  Dwellings  Improvement  Act  of  1875, 2  empowered 
any  town,  if  authorised  by  a  provisional  order  of  the  Local 

'  Cf.  Chamberlain,  "The    Caucus."     Fortnightly,  November,  1S7S;  and 
the  two  articles  by  II.  W.  Crosskey  already  cited. 
1  38-39  Vic,  c.  36. 


490         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Government  Board  confirmed  by  Parliament,  to  expropri- 
ate at  its  fair  market  value  an  unhealthy  area,  that  is, 
a  district  where  the  crowding  together  or  bad  condition  of 
the  houses,  and  the  want  of  light  and  air,  were  such  as  to 
be  dangerous  to  health.  The  town  was  to  prepare  a  scheme 
for  laying  out  new  streets  and  otherwise  improving  the  area, 
and  was  authorised  to  sell  or  let  any  part  of  the  land  on 
condition  that  the  purchasers  should  carry  the  scheme  into 
effect.  Now  Birmingham,  like  many  of  the  English  manu- 
facturing places,  had  grown  up  in  a  squalid  way,  a  network 
of  narrow  streets,  devoid  of  space  or  dignity;  and  in  the 
centre  was  a  great  slum  with  a  high  death-rate.  This  last, 
a  region  of  more  than  ninety  acres  in  extent,  was  taken 
under  the  Act ;  a  broad  thoroughfare,  named,  in  recog- 
nition of  its  public  origin,  " Corporation  Street,"  was  laid 
out,  and  the  land  bordering  upon  it  let  on  long  ground 
leases  for  commercial  buildings.  The  original  intention 
had  been  to  erect  new  houses  for  the  people  whose  dwell- 
ings had  been  destroyed ;  but  this  part  of  the  plan  was  in 
the  main  abandoned,  on  the  ground  that  houses  enough 
were  provided  by  private  enterprise. 

The  management  by  a  town  of  its  gas  and  water  supply, 
the  purchase  and  lease  of  large  tracts  of  land,  are  steps  in 
the  direction  of  what  is  known  to-day  as  municipal  social- 
ism ;  and  they  provoked  a  difference  of  opinion  that  still 
exists,  both  upon  the  wisdom  of  the  policy  in  general,  and 
upon  the  extent  to  which  it  can  be  profitably  carried.  The 
problem  will  be  discussed  hereafter,  but  we  must  note  here 
that  the  Radicals  of  Birmingham  believed  it  to  be  a  political 
issue,  which  justified  the  use  of  party  organisation  as  much 
as  the  issues  that  arose  in  Parliament.  They  felt  in  the 
same  way  about  the  administration  of  the  new  school  law. 
In  their  eyes  all  these  things  formed  part  of  a  great  Radical 
policy  of  which  they  were  the  protagonists. 

The  Birmingham  Radicals  had  faith,  not  only  in  their 
political  aims,  but  also  in  the  means  they  had  devised  for 
carrying  them  out.     They  did  no  little  missionary  work  in 


LOCAL   PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  491 

other  towns,  urging  the  Liberals  to  introduce  local  repre-  The  Spread 
sentative  associations  on  a  democratic  basis  after  the  Bir-  ?.f  Assoc,fl- 

tions  on  the 

mingham  pattern.  In  spite  of  opposition  the  idea  was  Birming- 
received  with  such  favour  that  by  the  end  of  1878  about  one  ham  ModeL 
hundred  bodies  of  this  kind  existed  in  different  places.1 
The  movement  was  reinforced  by  the  foundation,  in  1877, 
of  the  National  Liberal  Federation,  whose  history  will 
form  the  subject  of  a  later  chapter.  This  body  admitted 
to  membership  only  associations  of  a  democratic  char- 
acter, and  its  influence  was  strongly  felt.  The  Birming- 
ham leaders,  who  controlled  the  Federation,  naturally 
desired  to  increase  its  power  by  extending  the  number  of 
affiliated  bodies  as  much  as  possible ;  while  the  local  asso- 
ciations found  an  advantage  in  joining  it  as  soon  as  it 
became  a  factor  in  Liberal  politics.  Moreover,  after  the 
split  in  the  party  over  the  Home  Rule  Bill,  in  1886,  when 
the  Federation  took  the  side  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  followers 
against  Mr.  Chamberlain,  the  former  became  interested  in 
making  the  organisation  as  widely  representative  and  popu- 
lar as  possible.  These  various  motives  gave  successive 
impulses,  with  the  result  that  by  188G  the  Federation  com- 
prised two  hundred  and  fifty-five  local  associations,  and 
by  1SSS  seven  hundred  and  sixteen.2  The  rules  of  the 
Federation,  under  the  title  of  the  "Objects"  for  which  it 
exists,  still  open  with  the  words  ''To  assist  in  the  organisa- 
tion throughout  the  country  of  Liberal  Associations  based 
on  popular  representation,"  and  the  rules  are  preceded  by 
a  statement  which  says,  All  associations,  thus  constituted, 
are  eligible  for  affiliation.  Although  the  statement  goes 
on  to  declare  that  "No  interference  with  the  local  inde- 
pendence of  the  Federated  Associations  is  involved.  Each 
association  arranges  the  details  of  its  own  organisation, 
and  administers  its  own  affairs."  Still  it  has  always  been 
assumed  that  the  local  bodies  were  to  be  popular  in  char- 
acter.    In    fact    the    old    self-appointed    committees    were 

1  II.  \V.  fWskcy.      Mfirmillnn.  I Vcrmbrr,  1878. 

2  IVoc.  Ann.  Mcc'tintf,  ISSN,  p.   It. 


492 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OP  ENGLAND 


Existing  Or- 
ganisation 
of  Local 
Liberal 

Associa- 
tions. 


hardly  compatible  with  the  democratic  spirit  brought  in 
by  the  Reform  Act  of  1867,  and  in  the  boroughs  they  soon 
gave  way  to  representative  bodies  with  a  popular  organi- 
sation. 

The  process  was  much  less  rapid  in  the  county  constitu- 
encies,1 for  not  until  1884  was  the  franchise  in  these  enlarged 
as  it  had  been  in  the  boroughs  in  1867,  and  when  that  had 
been  done  the  traditional  authority  of  the  squire  and  the 
parson  presented  an  obstacle  that  yielded  slowly.  Even 
now  Conservative  candidates  are  returned  unopposed  more 
frequently  in  the  counties  than  in  the  boroughs,  especially 
in  the  rural  counties  of  the  south.  Often  it  was  found  im- 
possible to  establish  a  Liberal  association  in  each  parish, 
and  a  local  correspondent  was,  and  in  some  cases  still 
is,  a  necessary  substitute.  But  the  growth  of  democratic 
ideas,  the  practice  of  popular  election,  the  change  in  eco- 
nomic conditions  caused  by  the  decay  of  agricultural  pros- 
perity and  the  desire  to  live  in  cities,  with  the  consequent 
scarcity  of  rural  labour,  have,  by  reducing  the  patriarchal 
influence  of  the  landlord  over  his  people,  paved  the  way 
for  representative  political  organisations.  At  the  present 
day  associations  democratic  in  form  exist  in  almost  every 
parliamentary  constituency,  whether  borough  or  county, 
where  the  number  of  Liberal  voters  is  not  so  small,  or  the 
chance  of  success  at  elections  is  not  so  desperate,  that  the 
district  is  what  is  sometimes  officially  called  derelict. 

The  constitutions  of  the  local  Liberal  associations  are 
not  precisely  uniform,  nor,  apart  from  the  general  principle 
that  they  ought  to  be  based  upon  popular  representation, 
is  any  pressure  exerted  to  make  them  alike.  The  Liberals 
in  each  place  are  at  liberty  to  organise  themselves  as  they 
please ;  and  in  this  connection  it  may  be  observed  that 
all  political  societies  are  treated  as  purely  voluntary,  that 
is,  the  state  makes  no  attempt  to  regulate  them  by  law. 
The  provisions  in  regard  to  primaries  and  the  nomination 
of  candidates  by  party  conventions,  which  have  become 
1  Cf.  Ostrogorski,  "  Democracy,"  I.,  Part  III.,  Ch.  i.,  Ser.  viii. 


LOCAL  PARTY  ORGANISATIONS  403 

universal  in  the  United  States,  are  entirely  foreign  to  Eng- 
lish ideas,  and  would  be  regarded  with  astonishment  and 
aversion. 

But  while  the  Federation  does  not  strive  to  enforce  uni-  Tho 
form  regulations,  it  issues  a  pamphlet  of  ''Notes  and  Flints   Draft  Rulps 
for  the  Guidance  of  Liberals,"  covering  organisations  both 
in  rural  villages  and  in  towns,  and  containing  drafts  of  rules, 
which  may  be  taken    as  typical.     The  pamphlet  suggests 
that   in   rural   districts  there   should   be   normally,  in   each   Rural 
parish  or  polling  district,  a  self-appointed  committee  with    I)ls,ru',s- 
power  to  add  to  its  own  members.     The  term  "committee" 
is  used  because  the  members,  being  few,  can  do  most  of 
the   work   directly,   instead   of   delegating   it    to   a   smaller 
body.     In  reality  the  committee  is  the  whole  association 
for  the  parish,  and  although  the  draft  rules  do  not  expressly 
so  provide,  the  intention  is  clear  that  it  shall  include  all 
known   Liberals   there,    whether   voters   or   not.     It    must 
meet  at  least  six  times  in  the  year;   and  elects  a  chairman, 
treasurer,    honorary    secretary,    and    any    sub-committees 
that  may  be  needed.     It  appoints,  also,  in  proportion  to 
population,  delegates  to  the  Liberal  association  for  the  par- 
liamentary division,  which  selects  the  candidate  of  the  party 
for  the  House  of  Commons. 

For  small  towns  without  wards  the  model  organisation  is  small 
similar,  except  that  the  primary  body  is  called  an  associa-  lown8, 
tion,  and  meets  only  once  a  year,  unless  convened  at  other 
times  on  the  request  of  twelve  members;  current  business 
being  transacted  by  an  executive  committee  composed  of 
the  officers,  and  of  a  certain  number  of  other  members 
chosen  at  the  annual  meeting.  Above  the  associations  for 
the  parish  or  polling  district,  and  the  small  town,  conies  an 
association  for  the  parliamentary  division  of  the  county  in 
which  they  are  situated.  This  is  often,  though  not  always, 
purely  a  representative  body,  without  any  mass  meeting 
of  members.  It  has  a  council,  composed  mainly  o|  delegates 
chosen  from  the  parishes,  towns,  or  other  primary  districts, 
roughly  in  proportion  to  population  ;  and  an  executive  coin- 


Towns. 


494  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

mittee,  sometimes  elected  entirely  by  the  council,  sometimes 
containing  delegates  from  the  districts.     Finally  it  has  its 
officers  who  are  members  of  both  these  bodies. 
Large  For  large  towns,  that  are  divided  into  wards,  the  draft 

rules  follow  more  closely  the  Birmingham  plan.  They  pro- 
vide in  each  ward  for  a  committee  or  association  designed 
to  include  every  man  who  is  disposed  to  help  the  Liberal 
cause.  This  body  elects  its  officers,  the  other  members  of 
its  executive  committee,  and  delegates  to  the  general  com- 
mittee for  the  town  according  to  population.  The  associa- 
tion for  the  whole  town  meets  annually  to  choose  its  officers, 
some  members  of  the  general  committee,  and,  in  case  the  town 
is  not  a  parliamentary  borough,  delegates  to  the  associa- 
tion for  the  division  of  the  county.  The  association  for  the 
town  is  managed,  as  is  usually  the  case  in  all  organisations 
of  this  kind,  by  three  distinct  authorities.  First,  the  offi- 
cers, who  attend  to  current  administration.  Second,  the 
executive  committee,  which  consists  of  these  officers,  of  the 
three  officers  of  each  ward,  and  of  members  chosen  by  the 
general  committee.  Third,  the  general  committee  itself, 
which  determines  the  policy  to  be  pursued,  and  is  com- 
posed of  members  elected  in  part  by  the  ward  committees 
and  in  part  by  the  annual  meeting  of  the  whole  association 
for  the  town.  In  parliamentary  boroughs  the  general  com- 
mittee —  often  known  as  the  Council,  and  sometimes  as 
the  Liberal  Two  Hundred,  or  whatever  the  nearest  hundred 
may  be  —  nominates  the  party  candidate  for  the  House  of 
Commons,  on  the  recommendation  of  the  executive  com- 
mittee, and  subject  to  final  adoption  at  a  meeting  of  the 
association.  But  in  fact  the  executive  committee,  in  all 
Liberal  associations  for  parliamentary  constituencies,  either 
selects  the  candidate,  and  asks  for  a  formal  approval  by  the 
council,  or  lays  before  that  body  two  or  three  names  to 
choose  from.  In  any  case  the  meeting  of  the  whole  associa- 
tion is  merely  a  grand  ratification  gathering  held  for  ap- 
plause, not  for  consultation.  The  effect  is  like  that  of  the 
ancient  proclamation,  "this  is  your  king  an'  it  please  you." 


LOCAL  PARTY    ORGANISATIONS  495 


The  draft  rules  prepared  by  the  Federation  are  merely  Variations 
typical,  and  although  in  their  general  outlines  they  give  a  pia!t!|ferent 
very  fair  idea  of  the  organisation  of  local  associations 
throughout  the  country,  there  are  endless  variations  in  de- 
tail and  in  nomenclature.  If,  indeed,  the  constitutions  of  a 
number  of  these  bodies  are  examined  at  random,  no  two  of 
them  will  probably  be  found  exactly  alike.  It  may  be  ob- 
served that  the  draft  rules  make  no  provision  for  cooptation, 
an  arrangement  that  appears  nevertheless  in  the  rules  of 
many  local  associations.  Nor  do  they  require  the  payment 
of  any  subscription  as  a  condition  for  membership ;  but 
this  again  is  not  infrequently  done,  the  sum  required  running 
from  a  nominal  amount  up  as  high  as  five  shillings.  Some- 
times the  payment  is  a  condition  for  any  participation  in  the 
organisation ;  sometimes  it  is  not  needed  for  voting  in  the 
ward  or  district  meetings,  but  confers  a  right  to  vote  in 
the  general  meetings  of  the  association,  or  to  be  elected  to 
the  committees  by  cooptation.  Occasionally  Liberal  members 
of  the  town  council  and  school  board  have  ex  officio  seats  on 
the  council  of  the  association  ;  or  local  Liberal  clubs,  although 
not  strictly  democratic,  are  given  a  representation  upon  it. 
But  owing  to  the  fact,  which  will  be  explained  hereafter, 
that  the  competition  for  nomination  to  Parliament  is  not 
very  keen,  and  hence  there  is  rarely  a  close  canvass  of  the 
members  of  the  committees,  all  these  differences  in  detail  are 
of  little  practical  importance.  The  essential  point  is  that  in 
almost  every  English  parliamentary  constituency,  whether 
county  or  borough,  where  the  chance  of  carrying  the  election 
is  fair,  there  is  to-day  an  association  of  a  representative  and 
nominally,  at  least,  of  a  democratic  character.  It  contains 
habitually  the  three  organs,  of  officers,  executive  committee, 
and  council;  while  in  the  great  towns  that  have  several 
seats  there  is  a  still  larger  organisation  comprising  all  the 
parliamentary  divisions. 

It  is  an  old  custom  for  parliamentary  candidates  to  em-  The  Paid 
ploy  paid  agents,   usually  solicitors  by   profession,  to  take 
charge  of  the  election,  and  with  the  growth  of  popular  or- 
2  i 


496         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

ganisations  the  business  has  assumed  in  most  places  a  more 
systematic  form.  The  association  for  each  parliamentary- 
division,  and  sometimes  for  a  smaller  district,  has  a  paid  as 
well  as  an  honorary  secretary.  His  duties  are  many,  for  he 
is  the  maid-of-all-work  of  the  organisation,  and  is  known 
by  the  comprehensive  title  of  Liberal  Agent  for  that  division. 
He  acts  as  clerk  for  the  association,  organises  committees 
for  wards  or  polling  districts,  supervises  subordinate  agents, 
arranges  public  meetings,  gives  advice  and  assistance  wher- 
ever needed,  canvasses  the  voters,  attends  to  their  registra- 
tion, and  conducts  the  hearings  before  the  Revising  Barrister. 
He  is  also  usually  appointed  by  the  candidate  his  statutory 
election  agent ;  and,  if  so,  he  takes  general  charge  of  the 
whole  campaign,  having  under  him  a  band  of  clerks,  sub- 
agents,  and  messengers,  and  a  small  army  of  volunteer  can- 
vassers. He  is  an  important  factor  in  politics ;  for  upon  his 
skill  as  an  organiser,  and  his  tact  and  good  sense  in  conduct- 
ing the  fight,  the  result  of  the  election  may  often  depend. 

These  agents  have  been  said  to  be  the  only  professional 
politicians  in  England  ;  and  in  one  sense  that  is  true,  for  they 
are  the  only  class  of  men  who  make  a  living  out  of  party 
politics;  but  the  expression  is  inappropriate,  because  they 
are  not  politicians  at  all  in  the  sense  in  which  the  term  is 
used  in  other  countries.  They  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
direction  of  politics ;  they  merely  help  to  elect  a  candidate 
in  whose  selection  they  have  no  voice ;  and  although  their 
advice  may  have  weight,  their  duty  is  solely  to  carry  out 
the  instructions  of  others.  Like  all  other  permanent  offi- 
cials in  England,  their  actual  influence  depends  upon  cir- 
cumstances. If  a  chairman  is  capable  and  active,  the  power 
of  the  agent  will  not  be  so  great  as  in  the  more  common  case 
where  the  chairman  leans  very  much  upon  him.  The  agents, 
in  short,  are  more  nearly  akin  to  the  permanent  official  than 
to  the  politician.  In  fact  they  have  no  political  aspirations 
for  themselves,  for  they  are  not  of  the  class  from  which 
members  of  Parliament  are  taken. 

Their  salaries,  which  vary  much,  run  all  the  way  from  forty 


LOCAL   PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  497 

pounds  to  four  hundred  pounds,  with  about  one  hundred  and 
fifty  pounds  as  the  average,  the  scale  of  pay  having  risen 
somewhat  of  late  years.  They  must  be  thoroughly  familiar 
with  the  law  of  registration  and  election,  and  are  commonly 
recruited  from  solicitors  with  a  small  practice,  or  from  ac- 
countants; although  many  of  them  —  perhaps  nearly  one 
half  —  finding  that  their  work  as  agents  fills  their  whole 
time,  have  given  up  all  other  business.  The  occupation 
tends,  indeed,  to  become  a  profession  by  itself;  one  to  which 
a  man  devotes  his  life  after  he  has  once  entered  it.  The 
Liberal  agents  have  a  national  association  of  their  own, 
containing  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  members,  and  a  few 
years  ago,  in  order  to  maintain  a  higher  standard,  a  smaller 
society  was  formed,  which  issues  certificates  of  qualification. 
The  association  meets  every  year  at  the  time  of  the  meeting 
of  the  National  Liberal  Federation,  and  such  of  the  agents 
attend  as  can  afford  to  go,  or  can  get  their  employers  to  pay 
their  expenses.  They  meet  usually  about  one  hundred  and 
fifty  strong,  and  are  given  a  breakfast  at  which  they  are 
addressed  by  the  chief  whip,  and  by  the  leader  of  the  party 
in  Parliament  or  some  other  prominent  member ;  for  their 
importance  is  now  thoroughly  appreciated.  Thus  there  has 
arisen  in  English  political  life  a  class  of  men  whose  coun- 
terpart exists  in  no  other  country.  They  occupy  in  the 
party  a  position  not  unlike  that  of  the  non-commissioned 
officers  in  the  army.  Their  work  is  essential  to  success,  but 
they  have  no  hope  of  promotion  beyond  their  own  grade. 
Their  position  is  perfectly  well  understood,  and  they  tend  to 
surround  it  with  professional  safeguards  and  supports. 

In  Scotland  political  associations  with  paid  agents  have  Liberal 
developed  more  slowly  than  in  England;  partly  because  a  s^)t'ja*Kju 
great  deal  of  the  work  connected  with  registration,  which 
falls  upon  the  party  agents  in  England,  is  done  by  the  public 
authorities  north  of  the  Tweed;  and  partly  because  it  was 
the  old  Scotch  habit  to  have  election  business,  like  every- 
thing else,  conducted  for  the  candidate  by  his  regular  attor- 
ney.    The   result    is  that    although   there  are   nianv    Liberal 


498 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Conserva- 
tive Local 
Organi- 
sations. 


Their 
Growth 
after  1867. 


associations  in  Scotland,  and  the  agents  have  tended  to 
become  a  class  so  far  as  to  form  a  society  among  themselves, 
they  have  as  a  rule  much  less  work  to  do  than  in  England, 
and  are  still  usually  paid  almost  entirely  out  of  the  candi- 
date's own  pocket.  Hence,  when  he  is  defeated,  and  gives 
up  the  fight,  the  constituency  is  apt  to  lose  its  agent  alto- 
gether, and  become  derelict. 

Contrary  to  the  prevailing  opinion,  the  Conservatives 
have,  in  the  matter  of  party  organisation,  been  more  than 
once  the  first  in  the  field;  and  although  their  machinery 
has  neither  been  so  democratic  nor  attracted  so  much  at- 
tention as  that  of  the  Liberals,  it  has  been  on  the  whole  more 
effective.  The  Reform  Act  of  1832  was  no  sooner  passed 
than  they  began  energetically  to  form  registration  societies ; 
and  the  extension  of  the  borough  franchise  in  1867  brought 
a  renewed  activity.  They  tried  at  once  to  enlist  the  in- 
terest, and  win  the  support,  of  the  workingmen  who  had  been 
made  voters  in  large  numbers.  At  the  general  election  of 
the  following  year  they  worked  in  vain,  but  in  a  short  time 
they  succeeded  so  well,  that  at  the  next  election,  in  1874, 
they  obtained  a  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons  for  the 
first  time  since  1841.  Their  victory  was,  indeed,  commonly 
attributed  to  their  superior  organisation,  a  fact  which  gave 
a  powerful  incentive  to  the  adoption  by  their  rivals  of  Mr. 
Chamberlain's  plan  for  a  National  Liberal  Federation. 

Conservative  associations  of  a  modern  type  had,  indeed, 
been  formed  in  some  places  long  before  1867, 1  but  the  Act 
of  that  year   gave    a   new   and   vigorous  impulse.     It  had 

1  In  Liverpool,  for  example,  a  Conservative  association  originally  formed 
in  1832,  was  replaced  in  1848  by  a  new  Constitutional  Association  upon  a 
broader  foundation.  Among  the  objects  the  latter  aimed  "To  promote  by 
all  legal  means  the  Election  of  Members  of  Parliament  for  the  Borough  who 
subscribe  to,  and  uphold  the  principles  of  the  Association.  .  .  .  To  promote 
by  all  legal  means  the  Election  of  such  Candidates  for  the  Town  Council  as 
are  Members  of  this  Association."  It  contained  at  the  outset  a  couple  of 
hundred  members;  and  it  had  in  part  a  representative  character  with  the 
wards  as  a  basis,  for  its  affairs  were  managed  by  a  general  committee,  com- 
posed of  thirty  members  chosen  by  the  association,  together  with  the  chair- 
man and  secretary  of  each  ward  committee  ex  officio.  (Fiftieth  Rep.  Liver- 
pool Const.  Assoc",  1898.) 


LOCAL  PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  499 

hardly  been  enacted  when  local  associations,  largely  com- 
posed of  workingmen,  sprang  up,  especially  in  the  manufac- 
turing districts  of  the  north.  Some  of  them  were  very  large, 
the  one  at  Bradford,  for  example,  had,  by  1872,  twenty-five 
hundred  members,  and  was  believed  to  have  caused  the 
change  in  the  politics  of  the  place.1  The  associations  in- 
creased rapidly  in  number.  In  1871  there  were  two  hundred 
and  eighty-nine  of  them ;  in  1872,  three  hundred  and  forty- 
eight  ;  in  1873,  four  hundred  and  seven  ;  in  1874,  four  hundred 
and  forty-seven;  in  1875,  four  hundred  and  seventy-two, 
besides  two  hundred  and  twenty-eight  branch  associations; 
and  in  1876  the  number  of  Conservative  associations  of 
every  kind  in  England  and  Wales  was  nearly  eight  hundred.2 
A  considerable  part  of  them  were  composed  almost  entirely 
of  the  artisan  class.  Many  societies  had,  indeed,  been  or- 
ganised under  the  name  of  Conservative  Working  Men's  As- 
sociations, and  these  had  set  up  a  separate  national  union 
among  themselves. 

The  associations  formed  at  this  time  seem  to  have  been  They  Bo- 
voluntary  bodies  without  a  representative  character,  and  ^Sntati^ 
in  fact  some  of  them  were  turned  into  clubs,  in  order  to 
make  them  more  attractive,  or,  according  to  the  expression 
then  used,  to  enable  the  members  to  obtain  recreation  as 
well  as  knowledge.  But  if  the  new  Conservative  associa- 
tions were  unlike  the  Birmingham  Caucus,  the  size  of  their 
membership  made  them  also  very  unlike  the  old  registra- 
tion societies.  The  object  was  not  now  merely  to  see  that 
the  faithful  were  properly  registered,  but  to  recruit  sup- 
porters, stimulate  enthusiasm,  and  discipline  a  fighting 
force  among  the  masses  of  the  people.  The  Conservatives 
are  more  easily  led  by  authority  than  the  Liberals,  but  the 
time  was  at  hand  when  even  among  them  more  democratic 
forms  were  needed.     After  Mr.  Gladstone's  victory  at  the 

1  Speech  of  Mr.  Taylor,  in  the   Report  of  the  Conference  of  the  National 
Union  in  1  S7_\ 

2  Reports  of  Council  at  Conferences  of  the  National   Cuion  in   is?.">  and 
1876. 


sations. 


500  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

elections  of  1880  a  cry  was  again  heard  that  the  result  was 
due  to  better  organisation ;  in  this  case  to  the  Birmingham 
Caucus,  and  curiously  enough  to  the  paid  agents  which 
it  employed.1  The  movement  among  the  Conservatives 
towards  more  popular  forms  of  party  machinery  began  with 
the  associations  in  the  large  towns,  which  felt  keenly  the 
competition  of  the  Liberal  hundreds  with  their  closely 
knit  fabric  of  representative  committees  based  on  open 
meetings  in  the  wards.  In  these  places  the  Conservatives 
copied  the  organisation  of  their  rivals,  and  thence  the 
fashion  spread  gradually  over  the  country,  receiving  an 
additional  impetus  in  1887,  when  the  National  Union  of 
Conservative  Associations  was  itself  remodelled  upon  a 
wider  basis,  with  a  series  of  representative  councils. 
Existing  Like  the  National  Liberal  Federation,  the  Conservative 

tive  Local  central  office  has  issued  draft  rules  to  serve  as  models  for 
°rtfon!f  local  associations,  and  they  may  be  regarded  as  typical. 
In  the  case  of  a  borough  the  ward  polling  district,  or  such 
other  subdivision  as  shall  be  found  convenient,  is  suggested 
as  the  primary  unit.  In  each  of  these  there  is  to  be  a  branch 
association,  composed  of  all  the  Conservatives  in  the  dis- 
trict who  subscribe  not  less  than  one  shilling  to  its  funds. 
The  branch  association,  at  a  mass  meeting  of  its  members, 
is  to  elect  a  president,  a  chairman,  an  honorary  secretary 
and  a  treasurer,  a  committee  to  manage  its  affairs,  and  repre- 
sentatives to  the  central  committee  for  the  borough,  in  the 
proportion  of  one  for  every  two  hundred  voters  upon  the 
parliamentary  register.  The  central  association  for  the 
whole  borough  is  to  consist  of  the  members  of  the  various 
branches.     It  is  to  hold  general  meetings  for  the  choice  of 

1  In  his  remarks  at  the  Conference  in  1880,  the  Chairman  of  the  Council 
of  the  National  Union  of  Conservative  Associations  said :  "It  was  not  at  all 
satisfactory  to  find  that  in  a  number  of  constituencies  gentlemen  who  prac- 
tically knew  nothing  of  election  matters  undertook  the  management  merely 
as  a  professional  duty  in  their  capacity  as  lawyers.  .  .  .  The  Birmingham 
Radicals  had  made  a  point  for  many  years  of  training  a  number  of  men  to 
election  work,  and  of  giving  them  experience  by  employing  them  in  muni- 
cipal contests,  and  he  recommended  their  example  to  the  attention  of  the 
meeting."     Report  of  the  Conference  of  1880. 


LOCAL   PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  601 

its  officers;  but  it  is  to  be  managed  by  a  central  committee 
composed  of  the  officers  and  representatives  of  the  branch 
associations,  together  with  the  officers  of  any  Conservative 
clubs  in  the  borough,  and  representatives  of  the  local  Habi- 
tations of  the  Primrose  League.  This  committee,  being 
large,  is  authorised  to  delegate  any  of  its  powers  to  an  execu- 
tive committee,  and  other  sub-committees,  subject  to  rati- 
fication of  their  acts.  In  order  to  stimulate  the  necessary 
subscriptions,  the  rules  provide,  in  accordance  with  a  com- 
mon Conservative  practice,  that  all  members  who  con- 
tribute not  less  than  one  guinea  a  year  shall  be  styled  Vice- 
President  ;  but  in  this  case  they  are  given  no  power,  and 
the  title  is  their  sole  reward.  The  model  rules  for  the  par- 
liamentary division  of  a  county  are  framed  upon  the  same 
lines,  except  that,  when  possible,  associations  are  to  be 
organised  in  each  parish.  This  involves  an  additional 
wheel  in  the  machinery,  the  parochial  meetings  electing 
the  committee  for  the  polling  district ;  and  the  district 
meeting,  which  consists  of  all  the  members  of  the  parish 
associations,  electing  the  central  committee  for  the  parlia- 
mentary division. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  Liberal  party,  the  model  rules  issued  a  Compie: 
by  the  central  office  are  merely  typical,  and  although  the  «yl^?f~d 
general  principles  of  organisation  in  the  different  local 
bodies  are  the  same,  there  are  great  variations  in  detail. 
The  Conservative  Association  of  Bradford  may  be  taken 
as  a  good  example  of  the  more  complex  forms.  Here  the 
geographical  elements  are  the  polling  district,  the  ward, 
the  three  parliamentary  divisions,  and  the  borough  as  a 
whole;  the  committees  in  each  of  these  being  constructed 
by  a  combination  of  direct  election,  and  of  representation 
both  of  the  smaller  units  and  of  clubs.  Thus  the  polling 
district  has  a  committee,  composed  of  all  the  members  of 
the  party  therein,  which  elects,  besides  its  own  officers,  ten 
representatives  to  the  ward  association-  -of  whom  three; 
are  designated  to  serve  on  the  ward  executive  five  rep- 
resentatives  to   the  council  for  the  parliamentary  division, 


502         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

and  two  to  the  general  council  for  the  borough.  The  ward 
association  consists  of  the  officers  and  representatives  of  the 
polling  districts ;  of  representatives  of  any  constitutional 
associations  within  the  ward ;  and  of  subscribers  to  the 
amount  of  five  shillings  a  year.  It  has  an  executive  com- 
mittee composed  of  the  officers  for  the  ward,  and  of  the 
officers  and  representatives  of  the  polling  districts.  The 
chief  business  of  the  ward  association  is  registration,  and 
the  nomination  and  election  of  candidates  for  the  city  coun- 
cil, the  municipal  contests  in  Bradford  being  conducted  on 
party  lines.  The  divisional  association  consists  of  all  per- 
sons who  subscribe  a  shilling,  or  are  enrolled  as  members 
of  a  polling  district  committee.  Its  business  is  conducted 
by  a  council  containing  the  officers  and  five  other  members 
chosen  at  the  annual  mass  meeting,  the  officers  of  ward 
and  polling  district  associations,  and  representatives  both 
from  those  associations,  and  from  Conservative  clubs.  It 
acts,  however,  largely  by  means  of  sub-committees. 

Finally  the  general  association  for  the  borough,  with  a 
similar  qualification  for  membership,  has,  besides  the  ordi- 
nary officers,  a  long  list  of  vice-chairmen,  which  includes 
all  persons  subscribing  two  pounds  a  year  to  its  funds. 
The  general  council  is  composed  of  all  these  officers,  of 
representatives  from  the  divisions,  polling  districts  and 
clubs,  and  in  addition,  of  all  men  who  pay  one  guinea  a 
year  —  another  instance  of  giving  special  privileges  to 
the  larger  subscribers.  The  executive  for  the  borough, 
styled  the  Finance  and  General  Purposes  Committee,  con- 
sists of  thirty  members  elected  by  the  council ;  of  represent- 
atives of  the  two  leading  clubs ;  of  officers  of  the.  divisional 
associations ;  and  of  all  the  officers  of  the  central  associa- 
tion, including  the  vice-chairmen.  Now,  in  1900,  the  vice- 
chairmen  formed  a  majority  of  the  committee,  and  many 
of  them  must  have  acquired  the  position  by  reason  of  sub- 
scriptions to  the  funds.  This  is  important  not  only  because 
the  management  of  the  association  as  a  whole  is  really  in 
the    hands  of   the  General  Purposes  Committee,  but    espe- 


LOCAL  PARTY   ORGANISATIONS  503 

cially  because  the  rules  require  the  divisional  councils  to 
invite  that  committee  to  be  present  for  consultation  at  the 
meetings  held  for  the  selection  of  parliamentary  candidates. 
The  privilege  so  conferred  is,  however,  merely  potential, 
for  it  is  almost  universally  the  case  in  Conservative  asso- 
ciations that  the  nomination  of  candidates  for  the  House 
of  Commons  is  arranged  by  the  executive  body  or  by  a 
sub-committee  thereof,  and  is  simply  accepted  by  the 
council. 

Conservative   associations  of  a  popular  character,   with   Extent  of 
subordinate   branches   more   or  less   fullv   developed,    now  ^ons<;rvil- 

1         '  tive  Asso- 

exist  in  almost  every  parliamentary  constituency  in  England  ciations. 
and  Wales,  and  in  all  but  a  few  of  those  in  Scotland,  the 
central  office  of  the  party  being  engaged  in  a  ceaseless 
effort  to  perfect  the  organisation  wherever  it  remains  incom- 
plete. Unless  in  a  very  feeble  state,  the  associations  have 
their  professional  secretaries  or  agents,  who  arc  paid,  on  The 
the  average,  a  little  higher  salaries  than  their  Liberal  rivals,   1,>a"1 

...  Agents. 

and  are,  therefore,  it  is  claimed,  on  the  whole,  a  better  grade 
of  men.  The  Conservative,  like  the  Liberal,  agents  have 
societies  of  their  own;  a  mutual  benevolent  society,  and  a 
national  association  with  subordinate  branches  which  admits 
members  only  on  examination. 

At   the   present   day   local   party   organisation   has   been  similarity 

brought  to  a  high  state  of  efficiencv  in  England,  each  party  t)f  \l^°rai 
o  &  jo  i  au,\  Con- 

having  covered  almost  the  whole  of  Great  Britain  with  a  servative 
tessellated  pavement  of  associations.  These  are  especially  tj0^ 
complete  in  the  boroughs,  for  on  both  sides  the  machinery 
in  the  rural  parts  of  counties  is  less  fully  developed.  The 
Conservatives  have  done  their  work  a  little  more  thoroughly 
than  the  Liberals,  because  with  more  rich  men  in  their 
ranks  they  have  larger  resources  in  money,  and  can  main- 
tain paid  agents  in  more  constituencies  where  the  chance 
of  success  is  small.  In  general  character  the  local  associa- 
tions of  the  two  parties  do  not  differ  greatly,  the  most- 
obvious  contrasts  being  the  common  use  of  coaptation  by 
the    Liberals,    and    the    special    privileges    accorded    to    the 


504         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

larger  subscribers  among  the  Conservatives.  But  neither 
of  these  things  is  universal,  and  in  their  essential  features 
the  local  organisations  of  both  parties  are  framed  upon 
the  same  general  principles.  Both  of  them  are  democratic 
in  form,  admitting  all  adherents  of  the  party,  or  all  who 
pay  a  small  subscription.  Both  are  in  form  representative, 
the  affairs  of  the  associations  being  managed  by  a  series 
of  councils  and  committees,  composed  mainly  of  delegates 
whose  authority  is  based  ultimately  upon  mass  meetings 
of  all  the  members. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

ACTION   OF   LOCAL  ORGANISATIONS 

Although  the  local  associations  purport  to  be  democratic  ah  Popular 
and  representative,  it  would  be  an  error  to  take  their  rules  ganisations 
too  seriously.  Every  voluntary  political  organisation  con-  are  Lar8ely 
tains  an  element  of  sham.  Part  of  its  stock  in  trade  is  the 
pretence  that  it  is  more  powerful,  and  more  widely  repre- 
sentative, than  it  really  is.  Much  of  its  success  depends 
upon  the  old  Chinese  military  policy  of  scaring  the  enemy 
by  an  imposing  appearance  before  the  fight  begins.  In 
ordinary  times  of  public  inattention  the  vox  populi  may  be 
manufactured  by  a  small  number  of  persons,  for  the  mass  of 
the  people  are  rarely  interested  until  an  issue  has  been  pre- 
sented to  them,  and  the  framing  of  that  issue,  which  may  be 
by  far  the  most  important  step  in  the  whole  process,  is  often 
done  at  a  meeting  of  half  a  dozen  men.  All  the  members 
of  the  party  may  have  a  right  to  attend  that  meeting,  but 
they  will  not  do  so,  or  if  they  do  the  private  conference  will 
take  place  earlier,  and  the  meeting  will  simply  decide  upon 
the  acceptance  of  plans  prepared  beforehand.  This  is  a  law 
of  human  nature  resulting  from  the  fact  that  a  large  assembly 
can  only  say  Yes  or  Xo.  It  does  not  mean  that  the  desires 
of  the  public  are  perverted,  for  as  a  rule  it  has  none  that  are 
strong  or  definite.  It  means  that  the  number  of  people  who 
care  enough  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  formative  stage'  is 
small,  and  in  the  long  rim  they  get  control  of  the  wires 
whether  as  an  elected  or  a  self-constituted  committee.  The 
sham  consists  in  making  it  appear  that  the  plan  proposed 
expresses  the  preconceived  wish  of  a  large  body  of  people. 

In  England  the  element  of  sham  in  the  party  organisations 
i.-  as  great  as  it  is  elsewhere.     Although  the  council  of  a  local 

r>or> 


506 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Local 

Associations 
Controlled 
by  a 
Few  Men. 


Possibility 
of  their 
Capture. 

For 

Personal 

Motives. 


association  is  a  numerous  body,  and  gives  the  appearance  of 
a  highly  popular  institution,  the  association,  as  a  whole, 
usually  contains  among  its  enrolled  members  not  more  than 
one  tenth,  or  at  most  one  fifth  of  the  voters  belonging  to 
the  party ;  and  the  meetings  for  the  election  of  delegates  to 
the  various  councils  and  committees  are  thinly  attended.1 
The  organisation  is,  in  fact,  managed,  as  a  rule,  by  a  few 
men  influenced  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  by  the  paid  agent. 
They  are  often,  especially  among  the  Liberals,  tradesmen  or 
even  workingmen,  who  take  an  active  interest  in  politics, 
without  cherishing  any  parliamentary  aspirations  for  them- 
selves, or  any  political  ambition  unless  it  be  for  municipal 
office ;  but  they  like,  especially  if  Conservatives,  to  take 
for  their  chairman  a  man  of  higher  social  position.  More- 
over, there  seems  to  be  little  rivalry  for  the  positions  that 
give  a  control  of  the  body.  On  the  contrary,  one  is  much 
more  impressed  in  ordinary  times  by  the  efforts  of  an 
organising  secretary,  spurred  on  from  above,  to  interest 
people  in  forming  associations  in  unpromising  districts,  than 
by  struggles  for  power  in  the  most  active  associations.  In 
England  the  stage  at  which  public  interest  awakes  is  the 
election,  the  process  of  selecting  the  candidates  arousing 
little  attention.  While,  therefore,  the  franchise  is  wide, 
and  the  number  of  people  who  vote  is  very  great,  the 
nomination  is  really  made  by  a  body  of  men  no  larger  than 
the  voters  in  an  ordinary  borough  before  1832. 

One  might  suppose  that  under  such  conditions  it  would 
be  easy  for  a  small  knot  of  adroit  and  persistent  men,  or 
even  for  a  single  resourceful  manipulator,  to  capture  a  local 
association ;  but  in  normal  times  there  is  little  incentive 
to  do  so.  To  explain  fully  why  this  is  the  case  would  an- 
ticipate much  that  remains  to  be  said  about  the  social  and 
political  traditions  of  England.  Yet  some  of  the  reasons 
can  readily  be  suggested.  The  expense  of  maintaining  the 
organisation  and  a  seat  in  Parliament  is  large,  and  the  funds 
must  be  provided  by  somebody.     If  they  are  subscribed 


OstroRorski,  I.,  332-33. 


ACTION  OF  LOCAL  ORGANISATIONS  507 

from  public  spirit  by  local  men  who  do  not  want  the  seat 
themselves,  those  persons  will  naturally  control  the  asso- 
ciation. If  they  are  defrayed  by  the  candidate,  or  member 
of  Parliament,  then  under  ordinary  circumstances  he  will 
control  so  far  as  his  own  seat  is  concerned ;  and  by  nursing 
and  courting  the  constituency,  or  by  his  political  reputation, 
he  will  probably  have  built  up  a  popularity  among  the  voters 
which  the  association  cannot  defy.  The  expense  limits, 
therefore,  the  class  of  persons  who  might  want  to  capture  the 
association  in  order  to  control  the  nomination  to  the  House 
of  Commons ;  nor  among  those  who  could  afford  the  cost  is 
there  much  object  in  so  doing.  If,  as  in  some  other  coun- 
tries, nominations  were  confined  by  law  or  by  custom  to 
residents  of  the  constituency,  the  rivalry  between  two  or 
three  aspirants  for  the  honour  might  become  intense ;  but 
in  England  the  local  man  has  little  advantage  over  a  stranger, 
and  if  the  party  association  in  his  own  place  is  unwilling  to 
accept  him,  the  expenditure  of  labour,  time  and  money 
required  to  capture  it  would  probably  be  much  greater  than 
would  procure  him  a  nomination  elsewhere.  Apart  from 
the  personal  privilege  of  sitting  in  the  House  there  are  no 
strong  selfish  motives  for  getting  control  of  a  local  organi- 
sation. The  member  of  Parliament  has  no  patronage  to 
distribute  among  the  men  to  whom  he  owes  his  seat;  and 
although  the  association  may  lead  to  the  town  council,  or 
even  the  honourable  post  of  a  justice  of  the  peace,  these  are 
not  in  themselves  objects  of  keen  emulation,  nor  are  they 
stepping-stones  to  higher  things  beyond. 

Moreover,  there  is  no  object  under  ordinary  circumstances  For 
in  capturing  a  local  association  with  a  view  to  promoting  a  Qb'ect* 
political  policy;  for  the  policy  of  the  party  is  directed  by 
the  parliamentary  leaders,  in  the  cabinet  or  on  the  front 
Opposition  Bench,  and  the  local  party  voter  has,  as  a  rule, 
little  sympathy  for  the  member  who  weakens  the  party  by 
thwarting  them.  There  are,  however,  cases  of  deep  political 
cleavage  in  the  party  ranks  before  the  leaders  have1  agreed 
upon  a  policy,  when  there  may  be  the  strongest  incentive 


508 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Relation  of 
an  M.P. 
to  his  Asso- 
ciation. 


The  Case  of 
Mr.  Forster. 


to  capture  the  local  organisations  in  order  to  turn  the  scale. 
The  breach  among  the  Liberals  over  the  first  Home  Rule 
Bill  was  an  example  of  that  kind,  and  had  Mr.  Gladstone 
given  a  longer  premonition  of  his  plans  there  would,  no 
doubt,  have  been  a  struggle  for  the  control  of  the  local 
Liberal  associations  all  over  the  country.  The  recent  agi- 
tation for  fiscal  reform  furnished  another  instance  of  the 
same  kind,  and  a  very  striking  one ;  because  the  Conser- 
vative leader  not  only  took  no  positive  stand  on  the  ques- 
tion, but  intimated  that  the  party  could  adopt  no  definite 
policy  on  the  subject  until  the  next  election.  Under 
these  conditions  the  attitude  of  the  local  Conservative  or- 
ganisations became  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  it  is  said 
that  a  systematic  effort  was  made  by  the  members  of  the 
Tariff  Reform  League  to  capture  them  in  the  interest  of  the 
reform.  Certainly  many  of  them  showed  that  they  held 
very  definite  opinions  on  the  point,  sometimes  absolutely 
opposed  to  those  of  their  sitting  member. 

Connected  with  this  question  is  another:  that  of  the 
relation  of  a  member  of  Parliament  to  the  association  of  his 
constituency.  In  the  early  days  of  the  Birmingham  Caucus, 
shortly  after  it  had  begun  to  spread  over  England,  a  case  of 
friction  between  a  sitting  member  and  the  local  association 
occurred,  which  caused  much  controversy  and  no  little 
alarm.  The  caucus  was  the  bugbear  of  the  day,  and  men 
feared  that  it  was  about  to  turn  the  representative  into  a 
mere  instrument  to  register  the  decisions  of  a  party  machine 
—  an  anxiety  heightened  by  the  fact  that  the  new  associa- 
tions were  in  the  hands  of  the  Radical  wing  of  the  party. 

Mr.  W.  E.  Forster,  in  carrying  through  Parliament  the 
Education  Act  of  1870,  had  offended  the  more  extreme 
Radicals,  because  the  act  did  not  provide  that  education 
supported  by  public  rates  should  be  compulsory  and  free, 
and  because,  in  their  eyes,  it  treated  the  Church  schools 
with  too  much  favour.  Although  opposed  by  the  Radicals, 
he  was  reelected  for  Bradford  in  1874  by  the  help  of  Con- 
servative votes;   but  in  1878  he  came  into  collision  with  the 


ACTION   OF  LOCAL  ORGANISATIONS  509 

Liberal  association  which  had  just  been  formed  there.  One 
of  its  rules  provided  that  any  one  proposed  for  nomination 
to  Parliament  must  give  an  assurance  to  the  general  com- 
mittee that  he  would  abide  b}r  their  decision  in  regard  to  the 
selection  of  the  candidate.  To  that  condition  Mr.  Forster 
refused  to  submit,  denying  the  right  of  any  association  to 
come  between  him  and  his  constituents.  The  association 
insisted  upon  its  rule,  and  the  controversy  in  Bradford 
provoked  a  discussion  in  the  public  press  of  the  country. 
In  the  end  the  matter  was  compromised  by  changing  the 
rule  so  as  to  read  that  such  an  assurance  "may  be  required" 
instead  of  "shall  be  required,"  and  Mr.  Forster  allowed  his 
name  to  be  submitted  to  the  general  committee.  He  had 
won  his  point,  for  he  had  been  nominated  without  giving  the 
assurance ;  but  his  troubles  with  the  association  were  not 
at  an  end.  In  1882  he  resigned  from  Mr.  Gladstone's  min- 
istry because  he  disapproved  of  the  so-called  Kilmainham 
treaty,  and  before  long  the  quarrel  broke  out  again,  continu- 
ing until  his  death  in  188G.1  The  particular  provision  which 
gave  occasion  to  the  dispute  in  1878  has  not  proved  a  per- 
manent source  of  difficulty,  for  the  local  associations  have 
not  been  in  the  habit  of  demanding  a  pledge  of  that  kind, 
and  on  the  other  hand  the  ordinary  rules  of  fair  play  require 
that  a  man  who  allows  his  name  to  be  proposed  for  nomi- 
nation shall  abide  by  the  decision  of  the  body  to  which  he 
submits  it,  unless  he  feels  that  he  has  been  unjustly  treated, 
or  unless  some  important  question  of  policy  is  involved. 

A  much  more  important  matter  is  the  control  exerted  by  Local  Press- 
the  local  party  association  over  its  representative  in  the  Members 
House  of  Commons,  whether  by  urging  him  to  take  a  par-  Neither 
ticular  line  of  action,  by  refusing  a  renomination,  or  even  by  gyBtcmatic 
the  more  drastic   measure  of  requesting  his  resignation  in 
case1  he  fails  to  comply  with  its  opinion.     Mr.  Ostrogorski 
lays  great  stress  upon  the  quarrel  in  1885  between  the  Liberal 
association  in  Newcastle  and  Mr.  Joseph  Cowen,   who  had 

'Ostrogorski,  I.,   194  203,  228-30.     T.  W.   Roid,  "Life  of  William   K<! 
ward  Forster,"   I.,  517-20;  II.,  44-55,  200-14,  210-20,  501,  511,  535-30. 


510  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

taken  a  highly  independent  attitude  in  Parliament,  and  had 
not  given  a  consistent  support  to  the  Liberal  cabinet.1  No 
one  would  assert  that  an  association,  any  more  than  an 
individual  voter,  is  bound  to  support  a  candidate  of 
whose  views  and  conduct  in  public  affairs  it  seriously  dis- 
approves, because  he  is  an  estimable  person.  Yet  this 
was  very  nearly  the  relation  of  Mr.  Cowen  to  the  local 
association.  Voters  and  organisations  must  consider  the 
opinions  as  well  as  the  personality  of  the  candidate,  and 
this  they  may  well  do  without  reducing  him  to  a  mere 
mouthpiece  of  their  wishes. 

But  in  order  to  determine  the  real  import  of  an  attempt 
to  fetter  the  independence  of  a  member  of  Parliament,  one 
must  consider  how  far  it  introduced  a  new  practice  into 
English  politics,  and  for  what  purposes  the  claim  of  the 
association  to  call  the  member  to  account  has  been  used. 
The  question  whether  a  member  of  Parliament  is  the  agent 
of  his  constituents,  morally  bound  to  carry  out  their  wishes, 
or  whether  he  is  to  act  solely  according  to  his  own  opinion 
of  the  interest  of  the  whole  kingdom,  is  as  old  as  Burke's 
famous  discussion  with  the  electors  of  Bristol.  The  latter 
view  always  has  been,  and  still  is,  the  prevailing  one  in 
theory ;  but  the  charge  that  the  representatives  have  be- 
come mere  delegates  has  been  constantly  cropping  up.  In 
1849,  for  example,  very  nearly  at  the  high-water  mark  of 
independence  in  Parliament,  and  long  before  the  party 
machine  had  been  thought  of,  there  were  complaints  about 
the  thraldom  of  members  to  their  constituents.2  A  member 
must  always  have  been  more  or  less  in  bondage  in  the  pro- 
prietary boroughs,  and  this  continued  in  some  places  after 
the  first  Reform  Act.  As  late  as  1857  Sir  Stafford  Northcote 
gave  up  his  seat  for  Dudley  because  he  found  that  he  prac- 
tically represented  Lord  Ward.3  The  exercise  of  control 
over  their  member  by  influential  constituents  is,  therefore, 
not  a  new  thing,  and  the  advent  of  the  modern  party  asso- 

1  I.,  230-40.  »  Cf.  Jephson,  "The  Platform,"  II.,  324-27. 

3  Lang,  "Life  of  Sir  Stafford  Northcote,"  I.,  141-50. 


ACTION   OF   LOCAL  ORGANISATIONS  511 

ciations  has  not,  as  men  feared,  developed  it  into  a  system. 
No  doubt  the  Liberal  caucus  in  the  days  of  its  youth  tried 
to  bring  an  organised  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  members,1 
but  this  has  diminished  rather  than  increased  of  late  years. 

The  question  under  what  circumstances  a  member  ought  The  Ques- 
to  resign  his  seat  is  one  which  always  has  been,  and  always  J^J'f11* 
will   be,    perplexing.     The    doctrine   that    he    must    resign  Ought  to 
simply  because  the  local  party  association  asks  him  to  do     eslgn" 
so  can  be  confidently  asserted  to  have  made  little  or  no  head- 
way in  either  of  the  two  great  parties.     But  that  a  member 
who  has  pledged  himself  expressly  or  tacitly  to  the  support 
of   a  certain  policy,  and  then  changes  his  mind,  may,  in 
some  cases,  be  bound  in  honour  to  go  back  to  his  constitu- 
ents, would  hardly  be  denied.     Whether  such  an  obligation 
has  arisen  or  not  must  depend  upon  the  circumstances,  and 
upon  the  definiteness  and  importance  of  the  pledge  or  under- 
standing.    When  Peel  decided  to  bring  in  the  bill  for  Catho- 
lic Emancipation,  to  which  he  had  previously  been  openly 
opposed,  he  felt  constrained  to  resign  his  seat   for  Oxford, 
and  was  defeated  for  reelection  to  his  great  grief ; 2   but  he 
did  not  feel  under  a  similar  duty  when  converted  to  the 
repeal  of  the  Corn  Laws,  and  was  reproached  on  that  account 
by  Disraeli.3 

A  candidate  who  seeks  election  as  a  member  of  a  party, 
or  as  a  supporter  of  a  cabinet,  may  well  be  considered  to  have 
given  a  general  pledge  to  remain  in  the  party  or  to  support 
that  cabinet,  so  that  if  he  ceases  entirely  to  do  so  he  may 
be  bound  to  resign.  This  is  the  form  in  which  the  question 
has  arisen  of  late  between  members  and  local  associations, 
but  both  obligation  and  actual  practice  are  as  unsettled 
to-day  as  similar  questions  have  been  in  the  past.  When 
the  South  African  War  broke  out  a  few  members  on  the  gov- 

1  Cf.  O.strogorski,  I.,  208-10,  and  see  Ch.  xxix.,  infra. 

2  Parker,  "Life  of  Sir  Robert  Peel,"   II.,  88,  101  -2. 

3  "To  the  opinions  which  I  have  expressed  in  this  House  in  favour  of 
protection,  I  adhere.  They  sent  me  to  this  House,  and  if  I  had  relin- 
quished them,  I  should  have  relinquished  my  seal  also."  Hans.  .'{  Ser. 
LXXXIIL,  112. 


512  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

eminent  side  of  the  House  felt  unable  to  support  the  cabi- 
net  on  that  question.  One  of  them,  Sir  Edward  Clarke,  who 
sat  for  Plymouth,  was  requested  by  the  Conservative  asso- 
ciation of  the  borough  to  resign,  and  did  so,1  provoking 
comment  favourable  and  otherwise.  The  same  action  was 
proposed  in  the  case  of  Mr.  (now  Lord)  Courtney;  but  he 
took  the  ground  that  as  a  Liberal  Unionist  he  had  professed 
to  support  the  cabinet  only  on  the  issue  of  Home  Rule,  and 
had  caused  his  independence  upon  other  matters  to  be  clearly 
understood.  The  motion  to  request  his  resignation  was 
defeated  in  the  Liberal  Unionist  association  of  his  constit- 
uency,2 but  he  was  not  renominated  at  the  next  general 
election.  In  the  same  Parliament  Mr.  (now  Sir)  George 
Doughty,  who,  for  other  reasons,  crossed  the  floor  from  the 
Liberal  to  the  government  side,  resigned  his  seat  at  Great 
Grimsby,  and  was  reelected  by  an  increased  majority. 
While  in  the  following  Parliament  Sir  Michael  Foster  and 
Mr.  Winston  Churchill  crossed  in  the  opposite  direction, 
without  feeling  bound  to  resign.  The  former,  representing 
a  university,  had,  indeed,  stated  at  the  election  that  he  was 
by  no  means  a  strict  party  man,  and  retained  his  seat  after 
a  good  deal  of  reflection.3  Other  cases  of  a  radical  change 
of  policy  could  be  cited,  but  these  are  enough  to  show  that 
local  party  organisations  have  not  fastened  on  their  mem- 
bers chains  that  can  be  used  with  certainty  to  withdraw 
them  from  their  seats  even  in  so  strong  a  case  as  an  open 
breach  with  their  party. 
Refusal  to  The  refusal  of  support  for  reelection,  by  men  of  decisive 

influence  in  a  constituency,  on  the  ground  that  they  cannot 
approve  the  course  pursued  by  their  representative,  is  a 
thing  that  must  always  happen  ;  although  it  did  not  take  the 
form  of  withholding  a  nomination  by  a  party  association 
until  bodies  of  that  kind  came  into  being.  A  refusal  made 
by  powerful  individuals  was  not  less  effective  because  they 

1  The  Times,  Feb.  10,  1900. 

J  Ibid.,  Feb.  23  and  20,  March  9  and  15,  1900. 

5  Ibid.,  Nov.  29,  1902,  Jan.  2,  3,  6,  7,  8,  12,  13,  17,  1903. 


Renominate. 


ACTION  OF  LOCAL  ORGANISATIONS  513 

were  not  styled  a  representative  committee.  But  such  re- 
fusals, by  whomsoever  made,  have  always  been  rare.  Noth- 
ing, indeed,  impresses  a  foreign  observer  of  British  politics 
more  than  the  universal  recognition  of  the  claim  of  a  sitting 
member  to  renomination.  So  far  as  his  own  party  is  con- 
cerned his  tenure  of  office  is  good  behaviour,  and  at  the  pres- 
ent day  the  local  association  very  seldom  fails  to  renominate 
him,  save  in  two  cases;  one  where  his  course  of  action  has 
been  nearly  tantamount  to  a  change  of  party,  a  going  over 
to  the  enemy;  the  other  where  the  party  itself  is  deeply 
cleft  over  a  vital  question  on  which  the  leaders  have  given 
an  uncertain  sound.  This  last  was  true  in  the  general 
election  of  190G,  when  several  of  the  local  party  organisa- 
tions were  sharply  divided  upon  the  issue  of  fiscal  policy. 

The  fear  that  the  local  associations,  by  dictating  to  their  influence  of 
member  a  given  course  of  action,  by  requesting  his  resigna-  I'^^f*30' 
tion,  or  by  refusing  him  renomination,  would  degrade  him  Used  for 
to  the  position  of  the  delegate  of  a  local  party  machine  has  hesion.  ° 
certainly  not  been  realised;  and  it  is  not  less  instructive  to 
observe  the  purposes  for  which  such  influence  as  they  pos- 
sess has  actually  been  used.  A  stranger  might  have  ex- 
pected that  it  would  be  employed  to  promote  local  interests. 
But  that  has  not  been  the  case.  No  doubt  members  of 
Parliament,  like  all  other  popular  representatives,  are 
affected  by  the  special  interests  of  their  constituents.  On 
matters  that  touch  these  they  must  consider  the  welfare  of 
their  own  locality.  A  measure  like  the  Agricultural  Hates 
Act  of  1896,  for  example,  which  by  relieving  agricultural 
land  from  a  part  of  its  burden  of  rates,  and  making  up  the 
loss  to  the  local  authority  from  the  National  Treasury, 
changed  the  incidence  of  taxation  between  town  and  country, 
is  sure,  for  local  reasons,  to  detach  some  members  from  their 
regular  party  allegiance.  But  with  the  absence  of  national 
grants  for  local  improvements,  and  witli  the  judicial  pro- 
cedure for  private  bill  legislation,  the  occasions,  outside  of 
the  dockyard  towns,  whore  distinctly  local  interests  come 
into  play  are  not    numerous.      Moreover,  in    those  cases  the 


for  This. 


514  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

member  is  affected  by  the  impression  his  action  is  likely  to 
have  upon  the  bulk  of  his  constituents,  or  by  the  solicita- 
tion of  a  body  that  represents  special  interests,  rather  than 
by  pressure  from  his  local  party  association.  Nor  does 
the  latter,  at  the  present  day,  commonly  try  to  enforce 
upon  him  the  particular  views  held  by  its  managers  upon 
matters  of  public  policy.  On  the  contrary  such  action  as  it 
takes  is,  and  has  been  from  the  beginning,  almost  wholly 
confined  to  urging  him  to  support  the  leaders  of  the  party.1 
Reasons  That  the  local  associations  act,  not  on  behalf  of  local 

interests  or  opinions,  but  for  the  cohesion  of  the  party  as  a 
whole,  is  the  result  of  many  causes,  and  not  least  among 
them  of  the  fact  that  the  member  is  commonly  not  a  resi- 
dent of  the  place  for  which  he  stands.  This  makes  it  easy 
for  him  to  look  upon  himself  as  a  representative  of  the  nation 
at  large,  rather  than  a  delegate  of  a  borough.  It  saves  him 
also  from  parochial  sympathies  and  prejudices;  and  above 
all  it  relieves  him  from  the  necessity,  he  would  otherwise  be 
under,  of  serving  an  apprenticeship  in  the  local  association, 
and  coming  into  Parliament  a  product  of  the  machine. 
Another  cause  is  the  strength  of  national  party  ties,  and 
the  greater  strictness  of  party  discipline,  of  which  more  will 
be  said  hereafter.  The  local  associations  have  fallen  in  with 
this  tendency,  and  any  substantial  control  they  have  ac- 
quired over  their  members  has  been  exerted  to  make  them 
follow,  not  local  wishes,  but  the  party  leaders.  Bagehot 
has  remarked  somewhere  that  the  House  of  Commons  has 
been  saved  from  becoming  a  collection  of  delegates  from 
local  constituencies  by  the  spirit  of  deference ;  but  at  the 
present  day  it  is  due  in  even  larger  measure  to  the  spirit  of 
party.  That  spirit  has  prevented  the  predominance  of  local 
interests  which  is  the  curse  of  many  legislative  bodies. 

1  Occasionally  some  local  interest  is  touched  by  an  administrative  act  or 
order,  and  the  member  for  the  place  exerts  himself  to  get  the  grievance 
redressed;  but  except,  perhaps,  for  asking  a  question  in  the  House  this 
hardly  afreets  his  attitude  in  Parliament,  and  the  fact  that  he  belongs  to 
one  party  or  the  other  has  little  or  no  weight  with  the  administrative 
departments. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

THE  EISE  AND  FALL  OF  THE  CAUCUS 

The  Liberals 

Not  content  with  creating  local  associations  of  Liberals  on  The  Con- 
a  democratic  basis,  the  Radicals  at  Birmingham  conceived  B^mlne-* 
the  idea  of  uniting  them  together  in  a  great  national  federa-  1)am  in 
tion  which  should  represent  the  whole  party  throughout  the 
kingdom.  The  Tories  had  formed,  some  years  earlier,  the 
National  Union  of  Conservative  Associations,  and  their 
great  victory  of  1874,  attributed  largely  to  better  organisa- 
tion, had  made  the  time  ripe  for  a  more  vigorous  combi- 
nation on  the  Liberal  side.  Moreover,  the  new  associations 
framed  on  the  Birmingham  pattern  had  already  shown  the 
possibility  of  concerted  action  on  national  questions ;  for 
they  had  held  simultaneously  a  large  number  of  indignation 
meetings  to  denounce  the  Bulgarian  atrocities.  In  May, 
1877,  therefore,  they  were  invited  to  send  delegates  to  a 
conference  at  Birmingham  to  form  a  national  party  organi- 
sation. The  call  for  the  meeting  contained  a  clear  state- 
ment of  its  purpose.  "The  essential  feature  of  the  pro- 
posed Federation,"  it  declared,  ais  the  principle  which  must 
henceforth  govern  the  action  of  Liberals  as  a  political  party 
—  namely,  the  direct  participation  of  all  members  of  the 
party  in  the  direction,  and  in  the  selection  of  those  particular 
measures  of  reform  and  of  progress  to  which  priority  shall  be 
given.  This  object  can  be  secured  only  by  the  organisation 
of  the  party  upon  a  representative  basis."  ' 

1  These  and  the  following  statements  arc  taken  from  the  official  "Proceed- 
ings attending  the  formation  of  the  National  Federation  of  Liberal  Asso- 
ciations with  Report  of  Conference  held  in  Birmingham  on  Thursday,  May 
31,  1877."  Since  this  chapter  was  written,  "The  National  Liberal  I'edeia- 
tion,  from  its  Commencement   to  the  (leneral   Election  of    190G,"  has  been 

615 


516  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

Proceedings  The  conference  was  attended  by  delegates  from  ninety-five 
local  associations,  and  Mr.  Chamberlain,  who  had  entered 
Parliament  the  year  before,  was  called  to  the  chair.  In 
his  opening  speech  he  propounded  with  even  greater  dis- 
tinctness the  object  of  the  plan.  "We  hope,"  he  said,  "that 
the  time  is  not  distant  when  we  may  see  a  meeting  of  what 
will  be  a  really  Liberal  Parliament,  outside  the  Imperial 
Legislature,  and,  unlike  it,  elected  by  universal  suffrage, 
and  with  some  regard  for  a  fair  distribution  of  political 
power."  After  speaking  of  the  need  of  trusting  to  the  popu- 
lar initiative  in  framing  the  immediate  policy  of  the  party, 
he  continued:  "Our  association  will  be  founded  on  the 
belief  that  the  Liberals  in  the  country  are  more  united  than 
their  leaders,  and  that  they  have  attained  a  pretty  clear 
conception  of  what  are  the  changes  in  our  Constitution  which 
they  believe  will  be  beneficial  to  the  country ;  that  we  may 
obtain  tfieir  adoption  by  a  little  gentle  pressure  which  con- 
certed action  may  enable  us  to  bring  to  bear,  and  that  in  this 
way  we  may  exert  a  great  influence  on  the  future  policy  of 
the  Liberal  party."  In  the  ensuing  debates  the  same  point 
of  view  was  emphasised  by  Mr.  William  Harris,  the  founder 
of  the  Liberal  "Four  Hundred"  in  Birmingham,  who  de- 
clared that  "The  enfranchisement  of  the  great  mass  of  the 
people  in  towns  had  given  the  power  of  controlling  represen- 
tation into  the  hands  of  the  people,  but  the  direction  of  the 
policy  of  the  party,  the  inauguration  of  measures  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  Parliament,  and  the  determination  of  questions 
on  which  the  people  should  be  asked  to  agitate,  had  been 
confined  to  the  people  who  had  managed  the  Liberal  party ; 
and  it  was,  no  doubt,  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  Liberals  with 
this  state  of  things  which  led  to  the  inaction  of  the  Liberal 
party  at  the  last  election.  ...  To  find  a  remedy  for  this 
state  of  things  was  the  object  they  invited  the  representa- 

published  by  Dr.  Robert  Spence  Watson,  for  many  years  its  president. 
But  although  a  valuable  history  of  the  organisation,  and  a  vigorous  state- 
ment of  the  opinions  held  by  its  leaders,  the  book  adds  little  to  the  infor- 
mation that  may  be  gathered  from  other  sources,  for  the  author  does  not 
take  us  behind  the  scenes. 


THE   NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  517 

tives  present  to  consider  that  morning.  .  .  .  Why  should 
they  not  at  once  and  for  all  form  a  federation  which,  by 
collecting  together  the  opinions  of  the  majority  of  the  people 
in  all  the  great  centres  of  political  activity,  should  be  able 
to  speak  on  whatever  questions  arose  with  the  full  authority 
of  the  national  voice." 

The  chief  business  of  the  conference  was  the  adoption  — 
without  amendment  —  of  the  constitution  which  had  been 
prepared  beforehand.  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  then  elected 
president  of  the  Federation  with  great  enthusiasm.  A 
number  of  vice-presidents  were  taken  from  other  towns; 
but  the  treasurer  and  honorary  secretary  were  also  citizens 
of  Birmingham,  while  Mr.  Schnadhorst,  the  great  organiser, 
whose  hand  had  been  at  work  throughout  the  movement, 
became  at  once  the  active  secretary.  In  short,  all  the 
offices  of  any  real  importance  were  retained  in  the  town 
that  had  given  birth  to  the  Federation  and  was  to  control 
its  movements  for  some  years  to  come. 

The  makers  of  the  Federation  had  taken  pains  to  secure  Mr.  Giad- 
for  their  plan  the  sanction  of  Mr.  Gladstone,  whose  name,  B°n,^ction 
in  spite  of  his  resignation  of  the  Liberal  leadership,  carried 
more  weight  than  that  of  any  one  else  in  the  party.  lie 
was  present  in  Birmingham  on  the  day  of  the  conference, 
and  in  the  evening  addressed  a  public  meeting.  After 
stating  that,  in  point  of  organisation,  the  Conservatives  had 
for  years  been  ahead,  and  would  remain  ahead  so  long  as 
the  Liberals  adhered  like  them  to  a  method  of  arbitrary 
selection  of  the  representatives  of  party,  founded  mainly 
upon  the  power  of  the  purse,  he  declared  that  it  was,  in  his 
opinion,  to  the  honour  of  Birmingham  that  she  had  "held 
up  the  banner  of  a  wider  and  of  a  holier  principle";  and  he 
rejoiced  that  the  large  attendance  of  representatives  of  con- 
stituencies showed  a  disposition  to  adopt  this  admirable 
principle.  Thus  he  gave  the  new  organisation  his  blessing 
and  bade  it  God-speed.1     The  public  meeting  ended  with  a 

1  M.  Ostroporski  points  mil  very  Hourly  how  important  it  was  for  t\\o. 
standing  of  the  Federation  to  have  the  real  Liberal  leader  for  its  sponsor, 
and  how  this  was  possible,  because  he  was  nol   I  he  nominal  leader.      I.,  181. 


518 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Aim  of  the 
Federation. 


Its 

Constitu- 
tion. 


The 
Council. 


resolution  moved  by  Mr.  Chamberlain,  and  adopted  unani- 
mously, which  put  into  formal  terms  the  aim  of  the  move- 
ment, already  so  clearly  set  forth  in  debate.  It  said  that, 
as  the  opinion  of  the  people  should  have  a  full  and  direct 
expression  in  framing  and  supporting  the  policy  of  the 
Liberal  party,  this  meeting  heartily  approves  of  the  propo- 
sal of  a  Federation  of  Liberal  Associations.  In  short,  it 
was  made  perfectly  evident  at  every  step  in  the  genesis  of 
the  Federation,  in  the  call  for  a  conference,  in  the  speeches 
made  thereat,  and  in  the  final  resolution  which  closed  the 
proceedings,  that  the  new  organisation  was  intended  to  take 
an  important,  and  perhaps  the  leading,  hand  in  directing  the 
policy  of  the  party.  It  was  expected  to  be,  as  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain expressed  it,  a  Liberal  parliament  outside  the  im- 
perial legislature  ;  not,  indeed,  doing  the  work  of  that  body, 
but  arranging  what  work  it  should  do,  or  rather  what  work 
the  Liberal  members  should  bring  before  it,  and  what 
attitude  they  should  assume.  By  this  process  the  initia- 
tive on  all  the  greater  issues,  so  far  as  the  Liberal  party  was 
concerned,  would  be  largely  transferred  from  the  Treasury 
Bench  to  the  Federation.  This  was,  indeed,  expressly 
stated  by  some  of  the  speakers  as  their  principal  desire, 
and  with  such  an  avowed  object  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
new  machine  for  the  manufacture  of  Liberal  policy  should 
have  been  popularly  called  the  Caucus. 

The  constitution  adopted  at  the  conference  provided  for 
a  great  representative  assembly  of  the  Federation,  called 
the  Council,  composed  entirely  of  delegates  from  the  local 
associations,  roughly  in  proportion  to  the  population  of 
their  towns  or  districts.  If  the  population  was  under  fifty 
thousand  the  association  was  entitled  to  five  representatives; 
if  between  fifty  and  one  hundred  thousand  to  ten ;  and  if 
larger  still  to  twenty  representatives.  The  Council  was  to 
hold  an  annual  meeting  at  which  the  president,  vice-presi- 
dent, treasurer,  and  honorary  secretary,  were  to  be  elected. 
Special  meetings  could  also  be  called  by  the  officers.  Each 
annual  meeting  was  to  decide  upon  the  place  at  which  the 


THE   NATIONAL   LIBERAL   FEDERATION  510 

next  should  be  held,  and  in  order  to  awake  enthusiasm  for 
the  party  all  over  the  country  it  has  been  the  habit,  from 
that  day  to  this,  to  hold  the  annual  meeting  at  one  after 
another  of  the  chief  provincial  towns. 

The  constitution  set  up  one  other  body,  partly  but  not  The  General 
wholly  representative  in  character.  It  was  called  the  Committee- 
General  Committee,  and  consisted  of  the  officers  of  the  Fed- 
eration ;  of  delegates  from  the  associations,  two  in  number 
if  the  town  or  district  had  less  than  fifty  thousand  people, 
three  if  it  had  between  fifty  and  one  hundred,  five  if  it  had 
over  one  hundred  thousand ;  and  finally  of  not  more  than 
twenty-five  additional  members  chosen  by  the  Committee 
itself.  The  principal  functions  of  the  Committee  were:  to 
aid  in  the  formation  of  local  associations  based  on  popular 
representation  (no  others  being  admitted  to  membership 
in  the  Federation) ;  and  to  submit  to  the  associations  po- 
litical questions  upon  which  united  action  might  be  con- 
sidered desirable.  Unlike  the  Council,  which  was  to  visit 
different  places,  the  General  Committee  was  to  meet  in  Bir- 
mingham until  it  decided  otherwise.  It  was  empowered 
to  elect  its  own  chairman,  and  it  chose  Mr.  William  Harris 
of  that  town,  the  father  of  the  first  representative  association 
established  there  in   18G8. 

The  Federation  docs  not  seem  at  first  to  have  been  uni-  The 
versallv  attractive,   even  to  the  local  associations  formed  ! (,<loratlon 

'  Begins 

after  the  Birmingham  pattern,  for  it  was  joined  at  the  out-  Actively, 
set  by  only  about  half  as  many  of  them  as  had  sent  delegates 
to  the  conference.  But  by  January,  1879,  when  the  first  meet- 
ing of  the  Council  was  held  at  Leeds,  the  number  had  risen 
to  one  hundred  and  one.  In  its  report  at  that  meeting 
the  General  Committee  showed  that  it  had  been  very  active. 
It  had  held  no  less  than  five  sessions,  and  on  the  subject  of  the 
Eastern  question  it  had  stirred  up  many  public  meetings, 
and  had  organised  a  great  deputation  of  local  delegates  to 
the  Liberal  leaders  in  the  two  Houses  of  Parliament.  The 
Committee  believed  that  its  labours  had  not  been  fruitless, 
for  the  report  said  :   "In  regulating  the  action  of  the  Liberal 


520         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

party,  both  in  and  out  of  Parliament,  in  bringing  about 
closer  union  between  leaders  and  followers  .  .  .  the  efforts 
of  the  Federation  resulted  in  a  great  and  important  meas- 
ure of  success.  .  .  .  But  for  the  Liberal  action,  largely 
stimulated  and  guided  by  the  Federated  Liberal  Associations, 
we  should  unquestionably  have  been  at  war  with  Russia." 
Mr.  Chamberlain  in  his  presidential  address  at  the  meeting 
of  the  Council  at  Leeds,  speaking  of  any  possible  attempt 
to  avoid  a  programme  of  domestic  policy,  when  the  Liberals 
again  came  to  power,  remarked:  "I  think  we  shall  be 
justified  in  saying  to  Lord  Hartington1  that  concession  is  a 
virtue  that  gains  by  being  reciprocal."  At  this  time  the 
Radicals  and  the  Whigs,  or  Liberals  of  the  older  type,  still 
formed  mutually  distrustful  wings  of  the  party,  and  the 
Federation  was  the  organ  of  the  former. 

In  its  regular  session  the  Council  passed  no  vote  on  public 
policy ;  but,  at  the  public  meeting  in  the  evening,  resolu- 
tions were  adopted  against  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Con- 
servative government,  and  in  favour  of  peace,  retrench- 
ment, and  reform.  At  the  meeting  at  Darlington  in  the 
following  year  a  similar  course  was  followed.  Clearly  the 
Federation  was  taking  very  seriously  its  mission  as  a  spur 
to  the  Liberal  steed ;  but  equally  clearly  it  was  not  as  yet 
seeking  to  act  as  a  parliament  outside  of  the  imperial  legis- 
lature, and  the  centre  of  gravity  was  at  this  time  not  in  the 
Council,  but  in  the  General  Committee. 
Mr.  Cham-  Before  the  third  meeting  of  the  Council  took  place  in  Jan- 
FiTtcrs  the  liaiT>  1881,  an  event  had  occurred  that  changed  essentially  the 
Cabinet.  attitude  of  the  Federation.  The  general  election  of  1880  had 
placed  the  Liberals  in  office  with  Mr.  Gladstone  at  their 
head,  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  been  given  a  seat  in  the 
cabinet.  It  is  commonly  stated  that  his  connection  with 
the  Federation  was  not  the  cause  of  his  selection,  and  this 
is  no  doubt  perfectly  true  in  the  sense  that  it  was  not  the 

1  Then  the  Liberal  leader  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The  statements  of 
what  took  plaee  at  these  meetings  are  taken  from  the  annual  reports  pub- 
lished by  the  Federation. 


THE  NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  f>2l 

direct  reason  for  offering  him  the  seat.  It  is,  indeed,  well 
known  that  the  choice  lay  between  him  and  Sir  Charles 
Dilke.1  But  as  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  sat  less  than  four  years 
in  Parliament,  and  had  never  been  in  the  ministry,  it  can 
hardly  be  denied  that  his  position  at  the  head  of  the  new 
Liberal  organisation,  which  had  attracted  so  much  attention 
throughout  the  country,  was  one  of  the  factors  in  the  political 
prominence  that  brought  him  within  reach  of  the  cabinet. 
His  new  office  necessarily  brought  a  change  in  his  relation 
to  the  Federation.  It  was  obviously  unfitting  for  him  to 
remain  the  chief  officer  of  a  body  that  might  be  used  to 
bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  Parliament  and  even  upon  his 
colleagues.  He  therefore  resigned  the  post  of  president,  and 
was  succeeded  by  his  friend  and  fellow-citizen  Mr.  Jesse 
Collings ; 2  but  he  continued  until  the  Liberal  split  in  1886 
to  make  the  principal  speech  at  the  evening  public  meet- 
ing held  in  connection  with  the  annual  session  of  the 
Council. 

The  Federation  lost  none  of  its  momentum  from  the  change  The 
of  ministry.     On  the  contrary  its  activity  increased,   and  BeghiftcT 
in  fact  it  began  at  this  time  to  try  its  hand  at  framing  a  Act  as  an 
programme  for  the  party  in  a  rudimentary  way.     At  its  parliament, 
meeting  in  Birmingham  in  January,  1881,  the  Council  passed, 
among  other  resolutions,  one  that  urged  upon  the  govern- 
ment the  need  of  dealing  at  the  earliest  possible  moment 
with  various  reforms,  such  as  the  amendment  of  the  land 
laws,  the  extension  of  the  franchise  in  rural  districts,  the 
redistribution  of  seats,  and  the  creation  of  representative 
institutions  in  the  counties.     Similar  resolutions  were  passed 
at  the  next  annual  meeting,  which  took  place  at  Liverpool 
in  October  of  the  same  year. 

Meanwhile  the  activity  of  the  General  Committee  about 
current  political  questions  continued;  especially  in  the  form 
of  inciting  local  associations  to  constrain  their  representa- 

1  Morley,"Life  of  Gladstone,"  II.,  0.30.     Jeyos,"  Mr.  Chamberlain."  Kf>  SO. 

2  Mr.  Collings  remained  president  only  one  year,  and  his  sueeessors  were 
from  other  towns. 


522 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


rt  Puts 

Pressure 
upon  Mem- 
bers of 
Parliament. 


lives  to  vote  with  the  cabinet.  The  annual  report  to  the 
meeting  of  the  Council  at  Liverpool  said  that  some 
Liberals  had  been  disposed  to  propose  or  support  amend- 
ments which  struck  at  the  vital  principle  of  the  Irish 
Land  Bill,  while  others  abstained  from  voting.  The 
Committee  had  thereupon  decided  that  its  "duty  could 
be  most  properly  and  efficiently  discharged  by  inviting 
the  Liberal  constituencies  to  bring  legitimate  pressure  to 
bear  upon  those  of  their  representatives,  who,  in  a  great 
national  crisis,  had  failed  to  support  the  government." 
A  circular  was,  therefore,  issued  to  the  federated  associa- 
tions which  excited  much  complaint  amongst  the  members 
of  Parliament,  but  produced  the  desired  effect.1  When 
the  bill  was  threatened  with  amendments  of  the  House  of 
Lords  a  meeting  of  delegates  was  called  to  attack  the  peers. 
This,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Committee,  also  had  an  effect, 
and  helped  to  pass  the  bill.2 

The  systematic  obstruction  by  Mr.  Parnell  and  his  fol- 
lowers in  the  Commons,  and  Mr.  Gladstone's  plan  in  1882 
for  a  new  procedure  which  would  enable  the  House  to  cut 
off  debate,  gave  a  fresh  occasion  for  bringing  the  pressure 
of  the  federated  associations  to  bear.  A  circular  was  sent 
out,  and  at  once  a  large  majority  of  them  passed  resolutions 
in  support  of  the  government's  plan.3  The  General  Com- 
mittee held  meetings  also  in  connection  with  the  Irish  Coer- 
cion Act  of  that  year,  and  sustained  the  cabinet  heartily, 
while  at  the  same  time  suggesting  amendments.  Some  of 
these  were  adopted,  and  as  the  Committee  complacently 
remarked,  "The  Federation  may  thus  claim  the  credit 
of  having  on  the  one  hand  strengthened  and  guided  public 
opinion  in  support  of  measures  deemed  necessary  for  the 


1  Rep.  of  1881,  cf.  Ostrogorski,  I.,  209-11. 

2  Political  education  had  always  been  one  of  the  functions  of  the  Federa- 
tion, and  it  was  in  the  habit  of  distributing  party  literature.  In  1881  it 
sent  out  copies  of  two  speeches  by  Mr.  Chamberlain.  These  were,  in  fact, 
the  only  speeches  it  circulated  that  year. 

3  Rep.  of  meeting  of  General  Committee,  March  6,  1882;  Ann.  Rep.  to 
Council,  December,  1882,  cf.  Ostrogorski,  I.,  213-15. 


THE  NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  523 

maintenance  of  order;   and  on  the  other  of  having  sought 
to  mitigate  the  severity  of  the  proposed  enactments."  l 

In  1883  the  Federation  took  up  energetically  the  exten-  it  Calls  a 
sion  of  the  franchise  in  the  counties.     It  called  a  great  con-  General 

°  Conference 

ference  of  delegates  at  Leeds;  acting  on  this  occasion  in  of  the  Party, 
cooperation  with  the  National  Reform  Union  of  Manchester 
and  the  London  and  Counties  Liberal  Union,  two  rival 
organisations,  which  were,  however,  more  local  and  less 
aggressive,  and  waned  slowly  before  the  greater  vigour  of 
the  Federation.2  The  delegates  met  two  thousand  strong, 
representing  more  than  five  hundred  associations,  and 
adopted  resolutions  declaring  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
government  at  the  next  session  of  Parliament  to  introduce 
bills  to  extend  the  county  franchise  and  redistribute  seats. 
Another  conference  in  Scotland  passed  similar  votes. 
"Taken  together,"  the  General  Committee  say  in  their 
annual  report,  "they  represent  the  great  bulk  of  the  Liberal 
party  throughout  Great  Britain  .  .  .  and  ...  it  is  not 
too  much  to  expect  that  such  an  expression  of  opinion 
will  exercise  decisive  weight  with  the  Members  of  the  Govern- 
ment in  the  arrangement  of  their  measures." 

These  examples  show  the  attitude  and  the  activity  of  its  claims 
the  Federation  during  the  first  Liberal  ministry  that  held  ximells 
office  after  its  formation.  It  claimed  to  represent,  or  per- 
haps one  ought  to  say  it  claimed  that  it  would  when  fully 
developed  represent  and  that  it  could  immediately  evoke, 
the  opinion  of  the  whole  Liberal  party  in  the  country.  It 
was,  therefore,  convinced  that  it  ought  to  exert  a  great  in- 
fluence upon  the  cabinet  in  the  framing  of  measures;  and 
it  believed  that  it  did  so.  There  is  no  need  of  reviewing 
further  the  history  of  the  Federation  during  this  period, 
for  its  position  remained  unchanged  until  Mr.  Gladstone 
brought  in  his  Home  Rule  Bill  in  18SG.  But  on  two  points 
the  action  of  the  Council  is  noteworthy  in  connection  witli 
its  subsequent  career.     The  resolutions  passed  at  the  annual 

1  Ann.  Rep.  tn  Council,  December,  1882. 
■  Cf.  Ostrogorski,  I.,  218-25. 


524         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

meetings  began  to  cover  a  wider  field.  This  was  especially 
true  after  the  downfall  of  the  Liberal  government,  in  1885, 
when  they  assumed  the  proportions  of  a  full  programme 
of  internal  reforms.1  Then  again  amendments  to  the  reso- 
lutions offered  were  moved  from  the  floor.  In  1883,  for 
example,  an  amendment  in  favour  of  woman  suffrage  was 
carried ;  and  in  1885  another  demanding  local  option  in 
regulating  the  sale  of  liquor. 
The  stmg-  Mr.  Gladstone's  ministry  having  resigned  in  consequence 
HomeeRuie  °^  a  defeat  on  the  budget,  the  Conservatives  came  to 
power  in  June,  1885,  and  the  general  election  at  the 
end  of  the  year,  with  the  political  upheavals  to  which 
it  gave  rise,  proved  a  turning-point  in  the  history  of  the 
Caucus.  The  election  left  both  parties  without  a  working 
majority;  for  the  Conservatives  and  Home  Rulers  together 
almost  exactly  balanced  the  Liberals.  In  January  the  Con- 
servatives were  beaten  on  the  address  with  the  help  of  Irish 
votes,  and  Mr.  Gladstone,  returning  to  office,  prepared  a  bill 
for  a  separate  Parliament  in  Ireland.  Some  members  of 
the  moderate  wing  of  the  party  had  already  left  him  during 
the  debate  on  the  address ;  and  in  March,  while  the  Home 
Rule  Bill  and  its  complement,  the  Irish  Land  Bill,  were 
under  discussion  in  the  cabinet,  several  of  the  ministers, 
including  Mr.  Chamberlain,  resigned,  one  of  their  chief 
stumbling  blocks  being  the  exclusion  of  Irish  representatives 
from  the  House  of  Commons.  A  struggle  began  at  once 
for  the  control  of  the  National  Liberal  Federation.  On 
one  side  stood  Mr.  Gladstone  with  his  cabinet,  the  official 
leaders  of  the  party ;  on  the  other  Mr.  Chamberlain,  hitherto 
the  hero  and  idol  of  the  Caucus,  which  he  had  nurtured 
and  made  great,  which  had  treated  him  as  its  special  repre- 
sentative in  the  cabinet,  and  had  passed  each  year  a  vote 
to   welcome   him   when  he  came  to  make  his  speech.     He 

1  The  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Council  in  October,  1885,  related  to  primo- 
geniture and  entail,  tenure  and  compensation  of  tenants,  registration  of 
land  titles,  enfranchisement  of  leaseholders,  compulsory  purchase  of  land 
for  labourers,  public  elementary  schools,  election  of  rural  governing  bodies, 
and  disestablishment  of  the  Church. 


berlain  is 
Defeated 


THE   NATIONAL   LIBERAL   FEDERATION  525 

had  declared  in  Parliament  not  long  before  that  he  was  not 
the  Caucus,1  but  it  certainly  expressed  his  views,  and  he 
fought  its  battles.  During  the  late  election  he  had  made 
the  country  ring  with  appeals  for  the  reforms  advocated 
in  its  programme,  especially  the  demand  for  labourers' 
allotments,  embodied  in  the  cry  for  "three  acres  and  a  cow." 
The  Caucus  was  the  weapon  of  the  Radical  wing  of  the  party, 
while  he  was  the  greatest  Radical  champion,  and  although 
Kitson,  the  president  of  the  Federation,  was  against  him, 
the  majority  of  the  officers  were  on  his  side,  among  them 
William  Harris,  the  founder  of  popular  party  organisation 
in  Birmingham  and  still  the  chairman  of  the  General 
Committee. 

On  April  6,  two  days  before  Mr.  Gladstone  brought  in  Mr.  Cham 
the  Home  Rule  Bill,  the  officers  sent  a  circular  to  the  feder 
ated  associations  asking  them  to  consider  the  proposals  of  the  in  the 
government,  as  soon  as  they  were  made  known,  with  a  view  to 
an  expression  of  opinion  by  the  Liberal  party.  A  special  meet- 
ing of  the  Council  was  then  summoned  to  meet  in  London  on 
May  15.  There  Mr.  Harris  moved  a  resolution  drawn  up  by 
the  officers,  and  expressing  Mr.  Chamberlain's  ideas.  It  ap- 
proved of  giving  the  people  of  Ireland  a  large  control  over 
their  own  affairs  by  means  of  a  legislative  assembly;  but, 
while  declaring  the  confidence  of  the  Council  in  Mr.  Glad- 
stone, requested  him  to  amend  his  bill  by  retaining  the 
Irish  representatives  at  Westminster.  The  resolution  was 
met  by  an  amendment  moved  by  the  followers  of  the  Prime 
Minister,  commending  the  Home  Rule  Bill,  thanking  him 
for  it,  and  assuring  him  of  support  in  the  present  crisis. 
After  a  long  and  eager  discussion  the  amendment  was  carried 
by  an  overwhelming  majority. 

The  result,  so  far  as  the  Federation  was  concerned,  was  and  with- 
decisive.  Six  members  of  the  General  Committee,  including  ^"v,™™ 
Mr.   Harris,2    thereupon   resigned;    and    several   influential  eration. 

1  Hans.  3  Scr.  CCXCIIL,  573   (Oct.  30,  1SS4). 

2  .Mr.   Harris  came  back  a  few  years  later  and  served  on  the  executive 
body. 


526 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


New  Posi- 
tion of  the 
Federation. 


Removal  to 
London. 


public  men,  among  them  Mr.  Chamberlain,  withdrew  from 
the  organisation.  But  the  mass  of  the  people  think  on 
broad  lines,  delight  in  strong  contrasts  easily  understood, 
and  have  little  sympathy  with  a  half-way  group  that  stands 
between  the  two  opposing  parties  in  the  state.  Hence 
like  the  Peelites  in  1846,  and  the  Free  Trade  Conservatives 
in  1905,  the  Liberal  Unionists  in  1886  were  a  body  in  which 
the  members  of  Parliament  were  many  and  their  following 
in  the  country  comparatively  few.  The  personal  secessions 
from  the  Federation  were  not  numerous,  and  not  a  single 
local  association  left  the  fold.1  But  the  break  soon  became 
incurable.  The  opponents  of  the  Home  Rule  Bill  ceased 
to  be  regarded  by  their  former  companions  in  arms  as 
members  of  the  party,  and  were  constrained  to  leave  the 
Liberal  associations;2  while  Mr.  Chamberlain  in  conjunc- 
tion not  only  with  his  Radical  friends,  but  with  all  the  Lib- 
erals who  could  not  follow  Mr.  Gladstone's  Irish  policy, 
including  even  Lord  Hartington  and  the  Whigs,  founded 
a  new  organisation  upon  the  old  model,  called  the  Liberal 
Unionist  Association. 

The  National  Liberal  Federation  did  not  save  Mr.  Glad- 
stone and  his  adherents  from  defeat  at  the  general  election 
of  1886 ;  but  they  had  obtained  control  of  the  organisation, 
and  must  find  out  what  to  do  with  it.  If  a  power,  it  had 
also  been  a  source  of  anxiety,  and  under  the  wrong  manage- 
ment it  might  again  be  used  to  put  pressure  on  the  mem- 
bers of  Parliament,  and  even  on  the  leaders  themselves. 
It  was  useful  and  must  be  cajoled  ;  but  it  was  also  dangerous 
and  must  be  kept  in  check.  Like  a  colt,  it  must  be  treated 
kindly,  but  must  be  broken  to  harness,  and  above  all  the 
reins  must  not  be  allowed  to  get  into  strange  hands  lest  it 
learn  bad  tricks. 

Obviously  the  offices  of  the  Federation  could  remain  no 
longer  at  Birmingham,  because  in  spite  of  the  loss  of  his 
organisation  Mr.  Chamberlain  still  controlled  the  city  so 
completely  that  his  candidates  carried  every  seat  there  at 


1  Rep.  of  the  Gen.  Com.  in  1886. 


Cf.  Ostrogorski,  I.,  293,  307-9. 


THE   NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  527 

the  election  of  1886.  The  offices  were,  therefore,  moved 
to  London,  where  they  were  established  in  the  same  build- 
ing with  the  Liberal  Central  Association  —  the  body  that 
acts  in  conjunction  with  the  party  whips  —  and  what  is 
more,  M.  Schnadhorst,  the  paid  secretary  of  the  Federation, 
who  had  taken  Mr.  Gladstone's  side  at  the  time  of  the  split, 
was  also  appointed  honorary  secretary  of  the  Association. 
This  arrangement,  which  lasted  until  he  retired  in  1894, 
and  has  continued  ever  since  under  his  successor  Mr.  Hud- 
son, was  not  mentioned  at  the  time  in  the  printed  reports 
of  the  General  Committee,  but  its  effects  in  bringing  the 
leaders  of  the  party  into  close  touch  with  the  management 
of  the  Federation  can  readily  be  imagined.  Another  link 
of  the  same  kind  was  soon  made.  The  General  Committee 
had  always  been  in  the  habit  of  distributing  political  liter- 
ature, and  in  1887  a  publication  department  was  created 
under  the  direction  of  a  joint  committee  consisting  of  two 
representatives  of  the  Central  Association,  and  two  of  the 
Federation.1  All  these  changes  brought  the  Federation 
nearer  to  the  party  chiefs,  and  gave  it  also  a  more 
national  stamp. 

At  the  same  time  the  constitution  was  slightly  modified.  The 
The  principal  changes  adopted  in  1887  were :  making  the  l^dened. 
representation  on  the  Council  more  nearly  proportional  to 
population  ;  giving  to  each  association  for  a  whole  constitu- 
ency throe  votes  in  the  General  Committee,  and  to  all  others 
one  vote  apiece  without  regard  to  size ;  and  lastly  providing 
for  district  federations,  especially  for  Wales,  the  Home 
Counties  and  London,  which  should  be  represented  as  sep- 
arate organisations  upon  the  governing  bodies.  The  ob- 
ject of  these  changes  appears  to  have  been  to  make  the 
Federation  attractive  to  all  Liberals  throughout  the  country, 
for  it  had  hitherto  been  regarded  as  preeminently  an  in- 
strument of  the  Radical  wing  of  the  party,  and  many  local 
associations  had  held  aloof.  The  managers  now  tried  to 
induce  them   to  join   in  order  to   make  the   Federation  as 

1  Rep.  of    1887,  pp.  28,  29,  40. 


528         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

fully  representative  of  the  whole  party  as  possible.  In  this 
they  were  successful  in  a  high  degree,  as  may  be  seen  from 
the  fact  that  the  federated  associations,  which  numbered 
in  1886,  before  the  split  over  Home  Rule,  only  two  hundred 
and  fifty-five,  rose  in  two  years  to  seven  hundred  and  six- 
teen.1 In  carrying  out  this  object  there  was  no  need  of 
opening  the  door  to  local  associations  not  framed  upon  a 
popular  and  representative  basis,  because  societies  of  that 
kind  had  already  been  entirely  superseded.2 
Relation  to  When  the  Federation,  breaking  away  from  Mr.  Cham- 
Leade™y  berlain,  chose  the  side  of  Mr.  Gladstone,  the  leaders  of  the 
party  took  it  at  once  under  their  patronage,  and  began  to 
show  a  keen  interest  in  its  proceedings.  Not  only  did  Mr. 
Gladstone  address  almost  every  year  a  great  public  meeting 
held  in  the  evening  during  the  session  of  the  Council,  as 
Mr.  Chamberlain  had  been  in  the  habit  of  doing  before  1886  ; 
but  other  leaders  of  the  party  attended  the  meetings  of  the 
Council  itself,  and  former  cabinet  ministers  made  speeches 
there  in  moving,  seconding  or  supporting  the  resolutions. 
This  practice  magnified  the  apparent  importance  of  the 
Federation,  and  lasted  until  the  Liberals  came  into  office 
again  in  1892. 
Resolutions  Meanwhile  the  Council,  meeting  as  before  in  one  after 
another  of  the  great  provincial  towns,  continued  to  adopt 
a  series  of  resolutions  setting  forth  the  policy  of  the  Liberal 
party.  The  embarrassment  that  might  come  from  this 
in  the  future  was  not  fully  perceived  at  the  time,  and  there 
was  at  first  no  attempt  to  discourage  it.  In  fact  a  state- 
ment of  the  objects  of  the  Federation  published  with  the 
new  rules  in  1887  repeated  the  words  originally  written  ten 
years  earlier:  uthe  essential  feature  of  the  Federation  is 
the  participation  of  all  members  of  the  party  in  the  forma- 
tion and  direction  of  its  policy,  and  in  the  selection  of  those 
particular  measures  of  reform  and  progress  to  which  priority 
shall  be  given."  3  The  resolutions  became,  in  fact,  more 
and  more  comprehensive,  because  the  Council  was  naturally 

1  Rep.  of  1888,  p.  14.  2  Ibid.,  p.  12.  3  Ibid.,  1887,  p.  39. 


of  the 
Council. 


THE   NATIONAL   LIBERAL  FEDERATION  529 

in  the  habit  each  year  of  reaffirming  its  previous  votes  about 
internal  reforms,  and  adding  new  ones,  the  older  expressions 
of  opinion  being  after  a  while  condensed  into  what  was 
known  as  the  "omnibus  resolution."  At  the  meeting  held 
at  Nottingham  in  1887  a  series  of  resolutions  was  adopted  The  Not- 
condemning  coercion,  urging  Home  Rule,  the  principle  of  one  S?1^,^ 
man  one  vote,  registration  reform,  disestablishment  of  the 
Church  in  Wales,  and  the  need  of  reform  in  the  land  laws, 
in  labourers'  allotments,  county  government,  local  option, 
London  municipal  government,  and  free  education.  The 
resolutions  were  talked  about  as  a  programme  for  the  party, 
and  the  managers  began  to  see  that  a  danger  was  involved, 
but  apparently  as  yet  only  the  danger  of  splitting  the  party. 
The  General  Committee,  therefore,  in  its  next  annual  report, 
after  speaking  of  the  influence  exerted  by  the  Federation, 
remarked:  "A  force  so  great  and  so  overwhelming  requires 
to  be  directed  with  the  utmost  care  and  judgment,  and  your 
Committee  asks  for  the  support  of  the  Federated  Associa- 
tions in  applying  it  only  to  questions  of  a  practical  character, 
with  regard  to  which  there  is  a  general  consensus  of  opinion 
in  the  party.  .  .  .  Much  has  been  said  and  written  of 
the  Nottingham  programme.  Neither  the  resolutions  sub- 
mitted at  Nottingham,  nor  the  resolutions  which  are  sub- 
mitted at  the  present  meetings  of  the  Council,  are  intended 
to  constitute  a  political  programme.  The  resolutions  which 
were  submitted  last  year,  and  those  which  will  be  sub- 
mitted this  year,  refer  to  subjects  upon  which  there  is  a 
general  consensus  of  opinion  in  the  Liberal  ranks.  Every 
question  added  which  is  not  thus  approved  tends  to  divide 
and  to  weaken  the  party."  1 

The  principle  that  resolutions  on  which  there  was  not  a  Amend- 
general  consensus  of  opinion  ought  not  to  be  adopted  by  p^  0ut 
the  Council   was  given   a   very   definite  application  at   that  ofOrder. 
meeting.      A  motion  stood  upon  the  agenda  in  favour  of  one 
man  one   vote,  and   the   payment   out   of  the   public   rates 
of  returning  officers'   expenses.      The   president,  Sir  James 

1  Rep.  of  188S,  pp.  13,  14. 


530         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Kitson,  stated  that  a  delegate  wished  to  add  the  question 
of  the  payment  of  members,  but  he  must  rule  that  it  should 
be  sent  up  by  one  of  the  federated  associations  with  a  request 
for  inclusion  in  next  year's  programme.  As  the  agenda 
was  prepared  by  the  General  Committee,  the  action  of  the 
president  was  in  effect  a  ruling  that  a  question  not  placed 
by  that  committee  upon  the  paper  could  not  be  proposed 
from  the  floor.  A  little  later  in  the  meeting  he  took  the 
same  position  when  a  member  wanted  to  bring  forward  the 
grievances  of  the  Scotch  crofters.1 

The  ruling  was  a  complete  innovation,  for  amendments  of 
a  similar  character  had  not  only  been  adopted  by  the  Coun- 
cil in  former  years,  in  1883  and  1885,  for  example ;  but  in 
the  great  struggle  for  the  control  of  the  Federation  in  1886, 
the  defeat  of  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  been  brought  about  by 
an  amendment  in  favour  of  the  Home  Rule  Bill,  which  was 
carried  in  the  Council  by  a  large  majority.  The  conditions, 
however,  had  changed.  A  freedom  of  making  motions  that 
was  harmless  when  the  Federation  contained  only  one  ex- 
treme wing  of  the  Liberals,  became  a  very  different  thing 
when  it  comprised  all  the  elements  in  their  ranks,  and  the 
ruling  was  now  essential  if  motions  were  not  to  be  made  that 
might  divide  or  weaken  the  party.  It  was  repeated  the  next 
year  when  a  delegate  sought  to  add  to  the  omnibus  resolu- 
tion a  rider  on  the  question  of  the  eight-hour  day ; 2  and 
it  was  confirmed  by  the  new  president,  Dr.  Spence  Watson, 
in  189 1.3  In  fact,  Dr.  Watson  in  his  opening  address  at 
the  meeting  explained  that  in  his  opinion  the  exclusion 
of  any  alteration  or  amendment  of  the  resolutions  sub- 
mitted to  the  Council  arose  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
case  ;4  and  thereafter  the  rule  was  firmly  established  in  the 
proceedings  of  the_  body. 

1  Rep.  of  1888,  pp.  109,  112.  *  Ibid.,  1889,  pp.  128-29. 

3  Ibid.,  1891,  pp.  87,  90. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  42.  On  other  occasions  he  repeated  the  statement,  adding 
that  the  practice  saved  the  Council  the  risk  from  which  the  Union  of  Con- 
servative Associations  had  suffered,  of  having  alterations  made  suddenly 
under  the  magic  strains  of  eloquence.     Rep.  of  1895,  p.  58;    1890,  p.  57. 


THE   NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  581 

Three  matters,  however,  deserve  a  brief  notice  in  this  con- 
nection. First,  the  rule  has  never  been  applied  to  the 
General  Committee.  At  its  meetings  amendments  may 
be  freely  moved  and  carried;  but  then  the  General  Com- 
mittee has  power  merely  to  discuss  public  questions,  not 
to  express  definitely  the  opinion  of  the  party.1  Second,  the 
rule  in  the  Council  would  seem  to  apply  only  to  amend- 
ments that  may  provoke  a  difference  of  opinion.  At  the 
meeting  of  1889,  for  example,  immediately  after  the  eight- 
hour  day  amendment  had  been  ruled  out  of  order,  another 
declaring  "that  Welsh  disestablishment  and  disendowment 
should  be  dealt  with  as  soon  as  Irish  Home  Rule  is  attained," 
was  adopted,  without  objection  from  the  president,  with 
the  unanimous  approval  of  the  meeting.2  Third,  the  rule 
in  the  Council  applies  only  to  resolutions  affecting  the 
Liberal  programme.  It  has  not  been  applied  to  such  a 
matter  as  a  revision  of  the  rules  of  the  Federation,  and  in 
1896  and  1897  several  motions  to  amend  proposals  relating 
to  the  rules  were  made,  and  one  of  them,  which  occasioned 
a  count  of  votes,  was  carried  by  a  narrow  majority.3 

With  no  questions  submitted,  save  those  on  which  there  Resoiu- 
was  believed  to  be  a  general  consensus  of  opinion  in  the  speakers 
Liberal  ranks,  and  no  amendments  allowed,  serious  dissent  Cut  and 
about  the  adoption  of  the  resolutions  never  occurred.     Nor 
was   there    much    real    discussion.     In    accordance    with    a 
common  English  custom  an  agenda  paper  was  distributed 
before  the  meeting,  which  contained  not  only  a  list  of  the 
resolutions  to  be  brought  forward,  but  also  the  names  of 
the  proposer,  the  seconder,  and  sometimes  a  third  or  fourth 
man  who  would  support  each  of  them.     Now  these  persons 
were  expected  to  make  speeches  long  enough  to  fill  together 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  sitting;  and  hence  the  other  delegates, 
although  at  liberty  to  take  part,  did  not  often  feel  inclined 

'As  late  as  1894  the  General  Committee  declared  that  the  Registration 
Bill  of  the  Liberal  government  was  not  satisfactory  and  urged  its  amend- 
ment.     Hep.  of  1894. 

2  Rep.  of  1S89,  p.  129. 

'Ibid.,  1896,  pp.  73-78;  Rep.  of  1897,  pp.  77-80. 


532         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  make,  upon  an  unopposed  resolution,  remarks  that  in 
the  presence  of  one  or  two  thousand  people  must  be  in  the 
nature  of  an  harangue.  As  a  rule,  therefore,  the  proceedings 
followed  closely  the  agenda ;  a  resolution  was  proposed, 
seconded,  and  supported  as  had  been  arranged,  and  was  then 
carried  unanimously. 

Under  such  conditions  the  duty  of  preparing  the  resolu- 
tions for  the  Council,  by  drawing  up  the  agenda,  was  of 
prime  importance.  If  the  Federation  was  no  longer  used, 
as  in  the  days  when  it  was  guided  from  Birmingham,  to 
press  forward  a  policy  upon  which  all  Liberals  were  not 
agreed,  it  might  now  be  supposed  to  speak  with  a  more 
authoritative  voice  on  behalf  of  the  whole  party;  and 
while  its  votes  were  passed  by  common  consent,  the  right 
to  select  the  questions  which  should  be  presented  for  gen- 
eral acceptance  conferred  no  small  power.  Nominally  this 
function  was  intrusted  to  the  General  Committee,  but  that 
body,  which  was  far  too  large  for  such  a  task,  had  been  in 
the  habit  of  delegating  the  preliminary  work  to  a  few  of  its 
own  members  under  the  title  of  the  General  Purposes  Com- 
mittee,1 and  in  1890  amendments  to  the  rules  of  the  Federa- 
tion were  proposed  chiefly  in  order  to  confer  the  power 
definitely  upon  the  smaller  body.  They  provided  that  the 
General  Purposes  Committee  should  consist  of  the  officers 
of  the  Federation,  and  of  not  more  than  twenty  other  mem- 
bers elected  by  the  General  Committee ;  that  it  should  pre- 
pare the  business  for  meetings  of  the  Council,  and  generally 
carry  on  the  affairs  of  the  Federation.  Although  the  change 
involved  a  concentration  of  power  it  was  adopted  at  the  time 
without  opposition,2  but  was  the  cause  of  heart-burning 
at  a  later  date. 
The  Process  In  his  opening  speech  the  next  year  the  President  explained 
u"cSionlg  the  functions  of  the  Council.  "From  the  earliest  time," 
he  said,  "it  has  been  the  practice  and  the  rule  of  these  meet- 
ings to  make  certain  declarations.  Some  of  us  think  those 
declarations  are  a  little  too  numerous  already.     Some  of 

1  Rep.  of  1890,  p.  29.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  6-8,  58. 


THE   NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  533 

us  are  afraid  that  the  declarations  partake  somewhat  of 
the  character  of  a  programme.  Some  of  us  look  back  to 
the  good  old  time  when  we  took  up  one  burning  question 
and  fought  it,  and  fought  it  until  we  carried  it  into  law. 
In  the  first  place  this  is  a  business  meeting  for  the  purpose 
of  receiving  the  report.  In  the  second  place  it  has  come  to 
be  a  meeting  for  making  certain  declarations.  It  is  not 
—  and  I  wish  to  be  particularly  clear  upon  this  point  — 
for  the  discussion  of  subjects.  But  you  will  say  'The  Na- 
tional Liberal  Federation  not  to  discuss  subjects!'  Cer- 
tainly it  can,  and  certainly  it  does.  It  does  not  discuss  them 
at  the  annual  meeting.  It  does  discuss  them  at  the  General 
Committee  meetings,  and  at  the  conferences  held  from  time 
to  time.1  Great  dissatisfaction  is  found  with  the  fact  that 
there  are  rules  affecting  the  Federation.  No  federation, 
no  society  of  any  kind,  could  ever  exist  without  rules. 
There  must  be  absolute  rules  of  procedure,  and  one  of  the 
rules  of  the  proceedings  of  these  meetings  has  been  that 
beforehand  the  General  Purposes  Committee  sends  out  to 
every  association  which  is  federated  —  between  800  and 
900  —  to  ascertain  what  the  wishes  of  that  association  may 
be.  From  the  replies  it  receives,  from  prior  resolutions, 
from  the  business  which  has  been  transacted  at  the  General 
Committee  meetings  of  the  Federation  and  at  the  confer- 
ences, the  General  Purposes  Committee  prepares  the  reso- 
lutions which  are  submitted,  and  those  resolutions  are  either 
accepted  or  rejected.  They  are  not  altered  or  amended. 
That  arises  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case.  ...  It  is 
absolutely  impossible  to  discuss  questions  in  which  great 
numbers  of  men  take  a  great  interest  and  hold  different 
views  in  a  gathering  of  this  character.  The  first  discussion 
must  take  place  in  the  individual  associations.  The  in- 
dividual associations  must  send  up  their  delegates  to  our 
General  Committee  meetings  and  conferences,  and  the 
matter    must    be    threshed    out    there,    and    there    must    be 

1  Tin  se  win-  special  conferences  of  delegates  from  (lie  associations  of  the 
whole,  or  of  some  pari,  of  the  country.     They  were  not  infrequently  held. 


534 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Contrast 
with  the 
Original 
Plan. 


The 

Newcastle 

Programme. 


clear  evidence  as  to  the  question  having  received  general 
acceptance  before  it  comes  to  a  meeting  of  this  kind." 
Then,  after  referring  to  the  question  of  an  eight-hour  day, 
about  which  the  associations  showed  a  wide  difference  of 
opinion,  he  added:  "Do  you  think  we  wish  to  stifle  dis- 
cussion ?  Why,  discussion  is  the  very  life-blood  of  Liberal- 
ism. We  long  for  discussion  of  all  questions.  We  wish  to 
have  further  discussion  of  this  question,  a  discussion  search- 
ing out  to  the  very  bottom  of  the  matter.  We  don't  want 
a  hap-hazard  discussion  in  a  great  meeting  where  it  is  abso- 
lutely impossible  that  men  can  give  their  real  opinions,  can 
argue  the  question  out,  and  go  down  to  the  roots  of  the 
matter."1 

It  would  be  difficult  to  express  more  forcibly  the  change 
that  had  come  over  the  Federation,  in  the  functions,  and 
still  more  in  the  aims,  of  the  Council  meetings.  According 
to  the  original  plan  the  Federation  was  to  be  a  true  Liberal 
parliament  outside  the  imperial  legislature ;  and  it  was 
a  far  cry  from  that  conception  to  a  body  voting,  without 
amendment  or  real  debate,  ratifications  of  measures  pre- 
arranged by  a  small  committee,  and  found  by  previous 
inquiry  to  express  the  universal  sentiment  of  the  party. 
If  the  Federation,  with  its  General  Purposes  Committee,  its 
General  Committee  and  its  Council,  still  remained  a  shadow 
of  a  Liberal  parliament,  it  was  one  somewhat  after  the 
model  of  Napoleon's  legislature  with  its  Council  of  State, 
its  Tribunate,  and  its  Legislative  Assembly,  where  one 
body  prepared  the  laws,  another  debated,  and  a  third 
voted  them.2 

As  the  General  Purposes  Committee  placed  upon  the 
agenda  for  the  Council  only  resolutions  on  which  the  party 
was  believed  to  be  united,  it  is  not  strange  that  they  were 


1  Rep.  for  1891,  pp.  42-44. 

2  "  Now  whilst  the  Council  of  the  Federation  declares  what  the  party  as 
a  whole  desires,  the  General  Committee  attempts  by  preliminary  discussion 
to  arrive  at  what  the  desires  are.  As  the  General  Committee  examines  but 
does  not  declare,  the  freest  and  fullest  discussion  takes  place  at  its  meetings." 
Rep.  of  1898,  p.  42. 


THE  NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  535 

invariably  carried,  and  almost  always  with  substantial  una- 
nimity. The  surprising  thing  is  the  number  of  questions 
on  which  the  whole  body  of  Liberals  appeared  to  agree ; 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  party  was  in  Opposition, 
so  that  neither  the  leaders,  nor  any  one  else,  could  make 
any  effort  at  present  to  put  into  effect  the  resolutions  that 
had  been  voted.  They  expressed  merely  aspirations,  and 
the  impulse  of  every  one  was  to  assent  to  any  proposal  for 
a  reform  to  which  he  had  no  fixed  objection.  This  was  the 
more  true  because  all  assemblies  of  that  kind  are  attended 
most  largely  by  the  ardent  or  advanced  members  of  the 
organisation,  the  more  moderate  elements  caring  far  less  to 
be  present.  The  resolutions,  therefore,  increased  until  they 
reached  high-water  mark  at  the  very  meeting  of  1891/ 
where  Dr.  Spence  "Watson  in  his  opening  address  said  he 
thought  them  too  numerous  already.  From  the  town 
where  the  Council  met  that  year  the  resolutions  became 
known  as  the  " Newcastle  Programme."  At  the  evening 
meeting  Mr.  Gladstone  took  up,  one  after  another,  most 
of  the  subjects  included  therein,  and  dwelt  upon  the  im- 
portance of  each  of  them ;  but  before  doing  so  he  remarked 
that  when  the  Liberals  came  to  power  they  would  want 
the  additional  virtue  of  patience,  because  with  the  surfeit 
of  work  to  be  done  it  would  be  difficult  to  choose  proper 
subjects  of  immediate  attention.2 

The  virtue  of  patience  was  needed  very  soon.  The 
Council  had  met  at  Newcastle  in  October,  1891.  Owing  to  a 
change  in  the  date  of  meeting,  it  was  not  called  together 
again  until  January,  1893  ;  and  in  the  meanwhile  a  Liberal 
ministry  had  come  into  office.  The  Council  took  up  no 
new  questions,  and  passed  a  single  modest  resolution  re- 
lating to  the  party  policy,  saying  "That  this  Council  con- 
firms the  series  of  Resolutions  known  as  'the  Newcastle 
Programme,'  and  confidently  expects  that  Mr.  Gladstone's 
government  will  promptly  introduce  into  the  House  of 
Commons  Bills  embodying  Reforms  which   have  been  de- 

1  Rep.  of  1891,  pp.  6-8.  '  Ibid.,  p.  101. 


536         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

clared  again  and  again  by  this  Council  to  be  essential  to 
the  welfare  of  the  people  of  the  United  Kingdom."  *  As 
the  reforms  contained  in  the  Newcastle  Programme  could 
hardly  have  been  embodied  in  statutes  in  less  than  ten  years 
by  a  cabinet  with  a  large  and  homogeneous  majority,  the 
demand  that  bills  upon  all  those  subjects  should  be  promptly 
introduced  by  a  ministry  with  a  very  narrow  majority,  and 
depending  for  its  life  upon  the  support  of  Irish  votes,  showed 
the  need  of  patience  rather  than  its  presence.  In  fact  most 
of  the  speakers  at  the  meeting  emphasised  the  reforms  in 
which  they  were  especially  interested,  and  the  rest  urged 
the  importance  of  the  whole  array, 
its  Effects.  The  wealth  of  the  programme  speedily  caused  embarrass- 
ment to  the  leaders  of  the  party.  Home  Rule,  as  every 
one  admitted,  was  entitled  to  the  first  place ;  but  after  that 
had  been  put  on  the  shelf  by  the  House  of  Lords  difficulties 
arose,  for  the  Liberals  in  the  House  of  Commons  were  not  all 
of  one  mind.  Some  of  them  were  more  interested  in  one 
reform,  some  in  another,  and  each  had  an  equal  right  to 
feel  that  his  subject  had  been  accepted  as  an  essential  part 
of  the  Liberal  policy  deserving  immediate  attention.  People 
said  that  the  traditional  division  into  parties  was  passing 
away,  that  the  parties  were  falling  apart  into  groups,  like 
those  in  continental  legislatures.  The  assertion  was  fre- 
quently repeated,  although  it  was  disproved  by  the  constancy 
with  which  the  ministers  were  supported  by  their  followers 
in  a  House  of  Commons  where  the  defection  of  a  dozen 
members  at  any  moment  would  have  turned  the  scale. 
Month  after  month  the  whips  came  regularly  to  the  table 
with  their  slight  margin  of  Liberal  votes.  In  fact  the  gov- 
ernment defeats  on  minor  matters  were  less  frequent  than  in 
Mr.  Gladstone's  previous  administration ;  and  no  defeat  on  a 
question  of  political  importance  occurred  until  June,  1895, 
when  it  was  accomplished  by  the  trick  of  bringing  Conserva- 
tives secretly  into  the  House  through  the  terrace.  After 
that  defeat  the  ministers  resigned,  not  because  their  fol- 

1  Rep.  of  1892,  p.  6. 


THE   NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  537 

lowers  had  ceased  to  vote  with  them,  but  because  they 
were  weary  of  a  hopeless  struggle.  Nevertheless  the  New- 
castle Programme  with  its  magnificent  promises  had  been  a 
source  of  weakness  to  them.  It  restrained  their  freedom 
of  action,  and  forced  their  hands.  In  short,  it  hampered 
their  initiative  in  party  policy,  and  it  caused  disappoint- 
ment among  their  followers. 

Lord    Rosebery,   who   had   succeeded   Mr.   Gladstone   as  Lord 
Prime  Minister  in  1894,  felt  the  bad  effects  of  the  Newcastle  J^bery'8 

'  Criticism. 

Programme.  At  the  public  meeting,  held  when  the  Council 
met  in  January,  1895,  he  spoke  of  the  function  of  the  Federa- 
tion in  threshing  out  the  issues  lying  before  the  party,  and 
that  of  the  cabinet  in  winnowing  them,  selecting  from  a 
vast  field  the  bills  to  be  brought  forward  in  the  session. 
"Now,  this  programme,"  he  went  on,  "as  it  stands  now, 
without  any  addition,  would  require  many  energetic  years 
in  which  a  strong  Government,  supported  by  a  united  and 
powerful  Liberal  Party,  would  have  to  do  their  best  to  carry 
into  effect  (sic).  But  what  is  sometimes  forgotten  is  this 
—  that  we  cannot  pass  all  the  measures  of  this  programme 
simultaneously.  .  .  .  Whilst  this  process  of  winnowing  is 
going  on,  all  Cabinet  Ministers  are  subject  to  a  bombardment 
of  correspondence  .  .  .  by  appeals,  some  of  them  menacing, 
some  of  them  coaxing  and  cajoling,  but  all  of  them  extremely 
earnest,  and  praying  that  the  particular  hobby  of  the  writer 
shall  be  made  the  first  Government  Bill.  .  .  .  Any  delay  in 
pushing  forward  each  measure  that  has  been  recorded  in 
what  is  called  the  Newcastle  programme  implies,  we  are 
told,  the  alienation  of  all  the  earnest  and  thoughtful  mem- 
bers of  the  Liberal  Party  —  in  fact,  the  backbone  of  the 
Liberal  Party.  And  I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  Liberal  Party  is  extremely  rich  in  backbones."  ' 

At  the  public  meeting  in  the  following  year,  after  the  fall 
of  his  government,  he  spoke  even  more  plainly.  He  said 
there  had  been  complaint  thai  officialdom  had  crept  into  the 
National  Liberal  Federation.      His  own  experience  was  that 

1   Rep.  of   ISO."),  pp.    Ill     13. 


538         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

it  played  a  very  subordinate  part  there,  and  if  he  had  a 
secret  hope  on  the  subject,  it  was  that  officialdom  might 
have  a  little  more  to  do  with  the  organisation.  "I  remember 
two  occasions  on  which  the  National  Liberal  Federation 
took  the  bit  between  its  teeth  and,  certainly  uninspired  by 
officialdom,  took  very  remarkable  action.  The  first  occa- 
sion was  when  it  made  at  Newcastle  a  programme,  a  very 
celebrated  expression  of  faith  which,  I  confess,  was  in  my 
opinion  too  long  for  practical  purposes."  *  Later  in  allud- 
ing to  the  fall  of  his  ministry  he  asked:  "Why  did  it  fall? 
It  fell  because,  with  a  chivalrous  sense  of  honour  too  rare  in 
politics,  and  with  inadequate  means,  it  determined  to  fulfil 
all  the  pledges  that  it  had  given  in  Opposition.  It  had, 
I  think,  given  too  many  pledges  — partly  owing  to  you,  Dr. 
Spence  Watson.  It  had,  I  think,  assumed  too  many  re- 
sponsibilities, it  had  taken  a  burden  too  heavy  for  its  back, 
or  the  back  of  any  Government  or  any  Parliament,  to  bear."2 
The  The  lesson  of  the  Newcastle   Programme  had  not  been 

Cut^^-n16  m  vain.  Already  in  1895  the  "omnibus  resolution,"  which, 
after  1894.  by  way  0f  comprehensive  reform,  threatened  the  interests 
of  the  landlord,  the  manufacturer,  the  mine  owner,  the 
Church,  and  the  House  of  Lords,  had  been  omitted,  al- 
though most  of  the  matters  covered  by  it  were  made  the 
subject  of  special  votes.  The  next  year  the  programme 
was  left  out  altogether.  Apart  from  resolutions  criti- 
cising the  Conservative  government  for  its  foreign  policy  in 
Armenia  and  Egypt,  and  stating  on  what  terms  an  edu- 
cation bill  ought  to  be  based,  the  only  vote  dealing  with 
the  policy  of  the  Liberal  party  declared  simply,  ''That  this 
Council  reaffirms  its  adherence  to  the  principles  for  which 
the  Federation  has  always  contended,"  a  confession  of  faith 
not  likely  to  cause  acute  discomfort  to  a  future  cabinet.  As 
the  years  went  by  the  pressure  for  specific  reforms  was  too 
strong  to  be  resisted,   and   resolutions  dealing  with  them 

1  The  other  occasion  was  when  it  held  a  conference  on  the  subject  of  the 
House  of  Lords. 

'  Rep.  of  1896,  pp.  109,  119 


THE   NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  539 

were  adopted ;  but  they  have  never  again  reached  anything 
resembling  the  range,  the  well-nigh  revolutionary  propor- 
tions, or  the  suicidal  capacity,  of  the  Newcastle  Programme. 

A  political,  like   a  military,  defeat  is  apt  to  cause  mu-  Complaints 

tual  recriminations.     If  Lord  Rosebery  lamented  that  the  ^?*the« 

J  \\  nips  Con- 

leaders  in  Parliament  had  been  overburdened  by  the  pro-  troi  the 

gramme  of  the  Federation,  there  were  Radicals  aggrieved  by  eratlon- 
the  control  which,  in  their  opinion,  the  leaders,  acting 
through  the  whips  and  the  Liberal  Central  Association,  had 
acquired  over  the  Federation.  The  complaints  were  so 
loud,  and  so  much  discussed  in  the  press,  that  Dr.  Spence 
Watson  felt  constrained  to  deal  with  them  in  his  presidential 
address.  The  charge  was  that  by  having  the  same  quarters, 
and  the  same  secretary  (Mr.  Hudson)  the  Federation  had 
been  fused  with  and  merged  into  the  Central  Association. 
This,  he  insisted,  was  absolutely  incorrect,  the  two  organisa- 
tions having  duties  which  lay  quite  apart  one  from  the  other; 
and  he  defended  the  existing  connection  between  them  as  a 
good  business  arrangement,  which  had  resulted  in  much 
better  work.1  The  charge  in  another  form  was  that  the 
General  Purposes  Committee,  in  preparing  the  resolutions 
for  the  Council,  was  swayed  by  the  whips  by  means  of  Mr. 
Hudson.  Of  this  he  said:  "We  are  told  that  the  resolu- 
tions are  not  genuine ;  that  they  are  forced  upon  us  by  the 
Whips  through  the  secretary,  Mr.  Hudson.  No  man  ad- 
mires the  work  of  Mr.  Hudson  more  than  I  do,  because  no 
man  sees  more  of  his  work.  I  think  Mr.  Hudson,  if  he  were 
so  disposed, which  I  imagine  is  very  far  from  his  disposition, 
would  find  it  very  difficult  to  impose  the  will  of  the  Whips 
upon  us.  We  are  not  exactly  the  men  to  be  dealt  with  in 
that  way.  Now,  gentlemen,  I  wish  to  put  this  quite  plainly. 
There  is  not  a  grain  of  truth  in  it.  I  have  written  down 
these  words  because  I  wish  to  be  precise.  I  assert  that  not 
a  single  resolution  has  ever,  at  all  events  since  1880,  been 
suggested,  hinted  at,  drawn,  altered,  or  manipulated  by  any 
Whip  or  leader  whatsoever."  2 

1  Rep.  of  189G,  pp.  58  GO.  2  Ibid.,  p.  .r>,S. 


540 


THE    GOVERNMENT    OF   ENGLAND 


Power  Con- 
centrated 
in  an 

Executive 
Committee 
in  1896. 


Although  the  statement  was  no  doubt  true,  and  would  per- 
haps continue  to  be  true,  the  efficiency  of  the  party  might 
well  depend  upon  having  the  resolutions  of  the  Council 
prepared  by  a  small  body  of  men  of  proved  discretion,  who 
would  insert  nothing  embarrassing  to  the  leaders.  In  view 
of  the  experience  with  the  Newcastle  Programme  it  might 
be  wise  to  take  even  greater  care  in  the  selection  of  men 
who  could  understand  the  situation  of  the  front  bench,  and 
to  increase  their  powers.  At  a  meeting  of  the  General 
Committee,  at  Leeds,  in  December,  1895,  a  vote  was  passed 
instructing  the  General  Purposes  Committee  "to  consider 
whether  the  machinery  of  the  Federation  can  be  made  more 
representative  and  democratic."  Democracy  is  a  principle 
in  whose  name  strange  things  are  done ;  and  in  accordance 
with  this  vote  a  plan  was  reported  for  a  revision  of  the  rules, 
in  which  the  principal  changes  proposed  would  strengthen 
the  hands  of  the  General  Purposes  Committee,  renamed  the 
Executive  Committee.  That  body  was  directed  to  invite 
expressions  of  opinion  from  the  federated  associations  about 
the  subjects  to  be  brought  before  the  Council ;  was  confirmed 
in  its  power  to  frame  the  resolutions  to  be  submitted  ; 1  and 
was  given  authority  to  decide  any  questions  of  procedure 
that  might  arise  during  the  sessions  of  the  Council.2  In 
order,  as  the  General  Committee  said  in  their  report,  to 
u  afford  an  opportunity  for  the  ventilation  of  views  upon 
subjects  not  dealt  with  in  the  resolutions,"  it  was  provided 
that  upon  the  motion  to  adopt  the  annual  report  "the 
Council  shall  be  open  for  the  free  discussion  of  any  matter 
affecting  the  policy  and  principles  of  the  Liberal  party." 
A  mere  chance  to  talk  supplies  a  useful  safety  valve,  without 
doing  harm ;  and  in  this  case  the  talk  could  not  be  followed 
by  an  expression  of  opinion  on  the  part  of  the  Council,  for 
no  vote  would  be  in  order  save  to  accept,  or  reject,  or  refer 
back,  the  annual  report.3     The  discussion  would  be  like  that 

1  The  agenda  was  to  be  sent  to  the  associations  in  advance  of  the  meeting. 

2  In  1902  the  Committee  itself  proposed  at  the  Council  meeting,  and  car- 
ried a  substitute  for  its  own  resolution.      Rep.  of  1902,  p.  70. 

3  It  was  so  ruled.     Rep.  of  1898,  p.  60. 


THE   NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  541 

in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  motion  to  adjourn  over 
Easter. 

Hitherto  the  action  of  the  General  Committee  had  been 
entirely  free,  but  the  revised  rules  intrusted  the  Execu- 
tive Committee  with  the  duty  of  preparing  the  business  for 
that  body  as  well  as  for  the  Council;  not,  indeed,  in  the 
same  absolute  way,  for  any  federated  association  could 
propose  an  amendment  or  further  resolution,  provided  they 
gave  notice  thereof  to  the  secretary  five  days,  at  least,  before 
the  meeting.  Moreover  the  Executive  Committee  was  given 
power  to  nominate  its  own  members.  Every  association 
had  also  a  right  to  make  nominations,  but  these  were  not, 
like  those  of  the  Executive  Committee,  circulated  among 
the  local  associations  before  the  meeting.1 

Finally,  members  of  Parliament  were  declared  ineligible  Members  of 
to   the    Executive   Committee.     To    a   question   why   they  Excluded1 
were   excluded,   the   chairman   of    the   General   Committee  Therefrom, 
"replied  that  it  had  always  been  considered  desirable  that 
when  a  man  became  a  Member  of  Parliament  he  should 
retire  from  the  Executive,  and  that  they  should  be  free  from 
all  thought  of  outside  influence."       The  answer  does  not 
make  it  perfectly  clear  whether  the  object  of  the  provision 
was  to  free  the  members  of  Parliament  from  the  influence  of 
the  Committee,  or  the  Committee  from  the  influence  of  the 
members.     Both  results  were  in  fact  attained.     The  mem- 
bers of  the  House  were  left  to  the  sole  tutelage  of  the  whips, 
so  far  as  the  Federation  was  concerned,  for  since  1886  it  had 
ceased  altogether  from  the  practice  of  stirring  up  local  asso- 

1  The  text  of  this  provision  was :  "One  month,  at  least,  prior  to  the  meet- 
i:.;r  of  the  General  Committee  at  which  the  Executive  Committee  is  to  be 
(I  ctid,  a  list  of  those  Members  of  the  existing  Executive  Committee  who 
oil' r  themselves  for  reelection,  together  with  the  names  of  any  others 
nominated  by  the  Executive  Committee,  shall  be  sent  to  each  of  the  Feder- 
ated Associations.  Federated  Associations  desiring  to  nominate  other 
Candidates  for  the  Executive  Committee  shall  send  in  formal  nominations 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Federation  at  least  fourteen  days  before  the  meeting. 
In  the  event  of  nominations  exceeding  the  number  to  be  elected,  a  ballot 
will  be  taken  at  the  meeting  of  the  General  Committee." 

2  Rep.  of  1890,  p.  77. 


542 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Opposition 
to  the 
Changes. 


ciations  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  their  representatives  ;* 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  new  rule  removed  any  oppor- 
tunity for  a  member  of  Parliament  to  use,  or  appear  to  use, 
the  Committee  for  his  own  political  advancement.2  Lord 
Randolph  Churchill's  doings  in  the  National  Union  of  Con- 
servative Associations — to  be  related  in  the  next  chapter  — 
was  still  fresh  in  men's  minds.  It  is,  indeed,  a  striking  fact 
that  from  the  time  when  the  Liberals  came  to  power  in  1892 
the  leaders  ceased  for  some  years  to  attend  even  the  sittings 
of  the  Council,  which  were  left  wholly  to  the  lesser  lights.3 
One  of  the  chiefs  spoke  at  a  public  evening  meeting;  but 
they  all  stayed  away  from  the  Council  itself  where  business 
was  transacted,  thus  depriving  it  of  the  weight  that  came 
from  having  its  words  sanctioned  by  the  presence  of  the 
real  leaders  of  the  party. 

During  the  debate  on  the  new  rules  in  the  Council,4  a  num- 
ber of  amendments  were  moved,  which  aimed  at  preventing 
the  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  General  and 
Executive  Committees.  Of  this  nature  were  motions  that 
the  Executive  Committee  should  be  chosen  by  the  Council ; 
that  amendments  to  the  agenda  and  further  resolutions 
might  be  proposed  at  Council  meetings ;  that  the  agenda 
should  be  prepared  by  the  General,  instead  of  the  Executive, 
Committee ;  and  that  the  Executive  Committee  should  not 
have  power  to  nominate  its  own  members.  As  these 
amendments  struck  at  the  very  root  of  the  revision, 
none  of  them  were  carried,  and  in  fact  the  new  rules  were 
adopted  without  substantial  alteration. 


1  This  appears  from  the  annual  reports  of  the  General  Committee,  which 
did,  however,  continue  for  some  years  to  send  circulars  to  local  associations 
urging  them  to  pass  resolutions  of  a  general  character. 

2  At  the  same  time  all  the  Liberal  members  of  Parliament  were  made  ex 
officio  members  of  the  Council,  where  their  presence  was  expected  to  exert 
a  restraining  influence  upon  the  extreme  and  impracticable  elements  in  the 
party. 

s  After  the  party  had  been  out  of  power  many  years  this  rule  was  not 
rigidly  observed.  In  1903,  for  example,  Sir  Henry  Cumpbell-Bannerman 
spoke  in  support  of  one  of  the  resolutions.     Rep.  of  1903,  p.  75. 

♦Rep.  of  1896,  pp.  71-78. 


THE   NATIONAL   LIBERAL  FEDERATION  543 

At  the  meeting  in  the  following  year,  1897,  the  same  ques-  Renewed 


tions  were  raised  again.  Changes  in  the  rules  were  pro 
posed,  similar  in  character  to  the  amendments  rejected  in  1898. 
1896,  and  brought  forward  with  the  same  object.  They 
were  urged  on  the  ground  that  the  control  ought  to  be 
taken  from  the  hands  of  the  few  and  placed  in  the  hands  of 
the  many,  that  at  present  "the  whole  thing  was  wire-pulled 
from  the  top,"  that  the  Liberal  party  had  got  out  of  touch 
with  the  Labour  party,  and  that  the  associations  had  not  so 
much  opportunity  as  they  ought  to  have  to  bring  matters 
before  the  Council.  In  the  end  the  proposals  were  shelved 
by  being  referred  to  the  Executive  Committee.1  The  next 
report  of  the  General  Committee  treated  the  matter  with 
great  frankness:  "The  Annual  Council  Meeting,"  we  read, 
"must  either  be  (a)  an  open  conference  for  the  debate  of 
multitudinous  questions  about  which  the  party  has  come 
to  no  agreement,  or  (b)  an  Assembly  of  a  declaratory  char- 
acter to  emphasise  matters  upon  which  the  party  are  agreed. 
The  former  function  is  impossible,  if  merely  because  the 
Council  may  consist  of  more  than  a  thousand  persons  sitting 
for  less  than  a  dozen  hours.  ...  It  is  inevitable  (and 
there  is  no  reason  why  it  should  not  be  frankly  recognised) 
that  the  business  of  the  Council  Meeting  should  be  more  or 
less  'cut  and  dried'  beforehand.  .  .  .  These  resolutions 
are  intended  to  inform  the  party  leaders  of  the  subjects  in 
dealing  with  which  they  may  rely  upon  the  support  of  the 
party  as  a  whole.  The  Federation  does  not  interfere  with 
the  time  or  order  in  which  questions  should  be  taken  up. 
That  is  the  province  of  the  leaders  of  the  party." 

The  report  went  on  to  discuss  the  occult  question :  Who 
was  responsible  for  the  Newcastle  Programme?  "The 
Federation,"  it  said,  "had  steadily  refused  to  formulate  a 

1  Rep.  of  1897,  pp.  75-80.  Oik;  of  the  arguments  in  favour  of  the  elec- 
tion of  the  Executive  Committee  by  the  (Jeneral  Committee  was  that  the 
latter  was  more  fairly  representative  than  the  Council,  because  the  dele- 
Kates  to  the  Council  from  the  part  of  the  country  where  the  meeting  was 
held  attended  in  greater  numbers  than  from  more  distant  places. 

2  Ibid.,  18'J8,  pp.  3'J,  41. 


Discussion 
in  1897  and 


544         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

political  programme.  .  .  .  How  then  did  the  Newcastle 
Programme  come  into  existence?  No  Newcastle  Pro- 
gramme was  ever  framed  by  the  Federation  or  by  any  one 
connected  with  it."  The  Council  merely  passed  a  number 
of  resolutions  urging  reforms,  all  of  which  had  been  de- 
manded at  previous  meetings.  "But  the  resolutions  of 
this  particular  meeting  received  a  special  significance  from 
the  fact  that  ...  to  the  surprise  of  every  one,  our  great 
leader,  Mr.  Gladstone  .  .  .  took  up  seriatim  the  resolutions 
which  had  been  passed  at  the  Council  Meetings  and  gave 
them  the  weight  of  his  direct  approval.  The  newspapers 
at  once  spoke  of  the  Newcastle  Programme."  !  Poor  Mr. 
Gladstone  !  It  seems  that  by  taking  the  action  of  the  Fed- 
eration too  seriously,  he  became  quite  unconsciously  2  the 
unfortunate  author  of  the  Newcastle  Programme. 

A  few  members  protested  vehemently  in  favour  of  the 
changes  they  had  proposed  in  the  rules,  but  the  report  of 
the  General  Committee  was  adopted  with  only  two  dissen- 
tients ;  and  thus  the  opposition  to  the  concentration  of  power 
in  the  hands  of  a  small  executive  body  was  laid  to  rest.  But 
it  must  be  observed  that  if  the  direction  of  the  Federation 
is  in  the  hands  of  a  few  men,  their  power  is  exerted,  not  to 
incite,  but  to  restrain  the  Council,  not  to  use  it  to  carry 
through  a  policy  of  their  own,  but  to  prevent  it  from  doing 
something  indiscreet. 
Discussion  The  ill-starred  Newcastle  Programme,  and  the  concen- 
tration of  authority  within  the  Liberal  organisation  to  which 
it  gave  rise,  provoked  discussion  in  the  press  as  well  as  in 
the  Federation  itself,  with  the  contending  views  painted  in 
higher  colours.  One  can  find  articles  written  to  prove  that 
the  political  machine  had  taken  the  place  of  public  opinion;3 
or  that  the  Federation  acted  at  the  instigation  of  the  whips, 
was  as  much  subject  to  the  Liberal  Government  as  the 
Board  of  Trade,  and  was  used  by  the  leaders  to  register 
opinions    upon    questions    on    which  the    party    itself    was 

1  Rep.  of  1898,   pp.  40-41.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  54-55 

3  "The  Ministry  of  the  Masses,"  Edinburgh  Review,  July,  1894 


in  the  Press. 


THE   NATIONAL  LIBERAL   FEDERATION  545 

divided;1  or  finally  that  the  Federation  had  become  an 
anti-democratic  juggernaut,  which  elevated  the  aristocratic 
elements  in  the  party  and  killed  enthusiasm.2  Opinions 
of  this  kind  are  exaggerated,  springing  from  dread  of  the 
organisation,  or  disappointment  at  the  results  achieved. 

Another  writer  tells  us  more  calmly  that  the  evolution  of 
Liberal  policy  goes  through  three  stages  :  first,  a  free  discus- 
sion in  the  General  Committee,  which  shows  the  trend  if  not 
the  balance  of  opinion,  but  which  docs  not  add  articles  to 
the  party  programme,  because  the  Federation  docs  not  act 
by  majorities,  and  all  the  associations  may  not  have  sent 
delegates  to  the  committee ;  second,  the  adoption  by  the 
Council,  without  amendment  or  real  debate,  of  resolutions 
which  have  been  found  to  command  the  assent  of  practically 
the  whole  party;  and  third,  the  unfettered  selection  by  the 
Liberal  cabinet  from  among  those  resolutions,  of  the  meas- 
ures they  think  it  best  to  bring  before  Parliament.3  The 
writer  states  correctly  the  theory  of  the  matter;  and  sees 
clearly  that  although  the  General  Committee  is  allowed  to 
discuss  very  freely  and  to  act  by  majority,  its  decisions 
are  not  considered  authoritative,  while  the  Council  which 
speaks  in  the  name  of  the  party  is  not  permitted  to  deal  at 
all  with  questions  that  might  arouse  a  serious  difference  of 
opinion. 

The   actual  working  of  the  National  Liberal  Federation  TheGeneral 
is  well  illustrated  by  its  action  in  regard  to  the  Boer  War,  J',"""^.6 
a  matter  on  which  the  Liberals  were  divided.     At  a  meeting  cil  at  Work, 
of  the  General  Committee  in  December,  1S99,  a  resolution  was 
proposed,  saying  that  there  was  much  to  deplore  in  the  con- 
duct of  negotiations  with  President  Kruger,  and  that  in  mak-   Example  in 
ingpeace  due  regard  must  be  paid  to  the  wishes  of  all  sections  wuar>  °' 
of  the  South  African  population  ;   but  avoiding  carefully  any 
statement  whether  the  war  was  inevitable  or  not.     A  second 


1  "The    Reorganisation    of    Liberalism,"    Janus    Annand,    Xew    Review, 
November,  1S95. 

2  "The  Future  of  Liberalism,"  Furtnii/hlh/  lieeinr,  January,   1  SOS. 
'"The  National  Liberal  Federation,"*  \>nU  mjiorary  lice  it  >e,  February,  18'JS. 


516         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

clause  simply  praised  the  soldiers  and  expressed  sympathy 
with  the  sufferers.  A  motion  was  made  to  add  somewhat 
incongruously  in  the  clause  a  recital  that  "a  wise  states- 
manship could  and  should  have  avoided"  the  war,  and  it 
was  carried  by  114  votes  to  94. *  But  this  was  treated  merely 
as  the  opinion  of  the  persons  present,  not  as  binding  the 
party;  and  in  preparing  the  agenda  for  the  meeting  of 
the  Council  in  the  following  March,  the  Executive  Com- 
mittee, wishing  to  avoid  points  of  difference,  omitted  the 
words  that  had  been  inserted.  The  principal  resolution 
relating  to  the  war  was  introduced  in  the  Council  by  a  speech 
in  which  the  mover  virtually  threw  the  blame  for  the  war 
upon  the  Boers.  This  raised  a  storm  of  dissent,  and  speakers 
took  the  other  side  with  no  mild  language.  But  an  amend- 
ment could  not  be  moved,  and  after  the  most  contradictory 
opinions  had  been  uttered  the  resolution  was  adopted  unani- 
mously.2 The  members  of  the  General  Committee,  there- 
fore, expressed  their  views  individually  and  collectively, 
but  ineffectually,  while  in  the  larger  assembly  the  members 
could  personally  declare  their  opinions,  but  the  Council  as  a 
whole  could  not.  It  could  only  pass  a  resolution  carefully 
drawn  so  as  to  conceal  the  differences  of  opinion  that 
existed. 
Selection  of  At  one  time  the  Federation  was  tempted  to  lay  its  hand 
Leaded  y  on  a  matter  even  more  delicate  than  the  formulation  of 
party  policy,  and  that  is  the  selection  of  the  party  leader. 
On  Dec.  13,  1898,  Sir  William  Harcourt's  resignation  of  the 
Liberal  leadership  in  the  House  of  Commons  was  made 
public,  and  it  so  happened  that  the  General  Committee  met 
three  days  later.  There  a  motion  was  made  requesting  him 
to  reconsider  his  position,  and  another  "That,  in  the  opinion 
of  this  meeting,  the  question  of  the  leadership  of  the  Liberal 
party  should  be  taken  into  immediate  consideration,  and 
calls  upon  the  leaders  to  close  up  their  ranks."  In  defer- 
ence, however,  to  a  strong  feeling  that  the  motions  did  not 
come  within  the  functions  of  the  Federation  they  were  with- 

1  Rep.  of  1900,  p.  15.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  G3-70. 


THE  NATIONAL  LIBERAL  FEDERATION  547 

drawn ;  '  and  before  the  Council  met  the  Liberals  in  the 
House  of  Commons  had  chosen  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Ban- 
nerman  as  their  leader.  The  decision  in  the  Committee 
was  wise,  for  the  success  of  parliamentary  government  de- 
pends upon  the  fact  that  the  leaders  in  the  Commons  pos- 
sess the  influence  required  to  command  the  support  of  their 
followers,  and  this  can  be  secured  only  by  having  them 
selected,  formally  or  informally,  by  the  members  of  the 
party  in  Parliament.  A  man  chosen  by  a  popular  body 
outside  might  well  be  quite  unable  to  lead  the  House. 

The  National  Liberal  Federation  has  now  had  a  history  The  Fed- 
of  thirty  years,  and  it  has  proved  very  different  from  what  MuMted8 
it  was  originally  intended  to  be.  As  an  organisation  it  is 
highly  useful  to  the  party  in  many  ways.  It  does  valuable 
work  in  promoting  local  organisation,  in  distributing  party 
literature,  in  collecting  information,  and  in  keeping  the 
Liberal  workers  throughout  the  country  alert.  Even  the 
Council  does  good  service  in  arousing  enthusiasm,  and  pre- 
serving an  appearance  of  participation  by  the  rank  and  file 
in  the  management  of  party  affairs.  But  as  a  Liberal  par- 
liament outside  of  the  imperial  legislature,  which  directs, 
the  policy  of  the  party,  the  Federation  is  a  sham.  The 
General  Committee  can  debate  and  act  freely,  but  the  lack 
of  a  sufficiently  representative  character,  and  the  almost 
invariable  absence  of  all  the  leading  Liberals,2  deprives 
its  deliberations  of  any  real  might ;  while  the  Council  is 
effectively  muzzled.  Its  resolutions  are  carefully  prepared 
so  as  to  express  no  opinions  on  which  every  one  does  not 
agree,  and  hence  they  declare  nothing  that  every  one  did 
not  know  already.  Nevertheless  it  involves  some  dangers. 
Popular  excitement  on  some  question  might  force  the  Exec- 
utive Committee  to  bring  in  unwise  resolutions;  the  Coun- 
cil itself  might  become  roused,  and  by  a  change  in  the  rules 
tear  off  the  muzzle;    and  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  a  man 

1  Rep.  of  1S99,  pp.  21,  24. 

2  The  exceptions  are  rare.      In  1903,  however,  Mr.  Bryce  moved  a  reso- 
lution on  education.      Hep.  of  1903,  p.  20. 


548  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

with  popular  talents  and  a  demagogic  temperament  might 
capture  the  organisation,  and  use  it  to  combat  the  leaders 
and  thrust  himself  into  power. 

To  a  person  unfamiliar  with  the  hopes  and  fears  in- 
spired by  the  Caucus  a  generation  ago,  a  discussion  of  this 
length  about  a  body  that  wields  very  little  real  power 
may  seem  like  a  long  chapter  on  the  snakes  in  Iceland ; 
but  there  are  a  couple  of  good  reasons  for  treating  the 
subject  thoroughly.  The  very  fact  that  the  Caucus  was 
regarded  as  the  coming  form  of  democracy,  destined  to 
undermine  the  older  political  institutions  of  the  nation, 
makes  its  subsequent  history  important,  for  it  shows  that 
among  a  highly  practical  people  democratic  theories  about 
direct  expression  of  the  popular  will  yield  to  the  exigen- 
cies of  actual  public  life.  The  story  of  the  Caucus  illus- 
trates also  the  central  conception  of  this  book,  that  in  the 
English  parliamentary  system  leadership  must  be  in  the 
hands  of  the  parliamentary  leaders.  We  have  seen  this 
principle  at  work  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  a  popu- 
lar organisation,  in  attempting  to  direct  party  policy, 
strove  against  it  in  vain.  That  the  result  is  not  an  acci- 
dent may  be  seen  from  the  experience  of  the  Conservative 
party,  where  a  similar  movement,  not  less  dramatic  at 
times,  has  travelled  through  different  paths  to  the  same 
end. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

THE  RISE  AND  FALL  OF  THE  CAUCUS 

The  Conservatives 

Ten  years  before  the  National  Liberal  Federation  was  Formation 
founded,  a  Torv  organisation,  called  the  National  Union  of  of  thc 

r-i  •  r\  •  i  National 

Conservative  and  Constitutional  Associations,  had  been  Union  of 
started  upon  similar  lines.  After  some  preliminary  meetings  £v!Tassch 
it  was  definitely  formed  at  a  conference  in  November,  1S07,  ciations. 
where  delegates  from  fifty-four  towns  and  the  University 
of  London  were  present.1  Here  a  constitution  was  adopted, 
which,  with  the  amendments  made  in  the  first  few  years, 
contained  the  following  provisions.  Any  Conservative  or 
Constitutional  association  might  be  admitted  to  the  Union 
on  payment  of  one  guinea  a  year,  and  would  then  lie  entitled 
to  send  two  delegates  to  the  Conference.  This  last  body 
was  the  great  representative  assembly  of  the  Union.  Like 
the  Council  of  the  National  Liberal  Federation  it  was  to 
meet  in  a  different  place  each  year,2  and  was  composed  of 
the  two  delegates  from  each  subscribing  association,  of  the 
officers  of  the  Union,  and  of  such  honorary  members  as  were 
also  members  of  the  Council.  The  Council  was  the  execu- 
tive body  of  the  Union,  and  consisted  of  the  president, 
treasurer,  and  trustees;   of  twenty-four  members  elected  b> 

1  The  reports  of  tho  first  three  ('(inferences  are  fount]  only  in  the  manu- 
script minutes  (if  proceedings.  Reports  of  the  fourth  to  the  ninth  Confer- 
ence inclusive  were  printed.  Since  that  time  only  the  reports  of  the  Coun- 
cil and  the  programmes  for  the  Conferences  have  been  published. 

s  In  the  original  constitution  it  was  to  meet  every  third  year  in  London, 
but  this  was  changed  in  INfJN.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  Conference  cor- 
responds to  the  Council  of  the  National  Liberal  Federation;  and  the 
Council,  although  a  much  smaller  body,  to  the  (ieiieral  Committee  of  the 
Federation. 

54!) 


550         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

the  Conference ;  of  not  more  than  twenty  nominated  by  the 
principal  provincial  associations ;  and  of  such  members  of 
the  Consultative  Committee  as  were  willing  to  act,  the  last 
being  a  body  formed  out  of  vice-presidents  and  honorary 
members  to  which  difficult  questions  could  be  referred. 

In  order  to  attract  money,  it  was  provided  that  any  one 
subscribing  a  guinea  a  year  should  be  an  honorary  member 
of  the  Union,  that  the  subscribers  of  five  guineas  a  year 
should  be  vice-presidents  with  seats  ex  officio  in  the  Con- 
ference, and  that  any  one  subscribing  twenty  guineas  should 
be  a  vice-president  for  life.  In  order  to  attract  titles  pro- 
vision was  made  for  the  election  of  a  patron  and  ten  vice- 
patrons  of  the  Union.  These  methods  of  procuring  the 
countenance  of  rank  and  wealth  were  not  tried  in  vain.  In 
1869  Lord  Derby  became  the  patron  of  the  Union,  and  on 
his  death  he  was  succeeded  by  the  Duke  of  Richmond.  In 
the  report  of  the  Council  in  1872  we  read,  "the  total  number 
of  vice-presidents  is  now  365,  among  whom  are  66  noble- 
men, and  143  past  and  present  members  of  the  House  of 
Commons."  The  honorary  members  at  the  same  time 
numbered  219. 
Objects  of  Although  the  National  Union  was  much  older  than  the 

National  Liberal  Federation,  it  attracted  far  less  notice. 
During  its  earlier  years,  indeed,  the  Conferences  were  very 
small  affairs.  At  the  second  Conference,  for  example,  in 
1868,  there  were  present  only  three  officers  and  four  dele- 
gates, and  in  the  two  following  years  respective^  only 
thirty-six  and  thirty-five  persons  all  told.  The  chief  reason, 
however,  why  the  Union  made  so  much  less  stir  than  the 
Federation,  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  work  it  undertook  to  do. 
The  Federation  was  a  weapon  of  militant  radicalism,  de- 
signed to  carry  into  effect  an  aggressive  public  policy,  and 
was  considered  a  serious  menace  to  old  institutions ;  but 
the  LTnion  was  intended  merely  as  an  instrument  for  helping 
the  Conservative  party  to  win  victories  at  the  elections. 
Its  object  was  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  local  associations ; 
while   its  work   consisted   chiefly  in  helping  to  form   such 


the  Union. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  551 

associations,  and  in  giving  information.'     For  this  purpose, 

it  kept  a  register  of  all  Conservative  associations,  so  that  it 

could  act  as  their  London  agency ;    it  offered  suggestions, 

was  ready  to  give  advice,  printed  and  distributed  pamphlets, 

and  arranged  for  speeches  and  lectures.2    The  Union  made  it  did  not 

no  claim  to  direct  the  policy  of  the  party.     At  the  meeting  GindePartr 

in  1867,  when  the  Constitution  was  adopted,  one  speaker  Policy. 

said  that  "  unless  the  Union  was  managed  by  the  leaders  of 

the  Conservative  party  it  would  have  no  force  and  no  effect 

whatever,"  and  this  was  given  as  a  reason  for  making  the 

honorary   members  eligible   to   the  Council.3     The   matter 

was  put  in  a  nutshell  some  years  later  by  Mr.  Cecil  Raikes, 

one  of  the  founders,  when  he  said  that  "the  Union  had  been 

organised  rather  as  what  he  might  call  a  handmaid  to  the 

party,  than  to  usurp  the  functions  of  party  leadership."  4 

In  fact,  for  the  first  nine  years  the  Conference  passed  no 

resolutions  of  a  political  character  at  all,  and  those  which  it 

adopted  during  the  decade  that  followed  expressed  little 

more  than  confidence  in  the  leaders  of  the  party. 

Mr.  (afterwards  Sir  John)  Gorst,  who  had  presided  at  the  Tts  Relation 
first  Conference  in  1867,  was  appointed  in  1870  principal  agent  Leaders*1^ 
of  the  party  —  that  is,  the  head,  under  the  whips,  of  the 
Conservative  Central  Office  —  and  in  order  to  connect  the 
new  representative  organisation  with  the  old  centralised  one 
he  was  made  the  next  year  honorary  secretary  of  the  Union.5 
The  policy  was  soon  carried  farther.  In  their  report  for 
1872  the  Council  said:  "Since  the  last  conference,  an  ar- 
rangement has  been  made  by  which  the  work  of  the  Union 
has  been  more  closely  incorporated  with  that  of  the  party 
generally,  and  its  offices  have  been  removed  to  the  head- 
quarters of  the  party  in  Parliament  Street.     This  arrange- 

1  Cf.  Statement  made  at  first  Conference,  1868,  and  Rep.  of  the  Council 
at  the  Conference  of  lS7.r>.  2  Cf.  Leaflet  No.  1,  1870. 

3  Manuscript  minutes,  p.  57.  *  Rep.  of  the  Conference  of  1873. 

6  Rep.  of  the  Council  for  1871.  He  held  the  post  of  principal  agent 
through  the  general  election  of  1874  which  his  efforts  helped  much  to  win. 
In  1881  lie  took  the  position  again,  and  at  thai  time  was  made  a  vice-chair- 
man of  the  Council  so  as  to  bring  the  1'nion  into  cooperation  with  the  whips' 
office.      (Rep.  of  the  Council  for  1881.) 


Conference 
of  1872. 


552         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

ment  has  been  productive  of  the  most  satisfactory  results, 
not  only  by  having  brought  the  Union  into  more  direct  con- 
tact with  the  leaders  of  the  party,  and  thereby  enhancing 
the  value  of  its  operations,  but  also  by  greatly  reducing  its 
working  expenses."  At  an  early  stage  of  its  existence,  there- 
fore, the  Union  took  for  its  honorary  secretary  an  officer 
responsible  through  the  whips  to  the  leaders  of  the  party 
in  Parliament,  and  this  was  openly  proclaimed  an  advantage. 
No  secret  was  made  of  the  fact  that  the  Union  was  expected 
to  follow,  not  to  lead ;  for  at  the  banquet  held  in  connection 
with  the  Conference  that  same  year  the  Earl  of  Shrewsbury, 
in  proposing  a  toast  to  the  Army,  said,  "The  duty  of  a  soldier 
is  obedience,  and  discipline  is  the  great  characteristic  of  the 
army  and  navy,  and  I  may  also  say  that  in  a  like  manner  it 
is  characteristic  of  the  Conservative  Union." 
The  The  Conference  held  in  1872  seems  to  have  been  the  first 

that  attracted  much  public  attention,  and  it  was  notable 
for  two  things.  Mr.  Disraeli  had  insisted  that  the  working 
classes  were  by  nature  conservative,  and  that  the  extension 
of  the  franchise  would  bring  an  accession  of  strength  to  his 
party.  His  opponents,  assuming  that  Liberalism  was  a  cor- 
ollary of  democracy,  had  laughed  at  the  idea  ;  and  although 
his  followers  had  expended  much  energy  in  organising 
Conservative  workingmen's  associations,  the  results  of  the 
election  of  1868  appeared  to  have  disproved  his  theory. 
But  the  meeting  in  1872  showed  that  among  the  artisans 
Tories  were  by  no  means  rare.  In  connection  with  the 
Conference,  which  was  held  in  London,  a  great  banquet  was 
given  at  the  Crystal  Palace,  and  this  caused  Mr.  Cecil  Raikes, 
the  chairman  of  the  Council,  to  remark  :  "a  few  years  ago" 
everybody  said  "that  if  a  Conservative  workingman  could 
be  found  he  ought  to  be  put  in  a  glass  case.  We  have 
found  for  him  the  largest  glass  case  in  England  to-night." 
The  banquet  was  also  notable  for  a  speech  by  Mr.  Disraeli, 
which  was  ridiculed  at  the  time  on  account  of  the  char- 
acteristically grandiloquent  phrase,  "You  have  nothing  to 
trust  to  but  your  own  energy  and  the   sublime    instinct 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL   UNION  553 

of  an  ancient  people."  !  Nevertheless  it  was  a  remarkable 
speech,  for  it  laid  down  the  main  principles  of  Tory  policy 
for  the  next  thirty  years  and  more,  a  feat  that  is  probably 
without  parallel  in  modern  history.2 

Although  the  Conservative  party  carried  the  country  at  Complaints 
the  general  election  of  1874,  and  Mr.  Disraeli,  for  the  first  unions 
time,  came  into  power  with  a  majority  at  his  back,  popular  no*  Repre- 
interest  in  the  Union  grew  slowly.  As  late  as  1878  not  more 
than  two  hundred  and  sixty-six  out  of  the  nine  hundred 
and  fifty  Conservative  associations  were  affiliated  to  the 
Union,  and  delegates  from  only  forty-seven  of  them  attended 
the  Conference.3  Yet  complaints  were  already  heard  that 
foreshadowed  the  strife  to  come  in  the  future.  In  1876 
Mr.  Gorst,  the  honorary  secretary,  but  no  longer  the  princi- 
pal agent  of  the  party,  proposed  to  reorganise  the  Council 
by  making  it  more  representative  in  character.4  His  sugges- 
tion was  opposed  by  Mr.  Raikes,  and  was  voted  down- 
The  next  year,  however,  he  returned  to  the  subject,  mov- 
ing first  to  abolish  the  Consultative  Committee  altogether, 
and  then  that  its  members  should  not  sit  on  the  Council. 
He  withdrew  these  motions  on  the  understanding  that  the 
Council  would  consider  the  matter;  and  although  other  per- 
sons also  urged  that  the  Council  should  be  strengthened 
by  becoming  a  more  representative  body,  the  only  action 
taken  at  this  meeting  was  to  provide  that  the  Council  itself 
should  not  propose  for  reelection  more  than  two  thirds  of 
its  retiring  members. 

1  Punch  made  the  expression  the  subject  of  a  cartoon. 

2  Curiously  enough  he  suggested  one  principle  which  has  only  recently 
been  taken  up  seriously  by  Conservative  leaders.  Among  the  three 
great  objects  of  the  party  he  placed  the  upholding  of  the  empire,  and  in 
speaking  of  this  he  said  that  when  self -government  was  given  to  the  colonies, 
it  ought  to  have  been  with  provisions  for  an  imperial  tariff,  common  defence, 
and  some  representative  council  in  London. 

3  Hep.  of  Conference  of  1878.  But  many  of  the  local  associations  may 
have  been  branches  with  less  than  one  hundred  members,  and  therefore  not 
admissible  under  the  rules. 

*  The  need  of  a  reorganisation  of  the  party  on  a  more  popular  basis  was 
afterward  urged  by  Mr.  Clorst  and  Sir  Henry  Dnmunond  WolfT  in  an  article 
entitled  "  The  State  of  the  Opposition."  Fortnightly  Review,  November,  18SU. 


554 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Changes  in 
its  Rules. 


Thp  Fourth 
Party. 


Mr.  Gorst  resigned  his  position  as  honorary  secretary  in 
November,  and  in  spite  of  continued  criticism  of  the  Council 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  to  a  great  extent  self -elected,1 
nothing  was  done  to  change  its  composition  until  after  the 
Liberals  had  won  the  general  election  of  1880.  Under  the 
pressure  of  the  defeat  the  Conference  of  that  year  adopted 
a  new  set  of  rules  drawn  up  by  the  Council  itself.  They 
provided  that  the  associations  should  be  represented  at  the 
Conference  in  proportion  to  their  size ;  that  the  members 
of  the  Consultative  Committee  should  no  longer  sit  on  the 
Council ;  and  that  instead  of  the  twenty  members  of  the 
Council  nominated  by  the  principal  associations,  who  were 
said  to  attend  little,  the  Council  itself  should  add  twelve 
persons  to  its  number.  This  plan  of  cooptation  was  des- 
tined to  open  the  door  for  a  most  audacious  attempt  to 
capture  the  organisation. 

The  chance  for  a  new  man  to  distinguish  himself  in  Par- 
liament comes  in  Opposition.  As  Mr.  Winston  Churchill 
remarks  in  the  life  of  his  father:  "There  is  small  scope  for 
a  supporter  of  a  Government.  The  Whips  do  not  want 
speeches,  but  votes.  The  Ministers  regard  an  oration  in 
their  praise  or  defence  as  only  one  degree  less  tiresome 
than  an  attack."  2  But  in  the  Opposition  free  lances  are 
applauded  if  they  assault  the  Treasury  Bench  from  any  quar- 
ter. Moreover,  although  the  game  of  politics  in  England 
is  played  under  a  conventional  code  of  rules  which  are  scru- 
pulously observed,  a  skilful  player  can  achieve  a  rapid 
prominence  by  violating  the  rules  boldly,  if  he  has  great 
ability,  high  social  rank,  or  wins  the  ear  of  the  people. 
These  truths  were  turned  to  advantage  in  the  Parliament 
which  sat  from  1880  to  1885  by  Lord  Randolph  Churchill 
and  his  small  band  of  friends,  who,  in  contradistinction  to 
the  Liberals,  Conservatives,  and  Irish  Home  Rulers,  came 
to  be  known  as  the  Fourth  Party.  The  general  election 
of  1880  had  brought  Mr.  Gladstone  back  to  power,  and  in 


1  E.ij.,  by  Dr.  Evans.     Rep.  of  Conference  of  1878. 

2  "Lord  Randolph  Churchill,"  I.,  09. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE  NATIONAL  UNION  555 

the  course  of  this  administration  he  was  obliged  to  face 
unexpectedly  many  delicate  and  difficult  questions.  The 
Conservative  Opposition  was  led  by  Sir  Stafford  Northcote, 
a  man  of  decorous  rather  than  combative  temperament,  who 
had  been  Mr.  Gladstone's  private  secretary  in  early  life, 
and  was  not  inclined  to  carry  parliamentary  contests  to 
extremes.  The  conditions  were  favourable  to  a  small  body 
of  members,  something  between  knights  errant  and  ban- 
ditti, who  fought  as  guerillas  under  the  Conservative  ban- 
ner, but  attacked  on  occasion  their  own  leaders  with 
magnanimous  impartiality. 

The  Fourth  Party  began  in  one  of  those  accidents  that  its  Origin 
happen  in  irregular  warfare.1  The  Bradlaugh  case,  involv-  and  Pohcy 
ing  the  thorny  question  whether  a  professed  atheist  could 
qualify  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  affirmation  or  oath, 
vexed  the  whole  life  of  the  Parliament,  and  brought  together 
in  the  opening  days  Sir  Henry  Wolff,  Mr.  John  Gorst,  Lord 
Randolph  Churchill,  and  Mr.  Arthur  Balfour.  This  case, 
in  which  they  played  successfully  upon  the  feelings  of  the 
House,  made  them  at  once  conspicuous,  and  taught  them 
the  value  of  concerted  action.  With  a  short  interruption, 
caused  by  a  difference  of  opinion  about  the  Irish  Coercion 
Bill  of  1881,  the  friends  acted  in  harmony  for  four  years. 
They  had  no  formal  programme,  and  no  one  of  them  was 
recognised  as  the  chief,  but  it  was  understood  that  they 
should  defend  one  another  when  attacked,  and  they  were 
in  the  habit  of  dining  together  to  arrange  a  common  plan 
of  action.  They  took  a  vigorous  part  in  all  debates,  criti- 
cised the  government  unsparingly,  and  under  the  pretence 
of  assisting  to  perfect  its  measures,  spun  out  the  discussions 
and  obstructed  progress.     They  showed  great  skill  in  baiting 

■Tli"  best  accounts  of  the  Fourth  Party  arc  to  be  found  in  Winston 
Churchill's  "Life  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill,"  1.,  Ch.  iii.,  and  in  three 
articles  by  Harold  E.  Gorst  entitled  "The  Story  of  the  Fourth  Party"  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  {or  November,  and  December,  1902  and  January,  1003, 
afterward  republished  as  a  book.  Tin-''  accounts  are  written  by  the  sons 
of  two  of  the  members  of  the  group,  and  may  be  taken  to  express  the  viewa 
of  those  two  members. 


556         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Mr.  Gladstone,  and  when  delay  was  their  object,  in  drawing 
him  by  turns  into  long  explanations  in  response  to  plausible 
questions  about  the  clauses  of  his  bills.  Their  aggressive- 
ness, and  their  profession  of  popular  principles  under  the 
name  of  Ton'  democracy,  spread  their  reputation  in  the 
country,  and  gave  them  an  importance  out  of  proportion 
to  their  number  or  their  direct  influence  in  the  House  of 
Commons, 
its  Attacks  Throughout  its  career  the  Fourth  Party  assumed  to  be 
Leaders101"7  independent  of  the  regular  Conservative  leaders  in  the 
House.  At  times  it  went  much  farther,  accusing  them  of 
indecision  and  an  inability  to  lead,  which  disorganised  the 
party.  Lord  Beaconsfield's  death  in  1881  left  the  Conserva- 
tives with  no  single  recognised  leader;  for  Lord  Salisbury 
was  chosen  by  the  Tory  peers  leader  of  the  House  of  Lords ; 
and  Sir  Stafford  Northcote  remained,  as  he  had  been  in 
Lord  Beaconsfield's  last  years,  the  leader  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  neither  of  them  being  regarded  as  superior  in 
authority  to  the  other.  The  members  of  the  Fourth  Party 
asserted  that  this  dual  leadership,  by  causing  uncertainty 
in  the  counsels  of  the  party,  was  disastrous;  and  they  soon 
settled  upon  Sir  Stafford  Northcote  as  the  object  of  their 
censure.  The  attack  upon  him  culminated  in  April,  1883, 
when  his  selection  to  unveil  the  statue  of  Lord  Beaconsfield 
seemed  to  indicate  that  he  was  to  be  the  future  premier 
whenever  the  Conservatives  might  come  to  power.  On 
that  occasion  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  published  a  couple 
of  letters  in  The  Times  in  which  he  spoke  of  Sir  Stafford  in 
strong  terms,  and  declared  that  Lord  Salisbury  was  the 
only  man  capable  of  taking  the  lead.  These  he  followed 
up  by  an  article  in  the  Fortnightly  Review  for  May,  entitled 
"Elijah's  Mantle,"  describing  the  decay  of  the  Conservative 
party,  setting  forth  his  ideas  of  Tory  democracy  as  a  means 
of  regeneration,  designating  Lord  Salisbury  as  the  proper 
heir  to  Lord  Beaconsfield's  mantle,  but  revealing  at  the  same 
time  his  confidence  in  his  own  fitness  for  command.  His 
quarrel  with  his  chief  in  the  House  of  Commons  did  not  im- 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  557 

pair  his  popularity  in  the  country;  while  his  speeches,  with 
their  invective  against  prominent  Liberals,  and  their 
appeals  for  the  support  of  the  masses,  caught  the  fancy  of 
the  Tory  crowds.  Hitherto  he  had  decried  Sir  Stafford 
Northcote  and  praised  Lord  Salisbury,  but  lie  now  embarked 
upon  an  adventure  that  brought  him  into  sharp  conflict  with 
the  latter.  Mr.  Balfour,  being  Lord  Salisbury's  nephew, 
could  not  follow  in  the  new  path,  and  before  long  opposed 
his  former  comrade,  while  the  other  two  members  of  the 
Fourth  Party  continued  to  support  him. 

In  the  summer  of  1883  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  conceived  Lord 
the  bold  plan  of  getting  control  of  the  National  Union  of  SmrSa 
Conservative  Associations,  and  making  it,  under  his  guidance,  piftn  to 
a  great  political  force  in  the  party.     Complaints  had  already  the  Union, 
been  made,  as  we  have  seen,  that  the  Council,  instead  of 
being  truly  representative,  was  in  the  hands  of  a  small  self- 
elected  group  of  men.     In  fact  the  Council  had  been  man- 
aged in  concert  with  the  leaders  of  the  party  in  Parliament ; 
while  the  real  direction  of  electoral  matters  was  vested  in 
the  "Central  Committee,"  a  body  quite  distinct   from  the 
Union,  created  at  the  instance  of  Lord  Beaconsfield  after 
the  defeat  of  1880  to  devise  means  of  improving  the  party 
organisation.     The     Committee    had    become    permanent, 
and,  working  under  the  whips,  had  exclusive  charge  of  the 
ample  sums  subscribed  for  campaign  expenses.     In  order  to 
achieve  any  large  measure  of  independent  power  the  Na- 
tional  Union   must   have    pecuniary   resources,  and  hence, 
as  a  part  of  his  plan,  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  determined 
to  obtain  for  it  a  share  of  the  funds  in  the  possession  of 
the  Central  Committee. 

The  three  friends  were  already  members  of  the  Council.  TheCon- 
Sir  Henry  Wolff  had  been  there  from  the  beginning.     Mr.   nirming- 
Gorst,  who  had    taken  an  active    part    in   its  work  in  the  i'^'nmiss3 
past,  had  recently  been  given  a  seat  again  as  vice-chairman; 
and  Lord   Randolph  Churchill    had    been  elected  a   coopted 
member  in  1882  by  the  casting  vote  of   the  chairman,  Lord 
Percy.     The  first  scene  in  the  drama  was  arranged  for  the 


558         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

Conference  held  at  Birmingham  on  Oct.  2,  1883.  There, 
when  the  usual  motion  was  made  to  adopt  the  annual  report, 
a  Mr.  Hudson  moved  a  rider  directing  "the  Council  for  the 
ensuing  year  to  take  such  steps  as  may  be  requisite  for  secur- 
ing to  the  National  Union  its  legitimate  influence  in  the 
party  organisation."  He  said  that  the  Conservative  work- 
ingmen  should  not  be  led  by  the  nose,  and  that  the  Union 
ought  to  have  the  management  of  its  own  policy. 
Lord  Ran-  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  supported  the  rider  in  a  charac- 
Churchill's  ^eristic  speech,  in  which  he  described  how  the  Central  Com- 
Speech.  mittee  had  drawn  into  their  own  hands  all  the  powers  and 
available  resources  of  the  party.  "From  that  day  to  this," 
he  went  on,  "in  spite  of  constant  efforts  on  the  part  of  many 
members  of  your  Council,  in  spite  of  a  friction  which  has 
been  going  on  ever  since,  your  Council  has  been  kept  in  a 
state  of  tutelage,  you  have  been  called  upon  year  by  year 
to  elect  a  Council,  which  does  not  advise,  and  an  Executive 
which  does  not  administer.  ...  I  should  like  to  see  the 
control  of  the  party  organisation  taken  out  of  the  hands  of 
a  self-elected  body,  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  an  elected 
body."  !  He  intimated  that  the  Central  Committee  had 
used  money  at  the  last  election  for  corrupt  purposes,  and 
declared  that  such  practices  would  not  cease  until  the  party 
funds  were  managed  openly.  Finally,  he  said  that  the 
Conservative  party  would  never  gain  power  until  it  gained 
the  confidence  of  the  working  classes,  who  must,  there- 
fore, be  invited  to  take  a  share,  and  a  real  share,  in  the 
party  government.  Several  men  spoke  on  the  other  side, 
among  them  Lord  Percy,  who  repudiated  the  charge  that 
the  Central  Committee  had  spent  money  corruptly.  He 
said  that  he  and  others  had  been  members  both  of  that 
Committee  and  of  the  Council,  and  that  there  was  a  constant 
interchange  of  ideas  between  the  two  bodies.     He  was  will- 

1  These  words  are  taken  from  the  manuscript  report  of  the  Conference  in 
the  records  of  the  National  Union.  The  language  is  more  brief,  and  differs 
in  unimportant  details  from  that  quoted  in  Winston  Churchill's  life  of  Lord 
Randolph. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  bij'd 

ing,  however,  to  accept  the  rider  upon  the  understanding 
that  the  Conference  was  not  committed  to  any  of  the  modes 
of  carrying  it  out  that  had  been  suggested.  The  rider  was 
then  adopted  unanimously.1 

Lord  Randolph  Churchill  was  elected  to  the  Council,  and  He  becomes 
so  were  many  of  his  opponents.  The  parties  were,  in  fact,  ^The"""1 
nearly  evenly  balanced,  but  he  and  his  friends  had  the  Council, 
great  advantage  of  a  definite,  well-arranged  plan.  Twelve 
coopted  members  were  to  be  chosen,  and  by  presenting  the 
names  of  prominent  men  from  the  large  towns,  to  whom 
his  opponents  found  it  hard  to  object,  Lord  Randolph 
secured  a  small  but  decisive  majority  on  the  Council.  At 
the  first  meeting  in  December  he  procured  the  appointment 
of  a  committee  to  consider  the  best  means  of  carrying  into 
effect  the  rider  passed  at  the  Conference.  The  committee 
was  composed  mainly  of  his  friends,  and  at  once  elected 
him  its  chairman,  although  according  to  the  custom  that 
had  been  followed  hitherto  the  chairman  of  the  Council, 
Lord  Percy,  should  have  presided  in  all  the  committees. 
Early  in  January,  1884,  the  committee  had  an  interview  with 
Lord  Salisbury,  and  brought  to  his  notice  the  uneasiness 
that  prevailed  about  the  party  organisation,  and  the  desire 
of  the  Union  to  obtain  its  legitimate  share  of  influence  in 
the  management.  Lord  Salisbury  took  the  matter  under 
consideration.  Meanwhile,  on  February  1,  when  the  com- 
mittee reported  progress  to  the  Council,  Lord  Percy  pro- 
tested against  his  exclusion  from  the  chair,  and  motions  were 
made  to  the  effect  that  he  ought  to  preside  at  meetings  of 
committees:  but  they  were  rejected  by  close  votes.  There- 
upon he  resigned  his  position  as  chairman  of  the  Council, 
and  as  he  refused  to  withdraw  his  resignation,  Lord  Ran- 
dolph Churchill  was,  on  Feb.  15,  chosen  to  succeed  him  by 
seventeen  votes  to  fifteen  for  .Mr.  Chaplin.  Lord  Salisbury, 
however,  ignoring  the  change  of   chairman,  still  communi- 

1  A  motion  was  al.-o  carried  unanimously  requesting  the  Council  to 
consider  a  method  of  electing  its  members,  such  that  the  associations  might 
be  represented  upon  it  by  delegates. 

2  N 


660         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

cated  with  the  Council  through  Lord  Percy,  which  exas- 
perated Lord  Randolph's  partisans. 
Lord  On  Feb.  29,  Lord  Salisbury,  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Randolph 

Le'tttTf'8  Churchill,  replied,  on  behalf  of  himself  and  Sir  Stafford 
Feb.  29,  Northcote,  to  the  suggestions  that  had  been  made  to  him 
in  January.  He  began  by  observing  that  no  proposals 
had  been  put  forward  by  the  Union,  beyond  the  represen- 
tation that  the  Council  had  not  opportunity  of  concurring 
largely  enough  in  the  practical  organisation  of  the  party. 
"It  appears  to  us,"  he  continued,  "that  that  organisation 
is,  and  must  remain  in  all  its  essential  features,  local.  But 
there  is  still  much  work  which  a  central  body,  like  the 
Council  of  the  National  Union,  can  perform  with  great 
advantage  to  the  party.  It  is  the  representative  of  many 
Associations  on  whom,  in  their  respective  constituencies, 
the  work  of  the  party  greatly  depends.  It  can  superintend 
and  stimulate  their  exertions ;  furnish  them  with  advice, 
and  in  some  measure,  with  funds ;  provide  them  with  lec- 
turers ;  aid  them  in  the  improvement  and  development  of 
the  local  press ;  and  help  them  in  perfecting  the  machinery 
by  which  the  registration  is  conducted,  and  the  arrange- 
ments for  providing  volunteer  agency  at  Election  times. 
It  will  have  special  opportunity  of  pressing  upon  the  local 
associations  which  it  represents,  the  paramount  duty  of 
selecting,  in  time,  the  candidates  who  are  to  come  forward 
at  the  dissolution.  This  field  of  work  seems  to  us  large  — 
as  large  as  the  nature  of  the  case  permits."  But  he  added 
that  any  proposal  which  the  Council  might  desire  to  submit 
would  receive  their  attentive  consideration, 
it  is  Mis-  The  letter  was,  no  doubt,  intended  to  enumerate  in  sub- 

bv^Lord  stance  the  very  functions  that  the  Council  had  hitherto 
Randolph,  performed ;  but  the  committee  affected  to  receive  it  with 
joy  as  a  complete  acceptance  of  their  plan.  They  prepared 
a  report  to  the  Council,  stating  that  the  duties  which,  ac- 
cording to  Lord  Salisbury's  letter,  ought  to  devolve  upon 
the  Council,  were  such  as,  with  the  exception  of  lecturers, 
they  had  not  hitherto  been  permitted  to  undertake.    "The 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  561 

Council/'  they  went  on,  "will,  no  doubt,  perceive  that  for 
the  proper  discharge  of  these  duties,  now  imposed  upon 
them  by  the  leaders  of  the  party,  the  provision  of  consider- 
able funds  becomes  a  matter  of  first-class  necessity."  They 
ought,  therefore,  to  claim  a  definite  sum  out  of  the  funds  in 
the  hands  of  the  Central  Committee,  from  which  they  had 
as  yet  received  only  irregular  and  uncertain  contributions. 
The  report  recommended  that  a  small  executive  com- 
mittee be  appointed  with  directions  to  carry  out  Lord  Salis- 
bury's scheme,  to  incur  liability  for  urgent  expenditure, 
to  enter  into  communication  with  all  the  local  associations 
in  order  to  learn  about  their  candidates,  elections,  funds, 
and  agents,  and  to  invite  from  those  associations  the  "fullest 
and  freest  communication  of  all  information  bearing  upon 
political  and  parliamentary  questions  as  viewed  in  the 
localities."  All  questions  involving  large  and  general  prin- 
ciples of  party  policy  were  to  be  reserved  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  Council,  but  the  chairman  and  vice-chairman 
were  to  be  authorised  to  perform  all  ordinary  executive  acts 
between  meetings.  It  is  needless  to  point  out  the  imita- 
tion of  the  National  Liberal  Federation  as  it  worked  at  that 
time,  or  the  great  power  that  these  changes  would  throw 
into  the  hands  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill. 

Lord  Salisbury  was  informed  of  the  report,  and  hastened  Further 
to  remove  any  misapprehension.  In  a  letter  to  Lord  ^"l'spon 
Randolph,  on  March  G,  he  said  he  had  not  contemplated 
that  the  L~nion  should  in  any  way  take  the  place  of  the 
Central  Committee,  and  he  hoped  there  was  no  chance 
of  their  paths  crossing.  Lord  Randolph  replied  that  he 
feared  that  hope  might  be  disappointed.  "In  :i  struggle 
between  a  popular  body  and  a  close  corporation,  the  latter, 
I  am  happy  to  say,  in  these  days  goes  to  the  wall."  A 
correspondence  took  place  also  between  Lord  Salisbury 
and  Lord  Percy,  in  the  course  of  which  the  former  wrote: 
"the  Central  Committee    represents    the  leaders,  by   whom 

1  These  two  Inters  do  not  appear  in  the  report  of  the  Council,  but  are 
quoted  by  .Mr.  Win- ton  Churchill. 


562         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

it  is  appointed.  So  far  as  those  duties  are  concerned  which 
attach,  and  always  have  attached,  to  the  leaders  of  the  party, 
and  depend  on  their  sanction,  these  can  only  be  delegated 
to  gentlemen  whom  we  appoint."  He  said  that  in  his 
opinion  no  change  in  this  respect  would  be  desirable,  and 
that  he  could  not  think  the  adoption  of  the  report  would  be 
expedient.  Lord  Percy  laid  the  letter  before  the  Council, 
and  moved  that  the  report  should  not  be  accepted,  but  his 
motion  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of  nineteen  to  fourteen ;  the 
report  was  then  adopted,  and  the  committee  was  instructed 
to  confer  with  the  leaders  of  the  party  as  to  the  best  way 
of  carrying  out  the  plans  foreshadowed  in  their  letters. 

The  temper  of  the  leaders  may  be  imagined,  and  may  well 
excuse  a  step,  which  was,  nevertheless,  a  mistake,  because  it 
offended  members  of  the  Council  of  local  importance,1  who 
had  probably  intended  no  disrespect  to  Lord  Salisbury. 
Three  days  after  the  adoption  of  the  report  a  curt  letter 
came  from  Mr.  Bartley,  the  principal  agent  of  the  party, 
giving  the  National  Union  notice  to  quit  the  offices  occu- 
pied jointly  with  the  Central  Committee.  Lord  Randolph 
Churchill  displayed  no  open  resentment  at  this ;  but  treat- 
ing the  objections  of  the  leaders  as  if  they  applied  only  to 
the  details  of  the  report,  he  proposed  to  modify  it  in  part, 
especially  by  a  change  which  showed  that  the  general 
questions  of  policy  reserved  for  the  Council  were  to  relate 
not  to  public  affairs,  but  merely  to  party  organisation. 
Lord  He  held  also  a  conference  with  Lord  Salisbury,  which  was 

Letter^8  aSam  an  occasion  for  misunderstanding;  for  on  April  1 
April  i,  that  nobleman  wrote  that  as  he  and  Sir  Stafford  Northcote 
had  already  expressed  their  disapproval  of  the  report,  they 
could  not  consider  it  further  in  the  absence  of  explanation, 
but  that  some  passages  had  been  explained  at  the  conference, 
and  it  had  been  made  clear  that  the  National  Union  did  not 
intend  to  trench  on  the  province  of  the  Central  Committee, 
or  take  any  course  on  political  questions  not  acceptable  to 
the  leaders  of  the  party.  It  was  very  satisfactory,  the  let- 
1  Winston  Churchill,  "Lord  Randolph  Churchill,"  I.,  318. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  563 

ter  said,  to  find  the  Council  agreeing  that  matters  hitherto 
disposed  of  by  the  leaders  and  the  whips  must  remain  in 
their  hands,  including  the  expenditure  of  the  funds  standing 
in  the  name  of  the  Central  Committee.  Lord  Salisbury  then 
went  on  to  describe  the  proper  functions  of  the  Council  in 
language  evidently  intended  to  cover  the  same  ground  as  his 
letter  of  Feb.  29. l  He  added  that  to  insure  complete  unity 
of  action  it  was  desirable  to  have  the  whips  sit  ex  officio  on 
the  Council,  and  be  present  at  the  meetings  of  all  commit- 
tees; and  he  ended  by  saying  that  under  the  circumstances 
a  separation  of  establishments  would  not  lie  necessary. 

Lord  Randolph  called  at  once  a  meeting  of  the  committee  Lord 
on  organisation,  and  although  only  three  members  besides  caustic**  " 
himself  were  present,  he  sent  to  Lord  Salisbury,  in  the  name  Reply. 
of  the  committee,  a  letter  unique  in  English  political  annals. 
The  document  is  long,  but  the  following  extracts  may  serve 
to  show  its  meaning   and  portray  its  tone:     "It    is  quite 
clear  to  us,"  it  said,  "that  .  .   .  we  have  hopelessly  failed 
to  convey    to    your   mind    anything   like  an  appreciation, 
either  of  the  significance  of  the  movement  which  the  National 
Union  commenced  at  Birmingham  in  October  last,  or  of  the 
unfortunate  effect  which  a  neglect  or  a  repression  of  that 
movement  by  the  leaders  of  the  party  would  have  upon  the 
Conservative    cause.     The  resolution  of  the  Conference  at 
Birmingham  .  .   .  signified  that  the  old  methods  of  party 

1  "It  appears  to  us  that  these  objects  may  be  defined  to  be  the  same  as 
those  for  which  the  Associations  themselves  are  working.  The  chief  object 
for  which  the  Associations  exist  is  to  keep  alive  and  extend  Conservative 
convictions,  and  so  to  increase  the  number  of  Conservative  voters.  This 
is  done  by  acting  on  opinion  through  various  channels;  by  the  establish- 
ment of  clubs,  by  holding  meetings,  by  securing  the  assistance  of  speakers 
and  lecturers,  and  by  the  circulation  of  printed  matter  in  defence  of  Con- 
servative opinions,  by  collecting  the  facts  required  for  the  use  of  Conserva- 
tive speakers  and  writers,  and  by  the  invigoration  of  the  local  press. 

"In  all  these  efforts  it  is  the  function  of  the  Council  of  the  National 
Union  to  aid,  stimulate  and  guide  the  Associations  it  represents. 

"Much  valuable  work  may  also  he  done  through  the  Associations,  by 
watching  the  registration  and,  at  election  time,  by  providing  volunteer 
canvassers  and  volunteer  conveyance." 

This  litter  and  the  replv  to  it  are  printed  in  full  in  Winston  Churchill's 
"Lord  Randolph  Churchill,"  I.,  App.  II. 


564         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

organisation,  namely,  the  control  of  parliamentary  elections, 
by  the  leader,  the  whip,  the  paid  agent  drawing  their  re- 
sources from  secret  funds,  which  were  suitable  to  the  manip- 
ulation of  the  ten  pound  householder  were  utterly  obsolete 
and  would  not  secure  the  confidence  of  the  masses  of  the 
people  who  were  enfranchised  by  Mr.  Disraeli's  Reform  Bill. 
.  .  .  The  delegates  at  the  Conference  were  evidently  of 
opinion  that  .  .  .  the  organisation  of  the  party  would  have 
to  become  an  imitation  ...  of  the  Birmingham  Caucus. 
The  Caucus  may  be,  perhaps,  a  name  of  evil  sound  and  omen 
in  the  ears  of  aristocratic  and  privileged  classes,  but  it  is 
undeniably  the  only  form  of  political  organisation  which 
can  collect,  guide,  and  control  for  common  objects,  large 
masses  of  electors.  ...  It  appeared  at  first,  from  a  letter 
which  we  had  the  honour  of  receiving  from  you  on  the  29th 
February,  that  your  Lordship  and  Sir  Stafford  Northcote 
entered  fully  and  sympathetically  into  the  wishes  of  the 
Council.1  .  .  .  The  Council,  however,  committed  the  seri- 
ous error  of  imagining  that  your  Lordship  and  Sir  Stafford 
Northcote  were  in  earnest,  in  wishing  them  to  become  a 
real  source  of  usefulness  to  the  party.  .  .  .  The  Council 
have  been  rudely  undeceived  .  .  .  the  precise  language  of 
your  former  letter  of  the  29th  February  is  totally  aban- 
doned, and  refuge  taken  in  vague,  foggy,  and  utterly  in- 
tangible suggestions.  Finally,  in  order  that  the  Council  of 
the  National  Union  may  be  completely  and  for  ever  reduced 
to  its  ancient  condition  of  dependence  upon,  and  servility  to 
certain  irresponsible  persons  who  find  favour  in  your  eyes, 
you  demand  that  the  whips  of  the  party,  .  .  .  should  sit 
ex  officio  on  the  Council.  ...  It  may  be  that  the  powerful 
and  secret  influences  which  have  hitherto  been  unsuccess- 
fully at  work  on  the  Council  with  the  knowledge  and  con- 
sent of  your  Lordship  and  Sir  Stafford  Northcote,  may  at 

1  Here  follows  a  rehearsal  of  the  functions  Lord  Salisbury  had  ascribed 
to  the  Council,  which  are  pronounced  to  have  been  clear,  definite,  and  sat- 
isfactory. The  assurance,  with  which  they  are  assumed  to  mean  something 
quite  different  from  what  his  Lordship  must  have  intended  is  one  of  the 
marvellous  things  about  the  affair. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE  NATIONAL  UNION  565 

last  be  effectual  in  reducing  the  National  Union  to  its  former 
make-believe  and  impotent  condition;  in  that  case  we  shall 
know  what  steps  to  take  to  clear  ourselves  of  all  responsi- 
bility for  the  failure  of  an  attempt  to  avert  the  misfortunes 
and  reverses  which  will,  we  are  certain,  under  the  present 
effete  system  of  wire-pulling  and  secret  organisation,  over- 
take and  attend  the  Conservative  partv  at  a  general  elec- 
tion." 

A  copy  of  the  letter  was  read  to  the  Council  the  next  day, 
when  a  motion  was  made  regretting  its  disrespectful  and 
improper  tone,  and  declining  to  accept  any  responsibility 
for  it.  This  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  nineteen  to  thir- 
teen, and  then  an  executive  committee  was  appointed  to 
carry  out  the  recommendations  in  the  report. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  after  receiving  a  letter  of  that  Ncgotia- 
kind  Lord  Salisbury  would  have  had  no  more  to  do  with  ^1'^ 
Lord  Randolph  Churchill  forever,  and  would  have  refused 
to  hold  further  communication  with  the  Council;  but  poli- 
tics makes  strange  bedfellows,  especially  in  a  parliamentary 
form  of  government.  Lord  Salisbury  could  not  afford  to 
alienate  a  body  which  represented  a  considerable  fraction 
of  the  Conservatives  in  the  country;  while  it  would  have 
been  folly  for  Lord  Randolph  to  burn  the  bridges  behind 
him.  Negotiations  were,  therefore,  opened  through  a 
third  person,  very  nearly  on  the  lines  of  Lord  Salisbury's 
letter  of  April  1,  except  that  three  thousand  pounds  a  year 
were  to  be  paid  to  the  National  Union ;  and  an  un- 
derstanding was  nearly  reached,  when  an  event  took  place 
which  broke  it  off  for  a  time. 

Mr.  J.  M.  Maclean,  one  of  Lord  Randolph's  supporters  in  and  inter 
the  Council,  whose  object  had  been  simply  to  supplant  Sir  rui)ted- 
Stafford  Northcote,  became  alarmed  lest  the  movement 
might  result  in  supplanting  Lord  Salisbury  also,  or  might 
cause  a  real  broach  in  the  party.  Not  being  aware  of  the 
pending  negotiations,  lie  moved  at  :•  meeting  of  the  Council 
on  May  2  the  appointment  of  a  committee  to  confer  with  the 
Central  Committee  in  order  to  secure  harmony  and  united 


566         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

action.1  Although  letters  were  read  showing  that  steps 
already  taken  would  probably  lead  to  an  understanding,  and 
although  Lord  Randolph  told  Mr.  Maclean  that  he  should 
regard  the  motion  as  one  of  want  of  confidence,  the  latter 
persisted,  and,  as  several  of  Lord  Randolph's  friends  were 
absent,  carried  his  proposal  by  a  vote  of  seventeen  to  thir- 
teen. Lord  Randolph  then  resigned  as  chairman  of  the 
Council ;  but  his  popularity  in  the  country  was  great,  and 
there  was  a  widespread  feeling  of  regret  at  a  quarrel  among 
influential  members  of  the  party.  A  conference  of  chairmen 
of  the  Conservative  associations  in  eight  of  the  chief  provin- 
cial towns  acted  as  peacemaker.  It  drew  up  a  memorandum 
regretting  the  lack  of  harmony,  suggested  an  arrangement 
very  similar  to  that  almost  reached  in  the  negotiations 
recently  broken  off,  and  submitted  that  if  these  suggestions 
were  accepted  Lord  Randolph  should  withdraw  his  resig- 
nation. 
a  Truce  The  memorandum  was  laid  before  the  Council  at  a  meet- 

ing on  May  16,  and  Lord  Randolph  was  unanimously  re- 
elected chairman.  At  the  same  meeting,  the  committee, 
composed  mainly  of  Lord  Randolph's  opponents,  which 
had  been  appointed  to  confer  with  the  Central  Committee, 
reported  that  they  had  effected  an  agreement.  Again  the 
terms  were  almost  precisely  the  ones  indicated  by  Lord  Salis- 
bury in  his  letter  of  April  1,  save  for  the  payment  of  three 
thousand  pounds  a  year  to  the  Union.2     Coming  from  this 

1  Maclean's  own  account  of  the  matter  is  given  in  his  "Recollections  of 
Westminster  and  India,"   68-79. 

2  The  terms  were  briefly  as  follows :  — 

1.  The  two  bodies  to  occupy  the  same  offices. 

2.  The  Union  to  attend  to  the  formation  and  maintenance  of  local  asso- 
ciations. The  agents  of  the  Central  Committee  to  assist  in  this  and  report 
to  the  Union  through  the  principal  agent. 

3.  Parliamentary  elections,  the  recommendation  of  candidates,  and 
questions  of  general  policy,  to  be  outside  the  province  of  the  Union. 

4.  The  Union  to  publish  literature  as  it  may  desire,  and  to  provide 
speakers. 

5.  The  Council  to  help  the  party  leaders  to  organise  public  meetings, 
and  circulate  pamphlets. 

6.  The  Central  Committee  to  allot  a  sum  of  money  to  be  paid  annually 
to  the  Union. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  567 

source  it  is  not  surprising  that  they  were  unsatisfactory  to 
Lord  Randolph's  friends,  and  they  were  referred  back  for 
further  consideration  to  the  committee  reenforced  by  new 
members.  A  month  elapsed,  and  at  a  meeting  on  June  13 
the  committee  reported  that  they  had  suggested  some 
changes,  which  the  leaders  would  not  accept.1  The  matter 
was  again  recommitted,  but  finally  on  June  27,  the  com- 
mittee reported  that  they  had  made  an  agreement  on  the 
lines  of  the  earlier  plan,  and  this  was  adopted  as  it  stood. 

Except  for  a  moderate  annual  subsidy,  Lord  Randolph 
Churchill  had  really  obtained  nothing  for  the  National 
Union.2  Personally  he  had  become  the  leading  figure  of 
what  purported  to  be  the  great  representative  organisation 
of  the  party,  for  the  chairman  of  the  Council  was  the  most 
important  officer  in  the  Union ;  but  the  position  of  the  organ- 
isation itself  remained  substantially  unchanged.  The  agree- 
ment that  had  been  reached  was,  however,  merely  a  truce, 
and  both  sides  canvassed  eagerly  the  delegates  to  the  ap- 
proaching Conference,  each  hoping  for  a  decisive  victory 
that  would  give  undisputed  control  of  the  Council. 

The  Conference  of  the  National  Union  for  1884  met  at  The  Con- 
Sheffield  on  July  23.     It  was  unusually  well  attended,  with  S,re"c<;.at 

*  Sheffield. 

some  four  hundred  and  fifty  delegates  in  the  hall,  represent- 
ing two  hundred  and  thirty-four  associations.  In  his  speech 
on  presenting  the  report  of  the  Council  Lord  Randolph  de- 

7.  The  chief  whip  and  the  principal  agent  to  have  seats  on  the  Council, 
and  the  chief  whip  to  sit  on  all  committees. 

8.  If  the  chief  whip  thinks  any  action  of  the  Union  inconsistent  with  the 
welfare  of  party,  the  matter  to  be  referred  to  the  leaders  for  decision. 

9.  The  leaders  of  the  party  to  appoint  one  or  two  members  of  the  Council 
on  the  Central  Committee. 

It  may  be  observed  that  this  arrangement  gave  the  leaders  of  the  party 
more  formal  power  of  control  over  the  Union  than  ever. 

1  The  changes  were  the  omission  of  Nos.  1  and  '.);  and  thai  the  chief  whip 
should  have  merely  a  right  to  be  present  at  all  the  committees,  instead  of 
being  a  member  of  them. 

2  Mr.  Winston  Churchill  (I.,  324,  3:51)  and  Mr.  Ostrogorski  attribute  a 
larger  measure  of  success  to  Lord  Randolph,  but  that  opinion  seems  to  me 
inconsistent  with  the  correspondence,  the  reports  of  the  committees  and  the 
proceedings  of  the  Council,  which  are  set  forth  in  the  printed  report  laid 
before  the  next  Conference. 


568 


THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 


Lord 

Randolph 
Makes  his 
Peace  and 
Abandons 
the  Union. 


scribed  the  dissensions  that  had  occurred,  and  begged  the 
delegates  to  elect  members  who  would  support  one  side  or 
the  other.  His  object,  he  said,  had  been  to  establish  a 
bona  fide  popular  organisation,  bringing  its  influence  to  bear 
right  up  to  the  centre  of  affairs,  so  that  the  Tory  party 
might  be  a  self-governing  party;  but  as  yet  this  had  been 
successfully  thwarted  by  those  who  possessed  influence. 
The  speech  was  followed  by  a  fierce  debate,  ending,  of  course, 
in  the  adoption  of  the  report.  The  real  interest  of  the  meet- 
ing centred  in  the  ballot  for  the  Council,  and  before  that  be- 
gan a  change  was  made  in  the  method  of  election.  Instead 
of  choosing  twenty-four  members,  and  allowing  them  to 
add  twelve  more  to  their  number,  a  resolution  was  adopted, 
whereby  all  thirty-six  were  elected  directly  by  the  Con- 
ference, thus  making  the  ballot  there  conclusive  upon  the 
complexion  of  the  Council.  Judging  from  the  action  of  the 
Conference  on  certain  minor  questions  of  organisation,  and 
from  the  size  of  Lord  Randolph's  personal  vote  for  the 
Council,  he  had  the  sympathy  of  a  majority  of  the  delegates ; 
but  they  did  not,  as  he  had  hoped,  divide  on  a  sharp  line 
for  one  side  or  the  other.  Lord  Randolph  himself  received 
346  votes,  while  the  next  highest  on  the  list,  although  his 
supporter,  received  only  298.  When,  however,  the  result 
was  announced,  his  friends  formed  only  a  small  majority  on 
the  Council. 

Lord  Randolph  Churchill  had  won  a  victory ;  but  a  vic- 
tory that  was  little  better  than  a  drawn  battle.  His  own 
reelection  as  chairman  was  assured,  and  for  the  moment  he 
controlled  the  Council,  but  his  control  would  be  neither  un- 
disputed nor  certain  to  endure.  He  could  use  the  Union  in  a 
way  that  would  be  highly  uncomfortable  for  Lord  Salisbury, 
but  he  had  not  captured  it  so  completely  that  he  could  do 
with  it  as  he  pleased.  Again  it  was  for  the  interest  of  both 
sides  to  make  peace,  and  the  negotiations  were  completed  in 
a  few  days.  The  Central  Committee  was  in  form  abolished  ; 
the  Primrose  League,  recently  founded  by  the  Fourth  Party, 
was  recognised  by  the  leaders ;    Lord  Randolph  withdrew 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  569 

from  the  chairmanship  of  the  Council ;  and  mutual  confi- 
dence and  harmony  of  action  were  restored.  These  appear 
to  have  been  the  nominal  conditions.1  Whether  the  real 
terms  were  ever  definitely  stated,  or  were  merely  left  in  the 
shape  of  a  tacit  understanding,  it  is  at  present  impossible  to 
say.  The  practical  upshot  was  that  the  Fourth  Party  was 
broken  up;  Lord  Randolph  abandoned  the  National  Union 
to  its  fate,  acted  in  concert  with  the  parliamentary  leaders, 
and  was  given  a  seat  in  the  cabinet  when  the  Conservatives 
next  came  to  power.  The  reconciliation  was  sealed  by  a 
dinner  given  by  Lord  Salisbury  to  the  Council  of  the  Union. 

The  subsequent  career  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  may  iiis  Later 
be  told  in  a  few  words.  In  the  reorganisation  of  the  Union  Career- 
he  took  no  part,  and,  indeed,  he  ceased  before  long  to  attend 
the  meetings  of  the  Council  altogether.  But  when  Lord 
Salisbury  formed  a  ministry  in  June,  1885,  he  was  offered 
the  post  of  Secretary  of  State  for  India,  with  a  seat  in  the 
cabinet.  He  made  it  a  condition  of  acceptance  that  Sir 
Stafford  Xorthcote  should  cease  to  lead  in  the  House  of 
Commons.  Lord  Salisbury,  who  had  been  hitherto  loyal  to 
Sir  Stafford,  hesitated,  but  at  last  the  old  statesman  was 
transferred  to  the  oblivion  of  the  House  of  Lords,  and  Sir 
Michael  Hicks-Beach  took  his  place  as  leader  of  the  Com- 
mons. Lord  Randolph's  success  had  been  extraordinary, 
but  he  was  destined  to  reacli  even  greater  eminence  in  the 
near  future.  The  Home  Rule  Bill,  in  the  session  of  1886, 
gave  him  a  chance  to  increase  his  reputation  as  a  debater, 
and  when  the  general  elections  following  the  rejection  of 
that  bill  brought  a  new  Conservative  government  into  office, 
he  was  given  the  position  of  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer 
with  the  leadership  of  the  House  of  Commons.  His  popu- 
larity in  the  country  was  greater  than  ever;  his  appearance 
on  the  platform  at  a  Conference  of  the  National  Union,  on 
Oct.  20,  188C),  "was  the  signal  for  a  tremendous  outburst 
of  long-sustained  cheering,"  2  and  addresses  were  presented 

'Winston  Chun-hill,  "  Lr.nl   Randolph  Churchill,"    I.,  3">f)  59 
7  Th   Times  of  Oct.  27,  ISSO,  p.  6,  r,  3. 


570         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

to  him  from  several  hundred  associations.  But  he  over- 
estimated his  personal  power,  and  is  commonly  supposed 
to  have  thought  that  one  more  quarrel  would  leave  him 
master  of  the  party.  His  battle-ground  was  unfortunately 
chosen,  for  he  took  his  stand  in  the  cabinet  for  a  reduction 
of  the  army  and  navy  estimates,  at  a  time  when  the  national 
desire  for  economy  was  on  the  wane.  His  colleagues  did 
not  agree  with  him,  and  on  Dec.  20  he  tendered  his 
resignation  to  the  Prime  Minister.  He  was  apparently 
confident  of  coming  out  victorious;  but  Mr.  Goschen,  a 
Liberal  Unionist,  took  his  place,  and  the  government 
went  on  without  him.1  He  failed  to  realise  that  a  conflict 
in  1884  with  the  leaders  of  the  Conservative  party  in 
the  Houses  of  Parliament,  two  men  neither  of  whom  had 
yet  proved  his  capacity  to  be  at  the  head  of  the  cabinet 
or  won  the  full  confidence  of  the  country,  was  a  very 
different  thing  from  a  quarrel  in  1886  with  the  government 
of  the  nation,  at  a  time  when  it  stood  in  the  eyes  of  the 
majority  of  the  people  as  the  bulwark  against  disunion. 
His  miscalculation  was  fatal,  and  during  the  few  years  of 
his  life  that  were  left  he  never  regained  a  position  of 
political  importance. 
Reconstruct  Meanwhile  the  National  Union  underwent  a  transforma- 
tion of  the     tion.     The  leaders  of  the  party  were  determined  that  it 

.National  x  J 

Union.  should  not  be  captured  again,  or  used  to  force  their  hand. 

But  any  changes  must  be  made  without  losing  the  semblance 
of  a  democratic  organisation ;  and,  in  fact,  it  was  believed 
that  if  the  Union  were  in  reality  broadly  popular  it  would 
be  more  inclined  to  follow  the  leaders  of  the  party,  and  less 
easily  captured,  than  if  it  represented  only  a  fraction  of 
the  local  associations.  In  this  respect  the  position  bore 
some  resemblance  to  that  of  the  National  Liberal  Federa- 
tion after  the  Home  Rule  struggle  a  year  later.  The  time 
was  propitious  for  reconstructing  the  Union,  because  the 

1  Mr.  Winston  Churchill's  account  of  the  occurrence  is  extremely  inter- 
esting; but  the  motives  he  attributes  to  his  father  do  not  seem  wholly  con- 
sistent with  one  another. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE  NATIONAL  UNION  571 

redistribution  act  of  1885  had  marked  off  the  constituen- 
cies on  new  lines,  and  thus  involved  the  formation  of 
many  of  the  local  associations  afresh.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  that  the  changes  provoked  no  struggle  between  those 
elements  in  the  Union  which  had  recently  been  in  con- 
flict ;  and,  indeed,  the  dissensions  ceased  with  the  with- 
drawal of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill. 

The  first  alterations,  made  in  18S5,  were  designed  merely  The  First 
to  give  the  Union  a  broader  basis,  and  the  Council  a  more  Vi1;!"ges ; 
representative  character.  The  most  important  provision 
was  that  even-  Conservative  association  should  be  affiliated 
without  the  need  of  any  formal  action.  The  Union  thus 
came  to  be  a  really  national  party  organisation  in  a  way 
that  it  had  never  been  before,  the  report  for  1SS7  stating 
that  the  affiliated  associations  numbered  1100.  The  changes 
of  1885  did  not  affect  seriously  the  structure  of  the  Union, 
or  its  relation  to  the  whip's  office,  but  those  questions  were 
taken  up  at  once  by  three  men.  One  of  them  was  Sir  Albert 
Bollit,  who  drafted  and  carried  through  a  new  set  of  rules. 
Another  was  Captain  Middleton,  who  devised  the  scheme 
on  which  those  rules  were  based.  He  was  appointed  prin- 
cipal agent  of  the  party  in  18S5,  and  in  188G  was  made 
honorary  secretary  of  the  Union.  lie  continued  to  hold 
both  positions  until  1903,  and  so  far  as  the  success  of  the 
Conservatives  at  the  polls  during  the  period  of  their  ascend- 
ency was  the  result  of  political  organisation,  it  was  due  to 
him  more  than  to  any  one  else.  The  third  was  Mr.  Southall, 
who  became  in  1880,  and  has  ever  since  remained,  the  secre- 
tary of  the  Union.  Ilis  constant  cooperation  with  Captain 
Middleton  removed  the  severe  friction  that  had  existed 
between  the  Union  and  the  whip's  office,  and  enabled  them 
to  work  in  perfect  harmony. 

The  new  rules  were  adopted  at  a  special  conference  held  The  New 
in  May,    1880,  at   which   more  than  six   hundred  delegates  tJ^!l" 
were    present.      Slightly    modified    so    far    ;is    the    National 
Union  itself  is  concerned   in    1SS7,  and  as  regards  the  divi- 
sional   unions   in    188.X,    1S89,    and    l.s'.M),    they    remained    in 


572         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

force  until  1906 ;  and  hence  they  governed  the  organisation 
of  the  Conservative  party  during  the  period  of  greatest  and 
longest  prosperity  that  it  has  known  since  the  Reform  Act 
of  1832.  They  recite  that  the  objects  of  the  Union  are : 
to  form  a  centre  of  united  action,  communication,  and  coop- 
eration, among  associations ;  to  promote  the  organisation 
of  associations;  to  spread  Conservative  principles;  and 
to  enable  associations  to  give  expression  to  Conservative 
feeling  by  petitions  and  resolutions.  They  provide  that  the 
chief  association  of  each  constituency  in  England  and  Wales 
shall  be  a  member  of  the  Union  without  payment,  while 
any  other  association  or  club  with  fifty  members  may  be 
admitted  on  paying  one  guinea  a  year ; 1  and  that  any 
person  may  be  admitted  as  an  honorary  member  or  vice- 
president  on  payment  of  a  sum  appropriate  to  those  dig- 
nities.2 The  Conference  was  made  to  consist  of  the 
officers  and  honorary  members,  and  of  delegates  from  sub- 
scribing associations,  from  the  ten  new  divisional  unions, 
and  from  the  chief  organisations  of  Scotland  and  Ireland.3 
The  Council  was  composed  of  the  president  and  trustees ; 
of  one  of  the  whips,  and  the  principal  agent  of  the  party ; 
of  twenty-one  members  elected  by  the  Conference ;  and  of 
the  chairman  and  three  representatives  elected  by  each  of 
the  divisional  unions. 
The  Ten  Within  the  National  Union,  which  included  only  England 

and  Wales,  there  were  created  ten  new  territorial  divisions ; 
and  a  provincial  or  divisional  union  consisted  of  all  the  mem- 
bers of  the  National  Union,  whether  associations  or  indi- 
viduals, within  that  division.     It   had  its   annual   meeting 

1  For  workingmen's  clubs  with  less  than  one  hundred  members  the  fee  is 
only  half  as  large. 

2  The  sums  required  for  these  offices  are  the  same  as  when  the  Union  was 
originally  formed.  The  subscriptions  from  associations  go  one  half  each 
to  the  National  and  divisional  unions;  those  of  individuals  go  wholly  to  the 
divisional  union  except  in  the  case  of  life  payments,  which  are  made  to  the 
National  Union,  one  half  of  the  interest  being  paid  over  to  the  division. 

3  To  these  the  principal  paid  agent,  or  secretary,  in  each  English  or  Welsh 
constituency  was  added  in  1892.  This  has  not  been  a  matter  of  much  im- 
portance, because  few  of  them  can  afford  to  attend. 


Divisional 
Unions. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE  NATIONAL  UNION  573 

corresponding  to  the  Conference,  and  its  council.1  In  fact, 
it  was  intended  to  be  a  miniature  of  the  National  Union  itself, 
with  similar  structure  and  functions. 

The  mechanism  of  the  National  Union,  and  its  subordi- 
nate branches,  looks  formidable ;  but  it  has  not  proved  in 
practice  so  complex  as  it  appears.  The  principal  change 
was  the  creation  of  the  provincial  or  divisional  unions, 
which  were  interposed  between  the  local  associations  and 
the  central  Conference  and  Council.  The  object  in  creating 
them  was  said  to  be  the  development  of  local  effort  as 
essential  to  the  success  of  the  party.  Representation, 
it  was  pointed  out,  thus  passed  by  graduated  steps  from 
the  individual  elector,  through  the  branch  or  district 
associations  and  clubs,  and  through  the  central  associa- 
tions in  each  constituency  to  the  provincial  councils,  to  be 
summed  up  in  the  Conference  and  Council  of  the  whole 
Union.2  Perhaps  the  words  "strained  "  or  "filtered"  would, 
better  than  "passed,"  have  signified  the  real  intention,  for 
the  divisional  unions  were  designed  as  a  safeguard  against 
popular  caprice  and  personal  ambition.  They  were  ex- 
pected to  act  like  water-tight  compartments,  as  it  was 
believed  that  all  ten  divisions  would  not  go  mad  at  once, 
and  that  any  man  would  find  it  very  hard  to  capture 
enough  of  them,  one  at  a  time,  to  control  the  Union. 
The}'  did  not,  however,  develop  any  vigorous  life  of  their 
own,  and  have  not  had  corporate  solidity  enough  to  main- 
tain separate  deliberative  bodies.  The  annual  meetings 
have  been  little  more  than  an  occasion  for  an  address 
by  the  president.  In  short,  the  divisions  did  not  turn 
out  to  be  of  much  consequence  as  a  basis  for  representa- 
tive party  gatherings. 

Although    the   divisions   did   not    prove    important    from  Conccntra- 
a  deliberative  point  of  view,  they  have  had  a  very  distinct   i>owcr- 

1  All  tlic  Conservative  members  of  Parliament  for  constituencies  in  the 
division  were  given  the  right  to  attend  the:  annual  meeting,  and  were  made 
members  of  the  Council. 

2  Rep.  of  the  Council,  October,  1886. 


574  THE    GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

value  for  administrative  purposes,  and  have  been  distinctly 
convenient  as  districts  for  the  spread  of  Conservative  doc- 
trines. Moreover,  they  have  furnished  a  means  for  con- 
trolling the  party  from  headquarters,  and  a  channel  through 
which  it  could  be  kept  in  touch  with  the  whip's  office. 
This  was  darkly  hinted  at  when,  on  behalf  of  the  committee 
that  framed  the  new  rules,  a  hope  was  expressed  that  "In 
your  local  associations,  in  the  provincial  unions,  and  in 
the  National  Union,  and  with  the  help  also  of  the  principal 
whip  and  the  principal  agent  of  the  party,  you  will  have  a 
chain  of  assistance,  experience  and  authority,  which  will 
bind  together  our  party."  One  of  the  whips  and  the  prin- 
cipal agent  of  the  party  were,  indeed,  given  seats  ex  officio 
not  only  upon  the  Council  of  the  National  Union  itself, 
but  both  upon  the  Council  and  the  Executive  Committee 
of  each  of  its  divisions.  This  was,  of  course,  part  of  the 
"chain  of  assistance,  experience  and  authority  which  will 
bind  together  our  party." 

Another  provision  in  the  rules  relating  to  the  divisional 
unions  has  also  proved  important  in  this  respect.  It  is  one 
that  contemplated  the  employment  as  divisional  secretary 
of  a  sub-agent  of  the  central  office  without  cost.  By  doing 
this  the  division  saved  both  salary  an:"  rent ;  while  the  prin- 
cipal agent,  who  represented  the  leaders  and  the  whips,  had 
in  the  secretary  an  agent  selected  and  paid  by  him.  The 
relation  was  the  more  useful  because  the  habit  of  changing 
every  year  the  president  of  the  divisional  union,  and  the 
chairman  of  its  council,  prevented  any  one  from  acquiring 
a  large  influence,  except  the  secretary,  who  was  permanent. 
The  arrangement  was  made  in  most  of  the  divisions.  Even 
where  it  was  not,  the  secretary  acted  as  though  he  were  a 
subordinate  of  Captain  Middleton,  and  being  in  constant 
communication  with  the  local  agents,  he  could  give  infor- 
mation about  political  matters  throughout  his  division, 
thus  keeping  the  principal  agent  in  touch  with  the  whole 
organisation  of  the  party.  Personally  popular  and  tactful, 
Captain  Middleton  was  enabled  by  his  relation  to  the  divi- 


ions 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  575 

sional  agents,  by  close  cooperation  with  the  National  Union, 
with  the  Conservative  clubs,  and  with  other  ancillary  bodies, 
to  draw  all  the  threads  of  the  Conservative  organisation 
into  his  office  without  provoking  jealousy,  or  appearing  to 
exert  more  power  than  naturally  belonged  to  his  office. 
The  result  was  that  while  he  held  the  place  of  principal  agent 
the  Conservative  organisation  was  a  highly  efficient  admin- 
istrative machine,  working  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
leaders. 

Any  popular  party  organisation  in  England  involves  Resoiut 
two  dangers,  one  personal  and  the  other  political;  one  that  SjJstJoiw 
a  man  may  use  it  for  selfish  purposes ;  the  other  that  it 
may  force  upon  the  leaders  a  policy  which  they  were  not 
prepared  to  adopt.  We  have  seen  how  this  second  peril 
actually  confronted  the  Liberal  Ministry  in  the  form  of  the 
Newcastle  Programme,  and  how  it  was  met  by  muzzling 
the  Council  of  the  National  Liberal  Federation.  In  the 
National  Union  the  difficulty  has  been  solved  in  a  very 
different  way.  L'ntil  1885  the  Conference  passed  no  reso- 
lutions on  general  policy,  save  in  the  form  of  expressing 
confidence  in  the  leaders,  or  congratulating  them  on  their 
exploits ;  but  in  that  year,  when  an  effort  was  made  to  give 
to  the  Union  the  appearance  of  a  free  popular  organisation, 
confessions  of  faith  on  current  politics  began.  Resolutions 
of  this  kind  soon  became  numerous  and  included  demands 
to  which  the  Conservative  leaders  could  not  assent,  such 
as  woman  suffrage,  and  fair  trade,  that  is,  protection  in 
a  modified  form.1 

But,  except  for  occasional  cases  where  a  delegate  was  are  Free; 
persuaded  to  withdraw  his  motion,  or  where  it  was  shelved 
by  the  previous  question  on  the  ground  that  a  vote  on  the 
subject  would  be  impolitic,  no  attempt  has  been  made  by 
the  managers  to  fetter  the  free  expression  of  opinion.  The 
Conservative  leaders,  however,  made  it  clear  almost  at  once 
that  they  did  not  take  the  action  of  the  ( 'onference  very  seri- 
ously. In  1SS7  it  adopted  resolutions  in  favour  of  fair  trade, 
•These  were  both  passed  in  1887  and  at  intervals  thereafter. 
2o 


576         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

woman  suffrage,  and  reforms  in  the  tenure  and  sale  of  Church 
livings ;  but  although  Lord  Salisbury,  then  Prime  Minister, 
in  a  public  speech  immediately  afterward  said,  "More  and 
more  in  this  day  political  leading  and  the  making  of  political 
opinion  must  be  a  matter  of  local  effort,"  and  although  he 
referred  to  agricultural  distress,  and  the  forthcoming  budget, 
he  made  no  allusion  to  fair  trade,  or  for  that  matter  to 
woman  suffrage  or  Church  livings.1  There  was,  at  first,  no 
doubt,  some  dread  of  the  effect  the  resolutions  might  have 
on  the  public,  and  on  several  occasions  the  chairman  called 
attention  to  the  fact  that  among  the  delegates  were  men 
connected  with  the  press,  warning  them  not  to  report  the 
proceedings.2  At  one  time,  in  fact,  an  unofficial  proposal 
was  made  to  forbid  the  passing  of  resolutions  altogether. 
In  1889  a  delegate  moved  that  although  general  questions 
of  policy  might  be  discussed,  no  vote  should  in  future  be 
taken  upon  them.  The  fair  trade  resolution  of  1887,  which 
had  provoked  criticism,  was  referred  to,  and  several  gentle- 
men said  they  wished  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  that  incident. 
The  matter  was  referred  to  the  Council,  which  reported  in 
the  following  year  that  they  had  considered  both  this  sug- 
gestion and  another  that  no  resolution  should  be  placed  upon 
the  agenda  without  the  consent  of  the  Council;  but  that 
they  had  decided  to  recommend  no  change  in  the  rules,  ex- 
cept an  increase  in  the  number  of  days  prior  to  the  Confer- 
ence that  notice  of  a  motion  must  be  sent  in.  They  went 
even  further,  and  advised  that  reporters  for  the  press  should 
be  admitted  to  the  meetings,  which  was  done  forthwith, 
but  are  The  proceedings  at  the  Conference  of  the  National  Union 

ignored.        are  tjmg  qU^e  free      Any  delegate  or  other  member  has  a 

right,  on  giving  the  prescribed  notice,  to  prepare  a  resolu- 
tion on  any  subject,  and  amendments  can  be  moved  upon 
the  spot.  The  result  has  been  a  large  number  of  declara- 
tions of  opinion  on  public  questions,  not  always  consistent 
or  unopposed.     A  resolution  in  favour  of  woman  suffrage 

1  The  Times,  Nov.  24,  1887. 

7  E.g.  Rep.  of  the  Conference  in  October,  1886. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE  NATIONAL  UNION  577 

was  adopted  in  1887,  1891,  and  1894,  and  then  defeated  in 
1897  by  a  substantial  majority.  The  action  of  the  Confer- 
ence is  not  fettered ;  it  is  ignored.  Some  great  nobleman 
presides,  and  one  of  the  party  leaders  usually  addresses  a 
public  meeting  in  the  evening;  but  statesmen  of  the  first 
rank  take  no  part  in  the  regular  proceedings,  which  have, 
therefore,  no  political  weight. 

A  proof  of  the  small  importance  attached  to  the  votes  is  The  Fiscal 
furnished  by  the  history  of  the  movement  for  fair  trade  or  Que8tlon- 
preferential  tariffs.  Resolutions  in  favour  of  such  a  policy 
were  passed  over  and  over  again,  but  they  did  not  bring 
the  question  even  within  the  range  of  active  political  issues 
until  Mr.  Chamberlain  made  his  speech  on  the  subject  to 
his  constituents  at  Birmingham  in  the  spring  of  1903.  The 
meeting  of  the  Conference  at  Sheffield  in  the  following 
October  then  awoke  a  real  interest ;  and  yet  the  proceedings 
at  that  very  meeting  show  how  the  National  Union  shrank 
from  a  decided  stand  at  a  critical  moment.  The  situation 
was  extraordinary.  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  taken  his  stand 
for  a  preferential  tariff  in  favour  of  the  colonies,  including 
a  duty  on  grain,  and  had  recently  resigned  from  the  cabinet 
to  advocate  his  views  more  freely  before  the  country ;  while 
other  ministers  had  resigned  because  they  could  not  aban- 
don the  principle  of  free  trade.  Mr.  Balfour  had  expressed 
no  definite  opinion,  and  was  expected  to  make  a  statement 
on  the  subject  at  a  public  meeting  after  the  close  of  the 
first  day's  session  of  the  Union.  Under  these  circum- 
stances a  resolution  was  placed  upon  the  agenda  which  stated 
the  need  for  reconsidering  the  fiscal  system,  thanked  the 
Prime  Minister  for  instituting  an  inquiry  on  the  subject, 
and  welcomed  the  policy  of  retaliatory  tariffs  he  had  fore- 
shadowed. To  this  Mr.  Chaplin  moved  a  rider  favouring 
explicitly  Mr.  Chamberlain's  views ;  while  Sir  John  Gorst 
stood  ready  to  move  another  against  any  protective  duty 
on  food.  During  the  afternoon  the  fiscal  question  was 
hotly  debated,  and,  judging  by  the  way  the  free  trade 
speakers  were  interrupted,  a  large  majority  of  those  present 


578  THE   GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

must  have  agreed  with  Mr.  Chamberlain's  opinions;  but  in 
order  not  to  pass  a  vote  before  hearing  the  Prime  Minister, 
the  debate  was  adjourned  until  the  following  day. 

In  the  evening  Mr.  Balfour  declared  himself  in  favour  of  a 
retaliatory  tariff  as  a  means  of  commercial  bargaining  with 
other  nations,  but  said  that  a  tax  on  food  was  not  within 
the  limits  of  practical  politics.  When  the  debate  was  re- 
sumed the  next  morning,  Mr.  Chaplin  withdrew  his  rider, 
on  the  ground  that  it  might  look  like  a  resolution  hostile  to 
the  Prime  Minister ;  and  Sir  John  Gorst  said  that  Mr.  Bal- 
four's statement  was  so  far  satisfactory  that  he  should 
make  no  motion.  Thus  the  sharp  differences  of  opinion 
that  seethed  in  the  Conference  were  calmed  on  the  surface, 
and  the  original  resolution  was  adopted  unanimously,  only 
a  couple  of  staunch  free  traders  abstaining  from  the  vote. 
If  ever  an  English  political  organisation  had  a  chance  to 
determine  the  policy  of  the  party  it  was  on  this  occasion,  and 
a  decisive  majority  was  undoubtedly  on  Mr.  Chaplin's  side. 
Yet  this  Conference  which  had  often  voted  for  fair  trade 
when  the  ministers  would  have  none  of  it,  shrank  from  say- 
ing what  it  thought  when  the  ministers  were  undecided.  A 
stronger  proof  could  hardly  be  found  that  the  National 
Union  is  powerless  to  direct  the  policy  of  the  party. 
The  Or-  Although  the  popular  character  of  the  National  Union  was 

RTakf°n  unreal,  as  regards  both  administrative  machinery  and  the 
Down  after  formulation  of  political  opinion,  the  system  worked  well 
so  long  as  the  Conservatives  were  in  the  ascendent,  and 
Captain  Middleton  remained  in  control.  But  he  had  con- 
centrated the  whole  management  so  completely  in  his 
own  hands  that  the  machinery  could  not  run  smoothly  of 
itself  after  he  retired  in  1903.  His  successor,  instead  of 
consulting  the  officers  of  the  Union,  proceeded  as  if  the 
Central  Office  was  all-powerful,  and  thus  lost  touch  with  the 
Union  and  the  local  associations.  Moreover,  the  sub-agents 
in  some  of  the  divisions  were  not  wisely  chosen,  and  caused 
friction  rather  than  harmony  in  the  party.  Complaints 
became  loud,  and  found  expression  at  the  meeting  of  the 


1903. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE   NATIONAL  UNION  579 

Conference  at  Newcastle  in  November,  1905,  where  a  resolu- 
tion was  adopted  "that  in  the  opinion  of  this  Conference 
the  management  of  the  Central  Conservative  Association 
in  London  is  defective,  and  needs  revising;  and  for  this 
purpose  a  popularly  elected  committee  should  be  appointed 
to  cooperate  with  the  Conservative  Whips."  The  principal 
agent  thereupon  resigned ;  and  the  resolution  of  the  Con- 
ference, followed  by  the  disastrous  defeat  at  the  general 
election  in  the  January  following,  led  to  another  reorgan- 
isation of  the  party  in  1906. 

When  a  ministry  that  has  been  in  power  is  beaten  at  the 
polls,  much  of  the  blame  is  always  laid  at  the  door  of  the 
party  organisation,  and  a  cry  is  raised  for  its  reform  upon  a 
more  democratic  basis.  The  movement  on  this  occasion  is 
interesting  enough  to  merit  a  little  study,  because  it  furnishes 
the  latest  illustration  of  the  way  a  demand  for  popular  con- 
trol within  the  party  is  constantly  cropping  up  in  England, 
and  of  the  obstacles  that  it  meets.  As  in  earlier  cases,  the 
party  machinery  was  not  so  largely  responsible  as  some  peo- 
ple asserted.  Still  it  had  fallen  out  of  repair.  Besides  the 
dislocation  at  headquarters,  the  local  associations  had  been 
neglected  in  many  places ;  many  Tory  members  of  Parlia- 
ment having  come  to  feel  that  the  country  was  normally 
Conservative,  and  that  their  own  seats  were  safe,  had 
done  little  or  nothing  to  keep  the  local  organisations  in 
working  order;  while  for  a  time  some  associations  had  not 
dared  to  meet,  knowing  that  any  discussion  would  bring  to 
light  sharp  differences  of  opinion  on  the  question  of  fiscal 
policy. 

The  election  of  January,  1900,  was  no  sooner  over  than  the  changes 
whips  and  the  officers  of  the  National  Union  set  to  work  to 
overhaul  the  party  machinery.  In  the  first  place  they 
created  an  advisory  committee  of  seven  persons,  charged, 
indeed,  with  no  executive  powers,  but  with  the  duty  of  ad- 
vising the  whip,  and  thus  keeping  the  leaders  in  touch  with 
the  currents  of  opinion  in  the  party.  The  committee  con- 
sisted of  the  chief  whip,  three  persons  selected  by  him,  and 


of  1906. 


580  THE   GOVERNMENT   OF   ENGLAND 

three  chosen  by  the  National  Union.1  In  the  second  place 
they  transferred  a  number  of  functions  from  the  Central 
Office  to  the  Union,  together  with  a  staff  of  clerks  to  carry 
them  out,  and  a  grant  of  money  from  the  funds  to  defray  the 
expense ;  the  most  important  function  so  transferred  being 
the  entire  supervision  of  local  organisations,  the  supply  of 
speakers  over  the  country,  and  the  publication  of  party 
literature,  the  last  two  of  these  having  been  hitherto  only  to 
a  very  small  extent  in  the  hands  of  the  Union.  They  worked 
out  also  a  plan  for  changes  in  the  organisation  of  the  National 
Union  itself,  which  were  discussed  and  adopted  at  a  special 
conference  in  London. 
The  Con-  The  Conference  met  on  July  27;   and  after  a  unanimous 

!huy!Ce  m  vo*e  m  favour  of  the  fiscal  policy  of  the  party  leaders  had 
been  passed,  an  attack  was  made  upon  the  Central  Office 
in  the  form  of  a  motion  that  it  ought  to  be  brought  under 
more  effective  popular  control.  The  supporters  of  the 
motion  pointed  out  that  in  the  new  advisory  committee  the 
representatives  of  the  National  Union  were  in  a  minority ; 
that  the  committee  had  authority  merely  to  tender  advice ; 
and  that  even  this  function  did  not  extend  to  party  finance, 
to  the  recommendation  of  candidates  for  Parliament,  or  to 
patronage  of  any  kind.  They  repeated  the  charge,  familiar 
even  before  the  days  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill,  that  the 
party  was  a  democracy  managed  by  aristocratic  methods, 
that  the  leaders  ought  to  trust  it  more  and  suspect  it  less, 
and  that  the  Central  Office  had  not  its  confidence.  In  short 
the  demand  was  the  old  one  for  a  more  popular  control 
of  the  party  machinery.  Sir  Alexander  Acland-Hood,  the 
chief  whip,  met  it  by  stating  frankly  that  the  finances  were  a 
delicate  and  confidential  matter,  which  must  be  in  the  hands 
of  one  man ;  and  —  referring  to  the  new  advisory  body  of 
seven  —  he  said  that  it  would  be  disastrous  to  have  the  party 
managed  by  a  committee.     The  party  could  stand  many 

1  In  the  original  plan  these  were  to  be  chosen  by  the  Council ;  but  at  the 
special  Conference  in  July  it  was  agreed  that  they  should  be  elected  at  the 
annual  Conference. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE  NATIONAL  UNION  581 

things,  but  in  his  judgment  it  could  not  stand  a  caucus. 
Policy  must,  he  said,  be  initiated  by  the  leaders ;  no  leader 
and  no  whip  would  submit  to  anything  else.  Although  the 
demand  for  greater  popular  control  had  been  greeted  with 
applause,  it  was  evident  that  the  prevailing  sentiment  of  the 
meeting  was  with  the  chief  whip,  and  the  motion  was 
finally  withdrawn;  not,  however,  without  an  intimation 
that  it  would  be  renewed  in  the  near  future. 

The  special  Conference  then  went  on  to  debate  and  adopt  The  New 
the  new  set  of  rules,  the  most  important  change  involved  ^"{^ 
being  the  enlargement  of  the  Central  Council  by  the  direct 
representation  thereon  of  the  counties  and  boroughs,  the 
former  in  the  proportion  of  one  member  for  every  fifty 
thousand  voters,  the  latter  in  that  of  one  for  every  twenty- 
five  thousand.  This,  it  was  thought,  would  make  the  body 
more  truly  representative,  by  freeing  it  both  from  the  con- 
trol of  a  small  group  of  men,  and  from  the  tendency  of  every 
annual  Conference  to  choose  persons  whose  names  were 
known  in  the  part  of  the  country  where  the  Conference  hap- 
pened to  meet.1  The  only  other  change  of  importance 
related  to  the  provincial  divisions.  These  were  made  more 
elastic  by  a  provision  that  any  one  or  more  counties  might  be 
erected  into  a  separate  division.  Their  internal  organisa- 
tion was  also  remodelled ;  and  the  arrangement  for  furnish- 
ing sub-agents  of  the  Central  Office  as  their  secretaries, 
free  of  charge,  was  abolished,  partly  because  it  had  ceased  to 

1  Under  the  new  rules  the  Central  Council  —  previously  called  simply  the 
Council  —  consists  of  the  president  and  trustees  of  the  National  Union ; 
the  chief  whip  and  the  principal  agent  of  the  party;  one  representative  for 
every  fifty  thousand  voters,  or  fraction  thereof,  in  each  county,  chosen  at 
the  meeting  of  the  provincial  division  by  the  delegates  of  the  county  thereat; 
one  representative  for  every  complete  twenty-five  thousand  voters  in  each 
parliamentary  borough  that  contains  so  many,  chosen  by  the  central 
council  of  the  borough;  twenty-one  members  elected  annually  by  the 
Conference;  the  chairman,  honorary  secretary,  and  two  representatives 
from  the  National  Society  of  Conservative  Agents;  one  representative  from 
each  of  the  eight  local  associations  of  Conservative  agents;  and  two  repre- 
sentatives apiece  from  the  Association  of  Conservative  Clubs,  the  National 
Conservative  League,  and  the  United  Club.  The  Council  as  thus  enlarged 
contains  nearly  two  hundred  members. 


582 


THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 


Their 

Probable 

Effect. 


work  smoothly,  and  partly  because  many  members  of  the 
Union  felt  that  it  kept  them  in  leading  strings.1  The  dis- 
cussion of  the  divisional  councils  brought  up  an  interesting 
question.  By  the  rules  of  the  National  Union  honorary 
members  had  already  a  right  to  attend  the  Conference  with- 
out votes  ;2  and  by  the  new  rules  they  were  given  full  mem- 
bership in  the  councils  of  the  provincial  divisions.  When 
strenuous  objection  was  made  to  this  as  undemocratic,  a 
delegate  replied  that  if  money  was  the  root  of  all  evil,  it  was 
also  the  source  of  all  power ;  and  that  in  order  to  get  money 
it  was  necessary  to  do  something  for  the  men  who  gave  it. 
The  clause  was  the  subject  of  the  only  vote  at  the  Con- 
ference close  enough  to  require  a  count,  and  the  new  pro- 
vision was  adopted  by  148  to  103.  In  other  respects  the 
existing  rules,  though  much  changed  in  detail,  were  not 
altered  in  their  essential  features.3 

The  new  arrangements  have  increased  the  functions  of  the 
National  Union,  while  the  enlargement  of  the  Council  will, 
no  doubt,  change  its  method  of  work,  and  may  possibly  make 
it  more  useful  as  an  organ  for  interpreting  the  feelings  of 
the  party.  But  it  is  highly  improbable  that  these  things 
will  cause  any  substantial  change  in  the  relation  of  the 
organisation  to  the  leaders  in  Parliament.  There  are  still 
several  means  of  controlling  the  Union,  and  preventing  it 
from  getting  out  of  hand.  One  of  these  is  furnished  by  the 
party  war  chest,  or  campaign  fund,  over  which  Lord  Ran- 
dolph Churchill  tried  in  vain  to  get  a  large  share  of  control. 
It  is  disbursed  by  the  Central  Office,  and  its  distribution  holds 
many  constituencies  in  a  state  of  more  or  less  dependence. 


1  Opinion  on  this  question  was  by  no  means  unanimous.  One  or  two 
divisions  wanted  to  retain  the  former  system  on  the  score  of  economy,  and 
the  chief  whip  agreed  to  allow  them  to  do  so  for  a  time.  2  Rule  V. 

3  By  the  new  rules  the  Conference  consists  of  the  officers  of  the  Union,  and 
the  members  of  the  Central  Council;  of  the  honorary  members  of  the  Union, 
who  have,  however,  no  vote;  of  the  Conservative  members  of  both  Houses 
of  Parliament;  of  the  officers  of  each  provincial  division;  of  the  chairman, 
the  paid  agent,  and  three  representatives  of  the  central  association  in  each 
constituency;  of  one  representative  for  each  subscribing  association  or 
club;   and  of  twenty  representatives  apiece  from  Scotland  and  Ireland. 


THE  CONSERVATIVE  NATIONAL  UNION 


583 


Then  again,  even  in  the  last  reorganisation,  the  recommen- 
dation of  candidates  for  Parliament  to  places  seeking  for 
them  has  been  retained  under  the  exclusive  control  of  the 
Central  Office,  instead  of  being  allowed  to  pass  into  the  hands 
of  the  National  Union  ;  and  this  is  in  itself  no  small  source  of 
power.  As  a  further  security  against  capture  of  the  Union, 
the  practice  was  established  in  1889  of  changing  the  chair- 
man of  the  Council  every  year,  so  that  no  one  could  acquire 
influence  enough  to  be  dangerous.  Moreover,  fidelity  upon 
the  Council  has  often  brought  its  reward  in  the  form  of  a 
seat  in  Parliament,  or  of  a  baronetcy.  So  far  these  various 
precautions  have  been  effective.  Since  1884  no  one  has 
attempted  to  get  control  of  the  Union  for  his  personal 
advantage.  Certainly  the  capture  of  the  organisation  has 
been  made  more  difficult  than  it  was  formerly,  but  it  would 
be  rash  to  predict  that  it  is  altogether  impossible.  Nor 
would  it  be  safe  to  say  that  the  Union  will  never  embarrass 
the  leaders  by  laying  down  a  definite  course  of  policy  and 
insisting  that  the  leaders  should  adopt  it ;  this,  however, 
never  has  happened,  and  there  appears  no  more  reason  to 
expect  it  in  the  future  than  in  the  past. 

The   National   Unions  both  in   England   and   Scotland  ' 


The  Caucus 
is  Largely 
a  Sham. 


1  The  Union  hitherto  described  covers  England  and  Wales  alone,  although 
the  Scotch  and  Irish  organisations  arc  entitled  to  send  to  the  Conference 
twenty  delegates  apiece.     North  of  the  Tweed  there  is  a  separate  National 
Union  of  Conservative  Associations  for  Scotland.     It  is  a  copy  of  the  English 
body,  but  except  for  the  twenty  delegates  is  entirely  independent.     It  has  a 
conference  which  adopts  resolutions  as  ineffective  as  those  passed  farther 
south.     It  has  six  territorial  divisions;   but,  owing  to  the  fact  that  Scotland 
is  in  the  main   Liberal,  several  of  these  are   not  very  vigorous,  and  do  not 
raise  money  enough  to  have  councils  of  their  own.     All  the  divisions  are   The  Scotch 
very  much  under  the  control  of  the  Central  Council  of  the  Scotch  Union,    National 
to  which  they  send  their  reports  for  approval.     They  are,  indeed,  largely   Union. 
ornamental. 

But  if  the  National  Union  for  Scotland  is  independent  of  the  English 
Union  it  is  by  no  means  free  from  the  influence  of  the  whip's  office.  The 
party  agent  for  Scotland,  who  has  a  right  to  attend — although  without  a 
vote  —  all  meetings  of  the  central  and  divisional  councils  and  their  com- 
mittees, is  appointed  by  the  principal  agent  in  London,  and,  like  the  secre- 
taries of  the  divisions  in  England,  is  practically  his  subordinate.  In  this 
way  the  whip  and  the  principal  agent  .acting  through  the  agent  for  Scotland 
and  the  local  agents,  and  fortified  by  subsidies  at  election  times,  maintain 
a  real  control  over  the  whole  party  organisation  throughout  the  kingdom. 


584         THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  ENGLAND 

have  very  important  functions,  which  they  perform  with 
great  efficiency ;  but  ihey  are  really  electioneering  bodies. 
Their  work  is  to  promote  local  organisation,  to  arouse  in- 
terest, to  propagate  Conservative  doctrines,  and  this  they 
do  exceedingly  well  by  means  of  departments  for  the  publi- 
cation of  party  literature  and  for  providing  lecturers.  The 
English  Union  has  established  also  a  political  library  in 
London,  which  collects  a  large  amount  of  information,  in- 
cluding the  speeches  and  records  of  all  the  leading  men  in 
public  life.  But  as  organs  for  the  popular  control  of  the 
party,  for  formulating  opinion,  and  for  ascertaining  and 
giving  effect  to  the  wishes  of  the  rank  and  file,  these  bodies 
are  mere  pretences.  Both  the  National  Liberal  Federation 
and  the  National  Union  of  Conservative  Associations  have 
been  sources  of  anxiety  to  the  party  leaders,  but  for  the  time, 
at  least,  both  have  been  made  harmless.  The  process  in  each 
case  has  not  been  the  same,  although  the  results  are  not 
unlike.  Both  are  shams,  but  with  this  difference  that 
the  Conservative  organisation  is  a  transparent,  and  the 
Liberal  an  opaque,  sham. 


,  I 


THE  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

Santa  Barbara 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW. 


Series  9482 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

llll  Ill  II    II 


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